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Proprietory Esto:i;:.pel and the Family Hane 
This dissertation poses the question whether the doctrine of proprietory 
estoppel can provide the basis for recognising a range of rights in relation 
to the family home. This question also necessitates a consideration of the 
doctrine of constructive trusts and the a6quisition of rights under the 
Limitation Acts. 
The dissertation proceeds to consider whether the nature of the relationship 
between parties to a dispute concerning the family home constitutes a heavily 
determining factor in the outcome of that dispute. It will emerge that in 
practice the doctrine of proprietory estoppel operates differently in respect 
of each of three broad categories of licence relationships:-
i) Licence granted by resident family menber _ 
In this first category both parties are members of the same houshold 
who jointly occupy the property as their family home. In this context 
the term 'family'_ is used in a very broad sense. It includes not only 
relationships of blood and affinity but also all . those relationships 
where there is interdependence and a common concern by the 
participants for each other's welfare. The shared values of the 
participants in these relationships and the meaning they attach to 
each other's conduct may wel 1 be similar to those shared values and 
meanings which exist between members of the family in its stricter 
legal sense. The concept of 'family' is as much a functional notion 
as a descriptive term. This broader concept of the family is more 
akin to the t erm 'household'. 
ii) Licence granted by non-resident family member 
iii) 
In the second category the licensor and licensee are members of the 
same family but do not share the sarre house. 
Licence granted by a stranger 
In the third category the licensee and his family have been granted 
occupation rights by someone who is not a member of their family. 
Since the decision of the House of Lords in Gissing v Gissing it has generally 
been accepted that the elements necessary to found an implied trust (whether 
resulting or constructive) of the family home are limited in scope. The long-
standing equitable doctrine of proprietary estoppel has therefore been 
revitalised, in an attempt to fill the gap left by the decision in Gissing. The 
theory of proprietory estoppel aims to avert the unconscionable outcome which 
would otherwise result where one party has been encouraged by the holder of a 
legal title to alter his position to his detriment in the expectation of some 
entitlement in the property concerned. 
This dissertation contains an analysis of the case law of England, Northern 
Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, Australia and New Zealand, for the purpose of 
considering which forms of unconscionable conduct in the familial context are 
sufficient to give rise to the equity of proprietary estoppel. These 
jurisdictions have been selected because in each, proprietory estoppel has been 
used as a means of protecting rights in the family home. Each of the selected 
jurisdictions has recognised the limitations of the doctrine of constructive 
trusts in achieving that end. Canadian case law is also analysed to illuminate 
the relationship between the doctrine of proprietory estoppel and the doctrine 
of constructive tru~ts. It is noticeable that the Canadian courts have 
effectively ceased to use the doctrine of proprietary estoppel in the family 
home context, having replaced the doctrine by a creative use of the constructive 
trust. 
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INTRODUCTION 
........................ -........................... --.-·····-· 
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century 
there has been a growing legislative concern to protect the 
occupation of those members of society who are not owner-
occupiers of their homes. 1 A significant number of 
statutes have been enacted to achieve that end. 2 
Homelessness is regarded by legislators , the judiciary and 
by society at large as a dangerous and deplorable state of 
affairs. 
of society. 
It is dangerous in that it affects the stability 
It is deplorable in that it is a basic right 
of every human being to be housed. 3 Lord Scarman has 
compellingly argued4 that homelessness is a "critical 
element of the social conditions which provide a breeding 
ground for crime, marital breakdown, child abuse and 
neglect", and that · homelessness "destroys man's chance of 
developing and maintaining stable human relationships". In 
Lord Scarman's view 
1 According to the General Household Survey 61 per cent of 
residential property in England is owner-occupied (General Household Survey 861, preliminary results for 1985 p 6). 2 In Horsford Investments Ltd v Lambert ( 1976] Ch 39 at 52 Scarman LJ emphasised, for instance that the policy of the Rent Acts was to "redress the balance of advantage enjoyed in a world of housing shortage by the landlord over those 
who have to rent their homes." See now:- Rent Act 1977; Protection from Eviction Act 1977; Housing Act 1980; Housing Act 1985; Housing and Planning Act 1986; Matrimonial Causes Act 1973; Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976; Matrimonial Homes Act 1983 . See also National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth 
............... --.................... _ ........... .. [1965] AC 1175; Honore, The ...... Quest .. for .. _.s_ecur.i,.ty,. (The Hamlyn Lectures 1982); Murphy and Clark, Th .. ~ ... -f..9.:.l.!1..:!:.f.: .. Y.: ....... H..9..1.!1..~., (Sweet and Maxwell, 1983); (1983) 3 Ox Jour Leg Stud 425. 3 See G..tJJ.9_~ v Y:r.:i ... !..1 .. ~.4 ....... Kt~ .. i.9.:.9..l.!1. ( 19 8 6 ) Th .. ~ . -J'.A!l:1 .. ~ .. ~.. 2 9 November (European Law Report Case No 13/1984/85/132 where article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights was considered. 4 The Times 27 December 1986, Lord Scarman is President of the United Kingdom Council for the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless 198"7. 
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shelter is a human need ranking in priority 
with food and water, and a home is an 
essential condition of civilized life . Once 
these truths are seen, homelessness will be 
recognized for what it is: an affront to 
human dignit y and the denial of a basic human 
right. 
I THE SCOPE ...... OF . .. THE .. DI SSERTAT.I ON 
The focus of this dissertation is fi x ed upon one 
special group of people who remain at risk of finding 
themsel v es without a home . This group comprises essentially 
those who occupy property under some informal residential 
arrangement with a legal titl e holder. The dissertation 
confines itself to those persons who have a merely personal 
or non- c ontractual permission t o li ve in their home . Such 
oc cupat i on i s extremel y vulnera ble sinc e the permi ssion 
which underlies it may be r e voked at an y time provided t hat 
reasonable notice is given . s The focus of th i s 
dissertation, thus fixed , permits a distinction to be drawn 
between different c ategories of relationship . 
A Spo usa.l .... .. ..re l at.ion.sh i .ps 
I n En gland t h e Matr.imonial Homes Act 198 3 has 
amel iora ted t h e di ff iculti e s t o a limi ted e x tent for marri e d 
pers ons . Spou se s who live in p rope r t y owned by thei r 
·---···-···--·-·-~--········· ........................................ , .. _ 
5 See Robs o n v Hallett [1967] 2 QB 939; A.±.9.:.:i.:.!l. v .~!'?.:t .. :t.m.~.I . 
. 9...± . .13.:-.. !'.'~ . ..1.. .... 2! u t .. ~.h .. ~.~.9: ........... ~.P.9.-........ --9..9. [ 18 9 4 ] 2 Ch 4 3 7 ; Arms. t r on g. v 
.~heppard. and ... ... Short ....... L.td [ 1959] 2 QB 384; E ....... & ..... L .... Be.rg ....... Homes. 
~!:9: v Q.~ ( 1979) 253 EG 473, 
2 
partners are, of course, protected for the duration of their 
marri age , 6 The 1983 Act has, however, no application once 
a marriage has been legally terminated . Unless the court 
awards a property transfer under divorce legislation,7 the 
occupier's existing rights are rendered extremely 
vulnerable. Furthermore the 1983 Act does not cover de 
facto_ relationships or even married persons who have been 
granted a licence by a third party. 
B O_ther ..... re.l.at.i.onsh.ips 
Al though it has been regularly argued that those who 
live in a d~ ....... f..c.1..g .. :t:..9.. marital relationship should have the same 
rights as those enjoyed by married partners,s little 
attention has been paid to the protection of persons who 
live in other types of relationships. 9 
C Relat_ionsh_ips ..... and ..... res.i.denti.al ....... arrangements 
The residential arrangements examined in this 
dissertation arise in three different situations which all 
have their origins in some form of licence. 
6 See Hall v King ( 1987) T.h .. ~ ....... T.t.lll.~.~ 24 June. 7 See Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 24. 8 See i_nter ...... al.i.a Harpum, (1982) 2 Ox Jour Leg Stud 277; Blake, ( 1982) 12 Fam Law 13 at 25 Zuckerman, (1980) 96 LQR 248; Law Reform Commission (Tasmania) Report on obligations arising from de facto relationships (1977). 9 See Tennant, (1980] CLJ 31, where it is argued that "the significant criterion for what is typically 'familial' should n ot be sexual activity (and certainly not the form it takes) but rather interdependence, mutual caring and permanence." See also The Times 28 January 1987 p 17 where the Reverend BE Marbert in a letter to The Times called for a recognition of the value and dignity of friendship and the protection of such relationships . 
3 
i) L_ic.ence ..... granted ..... bY ..... res.ident fam_ily member 
In the first category of case, both licensor and 
licensee are members of the same household who jointly 
occupy the property as their family home. In this context 
the term 'family' is used in a very broad sense. It 
includes not only relationships of blood and affinity but 
also all those relationships where there is interdependence 
and a common concern by the participants for each other's 
welfare. 10 The shared values of the participants in these 
relationships and the meaning they attach to each other's 
conduct may well be similar to those shared values and 
meanings which exist between members of the family in its 
1 OThe American courts have redefined the term 'family' for 
the purpose of determining what relationships comprise a 
family for the purposes of zoning regulations. 'Family', 
in that context, has been held to embrace the concept of the 
household. The decisions recognise that. communal 
relationships which are not familial in the strict sense of 
the word nevertheless "achieve many of the personal and 
practical needs served by traditional family living." Ci_ty 
of Santa Barbara v Adamson 610 P 2d 436 at 438 (1980). See 
also C_ity .. o.f. ... Whi_te ..... P.la.ins v Ferrai_ol .. i 313 NE 2d 756 at 758; 
Gray, Elements ....... o.f ..... Land ...... Law, p 1071. See also Rent Act 1977 
Schedule I, Part I, Para 2 and Housing Act 1985, section 87 
which provide for statutory succession to a protected 
tenancy by a member of the original tenant's family . The 
English courts have refused to widen the meaning of the term 
'family' to - include friends living in a platonic 
re 1 at ions h i p ( see 9 .. ~.!: .. ~ .. g_~ ....... ..l: .. !: .. 9..P~ .. !:.!- i e_§ ........ 9..A. v .9..P.!=l: .. !: .. !: .. c:I; .. !: .. !: [ 1 9 7 9 ] 1 
WLR 928) but have restricted it for the most part to 
relationships of blood and affinity . A limited 
recognition, as familial, has been granted to those 
relationships resembling marriage. Couples living as if 
marri ed have been granted statutory tenancies ( see Dys_on 
R.2J9:_tn .. ~ .. §._ L \9.:. v Fox [ 1 9 7 6 1 QB s o 3 , . c f H .. ~JP..Y v R?.: .. f...f e. .. r. .. !:.Y (1979] 1 WLR 13; Harrogat.e .... _BC v Simps_on (1984) 17 HLR 
205.) An unsuccessful attempt was made to widen the 
definition of 'member of family' in the Housing Bill 1980. 
(see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official 
Report Col 675, 968 28 February 1980). See also Salter v 
Lask [1925] 1 KB 584 at 587 where Salter J was prepared to 
accept the possibility that the t erm 'family' could e xtend 
to members of the same household. 
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stricter legal sense. This concept of 'family' recognises 
that 'family' is as much a functional notion as a 
descriptive term. This broader concept of the family is 
more akin to the term 'household'.11 
ii) Licence,,,, __ granted ...... bY ..... non_-_res_ident ... ...family ...... member 
In the second category of case, the licensor and 
licensee are members of the same family but do not share the 
same house. 
iii) Licence ..... gran_ted ... by_ __ a,, ___ s_tranger 
In the third category of case, the licensee and his 
family have been granted occupation rights by someone who is 
not a member of their family. 
11see Bradney-, ( 1979) 9 Fam Law at 244. In :1.i?-~.~.P. .. ~.~.?-........ tl..1::1 .. t.-µ_~J .. 
Insurance Co v Bell (1957) 5 CR 581 at 584 Rand J defined 
household as "a collective group living in a house, 
acknowledging the authority of a head, the members of which, 
with few exceptions, are bound by marri~ge, blood, affinity 
or other bond, between whom there is an intimacy and by whom 
there is felt a concern with and an interest in the life of 
all that gives it a unity. It may, for example, include 
such persons as domestic servants and distant relatives 
permanently residing within it. To some degree they are 
all admitted and submit to the collective body, its unity 
and its conditions, particularly that of the general 
discipline of the family head. They do not share fully in 
the more restricted family intimacy or interest or concern, 
but they participate to a substantial degree in the general 
lif.e of the household and form part of it," 
5 
II THE DOCTR.INE_.OF ...... PROPRIETARY .ESTOPPEL 
This dissertation poses the question whether the 
doctrine of proprietary estoppel can provide the basis for 
recognising a range of rights in relation to the family 
home, This question also necessitates a consideration of 
the doc t rine of constructive trusts 12 and the acquisition of 
rights under the Limitation Acts,13 
The dissertation proceeds to consider whether the 
nature of the relationship between parties to a dispute 
concerning the family home constitutes a heavily determining 
factor in the outcome of that dispute. 1 4 It will emerge 
that in pract i ce the doctrine of proprietary estoppel 
operates differentially in respect of each of the three 
broad categories of licence relationships outlined above. 
For instance, the rights granted in the family home may 
differ in accordance with whethe r the licensor is a member 
o f the licensee's family or a stranger. 
Since the decision of the House of Lords in Gi.ss.ing v 
g_t_ss.,i.ng 1 s it has generally been accepted that the elements 
necessary to found a constructive trust of the family home 
are onerous to establish. 1 6 The long-standing equitable 
doctrine of proprietary estoppe111 has 
12 See Chapter Seven. 
13See Chapter Six. 
14 See Wade, (1980) 11 Fed L Rev at 346. 
15(1971] AC 886. 
16 See Chapter Seven. 
therefore been 
17 The doctrine dates back to the 16th century, see, e.g., 
B..':!!!.!..!! .. i. v :f .. ~..r. .. r._~ .. f. .. :?.. ( 1 7 11 ) G i lb E q 8 5 , 2 5 ER 5 9 ; ~ .. ?.:.~ .. t. ........ I.P.:9.:.t~ 
£2. v Vincent (1740) 2 Atk 83 , 26 ER 451 A..t...t..::::.G~.r.:i. v Bal1io.l 
College Oxford (1744) 9 Mod 407, 52 ER 538 ; Sti!es v Cowper 
(1748) 3 Atk 692, 28 ER 1198. 
6 
revitalised, in an attempt to fill the gap left by the 
decision in Gi_s_s_i_ng. 1 s The theory of proprietary estoppel 
aims to avert the unconscionable outcome which would 
otherwise result where one party has been encouraged by the 
holder of a legal title t o alter his position to his 
detriment in the expectation of some entitlement in the 
property concerned. In this dissertation the legal title 
holder who has allegedly encouraged an expectation will be 
referred to as the 'representor' even where the court finds 
the allegation unproven. The party who claims to have an 
expectation will be referred to as the 'representee'. 
This dissertation contains an analysis of the case law 
of England, Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, 
Australia and New Zealand, for the purpose of considering 
which forms of unconscionable conduct in the familial 
context are sufficient to give rise to the equity of 
pr oprietary estoppel. These jurisdiction3 have been 
selected because in each proprietary esto~pel has been used 
as a means of protecting rights in the family home . Each 
of the selected jurisdictions has recognised the limitations 
of the doctrin1::- of constructive trusts in achieving that 
2nd . Canad ian case law is a lso analy sed to illuminate the 
relationship between the doctrine of proprietary estoppel 
and the doctrine of constructive trusts . It is noticeable 
that the Canadian courts have effectively ceased to use the 
d octri n e of p roprietary estoppel in the family home contex t , 
.... ._ .. -............. ________ .. ,, .. _ ,_, ......................................................... . 
18 See the observations of Browne-Wi l kinson LJ in Walker v 
.. -............................. . 
W:.~1~.~r. (Unreported, Court o f Appeal 12 April 1984). 
7 
having replaced the doctrine by a creative use of the 
constructive trust,19 
III THE __ .. PERSPECT.IVES .... OF ..... THE .... .. DISSERTATION 
that 
Karl Llewellyn has urged legal researchers to recognise 
finding out what the judges say is but the 
beginning of your task. You will have to 
take what they say and compare it with what 
they do. Yo u will have to see whether what 
they say matches with what they do. You 
will have to be distrustful of whether they 
themselves know (any better than other men) 
the ways of their own doing, and of whether 
they describe it accurately, even if they 
know it. 2 0 
An attempt is made throughout this dissertation to take 
into account Llewellyn' s exhortation to discove r not only 
the v erbalised ratio of a decision but also the latent 
reasons for that decision . Latent judicial reasons are of 
no less importance than the patent reasons given by the 
court for reaching its decision . They may even be of 
greater importance in certain circumstances. Frank , an 
19 See Chapter Seven. 
2
°K N Llewellyn, Bramble Bush (1930), p 14. See also Otto KE;thn Freund, Labour and the Law, ( 1972), p 60; ( 1985) 101 LQR 455. 
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American judge and one of the leaders of the American 
movement of realist jurisprudence 2 1 recognised that 
opinions, then, disclose but little of how 
judges come to their · conclusions. The 
opinions are often ex ....... .Po.s.t ...... ..facto; they are 
censored expositions. 
eviscerated expositions 
To study those 
as the principal 
bases of future judicial action is to delude 
oneself. It is far more unwise than it 
would be for a botanist to assume that plants 
are merely what appears above the ground, or 
for an anatomist to content himself with 
scrutinising the outside of the body.22 
The exposition of both types of reasons is essential if 
members of families are to be helped to predict whether 
litigation should be undertaken to protect their rights in 
the home.23 
21 See Friedmann, Lega.l ............ Theory: 5th Ed 1967 p 292 ff. 
Llewellyn, (1930-31) 44 Harv L Rev 1222 .. 
22 Frank, (1932) 26 ILL L Rev 645. See also Frank, (1929) 
14 Cornell LQ 274; Hutcheson (1932) 7 Tulane L Rev 1. 
23 According to Llewellyn what judges do about disputes is as 
much the law as the legal ratio for the decision, ~ .. !: .. ?.:.!I.1.!?.J .. E?.. 
!3ul?,.h. ( 1930) pp 8, 39. See also O Holmes, T..h .. E?. ........ ?...~.t..h ........ .9. .. f. ... _J:JtE?.. 
I.:,_~ .. li , in g .. 9.11 .. E?. .. C?. .. t..~.9: ......... 1 .. E?. .. g.~J ____ J?. .. ~.P.~£..~ ( 1 9 2 0 ) p 16 7 . Latent 
reasons for a decision are often contained in judicial dicta 
which are totally irrelevant to the legal ratio of the case. 
Such dicta, if made public, may have more impact on societal 
consciousness of what is law than any formal statement of 
the legal rules, see Kantorowicz, ( 1937) 53 LQR at 326 
Savigny and the Historical School; (1984) 272 EG 1295. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
___ ........................ -·--·-
THE __ ,CONCEPT OF PROPRIETARY .... ESTOPPEL 
Proprietary estoppel is an old and well-established 
concept, 1 al though the term 'proprietary estoppel' was not 
in common use until the second half of the twentieth 
century. The expression 'estoppel by encouragement or 
acquiescence' was by far the more usual term for the 
concept. 2 
In this chapter the objectives and the development of 
the estoppel concept will be explored, prior to a 
consideration in the following chapters of its operation in 
the context of the family home. 
I OBJECTIVES OF THE DOCTRINE OF PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL ........ -...... -................................................................................................. - ... -........... -...... ............ ,_ .. _.,_ .................................................................................................................................. . 
One of the fundamental principles of equity is the 
prev ention of unconscionable dealings in relation to land, 3 
The doctrine of proprietary estoppel aims at the prevention 
of two specific t ypes of unconscionability . First, it aims 
1 See inter ...... a.l.i.a, s.ne.11 ... 's ..... Pr.i.nc.i.:Q.les ..... of ...... Eq_ui.ty ( 2 8th Ed 1982) p 558; Spencer Bower and Turner, The Law Relating to [~toppel. bY: ..... Re.pres.entat.ion, (3rd Ed 19.77) p 283 ff; Goff 
and Jones, The Law of Restitution, (3rd Ed 1986) p 138 ff. 
The principle of estoppel seems to be so fundamental that it 
is found in systems of law . in primitive society ( see I M 
Lewis, S0ci.al ....... Anthro:2..olo$_L i .n ..... Pers.pecti ve, ( Penguin 19 7 6) p 185) . 
2 Spencer Bower and Turner continue to use this term to 
prevent any confusion between the doctrines of promissory 
estoppel and proprietary estoppel ( see Spencer Bower and 
Turner, The __ Law _._Rela ti11L to .. _ EstQ_ppe.l ._bY ........ Representa ti.on , (3rd Ed 1977) p 283 ff). 
3 See G .. r..~_h..l.?. v Ar..:µ,P.-.. ...... P.G. [ 1976] Ch 179 at 187 P .. ~..F.. Lord Denning MR . 
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at the prevention of detriment to the representee who alters 
his position on the faith of a representation concerning the 
acquisition of rights in or over land which has been made to 
him by the legal owner the representor,4 Second, it aims 
to prevent the representor profiting if he reneges on his 
representation. s The representor might gain in two ways if 
equity did not intervene. First, he would obtain the 
benefi t of retaining a right which he had purported to grant 
to the representee. Second, he might also benefit from the 
representee's alteration of position,6 If, for instance, 
the representee has expended money on the property, the 
representor would clearly profit from that expenditure. 
The representee may , however, alter his position by working 
without wages for, or by taking care of, the representor. 
Such acts would equally benefit the representor,7 
The doctrine of proprietary estoppel thus provides an 
exception to the general rule that a person expending money 
on the property of another acquires neither rights in that 
property nor a right of compensation.a 
There is considerable uncertainty about the nature of 
the equitable right which the representee acquires because 
of the intervention of equity, In this dissertation the 
4 See .Grundt v Grea t ........ Boulder ..... .Pro_pertY ... Gol.d ....... M.i_nes. __ Lt_d ( 19 3 7) 
59 CLR 641 at 674; Thompson v Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507 at 
547. 
5 See Ramsden v Dyson (1866) LR I HL 129 at 140 . . 
6 Not all alterations of position will benefit the 
representor. See post at 91 
7 See Chapter Three. 
8 See Ramsde.n v Dys.on ( 1866) LR I HL 129 at 141 per Lord 
Cranworth LC; s.t.i.l.well v S,,imps.on ( 1983) 133 NLJ 894; 
~.c.ke v s.cott.i.s_h ........ I.mpe.rial_ ....... I.nsurance ..... co ( 1886) 34 Ch D 234 
at 248; s.avva v Costa __ and .... HaE_Lmode_ ....)nves.tments ....... Ltd ( 1981) 
131 NLJ 1114 . 
11 
right will be referred to as the 'inchoate equity' prior to 
the court hearing. The right will be referred to as the 
'satisfied equity' after the court hearing which grants the 
representee a remedy. Where it is unnecessary to 
distinguish the 'inchoate equity' from the 'satisfied 
equity' the right will be referred to as the 'equity of 
estoppel' . 9 
Unlike that other form of equitable estoppel 
promissory estoppel 10 - proprietary estoppel confers a right 
of action on the representee.11 Moreover, in the case of 
proprietary estoppel there need be no pre-ex isting 
contractual relationship between the parties12 and the 
remedy granted by the court is very much at the discretion 
9 The nature of the 'equity of estoppel' will be considered in Chapter Five . 
10 The doctrine of promissory estoppel is discussed in 9.!1..~J.t'. .§. __ J?..!: .. tr.!:9. .. i.PJ.~.!:5. .... _.9..f ...... gq~J.!:Y., ( 2 8 th Ed 198 2 } p 5 6 6 • See 
also Spencer Bower and Turner, T.h..E::! .... ~.!=l: .. if ...... R..E::!.J9.:t..J.P. .. g ...... t...9. .. ~E.>.!: . .9.PP.~.:l P..Y ... .R.E:=..P.!: .. E:=. .. !:5..~.P. .. t...?-.. !:J . .<?)J, ( 3rd Ed 1977) p 367. Attempts have been made · to merge the doctrines of proprietary estoppel and promissory estoppel into a single equitable doctrine ( see for example Ama.lgamated .... ..I.nves.tments .... and ..... PropertY ....... co ........ Ltd v Texas ..... co.mme.rce ..... I.nternati.onal .... Bank . . _Ltd [ 1982] QB 84 at 122 per Lord Denning MR). The courts do not always distinguish 
clearly between the two doctrines, the term promissory 
estoppel is occasionally used when it is clear that the doctrine under -consideration is that of proprietary estoppel ( see for example 9:.!:.J.K.f..A.!: .. l:1. .. §. v ~.tJ:: . .:l .. t?-.1.1.1..:?.. ( 1978) 248 EG 947; Maharaj v Jai ....... Chand [ 1986] 3 All ER 107, in neither of these cases was there a pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties). 11 See Crabb v Arun DC [ 1976] Ch 179 at 187; Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] QB 84 at 105; Thomas v Thomas [1956] NZLR 785 at 793; Jacks.on v eras.by (no· .. ····:f)···"·[19fi'fr····2T SASR 280 at 287; Jackson (1965) 81 LQR 223 at 245; Thompson [1983] CLJ 257. Cf Spencer Bower and Turner, The Law Relating to 
,Es.toppel .. _ .. bY: ......... Repres.entat.ion, ( 3rd Ed 1977) pp 303, 384; 9,ullen v Cullen [1962] IR at 268 . 
i"'isee Snell ... ' s ....... Pr.i.nc.i_ples ....... of ._.Equ.i.ty ( 28th Ed 198 2) p 5 5 5 ff; tl.oli.dar. ....... I.nns ....... .I.nc. v Broadhead (1974) 232 EG 951 at 1087; 8..:!:_<::!hes v Ho~ben [1986] 1 Qd R 315 at 339. 
12 
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of the court, The doctrine , the ref ore, has a much wider 
application than that of promissory estoppel. 
I I FORMULAT.I ONS ...... OF ...... THE .. _.DOCTR.I NE ...... OF ... PRO PR.I.ET ARY ...... ES TOPPEL 
A The .. l.aw ..... Pr.ior ....... to .... Taylors. Fashions_Ltd ..... ..V ...... L.i,verpoo.l 
Victor.i.a ...... Trus.tee.s .... Co ...... Ltd 
The early cases on proprietary estoppel were 
predominantly concerned with fact situations where the 
conduct of the legal title holder was passive . 1 3 These 
cases raised the question whether passive conduct could be 
interpreted as encouragement to the representee to believe 
that he had obtained rights in or over the legal title 
holder's property or whether his mistake was merely 
unilateral. 14 
i) Lo_rd ..... Cranworth .. ' ... s .... ..f ormul.a t.i.on.}.n .... Rams.den .. ..v ..... Dyso.n 
In Ramsden v Dys.on, 1 5 Lord Cran worth explained the 
doctrine of proprietary estoppel in the following terms 
if a stranger begins to build on my land, 
suppos-ing it to be his own, and, I, 
perceiving his mistake, abstain from setting 
him right, and leave him to persevere in his 
error, a court of equity will not allow me 
··--- .... _ ,,,, _______ .. ,_,, .......... ,._,_ ,,_,,,,,,, .. ,_ ... , ........ .. 
1 3 See, for example, P...?.:!:1.!l. v §.P.\!£.£ .. t~ .. r.. ( 180 2) 
94; De Bussche v Alt (1878) Ch D 286. 
7 Ves 231, 32 ER 
1 4 A genuine unilateral mistake on 
representee cannot give rise to a 
estoppel. The mistake must result 
the representor. 
the part of the 
plea of proprietary 
from encouragement by 
15 (1866) LR I HL 129. 
13 
afterwards to assert my title to the land on 
which he had expended money on the 
supposition that the land was his own . It 
considers that when I saw the mistake into 
which he had fallen, it was my duty to be 
active and to state my adverse title; and 
that it would be dishonest in me to remain 
wholly impassi v e on such an occasion, in 
order afterwards to profit by the mistake 
which I might have prevented . 16 
According to Lord Cranworth, two further requirements 
were necessary before the legal title holder would be bound 
b y his passi v e conduct . Fj rst , the person building on the 
land had to believe that he was building on land over which 
he had obtained rights . Second, the legal title holder had 
to know that the land in truth belonged t o him and not to 
the person e x pendi ng mone y ,17 
ii ) F.r Y ...... J .. ' ... s ... Jc::i.:r::~~.1 ..9:.:f::.t...<?..n in Willmott v Barber 
In Y.{ .. i .1J~<?. .. :t. .. t. v ~.?-E.P. .. ~ .. :r::. 1 s Fry J att e mpted to condense the 
requir eme n t s of propr ietary e stoppel into fi v e probanda . 
Th ese probanda were distilled from a line of nineteenth 
cen tury decisions which were primarily concerned with 
int e rpreting whether a mistaken belief had been encouraged 
b y the ac quiescen ce of the legal title holder . 1 9 
--.. ··--····-.. ·--···--·-·····--·············-· ............................... -·-·---16 Ibid a t 14 0 . 17 I bi d . 
18 (1880) 1 5 Ch D 9 6 a t 140. 
F.irst , 
1 9 Ramsden v Dy.son had been cited to the court in Wi..1 .. 1.mott v Barber. 
·--....... -......... __ .. .. 
14 
the claimant of the 'equity of estoppel ' must have made a 
mi stake as to h i s legal rights concerning the property in 
dis p ute . ~econd, the claimant must have expended money or 
done some other act on the faith of his mistaken belief. 
Thi r d , the possess o r of the le~al right must have known of 
.............. _,._ ........ .. 
hi s own right which is inconsistent with the right wh ich the 
c l aimant maintains that he has obtained . Fo.urth., the 
possessor of the legal right must know of the claimant ' s 
mistaken belief in his right . .f..tf...t..h., the possessor of the 
legal right must have passi v el y or actively encourag ed the 
claimant of the equity t o expend mone y or otherwise to alter 
his position. 
ii i ) Re s .. t r i .c t i .v e ..... J .mpac t ..... o.f. .... t h .e ... ea r .l .Y ... ...f o rm u 1. a t .i .ons. 
These earl y formulations of the doctrine of proprietary 
estop pel were unhappil y to stultify subsequent de v elopments 
of the doctrine. The Willmot t v Barbe .. r. pr.obanda were no 
mo re than one manifestation of the doctrine, yet the y have 
been regarded as the definiti v e statement of the d o ctrine 
itself . The probanda have been regarded as essential 
r equirements in all cases of proprietary estoppel a nd not 
on l y in c ases · wh ich i nvo lve d acqu iescen t condu c t.z 0 
Th is restrictiv e approach was promulgated in Spencer 
Bowe r's major work on estoppel , z 1 and hence pe r petuated. 
It also l e d t o the for cing of fact- s i tua t i ons into the 
·-·---........ -.. ·--·--·-·-.. ......................... _ ....................... . 
20 See, e . g. G..~ .. ~P.P. v Arun DC [1976] Ch 179. Thi s approach 
(::e ~ee -~~u~!o:~=~ ;~m~~~es[ 1 ~:~jd!d WI~:t;;8 ?·~-YJ..9.!: .. ~ .. -.. .¥..1!.~h_iq_!l.~. 
2 1 Spencer Bower and Turner, The Law __ _ Relat_i_ng __ ____  to .... Estoppel ___ __  by 
E:~.P.!:.~ .. ~-~ n ~~ .. !: .. !..2 .. ~ , ( 3 rd Ed 1 9 7 7 ) p 2 8 8 f . 
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WillJ!I.Q .. :t.J v J:3..~.r. .. l:? .. ~E. framework to enable a plea of estoppel to 
----
d e ven though it was quite obvious that the framework succee 
was not relevant to them. 2 2 
iv} Cont_r._gvers_i_a_l ....... fea ture.s ....... of ___ the ..... W.i))mot.t ...... .V ...... 13a..rber 
pro b ?-.P-.9.:~ 
In more recent years the main controversy concerning 
the doctrine of proprietary estoppel has centred on the 
third and fourth P.!: .. 9.P.9.'..r.:1..9:?.: outlined by Fry J 
Barber. 
a) Pas_s_ive . conduct 
in Willmott v 
.............. ,_ ...... , ... - .... -........... . 
Where the representor's conduct was passive, it was not 
unreasonable to demand that he must know not onl y of the 
representee 's mistaken belief but also of his own rights in 
the property before any 'equit y of estoppel' was upheld 
against him. The representee c ould, after all, have been 
expending money or otherwise altering his position in 
reliance on some alternative arrangement between himself and 
the representor. For instance , the alteration of position 
by the representee could have been equally consistent with a 
tenancy agreement with the representor . 23 In these 
circumstances there would have been nothing to warn the 
owner of the property that he should assert his legal title. 
If he was unaware of his own legal rights, in such 
circumstances, there would have been nothing in the 
-=----a a Se C:--......... -... ····------------· 
138 e --~!:?. v Arun DC [1976] Ch 179. 
Pere~_W_L~!! .. ~. "v"""'irm'(ta~e (1805) 12 Ves Jun 79, 33 ER at 31 ir W Grant MR. 
I 
!'{Jl.111!.9. .. t..1 v .1:3. . ~ .. !: .. t? .. ~ .. !'.'.. framework to enable a plea of estoppel to 
succeed even though it was quite obvious that the framework 
was not relevant to them.22 
iv) Co_ntrover_s_ia.l ... ...fea tures ....... of ____ the ...... W.i))_mot.t .... ..v .... Barber 
probanda 
In more recent years the main controversy concerning 
the doctrine of proprietary estoppel has centred on the 
third and fourth probanda outlined by Fry J 
Barber. 
a) Passive conduct 
.................................................... ................. 
in Willmott v 
.......................... ,_ .... -.......... .. 
Where the representor's conduct was passive, it was not 
unreasonable to demand that he must know not only of the 
representee's mistaken belief but also of his own rights in 
the property before any 'equity of estoppel' was upheld 
against him. The representee could, after all, have been 
expending money or otherwise altering his position in 
reliance on some alternative arrangement between himself and 
the represent.or . For instance , the alteration of position 
by the representee could have been equally consistent with a 
tenancy agreement with the representor,23 In these 
circumstances there would have been nothing to warn the 
owner of the property that he should assert his legal title, 
If he was unaware of his own legal rights, in such 
circumstances, there would have been nothing in the 
2 2S ee Crabb v Arun DC [1976] Ch 179. 
23 See Pillin& v Arm~ta&e (1805) 12 Ves Jun 79, 33 ER at 31 per Sir W Grant MR. 
16 
representee's alteration of position which might have 
ale rted him to intervene and tell the representee that he 
was e x pending money at his own risk. 
Where there was no pre-existing relationship between 
the parties concerning the property, the nature of the 
claimant's alteration of position could be seen as an 
important factor in determining whether the representor had 
knowledge of the representee's 
e xpenditure on another's land 
belief.24 
wou ld not 
Substantial 
normall y be 
undertaken without some belief that rights were being 
obtained in respect of that land. 2 s It would have been 
reasonable that such expenditure should alert the legal 
title holder to assert his rights. Without such knowledge 
of his own rights he could not be seen as encouraging the 
claimant by 
expenditure. 
reason 
b) Active conduct 
·····--·---···················-··········-····························· 
of his failure to prevent that 
Where the representor's conduct was of a positive 
nature it was always questionable whether all of the 
~.i.1 .1.mo t t v Barber pro.banda were relevant. In P l imrner v 
......... .......... ,,.- ,. 
~ayor ·- etc._ .. of ... _.we.1..1.i.ngton, 2 6 for instance, the Privy Council 
rejected the necessity to prove that the representor had 
e xplicit knowledge of the representee's mistaken belief . 
Sir Arthur Hobhouse e xplained that P. .. Lt..I.)lm~.r.. was not a case of 
2 4 See Denny v Jens.en [ 1977] 1 NZLR 635 at 638 ; 
Edwards [1983) 1 NSWLR 34 at 52 . 
Dewhirst v 
······-··· ............ ,,--···-······· 
25 See Pi.lli_ng v Arm.i.tage (1805) 12 Ves Jun 79, 33 ER 
Sir W Grant MR; Hamil.ton v Geraghty (1901) 1 NSWSR 
81. 
26(1884) 9 App Cas 699. 
~ITV 
I~ i !;,~~.-~v 
L:..:....:.::DGE 
P.~ .. r.. (Eq) 
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mere acquiescence by the representor, but was "a case in 
which the land owner has for his own purposes, requested the 
tenant to make the improvements." 2 7 The predecessor in 
title of the representor had clearly had knowledge of the 
expenditure on its land precisely because it had requested 
t hat e xpenditure. The land in question was the sea-bed, 
and it was clear that no-one would undertake improvements to 
the sea-bed without assuming he had or would obtain rights. 
These two factors led the Privy Council to decide that t he 
strict approach of the earlier cases was not applicable in 
P.l.immer.' s ...... cas.e .. 
v) Lo_rd ...... Ki.ng_s,down.' .. s ...... f .o_rmula t.i.on .... i .n ...... Rams.den ..... v ...... DY:s.o.n 
The decision in Plimmer was itself based on the ........... -···-·····-.. ············· 
dissenting judgment of Lord Kingsdown in Ramsden v Dyson . 2s 
Lord Kingsdown e xplained the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel in terms of positi v e conduct b y the representor . 
The relevant conduct of the representor could include " a 
verba l agreement with a landlord for a certain interest in 
land, or what amounts to the same thing, under an 
expectation, created or encouraged b y the landlord that he 
wil l have a certain interest."29 Lord Kingsdown's 
formulation of the principle is thus wider than that of Lord 
27 Ibid at 712. 
28 ( I 866 1) LR I HL 129 at 170, although Lord Kingsdown disse .. nted on the basis of his different interpretation of the relevant facts, there was no di sagreement among the judges on the principles laid down in the case ( see Pl.,i.mmer v Mayor._ ... etc ..... . of. ...... Wel_l_ington (1884) 9 App Cas 699 at 711 I?~.!: Sir Arthur Hobhouse). 29 (1886) LR 1 HL 129 at 170, although Lord Kingsdown couched h i _s observations in terms of landlord and tenant, it is accepted that his statement is of general application. 
18 
cranworth in the same case.lo In Pl__immer ' .. s ....... cas_e the Privy 
council recognised that knowledge by the representor of the 
representee' s belief was not a necessary requirement when 
t h e r e had been an actual request by the former to improve 
his land, Knowledge of the · representee ' s expenditure on 
the se a -bed was sufficient, in the Pri vy Council's view, to 
put any reasonable man on notice of the c l aimant's belief. 
A p r inciple similar to re.s ........ .J.psa ..... l.oqui_tur applies here. 
Th e representor cannot plead a lack of actual knowledge of 
the claimant ' s belief in these circumstances . 
For the greater part of a century the decision in 
Plt!ll:!ll:~t .. ' s .. S: .. ?.:§ .. ~. seems to have been largely ignored in 
Eng land. The more rigid approach of Fry J in Willmott v 
........... . ........ .. 
Barber 3 1 has prevailed even in circumstances where it was 
inappropriate. 
vi) Scarman LJ's formulation in Crabb v Arun DC 
The Willmott v Barber probanda were adopted in more 
recent times in Crabb v Arun DC . 3 2 Both parties to the 
dis pute in this case had conducted themsel v es i n a ma nner 
which demonstrated that they shared the same common 
e xpectation . The expectation was that Mr Crabb would 
r ecei v e rights over the defendan t ' s land . The precise 
details of the agreemen t , which inv olv ed the. grant of a 
right of way, were l ef t unspecified, 33 
-......... - ....... ______ ,,_.. ,_,,_,,, .......................... ,_ .......... ,_.,,, ..... .. 
30 Ibid at 140. 
31 (1880) 15 Ch D 96 . 
Arun District 
32 (1976] Ch 179; Crane (1976) 40 Conv ( NS ) 156. 
3 3See also Central ....... s.tree.t ...... Propert.ies ....... L.td v Mansbrook ...... Rudd ... & Cb . Ltd (1985) 279 EG 41 4 . 
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council subsequently refused to honour the expectation which 
it h ad shared with Mr Crabb. Scarman LJ held that 
the court canno t find an equity established 
unless it is prepared to go as far as to say 
that it would be unconscionable and unjust to 
allow the defendants to set up their 
undoubted rights against the claim being made 
b y the plaintiff . In order to reach a 
c onc lusi on on that matter the court has t o 
consider the history of the c ase under the 
fi v e headings to which Fr y J referred,34 
Scarman LJ th e n proc e eded to gloss ove r the fact that 
the representee had ne ver had a mistaken belief as to his 
legal rights . Both parties shared the same belief that a 
right would be granted at some t ime in th e f uture . Scarman 
LJ simply stated that this f irst probandum of Fry J ha d been 
satisfied . 3 s 
B The ...... d ec.is.ion ...... i n ...... Ta ylo r .s ... . Fash.i.o n.s ..... Lt d .. _ v .... L.i verpo o.l 
Victor ia Trustees Co Ltd 
_., ..... _._, ................. -............... _ .............................................. .. .............. ............................ .. 
It was not until 19 7 9 that any substantial judicial 
anal ysis was undertaken of the universal applicability of 
the W.J....1.J.~g_t .  !:. v i:3.  .1:i.,.:r.'._9. .. ~ .. !'.. P .1.'..: . .92?-.~9:?-. i n all cases o f proprietary 
-.. --·········--·-···-·-···· ............. -... -............. , .. -.................... ,,,_,,, ....... . 
34[1976] Ch 17 9 . 
3 5 I b i d at 195 . 
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estoppel. 36 In Tayl.ors ....... Fash.i.ons ..... _Ltd v L.i ver12.ool ...... ..Vi.ctor.i.a 
trustees ......... Co ......... Ltd 3 7 Oliver J undertook that analysis and 
recognised that a broader test of unconscionability was 
necessary to prevent "forcing those incumbrances into a 
Procrustean bed constructed from some unalterable 
criteria ," 38 
Counsel for the representor in the Tay.l.or.s .......... Fa.s.h.i.ons 
case had argued that the !.~.t.JJ!.J.1 . .9. .. :1:. .. :1:.. v Barber pro.banda should 
be applied in all cases of proprietary estoppel . He 
maintained that, whether the representor's conduct was 
active or passive, whether there was a mistaken belief or a 
common assumption, the representor must have had knowledge 
of bot h his own legal rights and the expectation of the 
representee. In these circumstances knowledge of the 
representee's alteration of position was i nsufficient. 39 
The parties in the Ta y) .ors ...... Fas.hions case had c onducted 
their relationship against a background of a tacit common 
assumption that the claimant of the equity had an 
unregistrable option to renew a lease which had been granted 
to him b y the representor's predecessor in title. When it 
3 6 However see Electrolux Ltd v Electri x Ltd 
2 3; .§.h.?-. .T:'.7. v AP.P..± .. ~Jit~ .. :I:..~. [ 19 7 7] 1 WLR 9 7 0 where 
o n the applicability of the Y!.tJ.:J.!!1 .. <?...:t. .. ~. v ~a:r..:t?..~ .. :r.. 
3 7(1982 ) QB 133. 
( 19 5 3 ) 7 1 RPC 
doubt was cast 
probanda. 
38 Ibid at 154. 
at 319. 
See al so R.i .. s:.h.~ .. ~. v Hogben [ 1986] 1 Qd R 315 
39 [1982 ) QB 133 at 145. See also Spencer Bower and Turner 
The ......... Law .... _.Re.l a t.ing ........ to ....... _.E s toppe.l ........... bY ........ Repy e s enta t .i.on ( 3 rd Ed 
1977), p 288. Kammi.ns ...... Bal.l.roo.m ...... co ...... Lt.d v Ze.n.i .th ... I .nves.tment.s 
LT.<?..£ .. q~ .. ~.Y.L ... kt..4. [ 19 7 0] 2 All ER 8 71 . Cf .H.?-.9..i.P. ..... J3. .. ~.P..~ v ~I~.9..!.P.. 
~an!s. ...... t\9. ...... ~-1::1 .. :r. .. i.9..h [ 19 8 1 ] 2 A 11 ER 6 5 0 ; tf_<? o :r:.~.~:t...~ ....... tl..~.!: .. 9..~.P..t. .. iJ~ ....... 9.9. 
~.!-.. 9- v Twitching's [1976) QB 225; Amalgamated Investments v 
Texas c·o-iii-m'e .. r'ci'e .......... CI 9 81 ] 1 Al 1 ER 9 3 5 ; ................. -Kee'ii'""':.;"'"'iiaTT'inci" .. "'Tfifs 4] 
............. _ ..,_. __ ,,._ ............. - .................... -.... ' ......................................... . 
1 All ER 75; Sarat_Chunder_Dey v Gopal Chunder_Laha (1892) 
19 LR Ind App 203 at 214 ff. 
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later emerged that options of this kind constituted a 
registrable interest,-10 the representor took the 
opportunity, in the absence of due registration, to disclaim 
the option. The representor claimed that any acquiescence 
on its part in the claimant's expenditure on the property 
had been without knowledge that it had a legal right to 
defeat the unregistered option. Having disclaimed the 
option as soon as the true legal position became apparent 
the representor claimed that its conduct could not be seen 
as encouragement. 
Oliver J gave judgment for the representor but at the 
same time rejected his argument outlined above. Whilst 
acknowledging that the representor's case was not 
"overburdened with merit",41 Oliver J recognised that it was 
not his function to impose his own idiosyncratic commercial 
morality on the strictly legitimate exercise of a right by 
the representor.42 0 l i v er J po in t e d out that the W i 11..J:I.l:.<?. .. :l:. .. !:. 
v Barber probanda could not be universally applied to all 
cases of proprietary estoppel . He accepted that they might 
be relevant in cases of total acquiescence by the 
representor, 4 3 al though even this was a matter of doubt. 
He emphasised that not all the probanda would be relevant 
where the parties shared the same expectation.44 
4 0 See BeesJy v Ha_lJwood _____ Es tate_s ______ L_td [ 196 0] 1 WLR 5 49 . 
41 [1982) QB 133 at 135. 
42 Ibid. See also H..1:1.-.. l?. .. :!:..~~-~--re Estates Ltd v Baker [1982] 1 
WLR 1109 at 1119; Leg_ione_ v HateJy (1982-87) 46 ALR 1 at 
18. 
~ 3 See SidneY ........ Bol_s_om ...... ..I.nvestment ..... Trus_t __ __ Ltd v E ...... Karm_i_os .. ..... & ....... co 
_ Lo~_9:.Q.P.J ......... ~ .. t..4 [ 19 5 6] 1 QB 5 2 9 at 5 4 0, 5 41 ; G.!3.:.P.!3.:.4.tl:l:.!l. {~_p __ er_i_or ______ Oi_l ......... Lt_d v Paddon ....... Hughes _____ De_ve_l_opmen_t ......... co ......... Lt_d 3 DLR 
Q~d 1 a!~ at 16 ; r.\.:r::.~.~--:t:..:r::.2.P. .. !{ v § . .h .. ~.EP.l:l: .. :r::.4 ..... ~.~-9: ...... §.h.<?..:r:: .. !: ....... ~ .. :t:..4 [ 19 5 9] 2 
44 Referring to In~.?-.. 1.'.:.9:.!3.. v I.3..~~--~ .. :r::. [1965) 2 QB 29 Oliver J said 
"th.ere was no mistaken belief on either side. Each knew 
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Oliver J then proceeded to formulate for estoppel 
purposes a broader test of unconscionability which requires 
t he court to consider "whether , in particular i ndividual 
circumstances, . it would be unconscionable for a party to 
deny that which knowingl y or unknowingly he has allowed or 
encouraged another to assume to his detriment."4s On this 
wider v iew, knowledge by the representor of his own rights 
and the belief of the representee become merely relevant 
fac tors in determining whether t h ere has been an 
encouragement by the representor . Oliver J acknowledged 
that the representor's knowledge might even be a determining 
factor in certain circumstances. 
III THE REFORMULATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PROPRIETARY 
ESTOPPEL 
• 
In the aftermath of Taylors .. Fas.hi.ons ...... Ltd v Li.verpo.o.l. 
Yi.ct.or.ia ..... Trus.tees ...... co ....... Lt.d it has been generally assumed that 
the elements of proprietary estoppel can be condensed into 
t wo interlinked requ irements distilled from Oliver J ' s broad 
test of unconscionabil i ty,46 First, there must be conduct, 
t h e state of the title but the defendant had been led to 
expect that h e would get an interest in . the land on which he 
had built a nd indeed , the overwhelming probability i s that 
was indeed the father's intention at the time" ([1982) QB 
133 at 152) . Olive r J inferred that Scarman LJ's speech in 
Crabb v AE.~.I.\ .. _ ... DC, [1976) Ch 179 concerning t he fourth 
probandum had to be construed i n the sense that "the 
d~fendant must know merely o f the plaintiff's belie f which, 
in the event, turns out to be mis taken." 
4 5 T._ay).ors .. _Fashi.ons ........ L.td v Li.verpoo.l ..... ..V.ictori.a ...... Trus.tees ....... co ....... Ltd 
[1982) QB 133 at 151; see also (1985) 101 LQR 305 at 306 . 
4 6 See, e.g. , Arna.lgamated ......... I .nve.stment ..... and ....... PropertY ...... co ....... Ltd v 
Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [ 1982] QB 84; 
g_~.!'leron v \'1.:t:.i . .E .. 9-.. <:2.9 .. h. [1983] WAR 321 at 350. 
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either express or tacit , by the representor , which 
enc ou rages the representee reasonably to believe that he has 
acquired or will acquire rights in or over the representor's 
property . 4 7 Second, the representee must prove that he has 
altered his position t o his detriment in reliance on a 
belief which has been engendered by the conduct of the 
representor. If there is no encouragement by the 
representor , there can be no relevant detrimental alteration 
of position by the repres e ntee . The nature of this 
alter a tion of position may , of course, make it easier to 
infer that there was a relevant encouragement. The 
representor's knowledge of the representee's belief and of 
his own right become merel y factors which the court must 
take into account in judging whether any given conduct 
c onstitutes encouragement. 
Al though Tay)_or.s ...... Fa_shions seemed to provide a major 
clarificatio1 of the law of proprietary estoppel, the ruling 
of 01 i v er J left much ambivalence particularly concerning 
the requir e ment of knowledge as to the precise elements 
ne c e ssary to ground an estoppel claim ,4 8 
Throughout this dissertation it is suggested that the 
r e f o r mulation of proprietary estoppel outlined above can 
p r ov ide a use f ul f r a me work f o r the anal ysis of t he cases 
whi c h i nvolv e p r ope r t y d ispu tes in t he contex t o f t h e f a mi l y 
home . These cases will be referred to throughout the 
47 See J H Baker, (1979) 82 Curre nt ___ Leg ____ Probl_ems p 17 . 
•ssee, e .g., Swallow Securities Ltd v Isenberg (Unreported, Court of Appeal 22 February 1985) per Cumming-Bruce LJ, 
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dissertation as the 'familial cases'. The reformulation of 
proprietary estoppel does not disregard the Willmott v 
Barber probanda entirely, The 'familial cases' decided 
under the W..!...:l.:.J.m.9..t. .. t v J?..~.!: .. 9 .. E?..T. rules can be analysed within 
this new framework, which equally permits an analysis of 
the cases to which the Wi..l..lmott v Barber probanda have no 
applicability . 
• 
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I INTRODUCT.ION 
CHAPTER TWO 
ENCOURAGEMENT 
~-·••••-•N-•-H•W•••--·-•••-----·-·-
The 'equity of estoppel' cannot arise unless the 
conduct of the legal title holder can be viewed as an 
encouragement or representation to the estoppel claimant 
that rights in or over the property are being , or will be, 
granted to him. In the absence of encouragement, any 
detrimental alteration of position by the claimant can only 
be in reliance on a unilateral mistaken belief. Such action 
represents both a "folly" 1 for the claimant and a gratuit ous 
benefit for the legal owner who may retain the va lue 
generated by the claimant's alteration of position . 
Expenditure with the consent of the landowner, unaccompanied 
by any encouragement that rights in respect of the property • 
are being created, can never found a claim of proprietary 
estoppel . 2 
The difficulty facing the courts relates to the proper 
interpretation of conduct which the representee sees as 
encouragement but which the representor does not. The 
interpretation of such conduct is a particularly problematic 
task in the familial contex t . The representor and 
representee may be members of the same fami l y; their 
·--···---...... _____ , _______________ , ........... ............... ,,_, ,,,, ......................... . 
1R~msden v Dyson (1866) LR I HL 129 at 141. 
; S e e , e , g , 1 .~.~.Y..Y..~ V 9...9. .. ~ .. t.E.: ........... ~!!.9.: ... _J!~.F,.Y._rr.1..QQ~ .......... J.!!.Y. .. ~ .. !::l .. t._~-~.:r:tt~ .......... J:' .. t.9: Tt 9 81 ) 13 1 NLJ 1114 P .. ~ .. r.. 01 i ve r LJ ; :J?...r. .. Ll!D..?-!!.9: v .~.!'!..~.!! .. ~. ( 19 8 7 ) 
IQ~·e·;;~~~~-la!de~~ne ;Ltd 1i~s"ff"-.. l 01ll .. 9..~~· 3~7 t~·~·~~~;Y.·~s·~-~·~ .. ;·it~· .......................................................... ............... L......................... 
.. ........................................................................ Y .. 
. ~ .. td v Si.n_gh (Unreported, Court of Appeal 5 March 1987). 
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relationship may have been conducted against a background of 
shared informal familial values. In these circumstances 
li ttle thought may have been given to the meaning of conduct 
until after the relationship has broken down. Where the 
the dispute are not members of the same parties to 
household, their relationship will probably have been 
conducted against a background of a different set of more 
formal values. The court 's task is to unravel the meaning 
given by the disputing parties to the conduct which is 
claimed as encouragement. Of necessity this task will be 
a value-ridden exercise which takes account of such factors 
as the nature of the relationship between the parties; the 
quality of the representor' s conduct and knowledge; the 
extent of the representee's alteration of position and any 
familial and social consequences which might result from a 
recognition of conduct as encouragement. 
+ 
II ENCOURAGEMENT ...... MAY .. BE ..... EITHER ... POS_ITIVE . OR .... ACQUIESCENT 
In Ward v Kirklandl Ungoed-Thomas J rejected the 
existence of any distinction between mere acquiescence and 
positive acts of encouragement. In relation to both 
acquiescence and encouragement he pointed out that 
the fundamental principle is unconscionable 
behaviour, and unconscionable behaviour can 
arise where there is knowledge by the legal 
owner of the circumstances in which the 
'":"" N•••o , ,,. ,v,,-••---•• ••-•--•-•••• 0, .. NO .. OOO OOH-OOOOOHO>-•••NoN,,oo, .. ,,,,,,,oo •oo,oooo 
3 [1967] l Ch 194. 
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claimant is incurring the expenditure as much 
as if he was himself requesting or inciting 
that expenditure,4 
Provided that certain conditions are fulfilled, 
inaction by the representor has always been accepted as a 
form of encouragement of the representee. s 
$purrier 6 Lord Eldon stated that 
In Dann v 
this court will not permit a man knowingly, 
though but passively, to encourage another to 
lay out money under an erroneous opinion of 
title and the circumstances of looking on is 
in many cases as strong as using terms of 
encouragement; a lessor knowing and 
permitting these acts, which the lessee would 
not have done and the other must conceive he 
would not have done, but upon an expectation, 
that the lessor would not throw an objection 
in the way of his enjoyment,7 
More recently Slade LJ has accepted that ". in some 
circumstances passive conduct, even if unaccompanied by any 
words, may suffice to constitute the relevant encouragement, 
if the facts are such that it is reasonable for the other 
4 Ibid at 239. 
5 0ne of the earliest cases in which inaction was accepted as 
encouragement was . $.J:. .. ~~-9: v ~.h.Ltl:i.:~ .. ~ .. !'.. ( 1740) Barn Ch 220 at 221, 27 ER 621 where the Lord Chancellor said "and another ingredient is, that the mortgagee has lain by, and let Samuel Steed go on and build upon the premises without giving him notice of the mortgage." 
6 (1802) 7 Ves Jun 232, 32 ER 94. 
7 1 bid at 9 5 , 9 6 • See a 1 so P. .. f?_.!?.1:!.~ .  ~f.:!i_~. v Al t ( 1 8 7 7 ) 8 C h 2 8 6 
at 314. 
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party so to construe it." s It is clear, however, that 
liabilities are not to be forced upon people behind their 
backs , 9 The courts have found considerable difficulty in 
determining the circumstances in which silent conduct may 
lead to the acquisition of rights by the representee. To 
remain silent whilst a person alters his position to his 
detriment may be explicable in terms other than 
encouragement of that person's belief that he either has 
acquired or will acquire rights in the representor's 
property. The representor's silence may well be e xplained 
by the existence of some alternative agreement between the 
two parties, in which case the representor ma y believe that 
the claimant is altering his position detrimentally on the 
faith of that other agreement. In such circumstances the 
representor's knowledge of the actual belief entertained by 
the r epresentee may well be a determining factor in raising 
an estoppel . 10 
III THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ENCOURAGEMENT 
··········-··-··-···-··"''""''''''''············ ............ ,.,_,,,.,, .. ,,,,-, ............................................................ _ .. _, ............................... ,,_, ,,,,,--···-······· .. ········" 
The encouragement provided by the representor must 
relate to land in which he either has o r will have a 
proprietary interest . 
··---··------.. ··-----.. -... --.......... -...... -............. .. 
~~~~)'·;·§· v Hed.l.e y ( Unreported, Court of Appeal 31 
9 See, e.g., P.~ . D.:.~ . .Y v .~ .. 1::? .. D.:.~ .. 1::?.:r.! [1977] 1 NZLR 635 at 638. 
January 
1
.
0 See, e.g., Brinnand v :g_.':'!.~.!} .. §. (1987) Th~--..... T._!:!1:1:.~-~ 4 June per 
Cumming-Bruce LJ. 
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A T.!t e -·~-~.9...9..!!!:.13-:.g.~~.~.!1..~_I!!!!~ .. t. .... ..  !'e.l ate .... to __ a _s pec.i f i c .... a.s set 
In Layton v Ma.rt.in, 11 a former mistress of the legal 
title holder pleaded proprietary estoppel in an attempt to 
obtain financial provision out of her late lover's estate. 
The deceased had made her a written offer of ''what emotional 
security I can give plus financial security during my life 
and financial security on my death",12 The plaintiff had 
moved in to her lover's home in what she later alleged was 
reliance on this assurance. Scott J rejected the plea of 
proprietary estoppel, maintaining that such a plea could not 
arise otherwise than in connection with some specific 
asset. 13 
B The .. r.epresento.r .... need ... no.t . current.ly O.li!l. . .. . t.J1.e land 
It is clear, however, that the property need not be 
owned by the representor at the time of the 
11[1986] 2 FLR 227. 
12 Ibid at 238, 239. In '\it:=. .. §.t.t:=. .. !:P: .... .f...t..i::ip ... :?.!:9.9:ll<?..:t§ .. J:,, .. t..q v .P. .. t:=. .. lf . .litt. .. J::i. 
DC [1981] 2 All ER 204 at 218 it was held that proprietary 
estoppel cannot, be pleaded where the claim relates to a 
representation concerning the representee's land. Megaw LJ 
stated that "there is no good reason for extending the 
principle further. As Harman LJ pointed out in Campbel.l. 
P..i.s.c.ount CompanY .... Lt.d v Bri.dge [1961] 2 All ER 97 at 103, the 
system of equity has become a very precise one. The 
creation of new rights and remedies is a matter for 
parliament, not the judges." In Sal.vat.i.on ....... Army ....... Trustee 
G._ompan_y_. Ltd v West Yorkshire MCC ( 1981) 41 P & CR 179, 
Woolf held that the equity of estoppel could arise in 
circumstances where encouragement had been given by the 
representor that he would purchase the representee' s land. 
The representee had purchased new property on the faith of 
this assurance. Cf A-.G ......... o.f ..... _Hongkong v Humphreys ........ Es.tate 
.{_Q.:µ~ .. ~.P:~.JL.9 .. ?.:.E_c!t:=..!.1..i::iJ ........ .J~ .. t.9.: [ 1 9 8 7 ] 2 A 11 ER 3 8 7 at 3 9 4 P. .. t:=. .. :r::. Lo r d 
Templeman. 
13 (1986] 2 FLR 227 at 239. 
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I 
representation. 14 In Itt...9._h_~.§. v H~gben 1 s the Full Court of 
the Queensland Supreme Court recently upheld a plea of 
proprietary estoppel even though the assurance made by the 
repr esentor related to property which she did not yet own at 
the date of the representation. Kel l y SPJ concluded that 
the 
obligation attaches not because of ownership 
of land but because of the expectation that 
she raised in the plaintiff and of his 
detrimental conduct subsequently encouraged 
by the defendant in reliance thereon. 
Having acquired the land, effect can and must 
now be given to that expectation.16 
The expectation of the representee , fostered by the 
encouragement of the representor, need not be concerned with 
a proprietary right. Any right in or over the land of the 
legal title holder will suffice . In Re ......... Sharpe .. _ ... J .. A 
Bankrunt) 17 
.................................... J::: ........ ... . Browne-Wilkinson J confirmed that 
representations for the purpose of proprietary estoppel may 
include rights (e . g. , rights of mere occupancy licence) 
which are generally assumed to be non-proprietary . 
~ ...................... _. __ ,,,.-·····················-··········· .. ··· ·····•···•····· .. ························ 14 See however PD Finn (ed ), Essay s ...... in ...... E9..u.i .t y (1985) at p 59 ff. 
15 (1986] 1 Qd R 315; (1986) 60 ALJ 345 at 348 . 
18Riche s v Hogbe n [1986] 1 Qd R 315 at 321. 
17 I1980] 1 WLR 219. 
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D The .... expectat.ion ...... may rela_te .... to the_ ... ac...9..u.is.i t.i.on ...... of ...... future 
r.ights 
Some of the 'familial cases' involve representations 
concerning future acquisition of property by the represent~e 
after the representor' s death. In Phi.l .. iP ...... Lowe ........ J.Ch.i.nes_e 
_RestaurantJ ....... L.td v S_au ...... Man_ .. Lee 18 May LJ questioned whether 
such a representation could be seen as a relevant 
encouragement for estoppel purposes. He doubted, "whether 
any representation as to what will happen upon the 
representor's death or what will be in the representor's 
will can be construed as one involving an intention that 
there should be a present acquisition of that future right 
by the representee." He added that, "if one considers the 
alleged representation to take effect onl y upon death, the 
two are indeed inconsistent." These dicta are obiter since 
the case was decided on another point. 
May LJ's restrictive approach is not reflected 
uniformly in the 'familial cases'. There is a long-
standing precedent for the view that proprietary estoppel 
may extend to future rights, Lord Kingsdown's judgment in 
R,_a,ms_den v Dys_on 1 9 being good authority for this wider 
approach. In Re .... Ba_s_ham .. J.decd)., 2 o moreover, the representor 
had throughout his lifetime constantly reassured the 
representee that she would inherit his property when he 
died. In upholding the representee's subsequent estoppel 
claim, Judge Edward Nugee QC confirmed that the principle of 
.. - - -·~····-.. - ··- ·--- ··--..... , .................................................... . 
18Unreported, Court of Appeal 9 July 1985. 
19 (1866) LR 1 HL 129 at 170. 
2 0[1986] 1 WLR 1498. 
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proprietary estoppel extends to beliefs that future rights 
ove r the property will be granted. 
If the claimant has a mere or speculative hope of 
obtaining rights in the properti in the future rather than a 
firm expectation that he will receive rights, the plea of 
proprietary estoppel will fail. 21 
IV THE ENCOURAGEMENT MUST BE FREELY GIVEN 
A There must be no coercion 
.. , .. ,_ ... ., ....................................... ...................................... .................................. --................... ' 
In the Irish case of 91::l:.1.J~.D. v Cullen2 2 Kenny J 
rejected as evidence of encouragement conduct resulting from 
coercion. The representee had requested a doctor to see 
her husband, the representor, with a v iew to certifying him 
as mentally ill. The doctor did so and ordered his removal 
to a mental hospital. The representor escaped from his 
famil y with the aid of his parish priest in order to avoid 
such incarceration. The representor had authorised his 
wife to take over his property. This authorisation was on 
condition that his wife acknowledged his sanity and took all 
the necessary steps to have the order for his detention 
withdrawn. Kenny J acknowledged that the 'equity of 
........................................... -.......................................................................... . 21 See Cullen v Cullen [1962] IR 268, where the estoppel 
claimant-·····r'aI"ied t::··;;········c;-:b·t-ain a transfer of title because he had 
merely a hope that the representor would make him a gift of 
the land. The claimant was, however, granted a long-term 
occupation right because he had been led to believe that he 
would not be removed from the land ( post at chapter 6) . 
See als o Brady (1970) Ir Jur (NS) 239 for an interesting 
discussion of this case . 
22 [1962] IR 268. There were two estoppel claims in Cullen , 
the discussion here relates to the first claim. The second 
claim is discussed post at 37. 
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estoppel ' was discretionary and that the plaintiff made the 
state ment that he was about to transfer his property to his 
wife b ecause he believed that it was the only way by which 
he c o u ld remain free. It would therefore be grossl y 
inequitable to regard the representee as being entitled to a 
transfer of the property. Kenny J was in any e vent anx ious 
to a v oid exacerbating the conflict between the members of 
the Cullen family. Had he found the relevant conduct to be 
encouragement he would have had to grant a remedy which 
would hav e further destroy ed famil y r e lationships. 23 
There is similarly some question whether the 
representor in Pascoe v Turner24 was acting under pressure 
when he told his de facto wife tha t she could have the 
family home . The plaintiff was tr y ing to calm down the 
defendant, who had become distraught after he confided to 
her that he was leaving her f or another woman . In this 
case , however , the representor ' s initial assurance of 
the entitlement was followed b y acquiescence in 
r epresentee's subsequ ent impro v ements to the house and this 
acquiescence appears t o hav e been freel y given . 
Furthermore the representor's later conduct towards the 
r epresen t ee was ruth less in the ext r eme . 2s 
B Who __ must ...... g .i ve _____ the ... encouragement_?_ 
The r e presentor ma y g i v e t h e e n courageme nt h imsel f 
or he may b e h e ld to have given the enc ouragement through 
---··-··--·----·-·--··· .. ····-·········-·- N•oNHo,,, .. ,_ ............. . 23Cullen v Cullen [196 2] IR 265 at 290 . 
2 4 Ti 9 7 9 ] 1 WLR 4 3 1 • 
2 5Post at 143 • 
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his agent, In Swa.l.,low .... Secu.r.i_t_i_es ... __ Ltd v _Isenberg, 2 & for 
instance, the encouragement relied upon by the claimant was 
that given by the resident porter of a block of flats who 
was the landlord's representative on the spot. 
The representations of an agent are not, however, 
necessarily conclusive in this area. In Van ...... den ....... Berg_ v 
G_i_le!';_, 2 7 for instance, the solicitors acting as agents for 
the representor contradicted the encouragement given by the 
representor herself. She had actively encouraged the 
representee to carry out the improvements he was making to 
her property. 
from doing so. 
Her solicitors had actively discouraged him 
In the New Zealand Supreme Court Jeffries J 
found that the representor had deliberately misled and 
inveigled the plaintiff into spending v ery considerable sums 
of mone y on her property. The representor had made a 
shr ewd assessment of the character of the plaintiff and his 
wife (who was described as "ingenuous to the point of 
foolishness") , Jeffries J could find no criticism of the 
manner in which the representee had treated the representor 
and her husband, who were "considerably older than him and 
more experienced in the ways of the world." At all stages 
in their dealings, the representee appeared to have shown 
them courtesy and to have been completely open with them in 
the activities he undertook in connection with the house.2s 
The amount of money spent by the representee was of 
overwhelming importance in the court's determination that it 
was not folly for 
2
-
6 
... (1985) 274 EG 1028 
(1976) 237 EG 411. 
27 (1979] 2 NZLR 111. 
28 Ibid at 120. 
him to 
at 1030. 
continue renovating the 
See also Ivory v Palmer 
35 
representor's property in the presence of contradictory 
representations by the representor and her agent . 
Permission given by a tenant for the carrying out of 
work on the owner's property is not sufficient to rank as 
encouragement by the owner. 2 9 A t enant cannot, in this 
sense , be an agent of the landowner. If, however, the 
tenant subsequently acquires a freehold estate in the land, 
it is arguable that this has the effect of 'feeding the 
estoppel' which has arisen from his earlier 
representations.ao 
Where the property is owned jointly, it must be shown 
that the encouragement was given by both or all of the joint 
owners . In the New Jersey case of Mahony v Danis a 1 the 
defendants were husband and wife and were together joint 
legal owners of the disputed property. It was claimed that 
the husband alone had encouraged the plaintiff to believe he 
had acquired rights in the property. The Supreme Court of 
New Jersey rejected any possibility of proprietary estoppel 
in these circumstances. 
29 See Ward v Kirkland [1967] 1 Ch 194 at 24 1 . 
3 0 See Watson v Go.ldborou~h [ 1986] 1 EGLR 26 5 in which Sir 
Nicolas ·· Browne-Wilkinson V-C upheld a claim of proprietary 
estoppel against two licensees who subsequently acquired the 
fee simple. Cf ..... !'! .. 9.:.r .. 4. v K.:i.-.. E .. ls.19.:P.:9: [1967] Ch 194 at 241. 3 1 !".L~hon_y v Dani.s. 469 A 2d 31 ( NJ 1983). See also Brownlee 
v Duggan (1976) 27 (3) NILQ 291 where the encouragement 
given by one of two joint owners was deemed to have been 
given also by the other joint owner in so far as he did not 
express his objection to the original representation . 
36 
c To ...... whom ...... must ..... the ...... encouragement __ be __  gi ven_? 
In the 'familial cases' the courts have taken a broad 
approach in determining the persons to whom representations 
can extend for the purpose of raising an estoppel claim, 
In Came.ran v M.:i:!.1.'.: .. 9.:.<?..<?..h. 3 2 the original encouragement had been 
given to the father and mother of the second plaintiffs. 
The Supreme Court of Western Australia nevertheless accepted 
implicitly that this encouragement was a continuing process 
where the plaintiffs had carried on their father's 
detrimental reliance. This decision can be contrasted with 
~?..!1 .. ~§. v ~ . .9. . .r::1.~ .. §. l l where the entire family of the representee 
had acted to their detriment by uprooting themselves from 
their home and moving to the representor's property. There 
was no explicit discussion by the Court of Appeal of the 
e x act identity of the representee. Roskill LJ, however, 
refused to extend the 'equity of estoppel' to the whole 
' famil y and restricted it to the representor ' s son in his 
capacity as the current head of family. 34 
The representee in Cullen v Cullenas had given the 
relevant land over to her son. The decision of Kenny J 
related to the question whether the son, rather than the 
original representee , his mother, had fulfilled the burden 
of proving an alteration of position · in reliance on the 
encourageme nt gi v en b y the legal title holde r. The case 
does not e x plain precisely how the encouragement made 
32 (1983 ] WAR 32 1 aff i rmed by the Privy Council (1985-1986) 63 ALR 575 . 
33 (1977] 1 WLR 438. 
3 4 Ibid a t 44 3 . 
35 (1962] I R 268. (The dis c u ss i o n h e r e r elates to the s econd 
es toppe l c l aim). 
37 
initially to the mother had subsequently been e x tended to 
her son, It may be that in such cases the original 
positive encouragement can be treated as being replaced by 
the silent acquiescence of the legal title holder in respect 
of the improvements being made. This silent acquiescence 
then becomes a separate encouragement, thereby permitting an 
estoppel to be raised in favour of the person who alters his 
position in reliance on the silent acquiescence. 
The encouragement given by the representor may be as 
to the acquisition of rights in his property by some part y 
other than the representee. The third party is clearly not 
the representee in such circumstances; it is still for the 
original representee t o show that he has altered his own 
suffered detriment in reliance on the 
posit ion and 
representation. In .?..:h .. t:l:J.9:.?: v K.i.ndlane ..... Ltd, 3 6 for instance, 
a company encouraged one of its employees to act to his 
de tr iment in the belief that his wife would be granted a 
conveyance of the family home which belonged to the company. 
The plea of proprietary estoppel succeeded here . 
V T.H.;g .... Jt~.~I;g .. ¥. ...... oF ...... THE ...... REPRESENTEE .. ,_MUST ...... co.I.NC.IDE ...... WITH ...... THE 
TERMS OF THE ENCOURAGEMENT ........................................................................................................ -................. _ .. , ...... -.. -.... , ........ . 
Unless the court finds (or imposes) a concordance 
between the conduct claimed as encouragement and the belief 
of the representee, there can be no successful claim of 
·-·-.. ·- ·--·· 38
.Shaida v Kindlane Ltd (Unreported , Chancery Di v ision 22 J un.~~·1 ~fa 2 ) . .. .............. -.......... -............................... - .. .. 
38 
11. 
proprietary estoppel. The representee may well believe 
tha t he is acquiring rights in the represent or's property. 
However, the encouragement given by the representor may 
relate to entirely different rights from those expected by 
the representee. 
It is always a difficult question whether the 
representor 's conduct can be seen as a relevant 
encouragement or as indicative merely of some al terna ti ve 
arrangement such as a tenancy or licence. 37 The courts 
have taken into account a number of interrelated factors in 
determining whether there is concordance between the 
encouragement and the belief. Among t he important factors 
are the nature of representor's conduct, the 
relationship between 
the 
the parties, the likely relative 
detriment suffered by the parties or their families as a 
result of the dec ision , the knowledge of the representor and 
the general social impact of recognising the conduct as 
encouragement. The 'familial cases' wi ll now be considered 
from this perspective. 
A Expl.ic.i.t ..... repr.esenta.tions ...... concern.ing r.ights ....... !.P.: ...... t..h .  ":. 
repre.sen.to.r .. ' .. s ...... property 
Where the representor makes an explicit representation 
that rights in or over his land are to be granted to the 
representee, there is patently a correlation between the 
terms of the encouragement and the terms of the 
representee's belief . In such circumstances the only 
3 7 See 
Vol 1 
Hinde, McMorland and Sim, Land_Law (Butterworth 1978) 
at 371, for a comprehensive discussion of licences. 
39 
question left for the court is usually whether there has 
been a detrimental alteration of position in reliance on the 
representation. 38 Such cases will be referred to hereafter 
as the 'common assumption' cases. 
A clear example of this type of case may be found in 
pJl.l.wyn v Ll.ewelyn. 3 9 
recited that 
Here a clearly worded memorandum 
Hendrefoilan, together with my other freehold 
estates, are left in my will to my dearly 
beloved wife, but it is her wish, and I 
hereby join her in presenting the same to our 
son, Lewis Llewel yn Dillwyn for the purposes 
of furnishing himself with a dwelling 
house. 40 
This memorandum was accepted as unequivocal evidence of 
encouragement by the representor. 41 
38 See Chapter Three . 
39 (1862) 4 De GF & J 517, 45 ER 1285. 
4 0 Ibid. See also I.n ....... re_ ... Hume ..... ex_ .... part'e ..... Of.f.i.c.ial ........ As.s .. ignee (1909) 28 NZLR 793. 
41 For other cases of unequivocal encouragement, see Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431 (where the representor made an 
unequivocal assurance to the representee on a number of 
occasions that "the house is yours") ; GreasJ.ey v 9 .. 9.-9 .. ls.~. [1980] 1 WLR 1306; §h.~j.Q~. v !\J.P.:9J:~.!:1 .. ~ .......... I:! .. t. .. 9.: (Unreported, Chancery Division 22 June 1982); Dodsworth v Dodsworth (1973) 228 EG 1115; Van .. den._Berg v Gi_les [1979] 2 NZLR 
111 ; I.b._9..!.!1..13.: .. §. v Th.9..!.!1.?:.§. [ 1 9 5 6 ] NZ LR 7 8 5 ; P. .. ~.?.: .. !: .. <?. .. ~. v P. .. ~.13.: .. !:..<?. .. ~. [1977] 1 NSWLR 170; In .. _ .. re ....... Basham, ........ decd [1986] 1 WLR 1498; E.i .. ~hes. v H..9.J~.P-~D. [ 19 86] 1 Qd R 315 ; ~~.h .. 13.: . .F..?:J v .J.~ .. :i.:.. ........ G.h_l:1. .. Q.9.: [1986] 3 All ER 107; Tay.lor v Ta7l.or [1956] NZLR 99. 
40 
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Likewise in I.rt.~_?-.!: .. 9:.~. v I? . .?-.. ~ .. ~ .. !:. • 2 and in l..<? .. P.c .. ~--~- v Jones_ • a 
the t erms of the representors' encouragement were beyond 
question. In the former case a father had suggested that 
hi s s on should "put the bungalow on [his] land and make the 
bungalow a little bigger" ,4 4 In the latter case a father 
had purchased a house for his son and had requested that he 
should come and live in it, thereby incurring expenditure. 
The father had said, "It's your place .. . because I owe you a 
lot II• 4 5 In Qi.::Jf.ft_ths v W_i_l_l_iam_s, 4 6 the representor and 
rep r esentee were mother and daughter respectively. The 
mother had repeatedly assured her daughter that for the rest 
of her life she could live in the family home, which 
belonged at this stage to the mother . 
In all these cases the representor obtained benefits , 
both financial and practical , from the representee's 
al t e r a t ion of p osition . Such benefits tend to reinforce 
the courts ' v iew that an e xplicit encouragement has been 
gi v en . In .RJC?.h..~.? v .f::Igg_p~n., 4 7 howe v er, there was no real 
benefit to t he representor from the representee's alteration 
of position . The court nev ertheless recognised that an 
e xplicit encouragement had been made . Here the representee 
had g i ven up a protected tenanc y and uprooted h is famil y 
fro m England and transported them to Australia . The court 
was reinforced in its v iew that there was an explicit 
e nc ouragement to the representee because his loss would have 
b e e n very real had t h e plea of estoppel failed . 
..... __ , ................. -..... --··--····-·· .................................. -....................... . 
42 (1965] 2 WLR 212 . 
43 [1 9 7 7] 1 WLR 438 . 
44 [1965] 2 WLR 212 at 215. 
45 [1977] 1 WLR 438 at 440 . 
46 ( 1978) 248 EG 947. 
47 [1986] 1 Qd R 315. 
41 
There has been very little discussion of the knowledge 
required in the representor where the representation has 
taken the form of an explicit assurance of rights. The 
representor's knowledge of his own rights has not arisen for 
consideration, and in circumstances of express and 
unequivocal encouragement by the landowner proof of such 
knowledge would seem not to be a necessary requirement. 4 8 
The representor ' s knowledge of the claimant's belief has 
been so clearly satisfied that there is no need of further 
discussion. 
B Acceptance ...... of ...... the ..... represent.ee .. '... s .... expend_iture .... on. the 
s _hared ...... f am_i..l;r ..... h ome 
A sharing of the representor's property by the 
representee may be brought about by the representee's lack 
of land or capital or the need of either the representor or 
the representee to be cared for. Circumstances of these 
kinds commonl y underlie the 'familial cases ', 49 although 
evidence of the precise nature of such family arrangementsso 
is fre quently sparse. The arrangements may have commenced 
in circumstances of residential crisis and little concern 
may have been gi v en t o the long-term future. A certain 
optimism is often present at the commenc ement of shared 
''"--·-···------···--... -...... _ .................. ......... ....................... . 
4 8 See ant e at 19 
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1
;·gn-~.£ .. ~whv1.· cEh ...... !.1 .. ~r. (Unreported , Court of Appeal 20 May 
Croom-Johnson LJ referred to such 
arrangements as "non-arrangements". See also Hardwick v 
~-qJ~.nson (1978] 1 WLR 683 at 688 per Lord Denning MR. 
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living arrangements; an optimism which may have turned to a 
cynical view of the agreement in the situation of discord 
which later faces the parties and the court.si 
Members of families who live together conduct their 
lives within the institution of the family. This 
institution has an accumulation of cultural associations and 
meanings which have emerged from the subjective evaluations 
of familial behaviour by society at large . s2 These 
meanings provide a framework for the interpretation of the 
behaviour of individual members of the family by other 
members of that family. Within the jurisdictions 
considered in this dissertation there may be different 
understandings based on social class or ethnic origin which 
are confined to that social class or ethnic group,53 
Within a given social class or ethnic group there will be a 
considerable common understanding about the nature of any 
rela t ionship . It is therefore somewhat paradoxical that 
the case law should contain so many disputes over the 
meaning of familial conduct where both parties to the 
dispute have been living together. Whilst a relationship 
continues amicably, the shared values of the family are such 
that the meanings of behaviour will not be questioned; they 
do not require to be . s 4 The precise significance of any 
particular event will not be verbalised. It is only when 
N•<"•"••·-·---·-•••."••• •• ••••••••"'' ' "''"h••••••••••"' '' '"' ''"'"" ''"""'"""'""'"'"' 51 See T'::!--1'.:1.L~.Y. v J.~~.~ .. !:>.. (Unreported, Court of Appea l 7 April 1982). 
52 See P L Berger and T Luckmann, 
Realjty (Penguin 1973), p 73. 
The Social Construction of 
.................................. ................................................................................... _ ................. ,_.,, .. ..... . 
53 See , for example P Willmott and M Young, Fami.lY. ....... and 
~.insh.ip,_.i.n .. _ .. Eas.t ....... Londo.n ( Penguin 196 2) . 
5 4 See Rogers v ~ .. :1.:.J.:.~.J.::. (Unreported, Court of Appeal 20 May 
1986 ) in which Slade LJ said "arrangements between members 
of the same family living happily in the same house are 
often of a very indeterminate nature." 
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the relationship breaks down that the meaning of events will 
assume significance.ss 
In such circumstances the courts have to place their 
own interpretations on events in order to decide whether 
acceptance of e xpenditure by the representor should be 
viewed as encouragement in the estoppel context. For the 
most part the courts have been fairly liberal in 
interpreting expenditure as encouragement in these 
ci r cumstances . The y hav e recognised that members of 
families, living together, have undertaken some sort of 
mutual support obligation.s6 This obligation may need to 
be continued even after family breakdown. In such 
circumstances the cour t s hav e very readil y ac c ep t ed that 
financial expenditure gives rise to an inference of 
encouragement. Th e courts have not demanded proof in 
these situations of ac t ual kno wledge of the representee ' s 
belief. Kno wledge of al t era t ion of pos it ion in these 
circumstances appears to be accepted a s kno wledge 
re p resentee ' s belief . 5 7 
of the 
In Morris v Morrisss for example the Ne w South Wales 
Supr eme Cour t g ran ted a reme dy based on proprietary es t oppel 
(ev en though the estoppel doctrine had not been specificall y 
pl e aded) . s 9 In this c a se the representee had gone to li v e 
·---.. -·-·-· .. ···········---·---·--·-·················--··-·····-······························ 5 5 See RD Laing , Knots (Penguin 1969) p 59 . 
56 See Bates ( 1984) 58 ALJ 44 8 ; P Stein and J Shand , Legal. Y..~Jues i n._ ... Wes.te rn ...... s.ociety ( 197 4) pp 20 ff . 57 Cf Gross v F r ench (19 7 6 ) 2 38 EG 39 a t 4 1 . 58 (1982 ] 1 NS WLR 61 . 
59 The Eng l ish Cou rts hav e insisted that proprietary es t oppe l 
must be specifically pleaded. See Halsbury' s Laws of 
E(ngland Vol 16, 4th Ed , Para 1516; B.i.shop v ~.9..~~.~. 
unreported Court of Appeal 16 October 1985); .:J::.P.: ........... :r:: .. E:!.. §_1::,?,_p. leLJ>al.mer (Unreported, Court of Appeal 12 April 1984) . 
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with his son and daughter-in-law in their property, having 
sold his own residential unit. The evidence concerning the 
precise nature of the arrangement was minimal. 
McClelland J found that there was 
no discussion as to the duration of the 
proposed living arrangements, or as to what 
was to happen if the theretofore harmonious 
relationship between the parties broke down 
or as to what was to happen if the defendants 
wanted to sell the house .. . Nor was there any 
discussion as to the characterization of the 
proposed application by the plaintiff of the 
proceeds of sale of his unit,60 
Mc c lelland J found that "the plaintiff spent money on 
the defendant's property in the expectation, induced or 
encouraged by the defendants that he wo uld be able to li v e 
there indefinitely as a member of the family . "6 1 The 
plaint iff' s expenditure of money was assumed to be evidence 
tha t the defendants had encouraged him in his expectation 
that he would be accommodated indefinitely, 62 
.. __ ... , ......................... ·····-· ........................ .......................................... -.... ......................................... . ............................. ...................................................................................................... ............... .. Cf s.no.ok v London ........ and ...... Wes.t ...... Ridi.ng ..... I .n ves.tments ........ Lt.d [ 1967] 1 
All ER 5 18 at 5 2 8 P..~-:r::. Di pl ock LJ ; TY.D..+..~.Y: v .l .~r.r.i .. ~ .. !:>.. (Unreported , Court of Appeal 7 April 1982) per Stephenson LJ . 
60 [1982] 1 NSWLR 61 at 62. 
61 [1982] 1 NSWLR 61 at 63. 
62 In Plimmer v Mayor ....... o.f_ ... We..1.1.i .ngton (1884) 9 App Cas 699 at 713 Sir Ar t hur Hobhouse maintained that the claim by the 
representee would not fail where it was unclear precisely 
what rights the representor was encouraging the representee lo believe h e was acquiring. See also P. .. ~ . .t.! .. I.!.Y.: v .l~.P.:.~ .. ~.P.: 
2
1
~1~LR
1 
4~~LRat
63
~2:~ 
638
Jinde~n~ .. ~:·~·vl~d!~ ~ 1ili11l~f\S!Ji.J 1 ~~~ ~ l§~'j")"~·~.J.J. v Hunt (Unrepo.r't°.ed .. ~ Ch·a·nc~·r ·y Division l February 
45 
In Walker v Walker63 Browne-Wilkinson LJ also rejected 
the trust claim of the plaintiff who lived with his son and 
daughter-in-law (the present defendants). The plaintiff had 
given the defendants over £5000 to spend on the property . 
There was no evidence of any intention to create a 
of the plaintiff . Browne-beneficial interest in favour 
Wilkinson LJ considered that, if proprietary estoppel had 
been specificall y raised, he might have been prepared to 
accept such a plea. He stated that there was "a common 
understanding that the father was to have a home in the new 
house." 6 4 However, both the evidence and the judge's 
findings were diverted from the crucial points because a 
resulting trust had been pleaded rather than a constructive 
trust. The latter claim (unlike the former) embraces the 
doctrine of proprietary estoppel,65 McClelland J's 
approach in tl..9 .. E .. :r::j __ ~. and the 9:A.9.:1::.9.'. of Browne-Wilkinson LJ in 
~~!~~~ v ~~!~~~66 accepted that family arrangements are more 
likel y to result from a "common understanding" between the 
parties rather than from any specific representation. The 
common understanding in these cases is somewhat unclear. 
In neither case was there any discussion between the 
parties about the more specific aspects of the arrangements . 
It appears in Morr~s, for instance, that McClelland J 
attempted to impute to the parties the agreement which the y 
might have reached themselves had they given the matter 
thought. He acknowledged the difficulties in ascertaining 
from a standpoint of conflict the precise terms of an 
63Unreported, Court of Appeal 12 April 1984. 64 Ibid. 
65 See Chapter 7. 66 U~reported, Court of Appeal 12 April 1984. 
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arrangement reached by the parties at a time of accord. 6 7 
He resolved this dilemma by taking a broad approach to the 
interpretation of conduct involving financial expenditure as 
encouragement. 
In Ph.i..1.1 .. i.P ........ Lowe ......... (Ch.i.nese ......... RestaurantJ. ......... Ltd v Sau Man 
..... -........ ..................... ......... . 
Lee6 8 the parties were de ...... ..facto husband and wife, sharing 
the property with the husband's first wife. 
refers to the second wife as a 'little wife'. 
Chinese custom 
The Court of 
Appeal recognised that it "must of course decide this case 
in accordance with English law, not in accordance with 
Chinese custom", Neverthe less the Court of Appeal recognised 
that it "must have the custom in mind as at least part of 
the background against which the parties in this litigation 
li ved, acted towards one another and may or may not have 
agreed, the one with the other." s 9 According to May LJ, 
the man's responsibility to his little wife "is very much 
the same as his responsibility for his first wife ... what the 
little wife can expect if the relationship should cease 
must ... be a matter for bargain and agreement between the 
parties. "1 o 
The 'little wife' claimed that her de facto husband had ... ...................... ,-........ ,_ .. ,,, .. , 
encouraged her to believe that the house would be hers. She 
had improved the property by repairing and decorating it. 
The Court of Appeal rejected the defendant's claim . The 
··-··-··-~········----···--· .. ······-············ .. ···-................... -._ .. · ............. . 6 7 See also Tunley v .~ .. 1:3.:~.~--~- (Unreported, Court of Appeal 7 April 1982) where there were equal difficulties in 
ascertaining the precise terms of an arrangement made at a 
time of accord when the parties were now in bitter dispute. 68Unreported, Court of Appeal 9 July 1985. 69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
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relationship between the parties could be viewed as quasi-
polygamous. Policy reasons may have prevented the Court of 
Appeal from recognising encouragement in a quasi-polygamous 
relationship. 
C Acceptance ...... o.f ...... expendi ture ..... from ..... a ...... member .. _o.f. .... the 
representor .. '.s ..... .fam.i.ly __ on ...... .Property __ not __ .. current_ly __ shared 
as ..... the ..... . familY ..... home 
When members of families are not living together, their 
relationships are likely to be governed by more formal 
social conventions than when they are living together. The 
meaning of conduct when families are living apart may be 
more complex than when they are living together. In 
deciding whether the acceptance of financial expenditure 
from a member of the representor ' s family constitutes 
encouragement in these circumstances, the courts have taken 
account of the level of expenditure by the representee and 
the effect any decision would have on other members of the 
extended family or on society at large. A combination of 
these factors rather than any one factor alone tends to 
influence the courts' determination of encouragement in any 
given case. 
i) Level ...... of ...... expend_i_ture 
In the complex Australian case of Cameron v Murdoch71 
......... -... ,................. ........ .. ................ ...................... .. 
the plaintiffs and the defendants were members of a large 
·-··-······- ·,, ....... ____ .... _ ,,, ................................................ -... 71 (1983] WAR 321. (The decision was affirmed by the Privy 
Council (1986) 63 ALR 575). 
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extended family living apart from each other. Brinsden J 
accepted that the plaintiffs had been encouraged to believe 
that they would obtain rights in the representors' property . 
He was influenced by the substantial nature of the 
plaintiffs' expenditure. The plaintiffs had spent more 
than thirty years improving extensive farmland. 
By contrast the expenditure of the representee in JN 
E 1. ~.i. o .t ..... & ....... Co .... J Farms l... .... Ltd v Murgatroyd72 was minimal. She 
had expended limited sums on furnishing a property belonging 
to her father, the representor. The latter had agreed that 
she could occupy the property but did not specify the time 
period. The New Zealand Court of Appeal accepted that 
there was an encouragement to the representee that she could 
li ve in the property but only for as long as it pleased the 
representor. 
ii ) Fami).i.a.l ...... c.ons.equences 
The court's inference of a relevant encouragement by 
the representor from the acceptance of financial e xpenditure 
from a member of his family may depend on the consequences 
s uch an inf~rence would have for other members of the 
famil y. In Warnes v Hed.l.ey , 1 3 for instance, the Court of 
Appeal was required to consider whethe-r the plaintiff had 
given her son and daughter-in-law any encouragement as to 
long-term rights in her property. She had allowed her son 
and daughter-in-law to use her property as their own family 
home . She had on occasion visited this home and had viewed 
7
.
2U-;reported, New Zealand Court of Appeal 12 September 1984. 73Unreported, Court of Appeal 31 January 1984. 
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the extensive and expensive works which they had carried 
out , May LJ recognised that "here was a mother or a 
mother-in-law who on the evidence, saw the work that was 
being done in the couple's matrimonial home." May LJ 
accepted that "she no doubt liked what she saw when she 
visited ... but in my judgment the evidence went no further 
than that," The representor would have lost her major 
financial asset had the Court of Appeal accepted the 
representees' claim of encouragement. Between the alleged 
representation and the court hearing the representor had 
herself become homeless. One of the representees, by 
contrast, had acquired an al terna ti ve home for herself and 
the children. The mere expression of pleasure at 
improvements which have been made did not necessarily, 
according to the Court of Appeal, constitute encouragement. 
Actual knowledge of the claimant's belief was held to be 
necessary in these circumstances. 
In Rolers v Eller74 the representor was the brother of 
the representee. · The representor was frequentl y absent 
from the disputed property, spending nine months of the year 
at sea with the Merchant Navy. For some forty years he had 
allowed the representee to live in and expend money on his 
home. The Court of Appeal held that his conduct was not to 
be interpreted as encouragement to the representee that she 
had acquired a permanent right to live in the property. In 
the Court's view · he had merely represented to his sister 
that she had a bare licence to remain there so long as the 
7
•Unreported, Court of Appeal 20 May 1986. 
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arrangements were congenial to him or at most during the 
period whil e her children were minors. 
In Roger.s. v Eller the representee had claimed as 
relevant encourag~ment that : 
to live in the property for 
( 1) she 
forty years; 
had been permitted 
( 2) she and her 
former husband had been perrni tted to maintain and improve 
the property; ( 3 ) the representor had accepted her care 
duri ng his six-month illness ; and ( 4) the representor had 
failed to recov er possession when the last of her children 
had left home. Slade LJ said that 
it is to be expected that in such 
circumstances close relatives in the position 
of the defendants, no doubt hoping and 
expect ing that they would continue to live in 
the property, by keeping the plaintiff well 
satisfied with the ir continued presence and 
wishing to improve their own comfort at the 
same time, would contribute by carrying out 
work to the property, even at substantial 
expense, and a lso b y giving other assistance 
to the plaintiff in one way or another.1s 
Slade LJ thus interpreted both the conduct of the 
representor and the belief of the representee as not 
ent itl ing the latter to obtain any long-term rights in the 
home . In reaching this conclusion, the court was 
Particularly influenced by the fact that the representor had 
75ib id . - -...........  -........................ ...... . 
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already bought out the representee's share in the property 
on their mother's death. To give the representee a new 
share would unjustly deprive the representor of a capital 
asset. Slade LJ also recognised that there were no longer 
young children of the family who required a home. 
In Savva v Costa ........ and ......... Ha:q::mode ........ I.nves.tments .......... Ltd 7 6 the 
representor had allowed the representee, his former de .... fact_o 
wife, to improve the house in which she was then living, 
apart from the representor, with their two children. The 
representor's consent to the improvements was seen as 
referable simply to an agreement that the plaintiff and the 
children could live there as licensees . The plaintiff had 
knowledge that the representee was improving the property 
but he did not know of her actual belief that she had rights 
beyond those of a mere licensee. The representor had no 
intention of evicting the representee and the Court of 
Appeal accordingly held that she did not need the protection 
of proprietary estoppel . 
decision "in no way 
plaintiff's right to 
Oliver LJ emphasised that the 
determined the 
continue in 
question of 
occupation of 
the 
the 
property". Oliver LJ warned that "the plaintiff would be 
entitled, if her enjoyment of the property is terminated in 
the future, to invoke that principle in support of a claim 
to an irrevocable licence ." 7 7 The plaintiff's occupation 
had not yet been disturbed and the defendant had assured the 
court that he had no intention of terminating the occupation 
currently enjoyed by the plaintiff and the children. 
·,"s-(i 9 81 ) 131 NLJ 1114 . 
77 Ibid. 
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In J .. ..N. ........ E.1.1.io.t ...... & ....... c.o .... J.Farms .. L ... Ltd v Murga troyd 7 s Somers J 
pointed out that the representor had already given a half-
share in the farm to the representee and almost the same to 
her b rother. To recognise the representee's expenditure as 
leading to an inference of encouragement of "a life 
occupanc y of farm property would be at odds with that 
virtual equality," 
In 9~m~TQn v M~T~9£h 79 Brinsden J took a broad approach 
in relation to encouragement and particularly in relation to 
the requirement of the representor' s knowledge. In 
advance of the court hearing of the estoppel claim, none of 
the representors knew what his or her legal rights over the 
propert y were. The administrator of the estate had 
"devel o ped procrastination into a fine art"so and this 
resulted in eight defendants disputing the plaintiffs' claim 
to the property. The estoppel claim succeeded in spite of 
the absence of knowledge by the de f endants of the precise 
nature of their legal rights . The court also held that 
there was no requirement that the representor should have 
actual knowledge of the representee ' s belief. In the 
present case every member of the extended famil y knew 
vagu el y that the plaintiffs had altered their position and 
were continuing to do so to their considerable detriment . 
Knowl e dge of this alteration of position, although tenuousl y 
evidenced , was deemed to be suffic i en t k nowledge to support 
the p laintiffs ' claim of encouragement . Th e defendants 
Would be wel l provided for from the ori g ina l rep r esent or's 
t su~reported , Ne w Zealand Co urt of Appe al 1 2 September 1984. 79 [1983] WAR 321. 
80 Ibid at 324. 
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estate; they would therefore not suffer unduly from the 
court's finding of a relevant encouragement . 
iii) Soc~etal_con~equences 
Although parties in such a close relationship as 
mistress and lover may regard themselves as members (at 
least whilst the relationship continues) of a de facto 
family, the courts have been very reluctant to recognise an 
'equity of estoppel' when the parties do not actually live 
in the same property. In such circumstances the courts 
have generally rejected the acceptance by the representor of 
financial expenditure as evidence of encouragement. If the 
courts were to permit claims in these circumstances, any 
mistress improving property would be granted an 'equity of 
estoppel' . a 1 
In 9 .. 9. . .9..@.P. .. ~ .. ~. v Smith a 2 Judge Jona than Parker QC made 
explicit the policy reasons for rejecting a mistress's 
claim that she had been encouraged to believe that she had 
been granted a right to remain permanently in the property. 
The judge accepted counsel's observation "that if the 
plai n tiff in the instant case has an equity to remain in 
occupation of the property, then a similar equity may be 
sic·f Jacks on v Cros.by ( No 2) ( 1979) 2 1 SASR 280. 92 (1986] 1 WLR 808. 
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expected to arise in the majority of cases where there is a 
dispute over property between man and his mistress."83 
The representor had provided a house for the 
representee and the child of their relationship but did not 
live with them. When the estoppel claimant had asked him to 
place the property in joint names, the representor had 
assured her that she need not worry because "he would 
prov ide a roof over her head", s 4 It would not seem 
unreasonable that the representee should have inferred from 
this that she had obtained a permanent right of occupation. 
This , however, the judge did not accept. 
somewhat obscurely that 
He explained 
a belief that the defendant would always 
provide her with a roof over her head is , to 
my mind, something quite different from a 
belief that she had a legal right to remain 
there against his wishes.as 
The parties had not discussed what should happen in the 
event of a breakdown in their relationship. The 
representation was therefore deemed to lack the clarity 
required for the purposes of an estoppel _claim. 
-
8
-
3C.~ombes v Smith [ 1986] l WLR 808 at 816. See also !.!2.r..r·cick·;;;-···-v For··;a:····-·····(1976] 1 WLR 230; Ha ton [ 1986] CLJ 395; Oli v·e·;·-··-( 19f"1fY"'·····~ff Current Leg Problems 8~. 84 Coombes v Smith [1986] 1 WLR 808 at 821 . I -·- .. ·-··- .................. - ....... . 5
.Ibid. See, however, Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431; G 
···--·······-·············· ······ ············· ···············-····-
... 1.:.~~s.ley v Cooke [ 1980] 1 WLR 1306 . 
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In .f. .. !:.:t::1-.tr.:1. v .f..r..:i::i..tr.:i, 8 6 the disputed property was of 
substantial value. The plaintiff was able to realise that 
value by defeating the defendants' claim in estoppel. The 
defendants, the third generation of an extended family (the 
plaintiff representing the second generation) had cultivated 
land as a smallholding whilst living in caravans on the 
site . The defendants claimed that their grandmother (the 
plaintiff's mother) had told them to keep up the good work 
which their father had commenced . She had also permitted 
them to place their mobile homes on the site. This conduct 
was held by Cumming-Bruce LJ to relate to a mere licence 
granted to the defendants by the grandmother. The basis 
for this decision was that the alleged representor could not 
have been expected to make a representation which would 
effectively involve giving the representee absolute rights 
in valuable freehold building land. Such an outcome would 
have left the representor's daughter, (the present 
plaintiff), without a penny.a, Any decision to recognise 
the representor's acceptance of expenditure as an 
encouragement relating to the acquisition of long-term 
rights over his property by the representee would have left 
valuable development land under-utilised. 
In. J ... N ........ El..l .. iot ..... & ..... co .... J .FarmsJ. ..... L.td v Mu.rg.atroydB a Somers J 
gave an additional reason for his inference that there had 
been a minimal encouragement as to a temporary occupation 
"' ·-MM"'"'••• """ 0 M .. HOMOMn,•o o •oo ...... 0• 0•• • "' '"" ...... 0 ............... . 86Unreported, Court of Appeal 15 November 1983. 87 The decision in Fruin was particularly unfortunate in that the grandmother had left a will granting the plaintiff and the defendants equal shares in the proceeds of sale of Property on condition that the defendants removed their caravans from the site on the death of the testatrix . The defendants had had no means of knowing this condition. 88Unreported, New Zealand Court of Appeal 12 September 1984. 
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right, He declared that any other view "would be likely to 
affect the future of the farm over a long period of years. 
AnY assumption of the father about her occupation must 
surel y have fallen well short of this." s 9 The Court of 
Appeal was concerned, more over, to protect the commercial 
viability of the farm . 
D Acc_eptanc_e __ ..o.f ... expenditur.e ... on .... property where 
representor ...... and .... representee. are ... strangers_ 
i) Where. ....... .r::1..e. t:t..h .. e..r. .. . PartY: .... ..i.s .. a .... f.~:Z:1.?-n.-.c::Jal ...... ~nsti tut ion 
The legal interpretation of conduct between strangers 
is assessed against the background of those wider customary 
rules wh ich govern societ y as a who le. Strangers are not 
expected to behave in an unquestioning benevolent manner 
to ward s each other in their dealings with property. 
Consequentl y in these circumstances the courts have been 
reluctant to a c cept a plea of estoppel which would interfere 
with the rights of the legal title holder unless certain 
stringent conditions are met . These conditions relate to 
the legal title holder's knowledge of his own rights and of 
the be lief held by the represent ee . 
a) C ons.t ruc.t.i v e .. kn owl edg e ....... o.f .. . th e ... repr e .s en t.e e.'.s .... be l.i.e f 
In P.i.11.i.ng v Armi.tage 9 o the Master of the Rolls 
explained that where a legal title holder sees a stranger 
.................... ,-.--......... -,., .............. ········-·············· .. ·············· .. ················ 8 9 Ibid per Somers J; see also tJ..£.~_e. .. ~.:r.! v Harvey [ 19 58] NZLR 25, ········-···· 
90 (1805) 12 Ves Jun 79, 33 ER 31. 
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laying out money on his land he is normally under a duty to 
speak out. It is readily understood that a person spending 
money on a stranger's land must be under a mistaken belief 
that he has rights over that land,91 Failure to speak out 
in such circumstances will usually be seen as encouragement 
to the person improving the land that his belief is correct. 
In H._~P}..:1.:.J . .t. .. 9..r.:1. v Q.~ .. E .. ?.-.g..l::i!.Y 9 2 the de fen dan t was aware of 
the fact that a stranger was building a house on the 
defendant's land . The defendant remained silent about her 
rights and in consequence was held to have encouraged the 
stranger to believe that he had acquired rights in the land. 
Knowledge that a stranger is building a house on land that 
is not his appears to be equated with knowledge that he 
believes that he must hav e a right ove r that land . In such 
circumstances , knowledge of this alteration of position 
normall y places a duty on the legal owner to intervene. 
b) Repres.en_to.r .. ' .. s ...... ac_tua.l ..... know_ledge ... . of ... hi_s ... own ..... rights 
In Pennell V Nunn 9 3 the bankrupt plaintiff claimed 
t hat the liquidator had, b y inaction , led him to think that 
9 1 Ibid at 3 3 . See also .9:.E .. ~ .. gg_.r. . .Y.: v !1..!)lh .. ~ .. J.: .J.:. ( 1811) 18 Ves Jun , 34 ER 341 where the Master of the -Rolls said that the 
representor had "permitted the plaintiff to remain in possessi on and t o make expenditure upon the land for eight Years, before he brought an ejectment. He must have known tha t the e xpenditure was made upon the faith of the 
;g:;;m~~!, ~ 
9 
a ;e;
1 
tlso Pl imme r v !1..~Y.9..E ......... 9..f. ...... ~.~..J.:..J.:J_~_g _ _t...9._.r.:i, ( 1884) 
9 2 ( 1901) 1 NSWSR ( Eq) 81. 
9 3Unreported, Chancery Division 2 April 1982 . See also Sl_!~~ v ~..EP..J.:.~ .. ~-~~ .. ~- (1978) 1 All ER 123 at 131 where the Plaintiffs were uncertain as to their legal rights but were 
aware of the defendant's activities. They took no action 
at first. Buckley LJ explained that "it should not ... be 
58 
the liquidator was asserting no claim to the land on which 
the plaintiff had built his home. Judge Finlay QC rejected 
the claim as outrageous. The bankrupt had done everything 
to prevent the liquidator from discovering the true 
ownership of the property. The liquidator's inaction was 
without any semblance of knowledge of his own rights over 
the property and could not therefore be seen as 
encouragement.94 
c) Ac.:t. 1c1.al ....... ~.:r.iow~.~dge. of. ..... the .repres.entee ' s .bel.ie.f 
In P.t~Jtpg v A.:r.:.~JJ .1:l:g~.9 5 the court acknow ledged that the 
nature of the representee ' s expenditure on the land might 
relate t o a pre-existing agreement between the parties 
rather than to an y alternative belief held by the 
representee. The representor's acquiescence in e xpenditure 
by the representee in such circumstances was not conduct 
which co ul d be v iewed as encouragement unless the 
repres e ntor had actual knowledge of the belief held by the 
representee. 
t he policy of the court to push people into litigation until t hey ar e really sure that they have got a genuine complai nt 
a nd have got a case in whi ch they are likely to succ eed, and 
ac quie s cence at a time when the parties are in doubt as to 
what their true r i ghts are, could ... seldom satisfy the tests I have been discuss ing '' . See also Canadian_Pacific_ Railway 9 ..9..~ .. l:!-.:9 .. J'.'.: v T..h .. ~ ....... KA:9 .. 11 [ 19 3 1 ] AC 4 14 at 4 3 0 P~ .. :r.:. Lord Russe 11 • 9 4 see a 1 s O $ .. Y ..~-~.~ .. <:.>.n. V :P .. c.l:.Y:9 .. ~. ( 19 4 5 ) 7 1 C LR 5 3 1 . C f § .. t...1.1 .. ~ .. !:3.. V Qowper (1748) 3 Atk 692, 28 ER 1198. 95
.(f8.Ci'5) 12 Ves Jun 79, 33 ER 31. 
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(1) Pre-ex~st~ng_~~cences 
In E ...... & ........ L ......... Ber~L ... _Homes ....... L.td v Grey9 6 the defendants had 
occupied a mobile home on the plaintiff company's site for 
twen ty-six years. The first defendant was an employee of 
the company. The plaintiff's representative had told the 
defendants that the site was to be 
suggested that it might be in their 
re-developed and 
interest to find 
alternative land for their mobile home if land became 
available. The plaintiff's representative also said that 
he did not think that the company would bother to evict the 
defendants. The latter continued to live on the site and 
actually purchased a more luxurious mobile home and improved 
the land surrounding it. The plaintiff's representative 
was aware of these improvements. 
Brandon LJ interpreted the words of the plaintiff's 
representative as a warning of the precarious nature of 
their rights, a warning which he thought the defendants had 
foQlishly ignored. According to Brandon LJ, 11 a statement 
by way of representation, a promise, in order to found an 
estoppel must be clear and unambiguous. 11 9 7 Furthermore, 
the plaintiff's acquiescence in the defendants' improvements 
was without actual knowledge of the defendants' belief. 
The defendants' expenditure could readily be understood by 
the plaintiff as related to the bare licence which it 
conceded had been granted to the defendants some twenty-six 
Years ago. 9 s In these circumstances the defendants had 
merely a unilateral and mistaken belief in their rights 
... ,-.......... , . .. , __ ••• --•••••••-•HOOO•H•••-••••HOO•NH,,,,,,.,,.,,o,,o •OOM•,0 0000• 
96 (1979) 253 EG 473. 97 Ibid at 477. 
; s ~~ ~ y a i; ~ 4 )'"~·-··E..~ .....  ~ .. ~~.~.1.~.¥. ...... f.~.1.~.~E (Unreported, Court of Appeal 
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which can never give rise to an estoppel claim. It is open 
to question whether the Court of Appeal would have made the 
same decision if the defendants had built a house 
constructed of bricks and mortar. 9 9 The concept of a 
licence whose scope may fluctuate to embrace further 
development of land was used as a means to defeat the 
estoppel claim. To have permitted the defendant to remain 
on the site would have left a valuable building plot 
undeveloped . As the Court of Appeal implied, this would 
not have made any commercial sense.100 
( 2) Y:t:1..t.~.?-.. !: .. ~.T.9.: .. ~ .. c hange .. i .n .... part.ies.' ....... relati.onship 
The representee's belief ma y change unilaterally during 
the course of his relationship with the representor. At 
the ' commencement of the relationship they may have been in 
agreement with each other as to the nature of the rights 
which we re to be granted. The encouragement given by the 
representor relates only to the agreement at the 
commencement of the relationship. It does not extend to 
any new and uncommunicated belief which has subsequently 
been adopted by the representee. 
The Northern Irish case of Devlin v ~ ............ .I. .......... Hous .. i.ng 
~.xecutive101 is an interesting illustration of the situation 
described above. 1 o 2 The defendant housing authority had 
99 Estoppel claims involving caravans as the family home have 
been remarkably unsuccessful, see, e.g., Fruin v Fruin (Unreported, Court of Appeal 15 November 1983j"°··;······-········williai·~···-·v 
9..2Jeman (Unreported, Court of Appeal 27 June 1984) :-············ ···············--··-·· 100 (1979) 253 EG 473 at 477. 101 (1982) 3 NILR BJ 1. 
~ ~ ~~~~ ; 1:~LR~.111~.l:l:.t~ ..... J~.E .. ~.~-:t.~ .. Es ..... 8:.~9: ..... ~t?-.. :t .. !9~~E .. ;;> ........ 1.:t .. 9.: v Hagg.ie 
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encouraged the plaintiff to believe that it would permit her 
to change her status from that of tenant to that of owner-
occupier jointly with her nephew. The plaintiff and her 
nephew then began to improve the property but, unknown to 
the defendant, intended that the nephew should be the sole 
owner-occupier. The common assumption on which the 
plaintiff and defendant initially acted had thus been 
revised unilaterally. As soon as the housing authority 
discovered this, it objected and ordered the improvement 
works to cease. Lowry LCJ held that "it is impossible for 
a person to be guilty of acquiescence unless it is shown 
that he knew what was going on or at least was wilfully 
blind to it. " 1 o a The Chief Justice clearly stated that 
knowledge of "what was going on" encompassed what was 
actually in the mind of the plaintiff and not the mere fact 
of the improvement works. 
( 3) Pre-_exi_s_t_i_ng ....... tenanc_i_es_ 
Where there is a pre-existing tenancy, the courts have 
been reluctant to infer that any encouragement given by ' the 
landlord relates to anything other than the existing 
agreement. In § .. ~ .. t. . .±.!.'."_~J.J:. v Simps_on, 1 o 4 the defendant 
tenants were told by the plaintiff landlady that "they 
would be alright for the house ... they would be secure in the 
> ....... ,,.M, ... .,_.MM<--•-••••-•• .. •o•-••••••-• •• ••••••••M•H•OO .. o .. ,o,,MoOH-
~
03 (1982) 3 NILR BJ 1, 20, 21. See also P. .. ~.P.:!tY. v .l .. ~.P.:§ .. ~.P.: 
3 
1977] 2 NZLR 635 at 638; t'):_9._J? .. ~ .. ~.P.. v H.~.!'..Y .. ~ [ 1958] NZLR 25 at O. In Rod v We_l_l_i_ngton ...... C.ity _Corporation [1919] NZLR 595 
at 601 it was held that there must be "actual knowledge 
unless the circumstances are such that the only explanation 
of the representee's behaviour is that he is mistaken as to his right." 
104 ( 1983) 133 NLJ 894. See 
T.h .. f?. ....... T.irne_s 4 June. 
also Brinnand v Ewens (1987) 
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house" after her death,1os Sir Douglas Frank QC , acting as 
a Deputy High Court Judge, interpreted this statement to 
mean that their tenancy would remain undisturbed which it 
has, The judge held that it was impossible to interpret 
the plaintiff's words as sufficient encouragement to found 
an estoppel. The words could equally mean that the 
defendants' residential security would be protected by means 
of a statutory tenancy under the Rent Act.106 
Again in $..~:i'.?:.b)9~ ..... .. 9 .. ~.9 .. \l!.:.t:1:...t. .. ~.~- Ltd v I_s_enberg 1 o 7 a pre-
existing tenancy led the Court of Appeal to reject an 
estoppel claim. The defendant had informall y agreed that W 
should take over the defendant's tenancy of the plaintiff 
company's property, al tho ugh this arrangement had no legal 
force . W subsequently spent £40,000on the property and, 
because the plaintiff's agent had acquiesced in this 
expenditure, W claimed to have acquired an ' equity of 
estoppel ' Cumming-Bruce LJ found that the plaintiff's 
agent, the porter knew all about the fact that the work had 
been procured and was taking place. Indeed the porter 
helped by making arrangements for a skip in which to place 
the waste building material. Cumming-Bruce LJ nevertheless 
held that the plaintiff had not " induced an expectation" in 
W. Although the plaintiff's agent knew of W's expenditure 
he did not know that W was acting on her own behalf. W' s 
alteration of position was equally consistent with the 
Possibility that it was being undertaken on behalf of the 
·····~ ......... , __ , ........................................................ _ .................................. .. 
: 0 5 § .. !:.AJ~~-Ll.. v § . .t..~P..!?,.9..r.:t. ( 19 8 3 ) 13 3 NLJ 8 9 4 at 8 9 5 , 06 See Rent Act 1977, S .2 (1) . 107 (1985) 274 EG 1028. The defendant attempted to he r eviction by the plaintiff landlord by arguing 
'e_qui ty of estoppel ' had arisen in favour of W, her tenant . 
prevent 
that an 
alleged 
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defendant tenant. Actual knowledge of W's belief would be 
necessary to found an estoppel claim here. 
ii) Where ...... one ...... of ...... the ..... part.i.e.s ...... ..i.s ...... a .. f.i.nancial ........ i.nst.i.tut.i.on 
The analysis of proprietary estoppel in this 
dissertati o n is primarily concerned with claims by members 
of families that rights have been obtained in the family 
home. However, the doctrine of proprietary estoppel has 
also been employed to resolve questions of priorities 
between members of families and financial institutions. 
The following section deals with 'familial cases' which fall 
mainl y into the latter category. 
a) Impo.rtance ...... o.f ...... c.ommerc .. i.al ....... c.o.ns.eque.nc.es. 
Relationships 
inv ariably formal. 
with financial institutions are 
There is a general acceptance II that 
banks are in business to make money and that they offer 
serv ices to the customer only if they can profit from 
them . 11 1 o s Thus these types of relationships are formalised 
agai n st the backgrou nd of an e x pectation that the parties 
will comply with rules of conduct which have regard to 
certain broad commercial consequences of the transaction. 
Th e strict controls which constrain financial institutions 
o ften oblige them to adopt a toug h-minded approach i n their 
deal i n gs with customers . 1 0 9 Moreov er , the caselaw 
·
10
·--;·Nation a l Con s umer Counc il, Banki.ng_ .. __ Serv.ices .......... and ._ ...... _t.h..~ g_onsumer ( Me t huen and Co Ltd 1983) , p 11. 1
~
9For e xample see Building Societies Ac t 1986 s 45. 
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demonstrates that the courts have also tended generally to 
the view that the interests of the institution should be 
preferred to those of the customer,110 
Where a financial institution has lent money to a 
family member in order to finance the purchase or 
improvement of the latter's property, the courts have 
sometimes viewed the borrower's conduct as a form of 
encouragement which may found an estoppel claim in favour 
of the financial institution. The acceptance of the loan 
by the borrower appears to override any possible 
interpretation of the borrower's conduct as other than 
relevant encouragement to the lender for the purposes of 
estoppel . The courts have frequently made the implicit 
assumption that financial institutions are protected there 
will be widespread repercussions throughout the commercial 
world which will affect society at large. 
b) The ... re.presen tor .. ' .. s ....... knowl.e.dge ...... i s ....... i.rre.l.evant 
Even where the representor' s conduct has been wholly 
acquiescent, the judges have tended to dispense with any 
requirement that the representor should be aware not only of 
his own rights but also of the belief of the representee. 
In Midland Bank 
··-·-······"'"''""'" "'"'""'""'''''-""'''' ''''"' -· •• ......... . 
V Farmpr i.de ........ Ha tc.h e r.i.e s ...... ~]:..9: 1 1 1 the 
second defendant had sought an overdraft from the plaintiff 
bank and had remained silent about his long-term licence to 
11 0See , however, the comments of Judge Myerson 
~ewton (The Times, 6 January 1987). 
ii""i(l981) 260 EG 493. 
in R v 
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occupy part of the property which was then charged to the 
bank , The Court of Appeal later viewed this silence as 
significant. The bank had not asked about the existence 
of any occupancy which might reduce the value of its 
security. The defendant's deliberate silence was regarded 
by the Court of Appeal as conduct which encouraged the bank 
to believe that its loan to the second defendant's company 
was secure. The Court inferred from this deliberate 
silence that the defendant had knowledge of the bank's 
belief . Shaw LJ emphasised that "it would have been 
obvious to a schoolboy, let alone a man of business" that if 
the representor were to offer company property as a security 
for an advance, the lender would regard his licence to 
occupy that property as his home as reducing the value of 
that security . The representor' s silence in relation to 
the li c ence could not be ascribed to mere oversight or 
inadvertance on his part.112 
Shaw LJ accepted that a prospective purchaser or lender 
normally has a duty to inquire whether the defendant's 
occupancy concealed a proprietary interest in his favour. 
If, however, the occupier induced the representee to believe 
that he had no interest, such an enquiry is no longer 
necessary. In effect the doctrine of notice has been 
reversed at this point. 
--............. .......... -............. ····-.. ···-······ .. ···········'"·-···········''"'''''''"''""'''''' 112 According to Shaw LJ "collateral and irrelevant matters Were described by [ the defendant] with profuse Particularity; but not a word about the licence. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that [the defendant] intended to conceal the existence of the licence." (1981) 260 EG 493 at 495. 
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In Angl .. i .a ....... Bui.ld.ing ......... Soci .. ety v the defendant Lewis 1 1 3 ........... _ .. , ............. . 
claimed that proceedings for possession by the mortgagee 
s hould be set aside because she had an overriding interest 
under section 70(1)(g) of the Land Registration Act 1925. 
The plaintiff building society claimed that the defendant 
was estopped from alleging such an interest. The Court of 
Appeal held that the defendant had represented to the 
building society that its interest would take priority. 
This representation was regarded b y the Court of Appeal as 
c onsi sting of silent conduct. Counsel for the defendant 
had argued that there should be an investigation of the 
extent of the knowledge of the defendant as to her rights at 
the date when the mortgage deed was entered into by her 
husband. The Court of Appeal accepted that the judge at 
firs t instance had failed to consider that the repre sentor 
had no knowledge of her own rights. The Court of Appea l 
nevertheless decided in favour of the building society on 
othe r grounds. Had t he d efendant succeeded, she would hav e 
been. allowed to stay in the property with no further 
payme nts to the bu ild i ng society and if the property were 
sold at a later date, obtain her share of the inflated 
proceedings of sale. It is rare for judges to verbalise 
their c oncern that financial institutions should suffer 
loss, but precisely this concern is implicit in Angl .. i.a 
Buil.di.ng_.s.o.c .. i .ety v Lewis . 
Browne-Wilkinson LJ did verbalise disquiet at the 
Possibility of loss by financial institutions in ~ .. E . .:i:: .. l=.i .. ~.9..t ...... ~-z::i.9.: 
~~.:?. .. t ...... Bu.i lding .... Soci.ety v Henning . 11 • Here, the defendant, a 
11
-3.l.Jnreported, Court of Appeal 29 January 1982 . 114 (1985) 1 WLR 778. 
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I 1 
~ ..... f..~ .. <? .. !-.<?. wife, claimed that she had an 'equity of estoppel' 
permitting her to occupy the family home in priority to any 
rights vested in the plaintiff building society. Browne-
Wilkinson LJ pointed out the "risk that the common sense 
answer may get lost in the man y different technicalities 
which can arise." The mortgage was granted to the society 
b y a de ...... ..fact.o husband with the full knowledge and approval 
of the defendant wife. There was a joint project between 
them to buy . the propert y with the assistance of a mortgage, 
and without the mortgage loan it was clear that the house 
could never have been bought. 
Browne-Wilk inson LJ, 
The defendant, according to 
had unsuccessfull y tried to find some way of 
paying the instalments under the mortgage, 
the logical result of her argument (if right) 
is that she is entitled to stay in possession 
indefinitely without making any payment. 
That would be a strange result which I would 
be reluctant to reach.11s 
In order to prevent such a result Browne-Wilkinson LJ 
was compelled to hold that the defendant's silence at the 
date of mortgage had provided encouragement to the building 
society to believe that she was postponing her right to its 
rights under the mortgage . By imputing to the defendant 
knowledge which she probably did not have, Browne-Wilkinson 
LJ was able to give judgment in favour of the building 
115
.ibid at 781. See l P dd . B · 1ct · S . a so a i_ngton ........ u.1 ... 1.ng ........ _oc_i_ety v 
M~ndelsohn (1985) 50 P & CR 244; Martin (1986) Fam Law 315; 
Welst-e~cC .. {1985] CLJ 354. 
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society. The woman had said in evidence that she had never 
thought about the building society's belief but that, had 
she done so, she would have appreciated that it believed 
tha t she was postponing her equitable right in its favour. 
The Court of Appeal was significantly influenced by the fact 
that the representor had knowledge of and accepted the 
representee's alteration of position in her favour. It was 
not , however, necessary that she should have known the 
precise nature of the building society's belief . 
The balance of legal protection seems to fall in favour 
of institutional lenders which, of course, have access to 
infini tely b ette r legal advice than is generally available 
to owners of informall y acquired equi t able rights . In 
William.~ .?.-P..9.- _G_lyn_'s ..... Bank_ Ltd v Bolandl 16 Lord Denning MR 
said 
......... ... ~ ' - •M• H •H 
it is utterly wrong that a lender should turn 
a blind eye to the wife's interest or the 
possibility of it and afterwards seek to 
turn her and the family out - ... If a bank is 
to do its duty, in the society in which we 
li v e, it should recognise the integrity of 
the matrimonial home . It should not destroy 
it by disregarding the wife 's interest in it 
simply to ensure that it is paid the 
husband's debt in full with the high 
interest rate now previously . We should not 
1 16 (1979] Ch 312. 
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give monied might priority over social 
justice. 1 1 7 
The courts seem nowadays less mindful of these words. By 
rejecting any requirement of actual knowledge, on the part 
of the totall y passive representor , the courts have 
steadily eroded informal property rights by reference to the 
same equitable principles which gave rise to the estoppel 
rights in the first place . 11a 
E No .... expendi ture .. .... on ...... the ...... repres_ento r ' .. s _.propertyor ...... other 
sign.i_f_ican_t . ... al teration .... of .. __ posi ti_on _which .!?~.!:l.~ .. :f..~ts the 
representor_ .. 
Where the representee's alteration of position does not 
benefit the representor, the courts hav e been unwilling to 
infer a relevant encouragement . 
instance , a divorce settlement left the wife in occupation 
of the former family home, a farmhouse. The husband 
continued to farm the adjacent land f rom his father's 
farmhouse close by. Prior to t h e di v orce he had given his 
wife permission to graze her horses on two of his fields. 
She had c ontinued to graze he r horses on these fields and 
earned a small income for herself b y doing so. The 
plaintiff husband subsequentl y wished to take these fields 
back into cultivation . The defendant now claimed that she 
had been induced to believe that the arran gement was 
pe rmanen t . Olive r LJ r e solve d the dispute in favour of the 
"i"i7 Ibid at 332, 333. A similar vi e w was take n by t he House 
of Lords in its dec ision in the same case, ([ 1981) AC 487). 11 ssee We l stead (1985] CLJ 354. 
1 19 Unrepo rted, Court of Appea l 20 November 1980. 
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husband, holding that this arrangement involved a mere 
licence. Any alternative view of the arrangement would 
have ruined the farming business and prejudiced the position 
of the husband who had granted substantial overdraft 
facilities to finance the farm. Furthermore it was 
unnecessary to use proprietary estoppel to protect the wife 
because her husband was happy to grant her a licence over 
other fields for her horses.120 
In W.tJJJ .. 1:l:.~~- v .G..<?.J .. ~~-?.::r.:i.12 1 the plaintiff widow (who was 
physically disabled) had agreed with the defendant that he 
could accommodate his greyhounds on her land. Subsequentl y 
he installed a caravan on her land to which she raised no 
objection. Fox LJ explained her failure to raise any 
objection on the simple ground that ''she was a lady under a 
severe disability and it may be that she wanted to avoid 
trouble." The Court of Appeal had no difficulty in 
rejecting the defendant's plea of estoppel. The 
defendant's alteration of position was insignificant and 
equivocal. The plaintiff was not even aware that the 
defendant was actually living in the caravan. 
Whe re the representee's alteration of position is 
minimal and confers no benefit on the r~presentor, it seems 
that the crucial element consists in the latter's knowledge 
of the representee's actual belief rather than of his 
alteration of position. 
-
1
·
2
-
0Ibid. See also S_avva v Cos.ta ____ and ____ Harymode ____ )_nves_tmen_ts !:,td ( 19 81) 131 NLJ 1114. 
12 1unreported Court of Appeal 27 June 1984. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
--.. ··'"····-······-··-----.... -.. , ...... -, ... 
P.~TE,.!.~.NJ~A!.'. ...... ALTERATION ...... OF_ ... POSIT.ION ...... AND ...... RELIANCE 
1 INTRODUCTION . 
, ............ --·- ·-·············· '""''"'"' '' '""'"''''''''' ' '"'' 
In ~.:i.:.J.J.m..9. .. t...t.. v J?. .. ?.-.. !'ber,.1 Fry J' s second 2._robandum for 
successful estoppel claims stated that the representee must 
hav e e x pended some money or must have done some act ( not 
necessarily upon the representor's land) on the faith of his 
belief. The modern reformulation of this probandum 
requires that there be some ultimately detrimental change of 
position by the representee in reliance on the 
representation 
encouragement . 2 
engendered by the representor's 
A relevant alteration of position need 
not initially be detrimental to the representee . In many 
situations the fact that he has altered his position may at 
first be to his advantage. However, the requi~ed element 
of det r iment lies in the damage caused by this alteration of 
position if and when the representor subsequently resiles 
from h is representation . The cases considered in this 
chapter demonstrate that there is a widespread 
mi sunde r stan ding in the present contex t o f the real meaning 
of t h e term 'detriment' . 
The notion of d e trime ntal reliance by the repre s e ntee 
conta i n s t wo c ompon e n t i deas. Fi.rs.t, t here mus t b e a n 
al terati on of p os i t i o n whi c h i s jud g e d t o be de trime ntal a t 
1(-1-880) Ch D 96 at 105-106 (ante at 14, 15). 
; See §.n ~)J, ... ~ ... !L ...... P .. r.J.P.:.9..i.PJ..~~.--.2 .. f .......... ~.9.:!:!.Lt.Y ( 2 8 t h Ed 1 9 8 2 ) , p 5 5 9 ; 
R P.encer Bower and Turner, T.h.~ .. ___ l.,,9:.!':1_ ... J.~ .. ~l-~_:!:.J.P.:.~ .......... ~.Q ... _.~.§ . .!=:..C?P.P~.J ........ !> .. Y: 
~ -t.:~.!?._e n t 9: .. t.i .. .2.P.:. ( 3 rd Ed 1 9 7 7 ) , p . 1 0 1 . 
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the date the representor resiles from his representation . 
second , this alteration of position must occur in reliance - ·---n •MOMO 
on the representor's representation. 
I I THE ..... DOCTR.INAL ..... NEED ...... FOR _ DETR.IMENTAL. ALTERA TI ON-· OF 
POSITION 
.... _ ............................. ........... .. 
In Grundt v The ... Grea t ....... Boulder _P'tz_ ... Gold ....... Mi.ne.s .......... Ltd, 3 
Dixon J explained that detrimental reliance is essential 
becaus e the very purpose of any estoppel 
is to avoid or prevent a detriment to the 
party asserting the estoppel by compelling 
the opposite party to adhere to the 
assumption upon which the former acted or 
abstained from acting . This means that the 
real detriment or harm from which the law 
seeks to give protection is that which would 
flow from the change of position if the 
assumption were deserted that led to it. So 
long as the assumption is adhered to, the 
party who alt~red his situation upon the 
faith of it cannot complain, 4 
If at the moment of resilition the representee is no 
longer suffering a detriment , there will no longer be any 
'inchoate equity ' left which r equi res to be satisfied by the 
-----··-.. ····-··----·-··-····· .. ·-········ .. , ............... -............. . 3 (193 7) 59 CLR 641. 
'Ibid at 671. See also Thom.Ps.on v Palmer ( 1933) 49 CLR 520 
at 547; Reed v §.h.~-~.h-~.!!. (1982) 39 ALR 260 at 275, 276, 
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court. Such a result may follow either because the 
representee has voluntarily accepted adequate compensation 
from the representor or because he has freely returned to 
his original position. In such circumstances all 
detriment has been spent; unconscionability has ended.s 
III MODERN ...... ATTEMPTS ...... To ..... DISPENSE._. WITH .. _.THE._,,,REQU.IREMENT ..... oF ..... A 
DETRIMENTAL ALTERATION OF POSITION ,,.,,,,,,, .. ,,,,,,-,,--••-••••'"''''u .. ,,,o••••••••••••••••••••H••••••• ••••••.,,,,, ,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, .. _,,,,_,,,,,,,,.,,,,,., .. ,,,,.,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,, .. ,. .. ,,,,,,_, ,, ,,,_, ... , .. ,,. __ ,,_, ... 
In Greasl_ey: v Cooke, 6 Lord Denning MR suggested that 
proof of detriment was unnecessary,7 He thought it to be 
sufficient if the party, to whom the assurance is given, 
acts on the faith of it in such circumstances that it 
would be unjust and inequitable for the party making the 
assurance to go back on it. This dictum has caused some 
confusion and has led to a belief that Lord Denning MR was 
in fact attempting to dispense completely with the 
requirement of detriment. The representee in Gre.as.ley v 
g_.9. .. <? . .k:.~. had clearly acted to her detriment, as Lord Denning MR 
recognised. She had worked for the defendants without 
wages over a period of thirty years when she could have 
left and obtained a job elsewhere. Th e alteration of 
position represented by her labours was no detriment to her 
-·--·--···-.... , ...... _ ... _______ , . ., ................................................. .. 5 See Ap£l eby v Cowl_ey ( 1982) The ..... Times., 14 April. In Vinden v Vinden (1982] 1 NSWLR 618 at 625 Needham J held t1ia"t""'""'once'""'·"t'fi"ei"""""representor had accepted the representee' s Periodic payment of outgoings of his property, he could not subsequently defeat the estoppel claim by seeking to prevent the representee from continuing such payments. 6 [1980] 1 WLR 1306 at 1311. See also Woodman (1981) 44 MLR 461; Annand (1981] Conv 154. ;!~ MLooorrcfa~=n~~~~anh~~l.e a~~e~~d :i I:i ~~:in;~e~;9:~~r~~s~~5 ~~ 
D
5
ixon J in Grundt v The ... _Great ....... Boulder_._PtY ...... M.i.nes ....... Ltd ( 1937) 9 CLR 641 at 675 as to the requirement of detriment. 
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so long as she received the benefit of a roof over her head 
but detriment was clearly threatened if this benefit were 
taken away from her. 
Lord Denning MR' s dictum in Greas.l.ey v Q.9. .. 9..~.~- s has been 
subsequently interpreted in the sense that the claimant need 
not show that he or she has suffered any detriment during 
the period while the representation holds good, but must 
simply show at this stage that his or her position has been 
altered . Such alteration of position will then be adjudged 
as raising an estoppel ( or not) in terms of the detriment 
which later ensues when the representor resiles. In Watts 
v Story ,9 for instance, Dunn LJ explained that Lord Denning 
MR' s dictum in Greas.ley v Cooke did not state any new 
proposition of law. For Dunn LJ it mattered not "whether 
one talks in terms of detriment or whether one talks in 
terms of it being unjust and inequitable for the party 
gi v ing the assurance to go back on it. " He found it 
difficult to envisage circumstances which would give rise to 
unconscionabili ty unless the representee had suffered some 
prejudice or detriment as a result of the representor' s 
resilition . 10 
Lord Denning MR's dictum in Greas,,ley v Cookell may 
equall y be interpreted as fostering a broader approach to 
de triment along lines which · mirrored the decision in Je 
MaJ..:r..itiendra.i. v Quagl .. i .a. 1 2 
8[.t'980] 1 WLR 1306. 
9 (1983) 134 NLJ 631. 
Here a majority in the Supreme 
: 
0
~.~.!:J: s. v § .. !:.9. .. r. .. Y. ( 19 8 3 ) 13 4 NLJ 6 3 1 . 1 (1980) 1 WLR 1306 at 1311. 12 (1981) 26 SASR 101 at 106, 116. This case relates to Promissory estoppel, but it is generally accepted that the 
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court of South Australia held that detriment flowing from 
the resili tion itself was sufficient to found an estoppel 
claim, In a dissenting judgment, however, Cox J rejected 
this wide view of detriment. He maintained that the use of 
the term 'detriment' in such circumstances resulted in 
"attenuating the word as to deprive it of any real 
meaning," 1 3 because if detriment can be considered as 
damage resulting from resilition alone, a representee could 
be said to suffer detriment in virtually all cases of 
proprietary estoppel. If the majority view of the Supreme 
Court in Je Maintiendrai is correct it may not be 
unreasonable to dispense completely with the requirement of 
detriment. 
IV DETRIMENTAL ALTERATION OF POSITION IN THE 'FAMILIAL 
CASES' 
A s.ubstantia.l ... ... e xpend.i .. ture ... o.f ...... moner .... o.r .. Jabour ...... on the 
represe.nt.or .. ' .. s ....... Pro.pe.rty 
Where the representee's alteration of position involves 
substantial financial outlay or the equivalent value in 
labour on the representor's property, the courts have 
accepted without question that detriment is present for the 
purpose of an estoppel claim. In such cases the 
representor clearly receives a major benefit if he is 
·--··----·-·--· .. -·····-·········· .. -··-·· .. ·-···········-······· ... ····-····-·-····--··· .. ---····-········-········-··-····-·---.. ,-.................. ,_ .. ___ ,,, ........ -................ ____ , ,_ .... _ .. , ............. ,_ .. ____ ,_,,, rules concerning detriment are the same in all branches of 
estoppel . See Spencer Bower and Turner, The .... Law ..... Relating 
f·~-~={~1TJ:tv·b[·R~:p~;~e~~a~~~~, pp. 101, 288; Morgan ( 1982) 
13
.~ e . __ Maint.i.endra.i. v Quag_lia ( 1981) 26 SASR 101 at 120. See ~~:~) ~h-~.J v .~ .. ~.!..!.h. (Unreported, Court of Appeal 4 February 
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permitted to resile from his own undertakings whilst the 
representee stands to suffer a quantifiable loss. In 
~j.Jl_l,1.Y..~ v 1.1.ewelyn, 1 4 for example, the claimant had spent 
£1 4000 on building a new residence for himself on the 
representor's land . ls 
B Lim.i.ted ...... expend_i ture ... of_money ...... or ..... labour ___ on ..... the 
representor .. ' ... s ...... Property 
Where the representee ' s outlay on the representor's 
property involves a less substantial contribution of money 
or labour, the nature of the relationship between the 
dispu t ing parties and their respective circumstances may 
play an important role in any subsequent judicial 
determination of whether such an alteration of position 
constitutes a relevant form of detriment. 
i ) Where ..... th e ..... par t .. i .e s ...... ar e _ ... mem be_r s ...... of ...... th_e __ same .... ..f am_i _l y 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Jo.nes ...... CA .. E ..... 1 v 
Jq_ne .. ~ __ (.L'..~.'.J .. 1 ~ i llustrates the value-laden nature of the 
courts' exercise in determining the question of detriment. 
The son of the now deceased representor had been led to 
1
'(1862) 4 DE GF & J 517 , 45 ER 1285 . 15 See also Inwards v Baker [ 1965] 2 QB 29; I:r.:t ...... J.:'..~ ....... ~.h .. tt. .. ~.h.~.1:1:.9.: [ 1948] NZLR 107 0; ~ .. 1:1:.S.~ .. ~ .. 9.!:l. v 9 .. :t::..9 .. ~.P.Y ( no 2) ( 1.9 79) 21 SASR 
T~~~epo~-f·~·~;-~· ~u~~~-~~-~- ~~~:7t] 1A:cskwl:Rnd170{9 ~;~!~~~r v ~~~:~ A770/78) · Van den Berd v Giles [1979] 2 NZLR 111; Morris ' ... -.... , .......... ,_, ______ ............. -... ~. _...................... 
.. ... _ .. ,_,, __ , .. , .. v tl9..! .. r.A .. ~. [1982] 1 NSWLR 61; §.h.?-J..9:.~. v Ki.P.:9-_b.?-.!!.~. (Unreported, 
~~:n~;;y f ;;;:;::;d 2~y J~~= i!~!~; Cou~~Tr:.~.9.(\9v8l1:'Yiftf-{~- ii9!f~ 57 5), 
16
·[19 77 ] 1 WLR 438. 
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I 
believe that the disputed property was his, and had 
accordingly spent £1000on the property. The plaintiff, 
the executrix and beneficiary of the representor' s estate, 
was the stepmother of the representee. The Court accepted 
that the representee' s expenditure constituted a relevant 
detrimental alteration of position noi least because he had 
also given up a job and an alternative home in order to take 
up residence in his father's property . It is clear that 
such actions are likewise accounted as relevant detrimental 
alterations of position. 17 However, in coming to this 
conclusion the Court of Appeal also considered the parties' 
circumstances and the nature of their relationship. The 
plaintiff was well aware of the arrangement which the 
representor had made with the representee. The representor 
had benefited by accepting £ 1000 from the claimant; he 
had also enjoyed the social contact of his son and family 
liv ing near him in his old age. 
securel y housed. 
The plaintiff was already 
A similar approach was taken in Pascoe v Turner ,1 s 
where the parties to the dispute were 9.:~ ......... .f. .. ~.9.t...C?. husband and 
wife . The representee had expended merely £230 on 
repairs and improvements to the representor's property. 
Cumming-Bruce LJ was prepared to take a broad view of 
de triment in 
relationship . 
expenditure was 
ad jective is used 
----·----17Post at 86, 87 
the context of a quasi-matrimonial 
He held that the representee 's minimal 
." substantial in the sense that that 
in the context of estoppel."19 Cumming-
18 ( 1979) 1 WLR 431. 11 Ibid at 435. The expenditure would have been insubstantial in the context of constructive trusts (post at 
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Bruce LJ also considered that the depletion of the 
representee's capital, by the representor, prior to the 
breakdown of the parties' relationship (and therefore prior 
to the representation} as a relevant detrimental alteration 
of position. He explained that eyen though 
her expenditure and effort can hardly be 
regarded as comparable to the change of 
position of those who have constructed 
buildings on land over which they had no 
legal rights ... the court has to look at all 
the circumstances. When the plaintiff left 
her she was ... a widow in her middle fifties. 
During the period that she lived with the 
plaintiff her capital was reduced from £4500 
to £1000.20 
It is most unusual for the courts to take account of 
expenditure prior to the representation as relevant to the 
question of detriment. In Pascoe v Turner the Court of 
Appeal demonstrated clearly that it regarded all the 
circumstances of both parties as significant in determining 
the question of detriment. The representor was weal thy by 
comparison with the representee. He had benefited by her 
expenditure during the relationship and was now himself 
securely housed. In upholding the woman ' s estoppel claim, 
---.................. , _____ ,, .......................................................... -........................ _,,_ ............ -,.,, .................................................................... -.......... _ .................................... ........................... -... -·-·----·····-···-· .. 2n} . See also I .n ....... re ... _Basham .... ..J .. decd.J [ 1986] 1 WLR 1498 at 1505, where the claimant had instructed solici tars at her own expense in connection with a boundary dispute on the representor ' s land. 
20 Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 WLR 435. 
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the Court of Appeal specifically voiced its concern that she 
be securely housed,21 
The Irish case of CulJ.en v Cullenz 2 illustrates well 
the way in which · the relationship between the representor 
and r epresentee may help to determine whether a detrimental 
alteration of position is proven. In Cullen a claim of OM .. _ MMU•-- •uw .. _UUO 
estoppel was rejected on the ground, i.nter_ .. _ .. al .i.a, that the 
repr esentee had suffered no detriment. Cullen is of 
···············-······· .. ······-·· 
particular interest as it was not the representee who 
pleaded proprietary estoppel. It was in fact the 
representee's son, the defendant in Cul~en , who claimed that 
his father, the plaintiff, had no right to prevent him from 
entering the family business premises which also served as 
the family home. The defendant claimed that the property 
now belonged to his mother, the representee, on the basis of 
proprietary estoppel and that he was therefore present on 
the premises as her licensee . For her part , the 
representee claimed that she had been encouraged to believe 
that the representor had given her the family business and 
that she had therefore expended her own resources on this 
business. Against this confusing background Kenny J held 
that the r e pr e s e nte e had s u ffered no lasting detriment in 
tha t she could have repaid the e xpenditure of her own money 
on t h e business from the proceeds of the business at any 
time . 
Th roughou t h is judgment , Ke nny J demonst r ate d his 
concern that the warring members of the Cullen fami l y should 21Tb id. _,,, _________ _ 
22(1962] IR 268 
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be reconciled and not torn apart by the litigation. An 
acceptance of the representee's expenditure as a detrimental 
alteration of position would have led to a deterioration in 
family relationships, a deterioration Kenny J was anxious to 
avoid , 2 3 
ii) Where ...... the ...... part.i.e.s ...... are ._. not .... _me.mbers __ ..of_ .. the .. _ .. same ... ...family 
Where the parties to the dispute are unrelated, the 
courts hav e been more cautious in accepting that the 
representee has suffered detriment from an alteration of 
position involving limited financial outlay. The courts in 
such circumstances may examine the representee's expenditure 
of money and labour, balancing it against the benefits 
received by him from the representor . Where the latter 
outweigh the former, detriment is deemed to have been 
'spent' and cannot then be claimed as such b y the 
representee . 
In Stilwell V S .. i .mps.on , 2 4 the representee had expended 
money and labour , on improving his flat (which was in any 
case the subject of a Rent Act protected tenancy) . The 
representee maintained that he had been encouraged in this 
expenditure by the defendant landlord ( this allegation was 
rejected by the court). The representee's e xpenditure was 
a lso rejected as a detrimental alteration of position by Sir 
Douglas Frank QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court judge. He 
explained that the representee 
Zlibid at 289. 
24Unreported, Queens Bench 21 June 1983. 1114. See (1983) 133 NLJ 
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has had the benefit of the works and will 
continue to have the benefit of them ... he 
will go on living there. I do not from my 
part see how he has any equitable right to 
recover that expenditure or notional 
expenditure incurred for his own benefit.2s 
The judge did not take into account, however, that the 
defendant landlord stood to receive would also get the 
benefit of the representee's expenditure when his statutory 
tenancy came to an end. Nevertheless, the representee 
was not at risk of losing his home, and this fact may have 
influenced the courts' determination of the question of 
detriment . 
C Ex12end.i.ture ..... on ...... outgoing.s ..... on. the ..... re12resentor .. ' .. s . .- .. property 
In Y.JP.9.:.~.P.. v Y..t..P..9.:.~.P.. 2 6 the representee had met the 
everyday financial obligations of running the family home. 
He had also paid the mortgage for a short period of time . 
This expenditure was considered to be a relevant detrimental 
alteration of -position , the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales likening the case to Pl.i.mmer v Mayor ....... of ........ we.ll .. i .ngton2 7 
and Inwards v Baker,28 Objectively the detrimental 
alteration of position in the latter two cases (where there 
had been substantial expenditure on land) was c6nsiderably 
..... _, ___ ,_,,, .. _, .. ,, __ . __ ....................................... _, ___ ,., __ , ... . 25 Ibid. See also E_ &_L _Berg_Homes_Ltd v Grey (1977) 253 EG 473 , where both Brandon and Ormrod LJJ took a similar approach in their determination of encouragement . 26 ( 1982) 1 NSWLR 618; cf Watts v Story (1984) 134 NLJ 631 (post at 87 ) • 
27 (l884) 9 App Cas 699. 28 (1965) 2 QB 29. 
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greater than in V_inden v Vinden. Furthermore the 
representee' s expenditure in Vinf!:.~.P.. was not continuing at 
the time of the court hearing, having been terminated in 
consequence of a family dispute. In Vinden v Vinden the 
-·---···-··············· ......................... , .. ___ _ 
court nevertheless accepted that this expenditure had 
enabled the representee's father, the representor, to retire 
early and this benefit to the latter was viewed as 
relevant to the adjudication of detriment. Needham J 
held that as long as the son was prepared to pay the 
outgoings, even though he was currently frustrated from 
doing so , there was a relevant detrimental alteration of 
position. There was also evidence in Vinden v Vinden that 
when the representee took over the mortgage instalments both 
he and the representor had envisaged that this state of 
affairs would be permanent. The representor subsequently 
won a Trifecta29 which permitted him to discharge the 
mortgage. The Court was not prepared to deny a remedy in 
these circumstances. 
In Griffiths v W.il.l_iams, 3 o by contrast, Goff LJ 
implied that detriment can be established only if the 
representee' s expenditure on the representor' s property is 
of a capital nature. In the instant case the 
representee' s expenditure on outgoings was to be regarded 
merely as "current payments for the benefits which she was 
enjoying by being allowed to live in the house." 3 1 These 
29 A Trifecta is the equivalent of a Treble in the English bet ting system, if successful it results in substantial gains. 
36 (1978) 248 EG 947. 
31 Ibid . The representee's expenditure on capital payments 
was accepted as a relevant detrimental alteration of Position . 
83 
however, be considered in context. In ~cta must, 
Gr.i..ff.i ths v Williams 
................................................ 
the representee claimed a life-long 
occupation right as satisfaction for her 'inchoate equity'. 
In Vinden v V.i.nden 3 2 the claim was merely to a right to stay 
in the property as long as the outgoings were paid. It is 
clear that the court will take account of the nature of the 
claim in determining the questions of detriment. Where the 
claim involves a less substantial 'satisfied equity', the 
courts may be prepared to accept evidence of a less 
substantial detriment . 
D Other Conduct 
i) The detri.men.ta.l ...... a .lte.ra t .i .on .. _.of ... Po.s.i.ti.on ... ~.'::1.§ .. :t. ..... !?. . ~ 
f.i.nanc.i.ally_ quant .. i..fiab.le. 
In the familial context the claimant's alteration of 
position is less likely to involve expenditure of money or 
even substantial labour on the representor' s property. In 
order that such conduct should be accepted as a detrimental 
alteration of position for the purpose of proprietary 
estoppel, the impact of the alteration of position must be 
quantifiable in financial terms. 
that 
Spencer Bower explains 
the alteration of position which it is 
incumbent on the r epresentee to establish 
must involve a change of position in the 
practical or business affairs or condition to 
the representee. Similarly , the 'damage', 
---·-------................ -........... ,---··· ........ ... 32 (1982] 1 NSWLR 618. 
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'loss' or prejudice which the representee 
must show to have resulted, in a natural 
change of causation, from the alteration of 
position means, and only means, actual and 
temporal damage ... some loss of money or 
moneysworth, which admits of quantification 
and assessment.33 
In R.i.ches v Hogben 3 4 the Full Court of the Supreme 
Court of Queensland has recently confirmed that detriment 
for the purpose of an estoppel claim can be founded on an 
alteration of position which involves no expenditure of 
money or labour on the representor' s property. Here the 
claimant had given up his rent-free council house in 
England, sold his possessions at less than their value and 
travelled to Australia with his family where he had been 
promised that he would be given a house by his mother, the 
representor who lived in Australia. The representee's 
alteration of position was not clearly related in any way to 
the property of the representor. However, the detriment 
resulting from his alteration of position was substantial 
and financially quantifiable . :f.?._§_ .. J3. .. ?.:..~h .. ~rr.i. ...... J .. 9.:.E::: .. <?. .. 9J.3 s provides a 
furt her illustration of this type of detrimental alteration 
of position. Here a representee had worked in her 
stepfather's business for many years without wages. After 
her mother's death she cared for her stepfather by preparing 
meals for him and looking after his home , 36 Judge Edward 
R
3 3Spencer Bower and Turner, The Law ....... Relat.i.ng ..... to ...... E.s.toppel_ .. by 
-~presentation, (1977 3d Ed), p 104. 34 (f~f8.6] 1 ·Q~:f° ... R 315 affirming the decision in [1985] 1 Qd R 229 . See also Nicholson (1986) 60 ALJ 345. 35 (1986] 1 WLR 1498. 36 See also Greasley v Cooke [1980] 1 WLR 1306. 
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Nugee QC held that these acts, together with relevant 
inaction 3 7 by the representee and her family constituted 
detrimental acts for the purpose of proprietary estoppel. 
Judge Edward Nugee QC observed that al though neither the 
representee's action nor her inaction was by itself 
significant , the cumulative effect was detrimental to the 
representee. 38 The representee's acts could all be 
financially quantified. 
ii) Confus .. i.on .. _.between ...... al terat.ion ...... o.f ...... pos.i tion ..... and .... detr.iment 
Judicial 9.:.t._.9. .. :t..!=I:. suggest that it is tempting to confuse a 
representee' s alteration of position with the damage which 
attaches to his altered position on the withdrawal of the 
original representation. Although the latter must be 
capable of quantification in terms of financial loss, there 
is no similar requirement that the former should be so 
quantifiable. Indeed, in many situations the claimant 
deri v es a benefit from the initial alteration of position. 
Confusion is made even more likely where the representee ' s 
alteration of position involves no financial loss until 
resilition takes place. 
In Greas.l.ey: v Cooke 3 9 the representee' s alteration of 
position was twofold. 
the Greasley family. 
al ternative employment. 
First she worked without wages for 
Second she refrained from finding 
Inaction can be as much an 
alteration of position as active conduct if the claimant 
------ .............. , .. ,,,--····-··---... . 3 7Post at 97 
38 In re Basham (deed) [1986] 1 WLR 1498 at 1505. 3 ···--······-···--- ---·······-·····-··--·······-·-······-··-·······-·-···· 9 [1980] 1 WLR 1306. 
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would have acted in some other way had it not been for the 
representation.•o It is possible, both before and after 
the representor resiles from his representation, to 
attribute a financial value to wageless labour undertaken by 
the representee. The quantification is clearly the 
measure of the wages foregone by the representee. By 
contrast, the effects of refraining from finding alternative 
employment cannot be quantified in monetary terms until the 
representor has resiled from his representation. Such a 
quantification is possible only when it has become clear 
whether the representee has been able to find employment 
once resilition takes place. The detriment resulting from 
the representee's alteration of position is measured in 
terms of the value of current wages. 
In Watts v S_t_ory 4 1 the Court of Appeal implicitly 
considered detriment in terms of the alteration of position 
itself rather than the damage resulting from that alteration 
at the time of the resili tion . The representee was the 
thirty year old grandson of the deceased representor. His 
grandmother had told him that she would leave her house to 
him in her will, and this representation was reinforced by a 
misl eading letter from her solicitor. The representee 
claimed that he had suffered six different elements of 
'detriment'. He claimed fjrst, that he had left a Rent Act 
protected tenancy; s~cond, that his girlfriend had given up 
her job; thjrd, that he had incurred both removal expenses 
and the aggravation associated with moving house; _fourth , 
that he had helped his grandmother pack her effects and had 
40
-P~st at 97 
41 ( 1984) 134 NLJ 631. 
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himself moved her and these effects to the Isle of Wight; 
fi fth, that he had undertaken responsibility for all the .. -.-·-... --
outgoings and expenses of the disputed property, Apple 
House ; sixth, that he would face problems in finding a new 
home in a difficult property market,42 It is significant 
that most of these 'detriments ' claimed by the representee 
involved no financial loss prior to the withdrawal of the 
repr esentation. 
The Court of Appeal in Watts v Story made no attempt to 
analyse the requirement of detriment in any detail but 
rejected outright the existence of any detrimental 
alteration of position. Dunn LJ simply stated that 
although the categories of detriment are not 
closed, the detriment alleged to have been 
suffered in this case is less in degree than 
the detriment suffered in any of the previous 
cases which have been drawn to our attention 
i n which claims on the basis of proprietary 
estoppel have been upheld, 4 3 
Th e r epresentee had clearly s u ffered quantifiable 
damage after the representor's resilition . The main damage 
suf f ered by the representee, was that flowing from the loss 
of the Rent Act protected tenancy . This is a financiall y 
quanti f iab le l o ss . It would be difficu l t f o r t h e 
repre sen tee to f ind anoth e r suc h t e nancy . 44 
· -2ib id . -.. . ... .. 
43 Ibid . 
4 4Cf Jones .... J.A.., .. E ... J. v Jones ...... JF ..... w ... J .. [1977] 1 WLR 438 ; v !!.QSben [ 1985] 1 Qd R 292. Riches 
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The second claim of detriment, rejected by the Court of 
Appeal was that the representee' s girlfriend had given up 
her job. Yet in Re ........ Basham ....... JdecdJ 4 s it was accepted that 
detriment can result . to a representee from a third party's 
alteration of position if the representee's life is so bound 
up with that of the third party. 
The third, fourth and fifth forms of 'detriment' 
claimed in W. .. ~ .. !: .. !: .. ~. v S_tory were clearly acts from which 
financially quantifiable consequences could and did flow. 
The final detriment claimed - the problem of finding a new 
home in a difficult property market - was again financially 
quantifiable . The difference between property prices at 
the time the representation was made and at the time of the 
court hearing could be said to represent the loss suffered, 
and in times 
substantial. 46 
of high inflation this loss would be 
In Wat~s v Story 47 Slade LJ made it explicit that the 
court must balance out the benefits received by the 
representee 
Rent-free 
accordingly 
against the 
occupation of 
six 
a 
'detriments' claimed by 
house for two years 
seen as sufficient compensation for 
him. 
was 
the 
representee's detrimental alteration of position. Slade LJ 
thought that it was neither possible nor desirable to 
45(1986] 1 WLR 1498 at 1505. See also S_ha_ida v Ki_ndlane 1 ..!:9: (Unreported, Chancery Di vision 2 2 June 1982) where it Was accepted that a detrimental alteration of position can be undertaken by a representee to give rights to a third Party . 
46 See also Dodsworth v Dodsworth (1973) 228 EG 1115. 4 7 ( 1 9 8 4 ) 1 3 ~f·····NL°5········1f:fi • 
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attempt to define the precise extent of the prejudice or 
detriment which must be established by a claimant who is 
relying on an allegation of something other than the 
expenditure of money. He merely stated that 
before allowing the claim in such a case, the 
court., .has to be satisfied that when all the 
circumstances are taken into account, the 
detriment or prejudice is such that it would 
be inequitable to allow the party who made 
the relevant representation to go back on 
it. 4 8 
In Watts v Story the Court of Appeal attached weight to 
the fact that the defendant had received other benefits 
under the will of his grandmother. 
and living on social security. 
Moreover he was young 
The decision implicitly 
suggests that his occupancy of the disputed property was in 
no way in need of protection. The Court of Appeal's broad 
approach to the question of detriment intimates that an 
estoppel claim is likely to fail if, when all the 
representee's circumstances are taken into account, he has 
sufficient finances to be able to rehouse himself. Such an 
approach ignores the basal purpose of the doctrine as 
outlined by Dixon J ,49 Proprietary estoppel is a 
compensatory remedy for loss suffered from an alteration of 
Posit ion on the faith of a representation. It should not 
be granted or denied on the basis that the representee has 
---·--·----·--·····-··--·······------··-· 48 I bid. 
49 I bid. 
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suffi cient resources to meet his current needs and can 
t herefore afford to stand that loss himself. 
iii) Conduct ...... wh_i_ch ...... does ..... not ...... benef_i.t ..... the ... repr_esen_tor 
There are gJ .. S! .. !:..13.:. in 9£ .. 13.: .. r.tt.. v ;g_q~?-.. 1.'.:.4..~.so whi ch suggest that 
in the 'familial cases ' the alteration of position must 
relate to the joint lives of the parties to the dispute . 
These dicta may impl y some requirement that there be a 
benefit to the representor in addition to the financially 
quantifiable loss which is suffered by the representee. 
The decision in Riches v Hogbens1 makes it clear, however, 
that the representee's alteration of position need not 
necessarily benefit the representor . Yet the 'familial 
cases' demonstrate that there is a tendenc y by the courts to 
reject a claim of a relevant detriment if the alteration of 
position does not benefit the representor. 
In T.h.~.~-~ .. :1:. .. 1:=. ~. v Ryan, s 2 for instance , the representee had 
left his wife and had moved into the representor's home in 
order to care for him . It seems that the representee 
obtained somewhat greater benefits than the representor from 
th is alteration of position , and accordingly the representee 
was deemed not to have suffered detriment in any true sense . 
Fullagar J gav e the main judgment of the Supreme Cour t of 
Victoria . He declined to vi e w the repre sentee 's alteration 
of position as that of a loving husband and father who gave 
------·--·-...... ,_.,, .................................. _ ....... .. 50 (1986] 2 All ER 426 
Wilkinson V-C (see post 51 (1986] 1 Qd R 315. 52 (1984] VR 65. 
at 439 
at 317 
per 
) . 
Sir Nicolas Browne-
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up "as one making a sacrifice, the comforts and 
companionship of a happy marriage and loving family, and 
foreswore the warmth of his accustomed although precariously 
rented hearth", in order to act as an unpaid servant , 
housekeeper, nurse and companion · of an old man. On the 
contrary, Fullagar J considered that when the representee 
left his home his marriage was finished in all but name. 
Indeed the representee was very content to escape from his 
famil y and readily fell in with the suggestion of the 
representor "who had just lost by death the male companion 
with whom he had cohabited for many years, that he alone 
should take the place of the dead cohabitant in every 
respect . • 5 3 Furthermore the representee had not taken good 
care of the representor. 
Had Fullagar J considered the representee's alteration 
of position and consequent damage at the moment of 
resilition, he might have found that the representee had 
suffered detriment. What the representee would have done 
if he had not gone to live with the deceased was unknown, 
al though it is likely that he would have had to seek out 
alternative accommodation . He lost that opportunity by 
ac c ept ing the representor's offer . 
A close reading of Thwaites v Ryan suggests that 
Fullagar J had regard to the totality of circumstances 
invo l ved in the case in rejecting the plaintiff 
representee's claim that he had suffered a detrimental 
a lteration of position in terms of the doctrine of 
----....... ,.-------·---·--·--·-·--·- ··"""" 53 Ibid at 87. 
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proprietary estoppel. These circumstances included facts 
which appear to be totally irrelevant to a claim of 
proprietary estoppel,54 Throughout the case, Fullagar J 
was highly critical of the representee' s social conduct. 
He referred specifically to the plaintiff's alcoholism and 
hinted at the existence of a homosexual relationship between 
the plaintiff and the representor. A further reason for 
the rejection of the estoppel claim may have been the fact 
that the plaintiff was one of two joint plaintiffs. The 
other plaintiff was his wife who had suffered no detriment 
and by the time the case came to court the first plaintiff 
was dead. 
iv) Detriment ____ and ...... Po.l,,icY .... cons.idera.t_i_on.s. 
In 9.9 .. <?..!I.1.P. .. ~ .. ?.. v Sm.i .. th 5 5 policy considerations were clearly 
of importance in the approach taken by the court in 
determining the question of detriment. The representee was 
the mistress of the representor. She had left her husband 
to live in a house provided for her by the representor. 
The first act claimed by her as a detrimental alteration of 
position comprised the fact that she had allowed herself to 
bec ome pregnant by the representor. Judge Jonathan Parker 
QC simply stated without e xplanation that he was "unable to 
t reat t h e ac t of the pla intiff in allowing h erself to become 
pregnant as constituting detriment in the context of 
proprietary estoppel . "56 However , pregnancy outside the 
.. , _________ ,,_, .................. -._ .. _____ .......... . 
5 4 See Lee , Th e .. __ jud.ic.i ous. u se _o f .. .J).ldi.cia .l .Jrre.lev ance ( 198 6) 102 LQR 353. 
55 (198 6 ] 1 WLR 808. See also Hayton (1986] CLJ 394. 511 f:oomb e s. v §..!!!-J:: .. ~.h. (1986] 1 WLR 808 at 820. 
93 
11 
I I 
context of a long term relationship and without the security 
of a home is normally regarded by society as a detrimental 
alteration of position. There seems to be no clear reason 
why pregnancy should not be treated as relevant detriment 
for the purpose of an estoppel claim. 
The second act claimed as detriment by the representee was 
that she had left her husband, with whom she was unhappy, in 
order to move into the representor's property . The judge 
accepted the submissions of counsel for the representor that 
"whenever a woman moves into a house provided by a man, she 
must have come from somewhere else; and that if the mere 
fact of that inevitable change were sufficient as detriment, 
there would be detriment in every case. " 57 On this basis 
the 'equity of estoppel' would be withheld simply on the 
ground that too many women would otherwise be able to make 
estoppel claims if leaving one home and moving into another 
were automatically accepted as rele vant detriment. Such a 
view disregards the possibility that women like the 
represen tee in Coombes v Smith might still leave their 
husbands and seek alternative accommodation rather than move 
in with men whom they knew would resile from their 
representations. 
In Coombes v Smith the third and fourth acts claimed as .................. ,_,,,,-,,-.......... . ............................ . 
de triment by the representee took the form of giving birth 
to and taking care of the child of the relationship. These 
acts were also, ·without further discussion, disallowed as 
relevant detriment. There has traditionally been a 
57Ibid at a16. 
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rel uctance in claims for damages in contract or tort to 
acc ept that the birth of a child after the failure of a 
sterilisation operation can give rise to a compensatable 
claim. 5 8 Nevertheless there has been an acceptance in such 
claims that pregnancy inevitably leads to a loss of income 
by the mother which can result in an award of damages. s 9 
There seems to be no reason, other than one based on policy 
considerations, why this loss of income should not 
constitute a detriment sufficient to found an estoppel 
cla im. 
The representee in g_g_Q.1..D.:P~ .. § v ?._~_t:t...h. had also spent money 
and labour on the decoration of the property. The court 
rejected this act as detriment without further explanation, 
the assumption seeming to be that the representee had 
already enjoyed the benefits of such improvements. 
Finally, the represen tee in Coombes v Smith claimed 
that she had deliberately refrained from looking for a job. 
The judicial response to this claim was that the representor 
had been content to pay the bills and that the representee 
had not therefore needed a job . This claim of a detrimental 
alteration of position was also rejected . The court failed 
to take account of the fact that the representee would quite 
clearly suffer detriment once resilition took place. It 
was predictable that she would find difficulty in finding a 
job, having absented herself from the employmen t market for 
..... _, __ , ...... ,.. -.. - ..... _. ____ ................. _ ,,.,, ,,_,,, ......... _,_,. ,,,,, ...... . 5 8 See, e.g. , -~-q_I!.~ .. §. v Berks_h_ire. Area __ Hea.l.th __ Author.i ty (Unreported, Court of Appeal 2 July 1986) per Ognall J; 9gld v Haringey __ Heal th ..... Authori.ty [ 1987] 2 All ER 888 at 890 per Lloyd LJ. See also, Symmons (1987) 50 MLR 269 . 5 9 See Emeh v Kens.i.ngton .... _.and.-...... Che.lsea and ____ Westm.inster .. Area H.~alth .. Author.i.ty [1984] 3 All ER 1044 at 1051 ff. 
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seventeen years, The representor had benefited from the 
representee' s alteration of position but implicit in the 
decision of the court was the idea that he had benefited 
1ess than the representee. The representor was paying a 
small amount of maintenance to the representee for their 
child , He was also prepared to permit the representee to 
continue in occupation until their child reached the age of 
seventeen. 6 0 
The decision in Coombes v Smith 6 1 can be contrasted 
with that of the Privy Council in ~-~-h.?.-.. ~.!:1._j_ v 9..h.?-.!1.9::. 6 2 The 
9:.~ .....fac.to. claimant in this case was accepted as having acted 
to her detriment by altering her position in giving up her 
flat , supporting her de facto husband's 
.......... . ................... 
application to the 
Housing Authority for a family home and looking after him 
and their children in that home as a wife and mother. The 
unspoken judicial va lue judgment in M.?-. .h .  ?.-.. :r::.?-). v Chand was that 
the closer a relationship is to marriage, the more worthy it 
is of protection. The representee in 9C?..<?..Il!.9.~ .. !:5. v Smith 6 3 was 
a mother and mistress not a de facto wife , 
The courts have generally adopted a restrictive 
approach to th·e question whether relevant detriment can be 
founded on an alteration of position which involves no 
financial expenditure. This t endency results from the 
incl ination of the courts to merge the doctrines of 
Proprietary estoppel and constructive trusts. The latter 
,·---.............. _____ ,,,,, ____ ,_,,,, ........... -...... _., ....................... . 
( ~~~ ~) ~~s1o w{"J~.Y{t'i 4 ~ Co.s.ta ....... and ____ Harymode_ ... , ... De.velopments ...... Ltd 11 ( 1986] 1 WLR 808. 12 ( 1986] 3 All ER 107. 13 ( 1986] 1 WLR 808. 
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seventeen years. The representor had benefited from the 
repr esentee' s alteration of position but implicit in the 
decision of the court was the idea that he had benefited 
less than the representee. The representor was paying a 
small amount of maintenance to the representee for their 
child. He was also prepared to permit the representee to 
continue in occupation until their child reached the age of 
sev enteen. 60 
The decision in Coombes v Smith 6 1 can be contrasted 
with that of the Privy Council in Maharaj v Chand. 6 2 The 
de_ facto claimant in this case was accepted as having acted 
to her detriment by altering her position in giving up her 
flat, supporting her 9.-.~ ..... .. f?.: _gJ:..<?. husband's application to the 
Housing Authority for a family home and looking after him 
and their children in that home as a wife and mother . The 
unspoken judicial v alue j udgmen t in tt.?.:.h.?.: .. 1-'.'. .. ?.:.J v Chand was that 
the closer a relationship is to marriage, the more worthy i t 
is of protection. The representee in 9 . .<?..<?. 11}.9..~.!=.> v Smith63 was 
a mother and mistress not a de facto wife . 
The courts have generally adopted a restrictive 
a pproach t o the questi o n wh e ther r elevan t de t rimen t can be 
fo unded on an alteration of position which inv olves no 
fi nanc i al e x penditure . 
i ncl ination of the 
This 
courts to 
t endency 
me r ge 
res u l t s f rom 
the doctrines 
the 
of 
p ropri e tary es t opp el and c o ns t ruct i ve t rus ts . Th e latt er 
·--................................... , __ , .................. -........................................ .. 6 0See also ~.?-..Y.Y...?.: v Co.s.ta .......... a nd ______ Ha rymod e _ ...... Deve l opmen ts ....... _ Ltd ( 1981) 131 NlJ .. 1i14 , 
61 (1986] 1 WLR 808 . 
62 (1986] 3 All ER 107. 
63 (1986] 1 WLR 808. 
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doctrine (considered later in this dissertation)&4 may 
require a different form of detrimental alteration of 
position. 
E Inaction as detriment 
_ , ............ ---·-·-···"'"" ....................................... ____ ............................. ,-. 
There has been little discussion in the 'familial 
cases' of whether inaction on the part of the representee 
can be accounted as a relevant detrimental alteration of 
position. It may be quite reasonable for a representee to 
refrain from certain action once he has been encouraged to 
believe that rights over the representor's property will be 
obtained. In such circumstances the representee's inaction 
may constitute a detrimental alteration of position if the 
representee would have taken certain action in the absence 
of the representor' s encouragement. Inaction was, for 
insta nce, accepted as a relevant detriment in Re Basham 
J.decdJ., & s Here the inaction was that of the representee's 
husband in that he had refrained from selling land to raise 
capital and had declined to take a job away from the 
representor's home town . If the husband had moved away, 
the represente~ would no longe r have been in a position to 
loo k after the representor. The latter received an obvious 
benefit from the second incident of inaction . 
·-.. -·--······ .. --·--·-·---···············" ''"'''"'""''''' ........ _ ........... . 6 4 Post at 313 
65 (1986] 1 WLR 1498 at 1505. See also Fontana v Mauntner ( 1980) 254 EG 199 at 207; Spencer Bower_ ...... ancf""·"Turne-r~-··---The· 
r··g-~ ...... Re.lating ..... to ....... Es.toppel __ n;r ... Re.J2.!:esentation ( 3d Ed 1977) p 
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v Detrimental .. _ ..Al terat.ion o .f _Pos.i tion .. : ............. a .. _ranked_ order of 
circumstance 
The courts have tended to impose some form of ranking 
upon the various kinds of alteration of position which are 
relevant to claims of proprietary estoppel. At the top of 
this hierarchy of circumstance is financial expenditure 
which is directly related to the property in dispute. At 
the bottom of the hierarchy is conduct totally unrelated to 
property. The lower down the ranking the alteration of 
position is deemed to be, the more likely the court is to 
consult a wider range of personal and extraneous 
circumstances in determining the question of detriment. 
VI Burden ...... o.f ...... Proo.f ...... .or ...... detr.imen.tal ....... al terat.ion ...... o.f ... posi.tion 
/ 
The onus of proof that any alteration of position is 
detrimental is on the claimant of the 'inchoate equity'. 
Counsel for the representee in f..9 .. 9..!1.1 . .9. .. E?, .. ~. v S.m.i.th 6 6 had argued 
that once the representee had proven that she had changed 
her position the onus shifted to the representor to prove 
that this change of position was not detrimental. This 
argument was rejected on the grounds that it was a 
misreading of the judgments in Greasley v Cooke . 67 In this 
case it was held that there was a rebut table presumption, 
that where the alteration of position i.s _____ proven to be 
det rimental to the representee , it was done in reliance on 
the representation made to her. 
-·--··-·-·--,.-·w-.. ,,,_, .... ,.__,.,_.,,_, .. ,.,, ,., ,.,,N.,•ONn,, .. ,.,., ,, 
86 ( 1986] 1 WLR 808 at 821. 
87 (1980] 1 WLR 1306 at 1311, 1313. 
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VII The .... detr.imental ....... al terat.ion ...... o.f. ___ po_s_i t.ion ...... must. ___ be ...... in 
rel.iance ...... on ...... the ..... representat.ion 
Not only must there be a detrimental alteration of 
position by the representee. There must also be a causal 
link between the alteration of position and the 
representation. The alteration of position must have been 
/ 
undertaken in reliance on the representor' s assurances.ea 
If there was no assurance, either explicit or implicit, 
there can clearly be no detrimental reliance. Any damage 
suffered by the claimant as a result of his alteration of 
position in these circumstances is his own fault. He is 
not a victim of any unconscionable conduct on the part of 
the representor,69 
A) ~ .. \1.i.;:.9.:.~.P. .... of ..... proof ..... of_ reliance .. on ..... the .... repr.es_entation 
In Griffiths v Williams7o Goff LJ confirmed that once a 
representee has established a detrimental alteration of 
position, the burden of proof shifts to the representor to 
6 8 See, e.g., _ Tayl.ors _____ Fash_i_ons ....... _Ltd v Li_verpool ...... ...V.i_ctor_i_a 
Trustees Co Ltd [1982] QB 133 at 156; Coombes v Smith Ti'§·i:rnT"T"'·"wLif'··"a"i5"8 at 8 2 0 ; AV On dale V Hagg ie·· Ti"i:fifg ] 2 '""ii'ZLR 
125 at 144. 
6 9See e.g. , Swallow Securities Ltd v Isenberg (Unreported, 
Court of Appeal 22 February 1985); Rogers. v ~ .. t+. ... E=.! .. !:. (Unreported, Court of Appeal 20 May 1986); §.!=l:.Y..Y. .. ~. v 9..<?...§ .. t.!=l:. ~ .. !'ld ........ Harymode ........ I.nves_tme.nts .... _Ltd (1981) 131 NLJ 1114; ~ ......... ~ .... -.. !:-. 
!3-.. ~ r g ..... Home s ........ Lt_ d v Grey ( 1 9 7 9 ) 2 5 3 E G 4 7 3 ; !?. .. :t.:..!.!l.P. .. 13.:-.P..9.:. v ~-~.~P..?.. ( 198 7) The .... _Ti.mes. 4 June; A-G. of. Hong_kong v Humphreys .. _ ..Esta te 
_(.9:µ~_E=.!_g_'. __ ~ ____ Q.l:1: .. £.9:.E=.!.P.: .. l:,IJ ........ :.!:!..t..9: [ 19 8 7] 2 All ER 3 8 7 ; r.1~..!: .. § ......... ~ .. E=.!.9..~ .. !:'_:tt._;r. 1~d v Singh (Unreported, Court of Appeal 15 March 1987) . 
70 (1977) 248 EG 947. This approach is not new. It was 
first put forward in R_rrne_ll v S_prye ( 1852) I de G M & G 660 
at 707, 708, 42 ER 710 at 728, 729 and subsequently followed 
in Smith v Chadwick (1882) 20 Ch D 27 at 44, 54. See also 9.!'~ .. ~.~_!.~;y v .9 .. 9 .. 9 .. ~.~- [ 1980] 1 WLR 1306 at 1313 P..~ .. t Waller LJ. 
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VII The ... detr.i.mental ....... al teration ...... of ... _pos.i t.ion .... mus.t._.be ..... in 
re.l iance ...... on._ .. the ... _representat.ion 
Not only must there be a detrimental alteration of 
position by the representee. There must also be a causal 
link between 
representation. 
the alteration of position and the 
The alteration of position must have been 
/ 
undertaken in reliance on the representor' s assurances.ea 
If there was no assurance, either explicit or implicit, 
there can clearly be no detrimental reliance. Any damage 
suffered by the claimant as a result of his alteration of 
position in these circumstances is his own fault . He is 
not a victim of any unconscionable conduct on the part of 
the representor.&9 
A) Burden ...... of ...... pro_o .f of reli.ance ... on ... the ...... repre.s.enta ti.on 
In Griffiths v Williams7o Goff LJ confirmed that once a 
representee has established a detrimental alteration of 
position, the burden of proof shifts to the representor to 
6 8 See, e.g. , . Tayl.or.s .. _ .. Fash.i.ons ....... _Ltd v L.i.verpool ....... .Y.i.ctor.ia 
Trustees Co Ltd (1982] QB 133 at 156; Coo.mbe.s. v §.!1.1.t:~.h. [1986] l WLR 808 at 820; Avo.ndale v Hagg_i .e [1979] 2 NZLR 
125 at 144. 
6 9Se e e.g. , Swallow Securities Ltd v I.::'>. .. ~ .. I.:1 .. 9. .. ~.1.'.: .. ~. (Unreported, 
Court of Appeal 22 February 1985); :R.9..g .. ~ .. :r::.::'>.  v ~ . .1.L~.:r::. (Unreported, Court of Appeal 20 May 1986) ; §!3.:.Y.Y .. 1:1:. v 9.9. .. §. .. t..!3.:. 
9:nd ....... Harymode ......... I.nves.tments ... _Lt_d (1981) 131 NLJ 1114; ~ ....... ~--1. 
_l=.lerg ...... Homes ....... Lt.d v Grey ( 1979) 253 EG 473; Brinnand v Ewens. ( 1987) The .... Ti_mes. 4 June; A-.G .... of ... Hong_ko.ng. v Humphreys .. _ ..Estate 
19:i::t .. ~.~-l}_~--~·----Q.~ .. :r::.4.~.P.: .. ::'>. ... L ..... :.!:, .. t..4. [ 19 8 7] 2 Al 1 ER 3 8 7 ; M:~.:r::.§ ......  $..~.9..!:1. .. 1.:'_:i.-..t.Y 
~td v Sing_h (Unreported, Court of Appeal 15 March 1987). 
70 (1977) 248 EG 947. This approach is not new. It was 
first put forward in R~ne.11 v Sprye ( 1852) I de G M & G 660 
at 707, 708, 42 ER 710 at 728, 729 and subsequently followed 
in Smith v Chadwick (1882) 20 Ch D 27 at 44, 54. See also Q.!'-~ .. ~.l!.-1.~z v .9 . .9. .. 9 .. ~.~- [ 1980] 1 WLR 1306 at 1313 P.~£ Waller LJ. 
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show that the detrimental ilteration of position was not in 
reliance on the representation. Counsel for the appellant 
in Gr_i.f.f i ths v W..t1..J.:J .. ~ . .l!!:.?. had claimed that, al though the 
representee had undoubtedly altered her position, she had 
not proved that she had done so in reliance on the 
representation . 11 Goff LJ took into account the familial 
nature of the relationship between the representor and the 
representee, who were respectively mother and daughter. 
The representee admitted that she had not thought about the 
assurances (i . e ., that she could live in her mother's house 
for her life time) when she incurred the expenditure on 
improvements to their shared family home. Goff LJ, however, 
shared the view of the judge at first instance that it was 
clear that the representee 
was reluctant to admit, even to herself that 
in spending her own money on housekeeping and 
house improvements , she was thinking of her 
own inheritance rather than the care and 
comfort of her mother.12 
The court was not prepared to disregard the unselfish 
sacrifices made by a loving daughter in caring for her 
elderly mother merely because she could not claim to have 
spent her days carefully calculating the benefits she might 
receive in return for these sacrifices. The court found 
that, if the r epresentee had thought that her future 
occupational security was at stake "she would have had to 
think whether she was not obliged to look more closely to 
·---·----.. -·-----····· ............ _, ___ ..................... , .. ,-, 
7 1Griffiths v Williams (1977) 248 EG 947 at 948. 7 2 ibid .--.. ._ .......................... ,_., ..... _. 
: I 
her own future." 1 3 The reason she did not think in this 
di recti on was entirely related to the repeated assurances 
that her life-long home was secure. Goff LJ's recognition 
of the 'inchoate equity' arising here followed from his 
willingness to have regard to the nature of familial 
relationships. 
cost-benefit 
Such relationships do not operate on a 
analysis approach to life but are more 
concerned with familial obligations based on love and duty. 
On this basis Goff LJ realistically imputed the existence of 
a causal link between the representation and the 
representee's detrimental alteration of position. 
In G..:r.'..E=,!?-.. §J .. E=,! .. Y. v .9..9. . .9..1': .. E=,!., 7 4 the Court of Appeal also held 
that it was unnecessary for the representee to prove that he 
had relied on the representor's assurances. Lord Denning 
MR quoted from his own decision in Brikom Investments Ltd v 
Carr, 7 s where he had held that once a representation has 
been made with the intention that another should act on it. 
He suggested that 
it is no answer for the maker to say : 'You 
would have gone on with the transaction 
anyway '. That must be mere speculation . 
No-one can be sure what he would, or would 
not, have done in a hypothetical state of 
affairs which never took place ... once it is 
shown that a representation was calculated to 
influence the judgment of a reasonable man 
- ·---.. -· .. --·---73Ibid . 
74 (1980) 
75 (1979) 
1 WLR 1306. 
QB 467. 
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the presumption is that he was so 
influenced , 7& 
Accordingly in Greas_ley v Cooke Lord Denning MR held 
that it should be presumed that the representee had acted on 
the faith of statements of the representor which had been 
calculated to convey to her that she would have a secure 
home for life. Waller LJ confirmed that if the court sees 
that on the face of it a statement is of such a nature as to 
induce a person to alter his position, the inference is that 
if he altered his position he acted on that inducement. 77 
More recently in Re ........ Bas_h_am ......... Jde c dJ 7 a the representor 
submitted that the representee's alteration of position 
could be attributed to her natural love and affection for 
the representor rather than to any reliance on the 
representation made to her. Judge Edward Nugee QC rejected 
this argument on three grounds. Fjrst, he held that the 
representee' s conduct went well beyond that expected of a 
stepdaughter . ~econd , the incidents accepted by the court 
as a relevant detrimental alteration of position were 
undertaken not only by the representee but also by her 
husband (who had no particular affection for the 
representor) ,79 Th_ird, there was no proof that the 
representee had not acted in reliance on the representation . 
.. _ H • • •• M • H •o , ,,,,, , ,, , .. ........ ,M, - Oo•-•M o .. , , , , o , ooooOMOO•H •• .. • - o o• O• o• 00 0000- 0Mo0 H - OO,o, OMO OO 7 6 Ibid at 482, 483 . 
:
7 Q~eas l ey v Co o ke [1980] 1 WLR 1306 at 1313. 8 (1986] 1 WLR 1498. 
79 Ibid at 1505. 
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B) Eros ion ...... of ..... the ...... Pr.inc iple ...... tha t ..... the ..... burden ...... o.f ...... Proo.f .... . is ...... on 
the representor 
The more recent 'familial cases' disclose a tendency 
towards erosion of the principl~ that the burden of proof of 
reliance is on the representor. The representee's 
alteration of position is increasingly understood in terms 
of reliance on some alternative state of affairs and not as 
reliance on the particular encouragement given by the 
representor . This more restrictive approach is especially 
evident in those cases where the representee claims that 
his belief derives from a non-explicit assurance on the part 
of the representor. In C:::.2 . .<?.1:i:1}::i~_§. v Smi.t.h, so for instance, 
the representee had pleaded that her conduct in becoming 
pregnant, in leaving her husband to move in with the 
representor and in forbearing to look for a job marked a 
reliance on her belief that she would receive rights in the 
representor's property . Judge Jonathan Parker QC refused 
to accept that this conduct (even if recognised as a 
relevant detrimental alteration of position) had been 
undertaken in reliance on any belief as to her rights. He 
maintained that "the reality is that the plaintiff decided 
to move ... because she pre f erred to have a relationship with, 
and a child by , the defendant rather than continuing to li v e 
wit h her husband." He found that "there is no evidence 
that she left her husband in reliance on the defendant ' s 
assurance that he would provide for her if and when their 
relationship came to an end. "s1 
~ 1 986] 1 WLR 808. 
81 Ibid at 820. 
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The judgment in Coombes v Sm~th effectively ignored the 
fact that the claimant might have acted partly for emotional 
reason s and partl y in reliance on some belief that she would 
obtain long-term rights. The course of events might well 
have been different if she had known that she would receive 
no rights in the representor's property . 
dual motive for her behaviour. 
There could be a 
In Ph.i.l .i .P ........... Lowe ......... (Ch.ines.e .... .... .... Res.taurantJ ........... Lt.d v Sau Man 
1-,~ .. ~, e2 the claim of the 9.:.~ .. f.9.-.9. .. !: .. <?. wife was that she believed 
that she would obtain rights in the plaintiff's property. 
This claim was ultimately rejected on the basis that she had 
not acted in reliance on the plaintiff's representation. 
Under Chinese custom a de facto wife is known as a 'little 
·-·······-··-.. ··-·-·······-···· .. ········ 
wife '. Her 9: .. ~ ..... .f.~.9..:l:._c:> husband has responsibilities towards 
her in a similar manner as he has responsibilities to his 
legal wife. The representee had carried out various works 
and repairs and decoration to the plaintiff's property . 
May LJ fa iled to recognise any dualit y of motive on the part 
of the representee . He upheld the first instance judgment 
against her claim on the ground 
that the work wh ich she did ... was not done 
because she claimed any right to live there 
but because she worked for the sake of the 
family. She was a member of the family, 
this was family property, and she played her 
8-....................... _ ................................... _, ______ ,,,,, ..... .. 
2Unreported , Court of Appeal 9 July 1985 . 
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part in improving it, repairing it and 
redecorating it as she thought necessary.al 
Aga in, in Warnes v Hedl.ey, s 4 May LJ found that the 
financial detriment claimed by the representees was related 
to the fact that they had moved into a new family home and 
their first baby was due to be born. May LJ was not 
therefore prepared to view the representees' alteration of 
position as constituting any reliance on an assurance that 
they had long-term rights in the representor' s property. 
The Court of Appeal may also have been prejudging the issue 
of detrimental reliance by finding that occupation of a 
rather grand house for twelve years had been in itself ample 
compensation for any expenditure on that house. 
In Murg.a t.royd v J .... .. N ..... El.l.i.o.t ....... JFarmsJ ......... Ltd, s s the New 
Zealand High Court accepted the claim of the representee 
that she had abandoned her city life to return to a house 
provided by her father, the representor . She had expended 
mini mal effort decorating and furnishing the property. She 
cla imed that she had acted in the belief that she had 
recei v ed long-term rights over the property. However, the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal s 6 took the view, some four 
Years later, that the claimant's alteration of position was 
consistent with a mere temporary arrangement between herself 
and her father that she should occupy the house only so long 
as was convenient to both of them. This temporary 
--·--·----·000 .. NM<H OO .. O•••••••••HO--OHO .. O-•OOOO-•-••••• 83 Ibid. 
84 Unreported, Court of Appeal 31 January 1984. 85Unreported, High Court of New Zealand 15 October 1980. 
Z
• 'J ..... N ... Elli.ot ....... & ....... co ..... (Farms.) __ L.td v Murga t.royd (Unreported, New ealand Court of Appeal 31 January 1984). 
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arrangement had been duly carried out . The court inferred 
that the representee's detrimental reliance was on the faith 
of this temporary arrangement. 
Estoppel claimants in the familial context may find the 
element of reliance difficult to establish if the courts 
continue to erode the principle that the burden of proof of 
reliance rests on the representor. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SATISFACTION_. OF .... THE. '_INCHOATE ...... EQUITY.' .. 
INTRODUCTION 
·---·· .. -········-·· .. ,-... ·-·-............... . 
Once a court recognises the existence of an 'inchoate 
equity', founded in proprietary estoppel, it must, according 
to Scarman LJ in Crabb v Arun ...... DC, 1 turn its attention to two 
further questions, the extent of the 'inchoate equity' and 
the remedy appropriate to satisfy the 'inchoate equity'. 
EQUITY' ..... AND .. .... THE ..... SAT.ISFACTION ..... oF . ... THE ...... ' .INCHOATE ... EQU.I .TY.' 
Lord Kingsdown' s judgment in g.£1:.!1.1 .. ~9.:.~ . .r.:i. v Dys.on 2 has been 
widely regarded as providing the classic definition of the 
extent of the 'inchoate equity' . He held that the court 
must e x amine the representee's expectation in order to 
decide the extent of the 'inchoate equity'. 3 If this is 
correct, the extent of the 'inchoate equity' may not in 
reality raise be a separate question in its own right .' Where the 
representor's conduct engenders an explicit expectation in the representee, 
1 [ 1976] Ch 179 at 193. 
2 (1866) LR 1 HL 129. 
3 Ib id at 170. This view was taken by the court in 
9r.iffiths v Williams ( 1978) 248 EG 917 at 948 per Goff LJ ; 
~.h.!:l:.!.9.:?.: v ~t.r.:i.9.:!.?-.:r:?:.~ ........ !:! . ~.9.: ( Unreported , Chancery Di vis ion 2 2 June 
19 82) ~:r._ Judge P V Baker QC. In Snell' s ........ Pri.nc .. ipl.es ....... of 
g_g_ui.tY. (28th Ed 1982) p 561, it is stated that the extent of 
the 'inchoate equity' is "to have made good, so far as may 
fa irly be done between the parties, the expectations of A 
(the representee) which O (the representor) has encouraged, 
A's expectation or belief is the maximum of the equity." 
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the question of the extent of the 'inchoate equity' merges 
with the question of expectation. The justice of any given 
case may of course require the courts to take a flexible 
approach to the satisfaction of the 'inchoate equity'. 
There may, for instance, be overriding factors which prevent 
the satisfaction of an 'inchoate equity' in a manner 
commensurate with the representee's expectation. In such 
circumstances the court will grant some alternative remedy. 
Here the remedy granted, rather than the representee·'s 
expectation, will itself be the measure of the extent of the 
'inchoate equity'. Similar l y, where there is doubt about 
the precise nature of the representee's expectation the 
court must find some way of satisfying the indeterminate 
expectation. A claim will not fail merely because "the 
interest to be secured has not been expressly indicated." 4 
An analysis of the 'familial cases' suggests that it is the 
manner in which the 'inchoate equity' is satisfied which 
ultimately determines the extent of the 'inchoate equity'. 
The court decides how best to do justice to the often 
vaguely expressed expectations of the parties by taking into 
account all the circumstances of the case.s The solution 
which the courts deem to be fair and just represents in 
effect the extent of the 'inchoate equity'; the extent of 
the 'inchoate equity' becomes merged with the satisfaction 
4 P_li_mrner v Mayor ___ _ etc ....... o.f ______ We_l _  l_ington ( 1884) 9 App Cas 699 at 713 p~r Sir Arthur Hobhouse . Lord Wensleydale ' s judgment i1: g_~_~s~.P.: v ;Q_y_~_Q.P.: ( 1866) LR 1 HL 129 at 171 expressed a similar view that the 'inchoate equity' will not fail for lack of certainty as to the nature of the expectation . See also Denny v Jensen [1977] 1 NZLR 35 at 638. 
;r}!.~~-~-~sir ~f;fifu-r~ .. t.lo·bi·~·u::··~1J~!-~~ ai;! 8i~o!ps~p: [~;~o ~9~o:: 406 , ··········-· 
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of that equity. In 9 .. !'. .. 9.:.QQ v A!'_',!_I,l_Q .. 9., 6 for instance, Scarman 
LJ failed to distinguish clearly the separate nature of the 
extent of the 'inchoate equity' and its satisfaction.7 
III THE REMEDIES 
................ -,.·--··-······················· .. ····· .. ·········· 
A Order ... . ..for ...... transfer ...... of ... the ...... fee .... s.imple 
The most valuable remedy available to any estoppel 
claimant is a transfer of the fee simple in the property. 
A compulsory transfer of a fee simple estate from 
representor to representee bears some resemblance to the 
'clean break' provision in divorce legislation. s Such a 
remedy may sever finally the relationship between 
representor and representee, a relationship which may well 
have broken down prior to the dispute either because of the 
dispute or because of the death of the representor . 9 In 
6(1976] 1 Ch 179 . 
7 That there are close links between the extent of the 
'inchoate equity' and its satisfaction is suggested in 
Griffiths v W.il..l .. iams. ( 1978) 248 EG 947; ~.?-.9.4.~ .. 9..!.:l. v 9..!:S' .. ~9. . .Y. (No ..... 2J . (1979) 21 SASR 280 at 288; Burridge [1982] CLJ 290 
at 308. 
8 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 Section 25A( 2) ( as introduced 
by Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 Section 3) 
states that where the court decides to e x ercise its 
financial power·s in favour of a party to the marriage it 
shall be the duty of the court to decide whether it would be 
appropriate to terminate all financial obligations between 
the parties. 
9 In most cases involving claims of proprietary estoppel , 
the re has been a breakdown of the relationship between the 
representor and the representee prior to the property 
disput e in question. Where the representor has died ( a 
common occurrence in the 'familial cases' ) the deceased' s 
pe rsonal representatives may have been in dispute with the 
representee prior to the representor's death. The personal 
representatives and the representee may often be related in 
some way. 
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the resolution of estoppel issues, a complete break in the 
relationship of the plaintiff and the defendant is usually 
preferable to any alternative remedy. The representee is 
left with an absolute interest in the property which avoids 
the problems associated with alternative remedies. A 
court-ordered transfer of a fee simple may simply be a 
realistic reflection of the fact that alternative remedies 
such as a right of occupancy for life may tie up the land 
for the lifetime of the representee without necessarily 
gi ving him the powers to manage that land effectively. 1 o 
The grant of an absolute interest to the representee permits 
him to protect his family's occupancy if he so desires. 
There is some doubt in any event whether remedies involving 
rights of occupancy extend to the representee ' s family,11 
The transfer of a fee simple in the disputed property is 
thus an extremely potent (but rarely) awarded remedy. 12 
B The ___ grant ...... of ... .a. .... r.ight .... of_ . .<?.<?.S.:1::1:P.~P:<?..Y. 
In the majority of cases the successful estoppel 
claimant is awarded a less valuable remedy in the form of a 
mere right of occupancy in the disputed property. 
---··- · -...... _.,, _____ .... ,-........................................................... . 10 See the discussion post at 130 on the relationship between proprietary estoppel and the Settled Land Act 1925. 11 See Jones v I2P:~~ [1977] 1 WLR 438 at 443 per Roskill LJ. Cf lg_?}_~ .. :?.. at 442 P..~ .. :r.. Lord Denning MR. 
T
1 2Di_]_,.J.:.~J'.'.}.! v 1.J.: .. ~-~-~.J.Y.P: ( 186 2) 4. De GF & J 51 7, 4 5 ER 12 8 5; 
_J):Q.~as v Thomas (1956] 1 NZLR 785; Pascoe v Turner (1979] 1 --····---· _,, __ ,, ............... -.......... 
. ............ -,.·-···········"·" ·····-··"··········"············· 
Di :t:io~3 ~;2 Jun~h.?.-/ll"z) ~ K.tgf~!~;n-···\~-iu~~~:~p~~\~~'1 i!:n~~I~ R_L_ches v Ho ben [ 1986] 1 ··Q-d ········1f····j15 · -· ·-···-·--in ...... re Basham deed [ 19 8 6T 1 wLiig····rifg 8 . ' -··-· .. ········-..... ·-··-··-···· ·-··· .. ··············1.....····--·-· ·-····· .. ··· 
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In Re ............... Sharpe ............ J A ............... Bankrupt). 1 3 Browne-Wilkinson J 
recognised that the grant of rights of occupancy may 
represent a possible remedy in estoppel cases. He accepted 
that Lord Kingsdown' s well-known statement in B .. ~~.§_<i~ .. Q; v 
pyson 14 had been extended in the modern case law so that 
it is now established that, if the parties 
have proceeded on a common assumption that 
the plaintiff is to enjoy a right to reside 
in a particular property and in reliance on 
that assumption the plaintiff has expended 
money or otherwise acted to his detriment, 
the defendant will not be allowed to go back 
on that common assumption and the court will 
imply an irrevocable licence or trust which 
will give effect to that common assumption.is 
It is in fact debatable whether Browne-Wilkinson J' s 
statement actually extends the principle enunciated in 
gams.den v Dys.on. 1 6 It is arguable that the principle in 
R.§1:ms.den v Dys.on has always applied to rights of occupancy. 1 7 
Shared occupancy in return for financial payment is now a 
mo re frequent occurrence, and it is simply the case that the 
rule is being more frequently invoked. 
1 3(1980] 1 WLR 219. 
1 4 (18 66) LR 1 HL 129. 
15 (1980] 1 WLR 219 at 223. 
16 (1866) LR 1 HL 129. See Woodman (1980) 96 . LQR 336 at 338 . 
17 See , e.g., ~t..!..!.~9...!:..t. v Barber ( 1880) 15 Ch D 96 where the Principle of proprietary estoppel was formulated in 
s ufficiently broad terms to include occupation rights. 
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Rights of occupancy, albeit long-term, have certain 
drawbacks for claimants of 'inchoate equities'. They are 
not assignable and may even, in certain circumstances, be 
revocable. 18 
C Reimbursement ...... o.f ..... expend_iture 
Another possible means of satisfying the 'inchoate 
equity' of estoppel takes the form of a simple reimbursement 
of expenditure,19 This may be a particularly appropriate 
remedy where the disputing parties are no longer able to 
live together amicably or where one of them has already left 
the disputed property prior to the court hearing. It may 
be the case that the estoppel claimant would prefer such a 
remedy in any event. The courts have, however, granted 
financial remedies even more widely, sometimes in instances 
where the representee had received a clear encouragement in 
terms of some right of occupancy in the land itself and 
would greatly have preferred such a remedy. 
Moriarty has argued that monetary solutions may also be 
appropriate in those 
representee had an 
.......... -.................. ,. ___ ., __ ..................................................................... . 18See post at 
estoppel 
expectation 
claims 
of 
in 
joint 
which the 
occupancy . 
19The Australian courts have accepted that an equitable lien 
may be granted to satisfy the 'inchoate equity' where 
reimbursement of expenditure is regarded as the correct 
remedy. See, e.g., HamiJton v Geraghty (1901) 1 NSWSR (Eq) 
81 at 91; In re Whitehead [1948] NZLR 1066 at 1072; Morr~s 
v Morris [1982] 1 NSWLR 61 at 66; Pearce. v Pearce [1977] 1 
NS~LR - liO at 177. 
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According to this argument , the expectation in such a 
situation is that there has been an oral grant of a joint 
inte r est in the property . Moriarty therefore concludes 
tha t it is frequently in the nature of joint ownership "for 
a person who expects occupation to end up, sometimes with 
money instead and it is this ... which explains why money is 
sometimes the remedy in the estoppel cases as well." 2 o It 
is not entirely clear that Moriarty's efforts to 
circumscribe the flexibility of the judicial remedy are 
supported in the ' familial cases ' . These cases demonstrate 
that substantial judicial discretion exists as to whether 
the relevant expectation related to an absolute interest in 
the property or to an occupation right or to a mere right to 
reimbursement of his e xpenditure. The content of the 
expectation is only one of the factors to be taken into 
account in determining the extent of the estoppel remedy. 
One major disadv antag e of simple financial 
reimbursement is that in times of rapid house inflation any 
del ay i n searching for alternati v e accommodation may leave a 
repre sentee homeless . Even reimbursement of expenditure 
plus interest may not be sufficient to prov ide a new home . 21 
·- ........................ , .. ___ ................ ,.. -, ..... , .. , __ ............... .... 2 0 (1984) 100 LQR 370 at 386 . 40 6 at 407. See also Th ompson [ 198 6 ] Conv 
21 See , e.g. , P..9..9:.~!.1..9...F. .. th. v :Q.9..9:.~.~.9..rth (1973) 228 EG 1115. 
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D Constructive Trust ·--·-·-··---· ............................ , ... _., ................... ,___ ,,, .. , .. ,... 
In Hussey v :R_~ .. !}~.~ .. !'.. 2 2 Lord Denning MR ( referring to his 
own decision in Inwards 
·······--··························· .. ·· 
v Baker 2 3) suggested that the 
'inchoate equity of estoppel' could be satisfied by the 
remedy of a constructive trust.24 The precise nature of 
this remedial constructive trust is uncertain. It is 
suggested that it dates only from the court hearing and in 
this respect differs from a constructive trust based on 
common intention. 2 5 The latter type of constructive trust 
is considered in more detail later in this dissertation.26 
The former type of constructive trust has not, as yet, been 
granted as a means of satisfying an 'equity of estoppel' in 
any of the 'familial cases'. 
Following P.JJ.!I.1:!I.1:~~'. .. § . case there is little doubt that the 
courts have maximum flexibility in deciding on an 
appropriate remedy for the purpose of satisfying the 
'inchoate equity' .2, The relief granted can be refined to 
22 (1972] 3 All ER 744 at 748. 
23 (1965] 2 QB 29. 
24 See also I .n ........ re ........ Basham ....... JdecdJ. (1986] 1 WLR 1498 at 1504. In Pearce v Pearce (1977] 1 NSWLR 170 Helsham CJ approved of the's"e ....... d.fc'ta . .................................... ' 
25 See Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 62 ALR 429 at 450. 26 See post at 242 
2 7 This flexibility in satisfying the 'inchoate equity' is 
stressed in P.l.immer v May:or ....... etc .. _ ..o.f ....... Wel.l.i.ngton ( 1884) 9 App Cas 699 at 713; Crabb v Arun DC [ 1976] Ch 179 at 189; Griffiths v Williams ( 1977) 248 EG 947 at 949; Dennz v 
~l[s E O ~ 1 ! ~ 7 f 3 i 2 ~ZLR tt_: .. : .. ;j .. :. t v 6 ~-~ .. ~ .. r.J_~q'{"i'§·~}l'Y.1 v N~·~El~·6 f 1;: O ~ 4; 
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take into account all the facts of any given situation. 
The creativity of the courts' approach is illustrated by the 
wide variety of remedies which can be found in the 'familial 
cases'. The crea ti vi ty of equity is no new phenomenon. 
Brady, for instance, describes the dee is ion in the Irish 
case of Cul .. len v C:::.1::1.J.J.~n2 8 as reaffirming " the willingness of 
the courts, at least in the context of equitable estoppel, 
to act in the classical equitable fashion, ex ... _ ..aequo __ ... et 
bo.no " 2 9 in order to determine in the circumstances of each 
case how the 'inchoate equity' should be satisfied. 
This judicial approach raises a number of important 
questions. Is there any logical and coherent pattern to 
this creativity? Is it possible to explain why a 
particular remedy was awarded in any given situation? Even 
more important, perhaps, is it possible to forecast with any 
certaint y what remedy the court will grant once the facts of 
a dispute are accepted as giving rise to the 'inchoate 
equity ' of estoppel?Jo 
9Y.J.1 .  ~.!:1. v g_y.JJ:: .. ~ .. r::i. [1962) IR 268 at 282; Sne.11 .. ' .. s ..... Pr.inc.ipl.es. 
<::> .f _Equ.ity ( 28th Ed 1982) p 562. 
28(1962) IR 268. 
29 Brady, An English and Irish View of Proprietary Estoppel, (1970) 5 I Jur (NS) 239 at 251. 
30See Moriarty, Licences and Land Law: Legal Principles and 
Public Policies, ( 1984) 100 LQR 376 at 379; I.n ...... re ....... S.harpe (A .... !?.~ .. r.~::kF..:1::1.P..:t:J .. [1980) 1 WLR 219 at 226 P..~ .. !:. Browne-Wilkinson J. See also Cowcher v Cowcher [ 1972 J 1 WLR 425 at 430 where Bagnall J upheld the need for certainty . He maintained 
that " In any individual case the application of established 
principles of property law may produce a result which 
appears unfair. So be it: in my view that is not an inj ustic e . I am convinced that in determining rights, 
Particularly property rights, the only justice that can be 
attained by mortals, who are fallible and are not 
omn iscient, is justice according to law; the justice that 
flo ws from the application of sure and settled principles to 
Prov ed or admitted facts . So in the field of property law 
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Moriarty has attempted to e x plain in one all-embracing 
the or y the principles which guide the courts in determining 
preci sely which remedy they will grant in satisfaction of 
the 'inchoate equity' ,31 Moriarty's theory, although 
elegantl y constructed, is dangerously alluring . J 2 For 
Moriarty there are very simple explanations for the granting 
of any particular remedy in a given case. He has 
hypothesised that the satisfaction of the ' inchoate equit y ' 
is n o more than a judicial sanctioning of " orthodox property 
rights simply denuded of formality in their creation" . 3 3 
On this basis, Moriart y has suggested that the remedy to be 
granted in any case can readily be pred icted b y asking what 
the representee wou l d have recei v ed if he had been formall y 
granted the right which he claimed he was granted 
informall y . Moriarty has argued for instance that in 
........ _," .. --··-.. ···--·········-··"·······""""''"'' ...................................................... ............... ············· ........................................................................ . the length of the Chancellor ' s foot has been measured or is capable of measurement . This does not mean that equity is pas t child bearing; simpl y that its progeny must be legitimate - be precedent out of principle . It is as well tha t this should be s o ; otherwise no lawyer could safely adv is e on h is cli e nt 's t i t le a nd every quarrel would lead to a l aw suit . " 
31 (19 8 4 ) 100 LQR 376 . See also Dewar ( 1986) 49 MLR 74 1. 3 2 Caj al warned of "the invincible attraction of theories wh i c h simplify and unify seductively . . . when the s impl e scheme s stimu l ate and appeal t o tendencies deepl y root e d i n our mi nds, t h e c ongenital inclinat ion to economy of mental effor t and the almost irres istible propensity to regard as true what satisfies our aesthetic sensibility by appearing in ag reeable a n d harmonious a rchitectural ' forms - as always reason is silent befo r e beauty. Th e case of Phryne repeats i t self." ( Rec o l l e c t i ons o f My Li f e , quoted i n Th,~ . ... P..Y. . .!.'. .. ~l:1.Lt. 2..L Na t u re , ed Alan Hodgki n et a l , (1937) p 43.) Ph r yne was a G""re_e_k ........ h etaira wh o , when pfacied on t ri al , won a n acqu ittal by disp l aying h e r e x traord i na ry beaut y to the jud ges. 33 (1984) 100 LQR 37 6 . Moriar t y, whi le acc epti ng t hat judicia l discretion exists, has attempted to circumscribe t hat di scret i on by fo r cing it into a f ramework of orthodox Property principles. 
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Baker 34 there was "no unambiguous, albeit oral, 
present of the land itself; only an assurance that he [the 
son] could build on it and live there . The son in fact had 
onl y an expectation of being allowed to stay there ." 3 s 
Accordingly, Moriarty concluded that the court could not 
have awarded a transfer of the fee simple as it did in 
p_i_llwyn v L.l.ewe_lyn 3 6 but quite properly granted only an 
occupation right. In the latter case, Moriarty argued, the 
memorandum clearly established the representor' s intention 
to give land to his son . Some doubt is cast on Moriarty's 
argument by the reasoning of Lord Westbury LC in Dillwyn v 
I.:,lewe,,lyn itself. Here the Lord Chancellor explicitly 
rejected the submission that the extent of the donee's 
interest depended on the terms of the memorandum . He held 
that the 'inchoate equity' claimed by the donee and indeed 
the satisfaction of that equity depended on the totality of 
the transaction. In the words of the Lord Chancellor, "no 
one builds a house for his own life only, and it is absurd 
to suppose that it was intended by either party that the 
house at the death of the son , should become the property of 
the father."37 
In the familial context the representee ' s expectation 
may be so ambiguous that the courts must consider other 
factors before deciding on the appropriate remedy. Even 
where the extent of the 'inchoate equity' is ascertainable 
"··-·· .. ,-....• -···--·--····--····-···-···· .. ·····-··-······-· .. ··········--··-·· 34 [ 19 65) 2 QB 29. 
35 (1984) 100 LQR 37~ at 383. 
36 (1862) 4 De GF & J 517, 45 ER 1285 . ;;~}1~fy~
2
;
7 
~J .. ~.~-~J .. Y~ ( 1862) 4 De GF & J 517 at 522, 45 ER 
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from the clearly evidenced expectation of the representee, 
the courts tend to look at all the circumstances in order to 
determine the remedy. There may be factors present which 
reinforce the courts in their view that it would be not only 
just but also practicable to giv~ effect to the unambiguous 
expectation. There may even be factors which necessitate 
the grant of a more extensive remedy than that suggested by 
the representee' s expectation. In certain other cases 
factors may be present which militate against the 
representee's expectations being satisfied . 
V FACTORS RELEVANT TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE 'INCHOATE 
EQU_ITY .. ' .. 
The 'familial cases' disclose a number of overlapping 
factors which the courts regard as relevant to their 
selection of the appropriate remedy in claims of estoppel. 
Some of the factors have already been employed by the courts 
to determine whether a relevant encouragement or a relevant 
det rimental alteration of position has been proved. Most 
of the factors bear a remarkable resemblance to those 
'matters' to w~ich the court is directed to have r egard in 
exercising its powers under sections 23 and 24 of the 
Mat r imonial Causes Act 1973 when reallocating property on 
divorce. ls Indeed Harpum has called for a statutory 
solution to the adjustment of non-matrimonial property 
.
3s"Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, Section 25 ( as amended by 
Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 , Section 3) . 
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rights in situations of conflict. He has proposed "a broad 
statutory discretion (broader than that conferred by the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 because the situations are far 
more varied) to adjust the rights of cohabi tees when they 
live together." 3 9 The trigger for discretion, he has 
suggested, could be a situation of total or partial economic 
dependence by one cohabitee on the other,4o It may be that 
the courts' approach to the satisfaction of the 'inchoate 
equity ' provides a non-statutory, albeit partial, solution 
to Harpum' s demands . In the majority of the 'familial 
cases' where a remedy was granted, the disputed property was 
owned by a member of the representee' s family. 4 1 It may 
not be unreasonable in such circumstances for the courts to 
exercise a broad discretion in determining the future of the 
property. 
Consideration will now be given to each of the factors 
which the courts regard as relevant to the satisfaction of 
the 'inchoate equity', in order to illustrate its influence 
on the operation of judicial discretion in the 'familial 
cases'. These factors are scattered in a fairly 
indiscriminate manner throughout the cases. It is unusual 
3 9 Adjusting Property Rights between Unmarried Cohabi tees, (19 82) 2 Ox Jour of Leg Stud 277 at 287. 
40 Ibid. 
4 1 Shaida v !<;.:i::.P.:.9.:1~.:l..1..~.-.. -11.4 (Unreported, Chancery Di vision 22 June 1982) was one of the rare household cases where the 
representee succeeded in safeguarding his family home 
against a company. However, it must be noted that the 
representee did pay the full value in return for the 
transfer of the fee simple and the house was completely 
separate in a physical sense from all other company ~~m~~~~d 
19 
~ ~l~~~o rat1e"d0 , ~:---~Hf;;:~ca~~t-_l~i'-1n1;P~~r~ 1 ~ 
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to find a case where one particular factor alone determines 
the outcome, and it is in fact much more usual to find 
several factors present in any given case. 
A The ..... expecta.t .ion ...... held ..... bY ..... the ..... re_presentee 
In § . .h..~A.c:f.:~ v K.i.ndlane ........... L.td, 4 2 there was a direct 
representation by the defendant company that it would 
transfer the disputed property to the plaintiff's wife. 
The property had originally been purchased by the company 
for occupancy by the plaintiff and his family. Judge P V 
Baker QC held that where the representee' s expectation was 
based on an unequivocal representation, this expectation 
should normally form the basis of the satisfaction of the 
equity. The court ordered a transfer of the legal title on 
condition that the plaintiff paid the defendant the sum of 
money previously agreed. The plaintiff's expectation had 
alwa ys been that he would have to pay for the property prior 
to conveyance. 
B F.inanc.ia.l}Y .... quant.if.iab.l.e ....... loss 
Where the representee has suffered considerable direct 
financial loss, in reliance on his expectation, the courts 
have seemed more prepared to order a transfer of the fee 
simple in the disputed property . 
42Unrepo rt e d, Chanc ery Division 2 2 June 1982. 
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In Dillwyn v Llewel~, 43 for instance, the plaintiff's 
alteration of position involved the expenditure of some 
£14 , OOO - a not inconsiderable sum of money in 1862 - on 
building a house on his father ' s land . The financial 
quantification of the substantial detriment flowing from the 
representee's alteration of position was an important factor 
in the satisfaction of the 'inchoate equity' . An order was 
mad e for a transfer of the fee simple to the representee. 
In Q ..~:".:l:.~.!: .. 9. .. P.: v tI.:t::!:.!: .. 9.:.9.g .. h. 4 4 the Supreme Court of Wes tern 
Australia granted an order declaring that the representees 
were entitled to acquire the freehold of valuable farmland 
in Western Australia . The representees had to make a 
payment to the defendants of t wo-thirds of the value of the 
land in return for the transfer . The case involved a 
dispute within a large e x tended family over ownership of the 
farml a nd . The e xpectation of the representees .had been 
that they would e v entuall y be allowed to succeed to 
ownership of the farmland . To have granted less than a 
transfe r of the fee simple wo u ld have caused serious loss to 
the representees who had expended considerable money and 
labour in farming the land over some thirty-four years . 
In Pascoe v Turner 4 s the Court of Appeal took into 
acc ount n ot only the financial loss resulting from the 
representee's detrimental reliance but also the d epletion in 
--- -•••-,, ,.,,,,M- ••-•••M------·•-••••o oMOO OOOOoOOOO OOHOOO"' '-"''"''' '' '''"' ''''' ''' ' • 43 (1862) 4 De GF & J 517, 45 ER 1285 . 44 [1983] WAR 321 (affirmed without further comment by the Privy Council (1985-86) 63 ALR 575). 45 [1979] 1 WLR 431. 
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the representee' s financial resources prior to the date of 
the representor' s encouragement. 
together in a 9:.~L .... .:f. .. ?:9...:t . .9 relationship. 
The parties had lived 
The representee had 
onlY a small amount of capital when she entered into the 
relationship. She had used this money for the benefit of 
both herself and the representor even before the representor 
had encouraged her to believe that their family home would 
be transferred to her. The totality of the representee's 
financial loss both prior to and after the representor' s 
encouragement was taken into account by the Court in 
awarding a transfer of the fee simple. Cumming-Bruce LJ 
recognised that the representee's financial loss was 
objectively not substantial. Her loss did, however, 
represent a high proportion of her total available capital. 
Riches v Hogben 46 is the only case in which the 
transfer of a fee simple estate has been ordered even though 
the detrimental alteration of position by the representee 
had not benefited the representor financially. Here, 
however, the representee's alteration of position was 
substantial in terms of its effect on the representee. The 
representee was the son of the representor. The 
representee had given up his council house and job in 
England and had transported himself and his family to 
Aus tralia. The representor who was already living in 
Australia had led the representee to believe that she would 
Provide a house for him there. 
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In the New Zealand case of Taylor v Tay_lor 4 7 the 
performance of an agreement between spouses that a wife 
should transfer land to her husband was delayed because of 
technicalities relating to registration. The wife 
subsequently refused to complete the transaction. The 
court refused to grant a transfer of the land to the 
husband. Instead Shorland J granted him a mere 
reimbursement of his financial outlay on the property, a 
garden shed, together with exclusive occupancy of that shed 
until he was repaid in full. By the time the case came to 
court the garden shed had become the husband's home. There 
was no detailed discussion of proprietary estoppel by 
Shor land J, whose decision to grant a much less valuable 
remedy than a fee simple transfer is explicable only on the 
particular facts of the case,48 The representee had made 
no major improvements to the shed and had therefore at 
47(1956) NZLR 99. 
48Moriarty, (1984) 100 LQR 376 at 384, 387 has arg·ued that 
the decision in Taylor v Tay lor can be explained in terms of 
the function of proprietary estoppel. If its function is 
to enable the informal creation of property interests in land , according to Moriarty, one must always ask the question what interest was intended to be created by the 
representor. As the representor gave the land to the 
representee for the purpose of building a matrimonial home, 
the intention of the representor was to create a joint interest. A grant of monetary compensation to the 
representee was simply a reflection of what the court would have done if there had been a formal creation of a joint interest at law. The court in such circumstances would have ordered sale if the purpose of the trust no longer 
existed and both parties would then have received a financial share of the proceeds of sale. Moriarty's 
argument is, however, unsound even within the framework of his own hypothesis. The representee was led to believe 
tha t he was the sole owner of the property. Had this belief been formalised under the Property Law Act 1952 (NZ) he would have had a right to the whole property. Furthermore the representee did not receive a share in the Value of the property but simply the capital which he had 
spent on it. 
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least in superficial terms - suffered little detriment from 
his alteration of position. The case illustrates how the 
courts appear to attach considerable weight to financial 
los s by the representee in consequence of direct expenditure 
on the property. Correspondingly little attention has been 
given to the quantifiable loss suffered by the representee 
in terms of the opportunity-cost involved in not seeking an 
alternative home. Where financial expenditure on the 
representor's property is minimal the courts have generally 
been reluctant to grant a transfer of the entire fee 
simple. 4 9 
C Benef.i ts ..... ga.ined. by .. __ the .... r.epresentor __ from ...... th_e_,parties'. 
rel_a ti_ons_h_ip 
In the familial context it is highly likely that the 
representee's alteration of position will take the form of 
mini mal financial expenditure or domestic labour. Where 
this type of detrimental reliance occurs , the courts have 
been particularly ready to take into account the benefits 
accruing to the representor from the representee's conduct . 
In Re ........ Bas_ham ... _ .. J .. decdJ. so the representee and representor 
were stepdaughter and stepfather resp~ctively, The 
representee had helped the representor to run his public 
house for many years, during which time she had received no 
.49Cf Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431; [ 19 as r-iQci' R 3 -:iK·:--....... __ _ RA.9.h~-~- v Ho gben 
50 (1986) 1 WLR 1498. 
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wages. When the representor required nursing care, the 
representee undertook that care and also provided him with 
meals . The substantial benefits thus received by the 
representor were factors which reinforced the court in its 
view that it should give effect to the representee's clear 
expectation (as engendered by the representor ' s explicit 
encouragement) that she would eventually succeed to his 
property. The court ordered a transfer to the representee 
of the fee simple in the disputed land. 
In Greasley v QQQ~~s1 both parties to the dispute had 
lived communally as members of the same family. The 
representee had worked in the representors' shop and had 
cared for the representors' mentally ill sister without any 
financial reward. She had also kept house for all the 
members of the representors' family. The representors had 
therefore benefited considerably from the representee ' s 
alteration of position , and the Court of Appeal accordingl y 
granted the representee a right of occupancy for as long as 
she wi shed . s 2 
In the New South Wales case of Vin~~Il v V\nden, 53 the 
defendant's alteration of position was fairly minimal; he 
had paid the representor , his father , $10 a week rent and 
contributed half of the household expenses . For two years 
he had undertaken mortgage payments but these had ceased by 
••••••u.,,,,,.,,.,..,,.,,_,,,,,,,,,o--.... •••••"••••••••••••00 .. ,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,.,,., ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 
5 1 (1980] 1 WLR 1306 . . 
5 2 Cf Maddi son v Alderson ( 19 81 y-Ti:f···· ·s··o 1 J o·ii-r .......... :f3'9"·:· 
[19 81] Conv 154. 
53 (1982] 1 NSWLR 618. 
( 1883) 8 App Cas 467; see also 
Woodman (1981) 44 MLR 461; Annand 
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the time the case reached the court. The payment of 
current outgoings has generally been seen by the courts not 
as a detrimental alteration of 
payment for benefits received. 
situation is deemed to have been 
position but merely as 
The detriment in such a 
spent. 54 In Vinden the 
... -............................ .. 
defendant's short-term expenditure on the mortgage had 
considerably benefited the represent o r by permitting him to 
retire at an earlier date than would otherwise have been 
possible. The acceptance of this benefit was a significant 
factor inclining the court towards the award of a right of 
occupancy for so long as the representee was prepared to pay 
the outgoings on the home. 55 
the representee was the 9.:~ ... f...?.-9. .. t..9. 
wife of the representor. They had lived together in the 
property with their two children. The representee had 
cont ributed her own minimal earnings to maintain the 
household. 
family. 
She had also cared for the children of the 
The representor had received significant benefits 
from the representee's contributions,57 Again a long-term 
right of occupancy was granted to the representee by the 
Pri vy Council . 
.. ,-, .................................. - .... , ................................. ... ~···· .. .. 
5 4 See , e.g . , E & L .:?.~_:r::g _____ lj:.<?_i:rt.~§. _I.:,_!:_q. v 9:.1.'.'. .. ~.Y ( 1980) 2 5 3 EG 4 7 3; 
AP.P.+. .. ~P.Y v 9. . .<?..~ .. +. .. ~.Y ( 19 8 2) Th.~---···T.J.!!1..~.~ 14 Apr i 1; G..i.::.t.f._f. .. Lt.h..?.. v 
~J.lliams ( 1977) 248 EG 947. 
55 Such remedies such as this are problematic in that it is 
uncertain in what circumstances they may be brought to an 
end. See also Hardwick v Johnson [1978) 1 WLR 683 . 
56 [1986] 3 All ER 107. 
57 See also Griffiths v Williams (1977) 248 EG 947 where Goff LJ recognis··e·d········"t·11·e········b·enef:Ct-;····-···;;·b·t-ained by the representor, an 
elderly lady, fr6m the representee's conduct. The 
representor would not have been able to remain in her home 
had it not been for the representee ' s care. See also 
Thg_mas v T.h..9..!!1.?.: .. ~. [ 19 5 6 ] 1 NZLR 7 8 5 • 
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D Nature ..... o.f ...... the ....... r.epresen.tee' s ...... c .laim 
In Inwards V Baker 58 the e x pectations of the 
representee were not dissimilar to those of the representee 
in D.illwyn v L.lewe.lyn . s 9 . In Inwards v Baker, however, the 
Court of Appeal granted the representee a mere right of 
occupancy for so long as he required the property as his 
home . · The representee had spent a substantial sum of money 
on building a bungalow on the representor' s land . Some 
question inevitably arises as to why the fee simple was not 
transferred to him . Although it can be argued quite 
cogentl y that the Court of Appeal should have awarded a 
transfer of the fee simple to the representee , 6 o such a 
remedy would have been neither nec e ssary nor just to the 
plaintiffs, the personal representatives of the now deceased 
representor. 
It is clear in any event that the representee in 
Inwards. v Baker 6 1 had claimed not a transfer of the fee 
simple in the property but merely a right to remain living 
there . 6 2 Moriarty has, however, rejected this as 
irre le van t on the ground that if the son in I p~?-.1.'.:.9.:~. v !3. .. 1:1:.!s .. ~F 
became tired of his bungalow, he could turn around and 
58 [1965] 2 QB 29. 
59 (1862) 4 De GF & J 517, 45 ER 1285. (1965 ) 81 LQR 183; Crane (1967) 31 Conv 60 Brady (1970) I Jur (NS) 238 at 251. 28 NILQ 123. 
61 [ 1965] 2 QB 29. 
See also Maudsl e y 
(NS) 332 at 342. 
Cf Maudsley, (1977) 
6 2See also Jone.s ..... J..AEJ v Jones __ j_FWJ [1977] 1 WLR 438; 
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require his father to compensate him, even if the father was 
quite happy for the son to go on living there,63 
Moriarty' s argument here may be flawed. Once the 
'inchoate equity' has been satisfied, the court will not 
normally alter the remedy unless new circumstances arise,64 
E Hou.s.ing ...... needs ....... o.f. ..... the .... _part.ies 
The respective housing needs of the representor and 
representee may influence the courts in their satisfaction 
of the 'inchoate equity'. Where the representor is 
securely housed elsewhere, the courts will not normally 
disturb the representee's occupancy of the disputed 
propertyG s if he requires the property as his family home. 
In I::I..?-.!: .. c::!~i.t...<;:J~. v ~ .. <?..h.~ .. § .. <?. P6 6 the representor had allowed her son 
and daughter-in-law to occupy property as their family home. 
When the marriage subsequently broke down and the son had 
left the property, the Court of Appeal refused to terminate 
the daughter-in-law's occupancy. She had a young child who 
63 (1984) 100 LQR 376 at 383. Cf Jacks.on v Cros.by (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 280; Jones ........ (AE)_ v Jones ........ JFW} [1977] 1 WLR 438 ; Brownlee v Duggan (1976) 27 (3) NI~Q 27. 64 See , e.g., Williams v Staite [1979] Ch 291; lohnson [1978] 1 WLR 683. 
Hardwick v 
P
65 See tf.!3--. .h!=!-T.?.-.J v .9..h?.-.P..9.: [1986] ~ All ER 107 at 111, where the rivy Council implied that the representor's need for housing might be a relevant factor in sati~fying the 
'inchoate equity' if there were children. The Privy Council, however, accepted that the representor ' s need for housing was not a relevant factor here. 66 [ 1978] 1 WLR 683. 
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required a home; & 7 
elsewhere. 
the representor was securely housed 
Where the representor and the representee have shared 
the property as their family home prior to the dispute, the 
grant of an occupation right to the successful estoppel 
claimant will generally be an inappropriate remedy. Joint 
occupation is usually possible only when the relationship 
between the parties is amicable. When the relationship has 
broken down, a financial remedy may be the only realistic 
solution open to the court.ss The representee in Morris v 
~orr.i .s., s 9 for instance, had sold his own home in order to 
move in with the representors, his son and daughter-in-law. 
He had handed over the proceeds of sale of his former home 
to the representors, who had built an extension to 
accommodate him. There had been no discussion between the 
part ies as to what would happen to the representee if their 
li v ing arrangements did not work out. The common 
assumption when the extension was built was that the 
plaintiff would be able to live with the representors 
indefinitely. The relationship between the parties to the 
dispute subsequently deteriorated primarily because of the 
marital disharmony between the r epresentors . Mcclelland J 
dec ided to grant the plaintiff an equitable charge over the 
·--···-.. ·-···-·····-······-····-··-···- -·······························-··· .. ·······-········· .. ···· 6 7 In Rogers. v ~JJ.~ .. !:. (Unreported , Court of Appeal 20 
198 6) Slade LJ implied that the Court would take 
account the existence of young children who required a 
i n its determination of the question of encourag ement. 
a lso s.avva v Cos.t.a ....... and ...... Harymode ..... I.nv es tment.s ........ L.td ( 1981) 
NLJ 1114. 
68 See Dodsworth v Dodsworth (1973) 228 EG 1115. 
69 [1982] 1 NSWLR 170. 
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required a home; 6 7 
elsewhere. 
the representor was securely housed 
Where the representor and the representee have shared 
the property as their family home prior to the dispute, the 
grant of an occupation right to the successful estoppel 
claimant will generally be an inappropriate remedy . Joint 
occupation is usually possible only when the relationship 
between the parties is amicable . When the relationship has 
broken down, a financial remedy may be the only realistic 
solution open to the court.GS The representee in Morris v 
Mo.rr.i.s., 69 for instance, had sold his own home in order to 
move in with the representors, his son and daughter-in-law. 
He had handed over the proceeds of sale of his former home 
to the representors, who had built an extension to 
accommodate him. There had been no discussion between the 
parties as to what would happen to the representee if their 
li v ing arrangements did not work out. The common 
assumption when the extension was built was that the 
plaintiff would be able to live with the representors 
indefinitely. The relationship between the parties to the 
dispute subsequently deteriorated primarily because of the 
marital disharmony between the representors. McClelland J 
decided to grant the plaintiff an equitable charge over the 
6 7 In Rogers. v :gJ.J..~ .. !:. (Unreported, Court of Appeal 20 
1986) Slade LJ implied that the Court would take 
account the existence of young children who required a 
in its determination of the question of encouragement . 
also s.avva v Cos.ta ....... and .. __ Harymode .... ).nvestments ......... Lt.d ( 1981) 
NLJ 1114. 
68 See Dodsworth v Dodsworth (1973) 228 EG 1115. 
6 9(1982] 1 NSWLR 170. 
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property with interest to accrue at 10% per annum. The 
representee had, in any event, already left the property and 
was securely housed elsewhere . A resumption of residence 
by the representee was not a realistic possibility . 
F Legal_ ... ..imped_iments 
There may be legal obstacles which prevent the court 
from satisfying the 'inchoate equity ' in a manner which 
would gi ve effect to the representee's expectations. 
i) Settled Land Act 1925 
The question has arisen whether the Settled Land Act 
1925 is brought into play by the grant of an irrevocable 
licence for life in satisfaction of the representee's 
expectation, If this were so, the representee would become 
a tenant for life under the Settled Land Act and would enjoy 
all the powers attendant on this status. In strict terms 
the tenant for life derives benefit only to the e x tent of 
his own equitable interest , being otherwise a mere fiduciary 
of the legal estate , 7o He is invested with certain 
statutory powers to manage and dispose of the land. These 
powers include the power to sell, exchange, lease, mortgage 
or otherwise deal with the land - not for his own personal 
benefit but for the g ood of the settled estate as a whole,71 
70 Settled Land Act 1925, ss 16(1)(i), 107(1). 
7 1 See In re Earl of Stamford and Warrington [ 1916] 1 Ch 404 
at 420, where Younger J described the fiduciary powers of 
the tenant for life as a "highly interested trusteeship" . 
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Inevitably these dealings may legitimately take into account 
of the needs of the tenant for life; he is after all one of 
the beneficiaries and is for that reason allowed to consider 
his own interests. In a very practical sense, however, it 
is impossible that . the tenant for life should exercise his 
powers without promoting his self-interest where he occupies 
the land as his home. 
The concern of both courts and legal commentators has 
centred on the problem that to invest the estoppel claimant 
with the statutory powers of a tenant for life is almost 
certainly in direct contravention of the intentions of both 
representor and representee.12 
In Dodsworth v Dodsworth 7 3 the Court of Appeal 
considered the relationship between estoppel-based rights of 
occupancy for life and the Settled Land Act 19 2 5 , The 
represen tees in P.9..9.:.?..~.<?. .. :r.: .. t. .. h had been invited to 1 i ve with the 
representor, a close relative. The representees then spent 
over £700improving the representor's bungalow in the belief 
that they could live there and make it their permanent home. 
See also In re Boston's Will T.:r.: .. 1::1:.?. .. t. .. ?.. [ 1956] Ch 395 at 405, where Vaisey ;J stated that "the tenant for life may legitimately exercise his own powers with some, but not of 
course an e x clusive regard for his own personal interest ." See also Wade [1956] CLJ 174. 
72 See also Binions v Evans [1972] Ch 359 at 366. Megaw and Stephenson LJJ discussed this problem in a slightly different context but concluded that they were bound by 
~annister v Bannister [1948] 2 All ER 133 and that therefore the defendant was a tenant for life even though this was contrary to the intentions of the parties. See also (1972) LQR 336; Oakley (1972) 35 MLR 551; (1972) 36 Conv (NS) 277 ; (1973) 117 Sol Jour 23. 73 (1973) 228 EG 1115. 
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When they later claimed an 'inchoate equity' the county 
court rejected any question of continued joint occupation of 
the bungalow because the parties were at loggerheads. The 
representor died before the case reached the Court of Appeal 
and thus the main ground on which ' the case had been decided 
at first instance had disappeared. The Court of Appeal 
considered whether, in the changed circumstances, it would 
be appropriate to give the defendants a right to occupy the 
bungalow for life . However Russell LJ took the view that 
such a remedy would have activated the provisions of the 
Settled Land Act 1925. 
In Dodsworth the Court of Appeal did not discuss the 
origins of the settlement which threatened to bring the 
defendants' claim within the Settled Land Act 1925. 74 For 
the purposes of the Settled Land Act a settlement is a 
document. 75 It is v ery generally accepted that a 
settlement cannot come into existence merely because the 
situation demands it,76 However, cases like Dodsworth 
indicate that the courts have not ruled out the theoretical 
possibility of a strict settlement in the present context 
even where there is grave uncertainty as to the precise way 
in which such a settlement is created. Megarry and Wade 
74 Section 1(1) defines a settlement as '.'any deed, will, 
agreement for a settlement or other agreement , Act of 
Parliament, or other instrument, or any number of 
instruments ." See the judgment of Goff LJ in Q_i.::j .. f.JJ.!:.h .. §. v 
~.i.Jliams (1977) 248 EG 947 at 950. 
7 5 See Megarry and Wade Th .. ~ ........... ~?.:.!i.._ .... .9. .. f. ......... :R.~ .. 9.:.J,, ........ .P.!: .. <?.P~.:t'.'.!: .. Y. ( 5th Ed 
198 4) p 343. See also Hornby (1977) 93 LQR 561. Cf 
[1 978] Conv 251. 
7 6 See Megarry and Wade, The ...... Law ... of ........ Real ........ Property, ( 5th Ed 
1984) p 343 . 
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refer to such decisions as 'borderline cases'. They 
mai n tain that the court's decision whether to hold that a 
case is caught by the Act depends on a consideration of the 
exact intention behind the transaction in any given case. 11 
Where an intentioh can be found or inferred that the 
representee should have the powers of the tenant for life, 
the court will ensure that the remedy granted in 
satisfaction of the representee's expectations falls within 
the ambit of the Act. 1 s If , however, the representee' s 
expectations do not extend to any enjoyment of powers of 
management and disposition over the property, the court may 
hold either that the remedy of a licence for life is not 
caught by the Settled Land Act 1925 or that the appropriate 
remedy is that of mere financial compensation. 
In P..<?.9.:.!:>..:i::<.<?. .!: . .!:h. v P.<?..9.:§.~<?. .. ~ .. :t...h. the Court of Appeal held that 
to a ward the representees a lifelong occupation right would 
result in their having "a greater and more extensi v e 
interest than was ever contemplated" by the parties. 79 The 
representees would otherwise hav e had power to sell the 
property, or quit and let it , thus recei v ing the income of 
the invested proceeds of sale for life . 
The reasoning of the Court of Appeal can be 
criticised on two counts. Fi.rs.t, the policy of the Settled 
--... -.......... -.... _ .. ____ ................................................................. . 
7 7 Me garry and Wade , The .... Law ...... of __ ,,_Real_ .. _Property , ( 5th Ed 198 4) P 349. 
7 8 In such a situation , however , 
that the c our t would g r ant a f e e 
1~ .. r ner [19 7 9] 1 WLR 437) . 
7 9 (1973) 228 EG 1115 at 1117. 
it is nowaday s more likely 
simple ( s e e , e .g., ?~~2Q~ v 
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Land Act 1925 is that, regardless of the intentions of the 
parties, 80 the powers of the tenant for life must always be 
ava ilable to prevent the land from being sterilised. In 
pod§.~.9. .. !: .. !:..h. this policy was simply ignored 
if the remedy 
by the Court of 
claimed by the Appeal, S_econd, even 
representees fell within the ambit of the Settled Land Act 
1925 , this remedy did not produce a result which in 
practical terms was more extensi ve than the expectations of 
the defendants.al Third, the final order of the Court of 
Appeal in Dodsworth was that the representees were to be ................................ -....... , ........... . 
compensated for their original expenditure plus interest. 
This remedy was considerably less extensive than the 
original expectations of the representees, even after taking 
the benefits into account which the representees had already 
received in terms of several years of rent-free and rate-
free occupancy. There had been rapid house inflation 
during the six years in which the representees lived in the 
8 0 See Megarry and Wade, The .. Law ... o_f ___ Real _Property, ( 5th Ed) 
at 349, 350. See also (1977) 93 LQR 561 at 562; (1973) 
117 Sol Jour 23 at 24; I.n .... . r .e ..... Carne .. ' .. s ... Settled ......... E.s_tates [1899] 1 Ch 324 at 330 where North J took the view that "It 
may be the mansion house with land surrounding it could be 
sold, and the rest of the settled estate left, with this 
island the property of someone else in the middle of it . 
That this would be contrary to the intention of the settlor 
does not much matter. The question is what does the Act 
say?". Swinfen . Eady J came to a similar conclusion in Re 
Baroness Llanover's Will [1902] 2 Ch 679 at 683. 
si .. in a slightly different context Oakley, (1973) 26 Current 
Leg Problems 17 at 23, has suggested that although the 
imposition of a constructive trust created a settlement 
within the Settled Land Act 1925 (see Bannister v Bannister [19 48] 2 All ER 133) "such a r .. e.suI"t .. ~ ................ desp':i .. t'e ............. f':f"s .. 
consequences, may well not be completely undesirable in view 
of the unconscionable conduct of the plaintiff ," The same 
can sure ly be said in the context of proprietary estoppel. 
In Binions v Evans [1972] Ch 359 at 366 Lord Denning MR 
diss .. en't''ect.-"on th"e ....... p.oint that the defendant was a tenant for 
life under the Settled Land Act 1925, since such a result 
would have been contrary to the intention of the parties. 
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bungalow. The representees were unlikely to be able to buy 
a new home, but the court thought that the factors weighing 
against a licence for life were greater than the problem 
which the representees would face in finding new housing.sz 
In Griffiths v Williamss3 
···--·············································" ···-·-· .. ···············-····-· ......... . 
some five years after 
Dodsworth , Goff LJ circumvented the problem whether the ···-· .. ---··············· .. ·· 
Settled Land Act 1925 can apply to occupational licences 
granted in satisfaction of the 'inchoate equity' . He 
suggested that the P.  .<?..9.:§..".:i..<?. .. :Z::..:t::.h .... _ .. case might have been decided 
per .... ...i.ncur_i.am because there had been no consideration of the 
instrument which constituted the settlement. a 4 Had the 
parties rejected his solution, he would have been prepared 
to decide this issue .a s 
In the event the solution propounded by Goff LJ 
had the effect of averting any necessity to consider the 
imp lications of the Settled Land Act 1925 . In his vi ew the 
court ought to see, hav ing regard to all the circums t ances , 
"what is the best and fairest way to secure protection for 
the person who has been misled by the representation made to 
him and subsequentl y repudiated." a 6 The representee in 
Gri.ff.i.ths v ¥.J.J .. J.:J .. 13.:-.:'1.1..~. had taken care of her elderly mother in 
reli ance on an encouragement that she would have a lifelong 
8 2 Cf the view of Goff LJ in Griffiths v W.i.11.i .ams ( 1977) 248 EG 947, where he stated that the decision in P. .. 9..9.:.~ . .".:i..<?. .. :r:: .. t..:h. went 
"too far the other way". 
83 (1977) 248 EG 947 at 948 . See also [1978] Conv 251. 84 See Section 1(1) of the Settled Land Act 1925. 85 Goff LJ also indicated that the order of the court 
~atisfying the 'inchoate equity' might itself be the ins trument of settlement. 
86 Q_ri..ffiths. v W.ill.iams (1977) 248 EG 947 at 948. 
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occupation of her mother's property. Accordingly, Goff LJ 
thought that the fairest way of dealing with the matter was 
that the plaintiffs, the executors of the representor, 
should grant the representee a long lease (at a nominal 
rent) determinable upon her death . In this way the 
representee would have the right of occupation for life 
which she had been led to expect and yet would be outside 
the ambit of the Settled Land Act 1925. Goff LJ recognised 
that no rent obligation had been contemplated when the 
relevant encouragement was given but he accepted that 
"perfect equity is seldom possible",B7 
The risk to the plaintiffs of such an arrangement 
was that the representee might then assign her lease or 
remarry in which case a successor might claim her statutory 
tenanc y. 88 In order to avoid the first possibility, the 
representee was simply required to give an undertaking to 
the court not to assign her lease . To avoid the 
difficulties implicit in the second possibility, the rent 
payable was deliberately fixed at a low level which would 
not attract the operation of the Rent Act provisions for the 
devolution of tenancies.s9 There was a marked reluctance 
on the part of Goff LJ to grant the representee anything 
other than a long-term occupation right. He pointed out 
87 Ibid. See also Hawkins (1966) 30 Conv (NS) 256 at 262; Martin (1972) 36 Conv (NS) 266 at 271; (1973) 177 Sol Jour 23 at 25; [1978] Conv 252. 
88 See Rent Act 1977, Schedule 1, Part 1, para 2. 89 See Rent Act 1977, s 5, which provides that a tenancy in which the rent does not exceed two thirds of the rateable value of the property is not a protected tenancy within the Rent Act . 
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that it would be very difficult to quantify the 
representee' s labour contributions in order to give her a 
financial remedy. 
ii) War Serv.i.ce ..... Home.s ..... Act ...... 1 .. 9) .. 8.-19_6 .. 2 ..... ....(.Cth). 
In E~~.f .. 9. .. f.?.. v P.f.?. .. ~.f .. 9. .. f.?.. 9 0 the New South Wales Supreme Court 
found that the plaintiff, the de facto wife of the 
representor, had clearly expected to have a joint share in 
the representor's property. She had pooled her income with 
the representor and had cared for the four children of the 
relationship. This relationship had broken down and the 
representor was attempting to sell the family home. The 
representee placed a caveat on the title, claiming an 
interest in the family home. The property was, however, 
subject to the War Service Homes Act 1918-1962 (Cth). 91 
Helsham CJ acknowledged that any transfer of the property to 
the representee would be in contravention of this act and 
therefore unlawful . In the circumstances, however, 
Helsham CJ was not prepared to accept that there was no 
remedy for the plaintiff. In the absence of transfer she 
would clearly have security of occupancy, because the 
representor could not have sold the property wi thout the 
9 0(1977) 1 NSWLR 170. 
9 1Now the Defence Service Homes Act i'918-1973 (Cth), 
Section 3 5 ( 1) of the latter act provides "so long as any 
land or land and dwelling-house is subject to a contract of 
sale, mortgage or other security in accordance with this 
Act, a transfer (other than a transfer by or to the 
Director) of that latid or land and dwelling-house or of any 
estate or interest therein shall not have any force or 
effect unless it .•. 
c) is made with the consent in writing of the Director. 
I . 
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permission of the Director of the War Service Homes Division 
(who would be unlikely to give such permission). But the 
chie f Justice was anxious to grant a more positive remedy to 
the plaintiff in order to prevent any further litigation 
between the parties. The couple had clearly intended to 
"enjoy the fruits of their joint labours".92 
The Chief Justice decided that the most 
appropriate way to satisfy the 'inchoate equity' was to 
grant to the representee a long-term right of occupancy in 
the property for as long as she required it as her home. 
Helsham CJ believed that this irrevocable licence in itself 
was not an interest which would be caught by Section 35 of 
the Defence Serv ice Homes Act 1918-1973 (C th}. Helsham CJ 
suggested, howe v er , that the plaintiff , representee might be 
able to enter a caveat against the title in order to protect 
the interest which the court had a warded in satisfaction of 
her ' inchoate equity' . He commented on the paradoxical 
situation which would arise in these circumstances. If the 
irrev ocable licence were caveatable, it would demonstrate 
that her licence was an equitable proprietary interest. 
Ironically, however, such caveatable status might ultimately 
render the plaintiff 's occupation right less secure because 
this right could then be caught by Section 35 of the Defence 
Servic e Homes Act . 
92 (1977] 1 NSWLR 170 at 177. 
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iii) Fi_j_i __ ,Nat.i.ve ...... Land_,_Trust ... Act _19 .. 5.5. 
In Mahara.j v Qh_~_I,1_4,93 the Privy Council held that the 
rep r esentor was estopped from denying that the representee 
had his permission to live permanently in his house. This 
defensive remedy was held to be a mere personal right which 
could not affect the interests of third parties. 9 4 Any 
remedy involving a grant of a legal or equitable interest in 
the property would have granted the representee a right 
which would have fallen within the scope of Section 12 of 
the Fiji Native Land Trust Act. This Act prevents any 
dealings with land without the consent of the Native Land 
Trust Board, which would not have been forthcoming. Had 
the Privy Council satisfied the 'inchoate equity' by the 
grant of an al terna ti ve remedy the representee would have 
forfeited her right to live in the property. 
i v) Land Subdivision in Counties Act 1946 ............................................................................................... -......................................... ........................................................................ ,_ ..... . 
In Re Whitehead95 the representee had expended labour 
and materials in order to build two cottages on the land 
belonging to his father, the representor. When the father 
died the son claimed that he had been led to expect that he 
would ultimately own one of the cottages. Sub-division of 
the land was not for legal reasons a viable possibility. 9 6 
93 (1986] 3 All ER 107. See also Ku~amma v Manadan (1968] AC 1062. Cf Qh~!~ers v Pardoe [1963] 1 WLR 677. 94 See post at 180 for a discussion of 'equities of estoppel' 
and third parties. 95 (1948] NZLR 1066. 96 Th e cottage was remote and had no road frontage and 
therefore no consent under the Land Subdivision Act 1946 
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The court therefore satisfied the 'inchoate equity' by 
mak ing an order for reimbursement of the value of the labour 
and materials which the representee had expended on the 
property. 
G Th_ird ..... par_tY. .. . imP.l.icat_ion_s 
Before deciding to grant a given remedy in satisfaction 
of the representee's e xpectation , the courts must take into 
account any third party claims to the disputed property. 
In Jo_nes ____  (.AEJ v Jone.s .... JFWJ, 9 7 for example, the expectation 
of the representee was that his father had given him the 
property which provided his present family home. The 
representor , however bequeathed his property to his wife, 
the representee's stepmother. 
the representor' s encouragement 
She had full knowledge of 
to the representee. The 
Court of Appeal held that the beneficiary was estopped from 
selling the property a nd the representee' s occupancy was 
thus safeguarded. The case presented an obvious 
opportunity for the court to order a transfer of the fee 
simple to the representee. Ho we ver, the Court of Appeal 
found itself constrained b y the decision at first instance, 
which had awarded the representee a one-quarter share behind 
a trust for sale. Lord Denning MR cast some doubt on this 
decision but was nevertheless reluctant to disturb the 
HW-~w, - , ... ,,.,,,,.,,u,,,_,,,.,,. ,,_,.,,,,,_, ,,,,,.,,,,,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,.,,,,,,,,,,,,u,,,,, .,,,,,,.,,,,, .. ,,,., ... ., ... ,.,,.,.,,,.,,,,,,,,.,,,.,,o,oo,,•.,,,.,,,,.,,,,.,,.,, "''''''''' ''' ''''"'''"''"'''''"""''""'"'"""''' '"' 
would have been forthcoming. Any agreement to dispose of th e land without consent is an offence under the Land Act 192 4, s 16 . 
97 [1977) 1 WLR 430. Moriarty , (1984) 100 LQR 376, 
completely ignores this important case . It does not , in any 
event, fit his hypothesis. 
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ruling. 99 In order to prevent the beneficiary of the 
representor's will from selling the representee's home, the 
court of Appeal took the novel approach of using proprietary 
estoppel to prevent sale which would have been the normal 
consequence of a trust for sale. ·g 9 The decision in 
Jones demonstrates that where the third party is a member of 
the representee' s family, the courts may be prepared to 
reach a compromise between protecting the 'inchoate equity' 
of the representee and protecting the proprietary interest 
of the representor's beneficiary. 
It is not infrequent in the 'familial cases' that the 
disputed property is in the hands of the personal 
r epres entatives of a now deceased representor , In such 
circumstances the court ma y have to consider the effect 
which any possible remedy may have on the interests of the 
various beneficiaries under the representor's estate . In 
Q~~~F.9~ v Murdoch,100 for example, there was a significant 
number of beneficiaries who would be affected by any remedy 
granted to the representees. This did not deter the court 
from awarding a transfer of the fee simple in return for a 
monetary payment by the representees. The beneficiaries 
had already been the recipients of substantial provision 
98 Alder, (1978) 41 MLR 208 at 209 questipned why the case 
came before the court at all since the plaintiff was the 
sole legal owner and could have sold without a court order. 
99 The beneficiary's interest is overreached on sale of the 
property if the proceeds of sale are paid to two trustees. 
The interest will be translated into a share in the proceeds 
f i 9 88t/ e 2° WLR ~; ~ 6 9. .. ~i.Y. .... i ~la-{!..9 .. J.lffr°-l\cf ~·~i~~ 1-i .. 1-fr.9.Bf}Y. 4 4v; ~·i .. ;f"!· 
[1 981] Conv 108; Cocks [1984] Conv 198. 
100 [1983] WAR 321 , 
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from the representor' s estate and would in any event be 
further compensated for their loss of the disputed property 
by the monetary payment to be made by the representees. 
H Conduct ...... o.f. ... . the ____ part i e s 
From time to time the conduct of one or other of the 
parties in an estoppel claim is so irregular as to demand 
consideration by the court.101 Any remedy granted by the 
court in satisfaction of the ' inchoate equity' must clearly 
reflect exceptional conduct. Pascoe v T~~~~~102 provides a 
good illustration of the type of conduct which will carry 
weight in the court's deliberations as to the appropriate 
remedy. Here the representor and the representee had 
previously occupied the disputed property as de facto 
husband and wife. When the representor departed to live 
with his new mistress, he explicitly assured her that the 
house was hers and she therefore had an expectation t hat the 
repreientor would transfer the property to her.103 
On these facts the Court of Appea l upheld a decision to 
award a tranfer· _of the fee simple to the representee. The 
overriding reason for this decision lay in the conduct of 
101 See also Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 25(2)(g) (as 
amended by Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 s 3) 
which directs the court to take account of conduct in 
matrimonial proceedings. 
10 2[1979] 1 WLR 431. 
103 Cf Cullen v Cullen [1962] IR 268 at 282, where Kenny J 
rejected the claim that there had been any representation by 
an alleged representor who had been under considerable 
duress as a result of the representee' s behaviour ( ante at 
33 ) • 
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the representor. For three years prior to the court 
hear ing he had shown that he was "determined to pursue his 
purpose of evicting her from the house by any legal means at 
his disposal with a ruthless disregard of the obligations 
binding upon conscience. ·104 This appalling conduct prior 
to any court hearing led the court to infer that unless it 
satisfied the 'inchoate equity' by the grant of a fee simple 
in the property, the representor would later find some 
excuse t o re-enter the property . Any lesser remedy than 
the award of a fee simple interest would have made the 
representee still vulnerable to the representor's oppressive 
behaviour. 
In satisfy ing the 'inchoate equit y ' which arose in 
Thomas v Thomas., 1 ° s the New Zealand Supreme Court had 
occasion to take into account the blameless and e x emp l ary 
conduct of the representee. The application had been 
brought by the representee under Section 19 of the New 
Zealand Married Women's Propert y Act 1952, which permits an 
order to be made b y the c ourt determining the title of the 
property. Gresson J e xpounded the view that in the 
matrimonial context the court should not be over-technical 
or too r igid in the application of the property principles 
governing the Act , "it may, provided there is a proper 
observ ance of legal principles , disregard niceties and make 
·- "-·- ··-···••, ..... _ ........ ,.- ----·····-·····-·-·-···············-· .. ···-··-·····-·· 1 04 Pascoe v Turne r [1979] 1 WLR 431 at 438 . SufrTn-;-( 19 7 9 r··";fz'"""''MLR 5 7 4. 
1 05 ( 1956] NZLR 785. 
See also 
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an authoritative declaration as to the respective beneficial 
interests of the parties."106 
During the marriage the wife had made a very real 
effort to help her alcoholic husband to play a responsible 
role within the family. To this end she had deliberately 
had the property vested in the joint names of herself and 
her husband even though she had paid the total purchase 
price herself. When the relationship between the parties 
broke down the husband orall y abandoned his interest in the 
property to his wife. The Court awarded a transfer of the 
husband's interest in the property to the wife. The court, 
in satisfying the wife's 'inchoate equity', was evidently 
impressed by the wife's efforts during the marriage. By 
contrast the husband was attempting to free himself from his 
maintenance obligations to his wife and children. The 
husband wa s prepared to honour his agreement to transfer his 
interes t to his wife in return for a release from his 
maintenance obligation. The court could not ignore such 
heinous conduct. The representor's maintenance obligations 
would of course continue to bind him even after the court-
ordered transfer had been made . 
In Q_:r.: .. ~ .. ?.-.. ~ .. J.:..~.Y. v G..9. . .9..~~-1 o 7 the representee had been assured 
of a long-term right of occupation in the family h ome. The 
representors subsequently attempted to evict her. The 
representors had behaved in a most devious way during the 
- ...... ·-·-··· .. , ...... ,,,,_, __ .............................................................. ..... . 10 6Ibid at 792. 
1 07[1980] 1 WLR 1306. 
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first instance hearing. They had withdrawn their claim for 
possession in the county court at the eleventh hour and had 
not sought to contest the defendant's counterclaim. Their 
hope had clearly been was that the counterclaim would fail; 
they could then have brought a claim to evict the 
representee to which she had no answer, the issue then being 
res ....... Jud.icata. The Court of Appeal awarded a long-term 
right of occupancy to the representee. The conduct of the 
representors was taken into account by the Court of Appeal 
in deciding how to satisfy the 'inchoate equity'. Lord 
Denning MR thought that a long-term right of occupancy would 
protect the representee from any possibility of e vict ion by 
the representor. 10s 
I Bene.fi t.s .... ga.ined .. bY ...... the .... repr_esentee ...... from ..... the .... Part.ies .. '. 
re.l.a t.i ons_hi.P 
In the majority of the 'familial cases' the courts have 
been inclined to doubt whether an 'inchoate equity' exists 
at all, if the representee has gained substantial benefits 
from his relationship with the representor.109 In 
exceptional cas_es the courts have accepted that the 
representee has an 'inchoate equity' but even in these 
1os1bid at 1312. 
438. 
C f !'.!:1.:.§..9. .. 9. .. ~. v T~.!: .. ~-~ .. !:. [ 197 9 ] 1 WLR 4 3 1 at 
10 9See, e.g., E ..... & ..... L .... Berg .. __ Homes ___ Ltd v Grey (1980) 253 EG 473; 
Fruin v Fruin (Unreported, Court of Appeal 15 November 
1"983); ..... :$.:I::ri:~.~-1.!. v § .. A!.11:P..!::l_Q .. I.! (Unreported, Queens Bench 21 
June 1983); Warnes v H .. ~.9:1 .. ~ . .Y.. (Unreported, Court of Appeal 
31 January 1984) . 
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circumstances have granted only some minimal form of remedy 
by way of satisfaction.110 
In the New Zealand case of J .. N ...... E.l_l_io.t ...... & ...... co ...... .CFarmsJ. ...... Ltd 
v tturgatroyd 111 the representee had left her home at the 
time of the breakdown of her marriage and had returned to 
occupy a house owned by her father, the representor. The 
representee then spent some of her own money on furniture 
and materials for this property. The house was later 
modified in design and decorated and furnished for the most 
part at no cost to the representee . The expectations of 
the parties concerning the nature of the representee's 
occupancy were uncertain. 112 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal decided to give effect 
to the minimal common assumption which it felt able to 
impute to the parties. Accordingly the Court granted the 
plaintiff the somewhat meagre remedy of compensation for her 
expenditure on the property and otherwise upheld the 
represento r ' s right to serve on the 
notice to quit the premises. 
representee reasonable 
In its satisfaction of the 'inchoate equity' claimed by 
the representee, the court took into account the fact that 
llOCf .l:f_~r9.:_li.t...C:::J~. v J-9 .. P.:.!!_~_.<?.n. [1978] 1 WLR 683 
representee was granted an occupational licence 
irrevocable as long as the representee continued 
pe r week to the representor. 11 1Unreported, New Zealand Court of Appeal 12 
1984. 
where the 
which was 
to pay £7 
September 
11 2 Some four 
granted the 
(Unreported, 
years earlier the New Zealand High Court had 
representee a permanent right of occupation. 
New Zealand High Court 15 October 1980). 
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the representee had clearly enjoyed eight years of rent-free 
occupancy of the disputed property . For five of these 
eight years the representee ' s occupancy had moreover been 
contrary to her father's expressed wishes. The benefit of 
this occupancy required to be balanc~d against the detriment 
which she had suffered, as was the fact that the representee 
had also been given a half-share in her father's farm. 
J Soc.i.a.l .. .. i.mpl.icat.ions 
There may be wider implications, particularly economic , 
for the community at large which the court will take int o 
account in deciding how to satisfy an ' inchoate equity' 
raised b y an estoppel claimant. In a ver y general sense 
the satisfaction of the 'inchoate equity' in any particular 
manner has implications not only for present and future 
l itigants, but also for society at large. Information 
concerning the legal decisions will eventually become part 
of popular consciousness . The knowledge thus gained may 
affect future dealings with land, 1 1 3 If the 'inchoate 
equity' in estoppel cases is satisfied by a remedy which is 
widely perceived as excessive, landowners in the future will 
be less likely to make informal arrangements concerning 
their property. If on the other hand the remedy awarded is 
perceived as insufficient, future recipients of informal 
grants of land may tend to use the property in a manner 
which leads to a diminution in the value of the land. Such 
·ti""jsee Kantorowicz (1937) 53 LQR 326; (1984) 272 EG 1295. 
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conduct would reflect the short-term interest of the 
recipients rather than the long-term good of the land. 
In its satisfaction of the 'inchoate equity' the court 
may also take into account the more specific social 
consequences of any given remedy. In Crabb v Arun DC 11 4 
the Court of 
representors' 
Appeal 
conduct 
verbalised its 
had left the 
concern that the 
disputed property 
standing useless to the prejudice of the local people. 
Lawton LJ said "in an area where employment for the young is 
not always easy to find, we have the spectacle of this piece 
of land next door to a housing estate being rendered useless 
at a time when it cou l d have been of value to the community. 
For that the defendants are solely to blame. 11 11 s Scarman 
LJ took a similar view of the representors' action. It 
amounted to "sterilization of an industrial estate for a 
very considerable period of time" 11 s and consequentl y any 
remedy awarded to satisfy the 'inchoate equity' must reflect 
this fact. 11 7 
In Cameron v Murdoch , 11s for example, any remedy other 
than the award of a transfer of the fee simple might have 
led t o the dim i n u tion in value of substantial farm land . 
The representees would have been unlikely to care for the 
·-·-··--............ "'--··-·- ·-.. ,, .............................................................. . 
11 4 ( 1976] Ch 179 . 
11 5 Ibid at 192. 
1 16 Ibid at 199 . 
11 7 Th e Court of Appeal a warded the representee a right of 
access over the representors ' land without making the 
pa yment , envisaged in the original agreement , to the 
representors . 
1 18 (19 8 3] WAR 321. 
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land with due regard to its long-term economic future 
potential had they been granted mere rights of occupation. 
In Q.!:.A.f. .. f._tt. .. h ..§. v :W.J:.JJ .. ! .. <:3.-.~.§. 1 1 9 the represent e e had devoted 
herself to the long-term care of an elderly relative. To 
hav e denied the representee a right of occupancy could have 
been seen as a denigration of such valuable work. It is 
clear that alternative care facilities would have to be 
found for old people at considerable social cost if 
members of families did not readily undertake the task of 
caring for elderly relatives themselves . 
VI CONCLUSION 
The 'familial cases' considered in this chapter 
illustrate the range of remedies granted by the court in 
satisfaction of the 'inchoate equity'. The cases also 
demonstrate the great flexibility open to the court in 
deciding on the remedy appropriate in any given case. The 
advantages of such flexibility must of course be balanced 
against the accompanying disadvantages of uncertainty. 120 
The estoppel claimant risks being granted a remedy which he 
does not want, a remedy which may compensate him financially 
but which neither protects his right · of occupancy nor 
permits him to purchase another home. The open-ended 
na ture of the court's response to estoppel claims may 
perhaps explain why, in disputes concerning the family home, 
119(1977) 248 EG 947 . 12osee Dewar (1986) 49 MLR 741 at 751. 
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there is often a stronger inclination 
existence of some trust of the property. 
to allege the 
Although a 
successful claim of trust may not always protect the 
occupation of the family home,121 this form of claim does at 
least give the claimant a converitional equitable proprietary 
right which permits him to share in the inflated sale value 
of the property. However, unless the claimant can prove 
the existence of a common intention to share the property 
there can of course be no trust.122 
Heavy criticism has been directed at the flexible 
approach of the courts in granting a remedy in estoppel 
cases even though this flexibility is frequently a response 
to the sheer complexity of the 'familial cases'. For the 
most part the critic ism has centred on the nature of the 
'equity of estoppel', an issue which is considered in the 
ne x t chapter . Particular concern has been expressed about 
the potential duration of the 'equit y of estoppel' and about 
its effect on third party purchasers. 
the subject of the next chapter. 
These matters are 
1 2 1 See, e.g. , C.i.tY .... of ..... London ..... Bu_i,,ld i_ng _ .. S_oc .. iety v Fl_egg [ 198 7] 2 WLR 1266 at 1288. See also Swadling [ 1987] Conv 379; Warburton [1987] Conv 415. 
1 2 2S ee post at 257 ff 
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CHAPTER_ FIVE 
'.].:'.HE ...... NATURE ...... OF ...... THE ...... EQU_ITY ..... AR.ISING ..... FROM ___ PR9PR_I_ET~Y. ...... ~§ . .1'.QJ~:P..~.!:!. 
I INTRODUCTION 
In property disputes between family members a 
successful claim to a benefical interest behind a trust for 
sale has generally been viewed as more advantageous than a 
plea of proprietary estoppel. The fact-situations which 
give rise to both pleas tend to be remarkably similar. 1 A 
litigant who obtains a beneficial interest behind a trust 
would normally be able also to plead proprietary estoppel 
successfully. The reverse, however, is rarely possible. 2 
In a significant number of claims litigants have pleaded 
both trust and estoppel in the alternative.3 
The principal advantage of a successful plea of a trust 
lies in the certainty of the remedy.4 A beneficial 
interest behind a trust is a conventional proprietary 
1 Se~ Anderson (1979) 42 MLR 203. 
2 In ~ .. ?.:.1..~.E:: .. !:. v W.13.: . .f:.~ .. ~ .. 1.:".. (Unreported, Court of Appeal, 12 April 
1984), Browne-Wilkinson LJ accepted that the facts pleaded 
in a claim based on a resulting trust would quite likely 
give rise to a claim of proprietary estoppel. However no 
such claim was raised on the pleadings. See also Wallace 
and Grbich ( 1979) 3 UNSW Law Jour 175 at 199; :?.~.:t. .. :t. .. ~\1 .. !:3-. v 
Becker (1980) ·117 DLR(3d) 257. 
3 See, e.g. , Br_i_stol ......... and ........ Wes_t ___ Bu_ilding ___ ,,_S_oc __ iety v Henn_i_ng 
[ 1985] 1 WLR 778; Morris v Morris [ 1982] 1 NSWLR 61; 
Pe~.!:.9. .. ~ v :P.~ .. 13.: .. !:..9..~. [ 19 7 7] 1 NSWLR 170; T.h.~.9.'..t.!.~ .. !:3-. v R.Y.13.:.!:i. [ 19 8 4] 
VR 6 5; 1 .. 13.: .. Y.:t...9..P: v M..13.: .. 1.:". .. t.t~ [ 19 8 6] 2 FLR 2 2 7; G.9. .. 9..~P. .. ~ .. !:3.. v $..~.tt..h. [1986] 1 WLR 808. 
4 Members of families, conveyancers, vendors and purchasers 
all require certainty of remedy. Llewellyn maintained that 
"it is a significant degree of reckonabil'i ty in the 
individual case which the bar demands and which the lay 
public expects as a condition of its confidence " ( The 
9,omnwn ___ Law ........ Trad_i_t__i_on ........ - ........ Dec_iding ...... Appeals. 1960 p 6). See 
also ~r~h.1?.. v A.1.:".YD ......... P..G [ 1976] Ch 179 at 191 P.~ .. :r.'.. Lawton LJ; 
P~.!:>,.9...9. .. ~. v T.:1::1 .. F..!1 .. ~ .. 1.:".. [ 1979] 1 WLR 431 at 438 P..~ .. i.::. Cumming-Bruce 
L J ; I.~---1.:". .. ~ ........ § . .h.?.:.F..P..~ ........ .LA. .. J3-.!!:.P:~ .. 1.:". .. 1::1P..:t:J_ [ 1 9 8 O ] 1 WLR 2 19 at 2 2 6 P.~.F.. 
Browne-Wilkinson J. 
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interest. In Hoys .. ted v The ...... _ ... Federal ....... J:: .. 9..1_11.1_11._i.ss .i .oner ...... -. o .f 
Taxati ons Isaacs J explained that .................... _ ....... - ..... --··· 
in equity, an identifiable contingent cestu~ 
que .......... trust has an interest beyond a mere 
possibility in the execution of the trusts, 
and in that sense he has, in the eye of a 
court of equity, an interest in the trust 
estate , because as shown , in equity the trust 
is everything . But his interest in the 
trust estate at any given moment is measured 
by the relief which equity is then prepared 
to give him, that is, by the rights which the 
due execution of the trust as framed by the 
creator of the trust will at that moment give 
him . 
The interest of the trust beneficiary has been so 
clearly recognised by equity that it is now considered to be 
almost as important as a legal proprietary interest ,6 The 
right of the c .e.s.tu.i ...... que ...... .. trust ranks at the head of the 
hierarchy of equitable rights . By contrast, the nature of 
the 'equity of estoppel' is far l e ss certain. This 
uncertainty arises primarily from a failure to distinguish 
between the nature of the 'equ ity of estoppel' prior to its 
satisfaction by the court (i.e., the 'inchoate equity') and 
t he nature of the equity after the court has granted a 
remedy (i.e ., the satisfied equity) . 
.... , ... ~ ............................ -.............................................................................. . 5 (1920) 27 CLR 400. 
6 See Everton [1982) Conv 118. (NS) 402 at 409; See Maitland, 
349 ff. 
See Bandali (1973) 37 Conv 
Collected Papers, Vol 111 p 
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Even where a distinction has been made between the 
'inchoate equity' and the 'satisfied equity', the courts 
have been unable to reach agreement on the nature of the 
respective equities. In the New South Wales case of 
B..?-mi.lton v Geraghty, 7 for instance, Owen J maintained that 
the ' inchoate equity' "is not a personal right to sue which 
could not be assigned but an interest in the land itself." 
At other times, however , the 'inchoate equity' has been 
do wng raded to the ea tegory of a mere equity " naked and 
alone ... incapable of binding successors in title even with 
notice ; 
Edwards 9 
......... ................ ,-···········-
it is personal to the parties." s 
the New South Wales Supreme Court 
In Dewhirst v 
took the v iew 
that all modern formulations of the doctrine of 'propr ietar y 
estoppel' agree that " the remedy which the court will suppl y 
is whatever is most appropriate in the circumstances" . The 
Court therefore declared that " it would seem that what the 
doctr ine gives rise to is an equit y - a right in personam -
rather than an equitable estate or interest . " 1 o In Frze.r 
v Brook ,11 Oli v er LJ similarly suggested that the ' inchoate 
equity' was more of a personal interest than a proprietary 
interest, and was " akin to the personal right of occupation 
created by a statutory tenancy ."12 
7 (1901) 1 NSWLR (Eq) 81 at 89. 
8 National Provincial Bank Ltd v 1238 £~.!: Lord Upjohn. . ......................... .. 
9 (1983) 1 NSWLR 34. 
lOibi d at 50, 
11 (1984) The Times 2 August. 
Ain s worth [ 19 6 5] AC 1175 at 
12 Ibid. See Rent Act 1977, Sch 1 , para 3 . See also C 
Proprietary Hand, The Statutory Tenancy: an Unrecognised Interest, [1980] Conv 351. 
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These apparently conflicting views greatly increase the 
uncertainty associated with claims of proprietary estoppel. 
Everton has suggested that if legal concepts could be 
represented pictorially, the concept of an equity should be 
depicted as "a grey and murky fog, consistent in depth of 
colour, the boundaries hazy and ill-defined." 1 a It is 
therefore readily understandable that the litigants in the 
'familial cases' avoid a plea of proprietary estoppel if 
there is any possibility that an alternative trust claim may 
succeed. However, certainty is of particular importance 
where rights in the family home are concerned. Not only do 
members of the family need to know whether they possess an 
'equity of estoppel' they also need to know whether the 
'equity of estoppel' has all the attributes of an equitable 
property right. 
The remainder of this chapter concentrates on the 
nature of equitable rights and more particularly on the 
nature of the 'equity of estoppel'. 
Attempts have been made to question whether the 
'equity of estoppel' is a conventional equitable proprietary 
interest. If the 'equity of estoppel' is deemed to be a 
13 Everton, (1976) 40 Conv (NS) 209. Cf Von Jhering, In the 
Heave.n __ of_ .... Lega.l ....... Conc.e.Pts. in Law_ ... and ..... Me.taphys .. i.c.s p 687 where property is depicted as "squat, rough, with sturdy limbs, 
Well fed and with a saturated expression on its face .. . you 
can . see that it will not permit challenge by anybody and 
feels perfectly secure ". 
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conv entional equitable proprietary interest it will have all 
the attributes of such an interest; it will be 
indefeasible; it will be assignable and it will have the 
potential 
property. 1 4 
to bind purchasers of the representor's 
If, however , the 'equity of estoppel' is 
denied the label of an equitable proprietary interest, it 
will clearly have no proprietary attributes. It will be 
merely a right i.n ...... Per.s.onam. 1 s 
This rigid classification of equities into equitable 
proprietary interests 
somewhat simplistic. 
and mere rights i.n ............ perso.nam is 
It implies that the courts permit the 
intervention of equity in relationships to protect 
established proprietary interests. In reality the courts 
ma y permit equity to play a more pragmatic role interv ening 
in relationships because the courts recognise that the 
relationships require protection. In the Australian case 
of Burns_ ... Phi.l.iP. .... Trus.te.e ...... C:::g v Y..tr::i.~.Y, 1 6 Kearney J explained 
that 
the administration of equity has always paid 
regard to the infinite variety of interests 
and has refrained from formulating or 
adhering to fixed universal and exhaustive 
criteria with which t~ deal with such varying 
situations.11 
1 4 See National Provincial Bank Ltd v ~J:r.:i .  ~.~.9. .. F. .. :t...h. [ 1965] AC 11 75 at 1247 per Lord Wilberforce . 15 Lord Up john took this view in ~~-t..i..9..n_~_l.:. ..... P. .. :r.: . .9..Y.J.I.1.:9. .. !. .. ~ .  1. ..... :1:3..~ . .I.1.:~ ... J,1 .. !:.9: v Ainsworth [1965) AC 1175 at 1238. 
16 (1981] 2 NSWLR 216. 
1 7Ibid at 223. 
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An illuminating and particularly interesting 
illustration of the flexible and pragmatic manner in which 
equity operates is the Australian case of Latec Investments 
...... _ ....... ,·-········--.............. ,_,,, .................... ,_ ........................ .. 
Ltd V !!~.!: .. ~.J ........ T.~ .. :r:: .. :r:: .. t~tl:l;.1 ....... P .. :t. .. Y. .. . ~:t.q_,,,,tt..!i ..... l.iq.J_ • l 8 The High Court 
of Australia was called on to determine a question of 
priority as between an equity to have a transaction set 
aside for fraud and the interest subsequently taken over the 
disputed property by an equitable chargee. Menzies J re lied 
heavily on the authority of Ph_i1l __ i_ps_ v Ph_il_l __ i_ps. 1 9 The 
approach taken by Menzies J recognised that different 
policy considerations may operate in different contexts and 
that proprietary qualities may (or may not) be attributed to 
an equity according to the policy consideration deemed to be 
important in any g i ven context.20 
Neave and Weinberg2 1 have suggested that resort to the 
concept of an equity may serve a useful purpose as a kind of 
'holding operation' whi ch allows the courts to refine 
details of the interest over a series of cases. In this 
way, argue Neave and Weinberg, questions as to the 
assignability of the interest and as to its enforceability 
against third parties "may be answered ... the equity may 
graduate into the category of equitable interests . " 22 
··-~--.......... ,,_, ........... ____ ,,, .............................................................. .... .. 
1 9(1965) 113 CLR 265. 
19 (1861) 4 De G F & J 208, 42 ER 1164. 
20This approach had led Smith [1973) CLJ 123 to declare that 
"the law is what it ought to be." 
2 1 Neave and Weinberg, The Nature and Function of Equities , 
(1978-80) 6 Tas Law Rev 24 at 38. 
22 Ibid. 
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Everton2 3 has likewise recognised the difficulties in 
categorising equitable interests and has accepted that these 
difficulties are a natural consequence of the role which 
equity plays. It is not easy to discover coherent patterns 
in a system which is designed to supplement the law. In an 
attempt to reduce equitable rights into systematic albeit 
fluid categories, Everton has distinguished two kinds of 
equitable interests. The first kind of equitable interest 
she designated as a 'patent' equitable interest24 which 
carries the traditional attributes of a proprietary right; 
it can be bought, sold and devised. Such an interest comes 
into existence by virtue of some act of the parties 
themselves. The interest may be enforceable only by a court 
order, but the court has no discretion as to the remedy it 
grants if the rules of equity are followed. 'Patent' 
equitable interests clearly include beneficial trust 
interests. By contrast the second type of equitable 
interest described by Everton, (the 'latent' 2s equitable 
interest) is dependent for its very existence on some 
exerc ise of the court's discretion. The 'latent' equitable 
interest becomes a 'patent' equitable interest only if and 
when the court, in exercise of its discretion, converts the 
'latent' interest into some form of established equitable 
proprietary right.26 
2 3 Everton, ( 1976) 40 Conv ( NS) 209. 
2 4Ibid at 215. 
25 Ibid. 
26 According to Everton the category of 'mere equity' should be reserved for those rights , of an exclusively personal 
nature, to pursue an equitable remedy. Everton' s category 
of latent equitable interests appear to be not dissimilar to Lord Upjohn's category of 'mere equities' not ancillary to l and ( National Provincial Bank Ltd v ~-t~ .. ~.!'.'...9.E .. !...h. [ 1965] AC 11 75 at 1238.) 
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Other commentators such as Wallace and GrbichZ 7 have 
re jected any attempt to classify equitable rights as 
proprietary or non-proprietary. In their view such attempts 
ar e unhelpful in that they lead to a reification of legal 
reality . 28 Wallace and Grbich argue that "property law has 
a long, involved history which tends to imbue it with an 
aura of certainty and stability, an image that is not 
entirely justified." 2 9 To force the classification of 
equitable rights in situations which are on the frontier of 
established categories Jo is thus to perpetuate that image. 
Artificial verbal manipulations do little more than classify 
remedies after the event.Ji Wallace and Grbich argue that 
it would be more useful for judges overtly to analyse 
"objectives and competing priori ties" J 2 prior to deciding 
whether the relationship under consideration requires the 
2 7Wal lace and Grbich, A Judge ' s Guide to Legal Change in 
Property: Mere Equities Critically Examined, ( 19 7 9) 3 UNSW 
Law Jour 175. 
2 8 Berger and Luckmann ( The Soci.al .Construction. o.f . Reality, 
(Penguin 1971), p 106) have defined reification as " the 
apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, that 
is , in non-human or possibl y supra-human terms ... Reification 
implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship 
of the human world, and further, that the dialectic between 
man the producer and his products is lost to consciousness." 
2 9 (1979) 3 UNSW Law Jour 175. 
30 Ibid at 179. See also KW Llewelyn, The Common Law 
Tr..?.:.9:.t.tJ.<:.>.!.:l_ .. ... :::: .. _ .... P .. ~.!:::.J9:.J.n:~ ..... AP.P.~ .. ?.:J.§, ( 19 6 o) p 12. 
31 See Gray, :gJ .. ~.~.~.n..ts of ....... Land ... Law, p 423. "It may, of 
course, be correctly concluded that it is not ultimately 
helpful to r~fer to anything as a 'property right' , since at 
best this usage operates merel y as an abbreviated reference 
to certain secondary characteristics which flow from the 
Primary fact of enforcement through legitimated state power. 
When the arrogant nonsense of the 'property right' is 
finally stripped away, all that remains visible to the naked 
eye is the brute fact of enforcement. The only relevant 
question, in a congeries of situations involving a variety 
of parties, concerns who will win. True it may be that the 
answer is conventional l y rationalised in terms of justice or 
conscience. But whether the 'equity' generated by 
Proprietary estoppel is or is not a 'property right' is not 
in i tself a particularly interesting question . " 
32 (1 979) 3 UNSW Law Jour 175 at 195. See also Woodman 
(1980) LQR 336 at 340. 
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protection of proprietary right status. This approach does 
not detract from the requirement that legal rules should be 
predictable but leads to a different type of predictability 
which points to patterns based on "fact value complexes" 3 3 
and not on facts alone. 
These different approaches, used to analyse the nature 
of equitable rights, are not, of course, mutually exclusive. 
It is undoubtedly true that Wallace and Grbich are correct 
in emphasising the necessity to seek out the value judgments 
implicit in judicial decisions. Gray has explained that 
whole areas of equitable jurisdiction can be 
understood only on the basis that an 
equitable right of property is protected not 
because it has first been characterised as 
' property' , 
intervention 
but because 
is imperative 
equitable 
in order to 
satisfy the demands of ethical dealing within 
a given social or commercial relationship. 34 
It is, however, equally correct to examine the legal 
label which is ultimately attached to a right in order to 
ident ify the nature of the court's intervention if it 
intervenes regularly in similar fact-value circumstances . 
Once a legal label has been · attached, legal consequences 
flow from that label. Any analysis of the nature of the 
'equity of estoppel' must attempt to elucidate the value 
33( 19 7 9 ) 3 UNSW Law J our 17 5 at 19 5 , 
~egal ...... ~stems ...... and ... _Lawy~r. ' s._ .... Reason.i.ngs, 3 4 Gray, E.lement.s ... _.of. ..... Land ...... Law ( 1987) pp 
citing Julius Stone, 
(1964), p 263-264. 
556-557. 
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judgments underlying the decision to grant or deny 
proprietary attributes to that 'equity'. It has thus 
become a particuarly live question whether (and if so when) 
'equities of estoppel' are indefeasible, assignable and 
binding on third parties. 
stages must be considered . 
In such inquiries two distinct 
Attention must be directed to 
the period prior to the point at which the court decides 
whether to satisfy the 'inchoate equity' . The analysis 
must then clearly distinguish a second period following the 
date of the c ourt's decision, when the 'inchoate equity ' now 
stands as a 'satisfied equity'. 
A 
In Crabb V Arun DC 3 s Scarman LJ suggested by 
implication that the 'inchoate equity ' does not constitute 
any specific right but comprises merely a more general right 
to come before the court and to ask f o r such a remedy as the 
court deems to be appropriate in the circumstances of the 
case . At the time of the court hearing any unconscionable 
a s pec t of the parti e s ' c onduct must be e xamined. In 
~J.1.1,,i.ams v Stai te 3 6 Cumming-Bruce LJ likewise expressed the 
view that 
the true a nal ysis is that , when the plaintiff 
c omes t o cour t to en f orce hi s lega l r i g hts , 
the defendant is then entit l ed to submit that 
••• •-N•N•--•••N•• ... H•••--•-•••••••"'"''" '' .. ' ' ""'"-'"''' ""MOHO .. , ............... .. 
35 [1976] Ch 179. 
36 (1979] Ch 291 at 300 . 
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in equity the plaintiff should not be allowed 
to enforce those rights and that the 
defendant, raising that equity, must then 
bring into play all the relevant maxims of 
equity so that the court 1s entitled then on 
the facts to look at all the circumstances 
and decide what order should be made, if any, 
to satisfy the equity. 
The relevance thus accorded to the parties' conduct is well 
illustrated, for instance, in J __ .w.i.11.i.s ...... ... & .. -.... s.o.n v Willis,37 
Here Parker LJ declined to satisfy an 'inchoate equity' on 
the ground that the representees had acted fraudulently. 
The y had attempted to bolster their estoppel claim by the 
submission of fictitious accounts of expenditure on the 
property . 
In some cases it may even be that the unconscionabilit y 
which once existed has ceased to exist by the time the 
matter reaches the court . The English cases have taken the 
approach that if by this date the estoppel claimant has 
already been recompensed by the representor, there no longer 
rema ins any ' inchoate equity' which requires to be 
sat i sfied. Where such compensation has been provided, it 
ma y well have taken an indirect rather than a direct form. 
Fo r example , the estoppel claimant may be deemed to have 
enjoyed sufficient use of the p r operty al r eady , with the 
37 [1986] 1 EGLR 62. 
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result that the any detriment originally caused by his 
alteration of position has now been remedied,38 
In Appl.eby v Cowley3 9 the representor had encouraged 
the representee to believe that he had an indefinite right 
of occupation of barristers' chambers. The representee had 
altered his position to his detriment in reliance on this 
representation. He was held to have received adequate 
compensation for this detrimental alteration of position in 
that he had paid a greatly reduced rent in respect of his 
occupation. The Vice-Chancellor, Sir Robert Megarry, 
quoted the phrase of Lord Hardwicke LC in Attorney_General v 
Bal)io) ..... Co).l.ege ......... Oxfo.rd 4 o when he held that the representee 
had had "sufficient satisfaction" for his expenditure. 
Whether this meant that the 'inchoate equity' had ceased to 
exist when the case came before the court or whether the 
equity existed but no remedy should be granted, Sir Robert 
Megarry V-C regarded as a "nice academic point" which he was 
not prepared to debate. The claim simpl y failed. 
In the sense outlined above 'inchoate equities' would 
in general seem to be defeasible prior to the court hearing. 
There are nevertheless some cases in which a 
representation which can reasonably be understood as having 
created a perpetual right or at least a life-long right in 
the property. In such circumstances the courts have tended 
·--....... ,-., .. _,., ___ . ., .. ,_ .................................................... ,_ ........ . 3 8 S e e , e • g • , :g __ .~_ .1 ......... 1?...'?. .. !:..tL .. H:.9..!i:i:.'?. .. ~ ..... J~.t..9- v Q.r. .. ~ . .Y. ( 19 8 0 ) !'{_~.t. .. t~. v §.19. .. F. .. Y. (Unreported, Court of Appeal 14 !.v .. 1:3:.F..!l..'?....!,3.. v !!.'?. .. 9.:.+. .. ~Y. (Unreported, Court of Appeal 1984) . 
3 9 ( 1 9 8 2 ) T..h .. ~ ....... .T.J.!i:i:.'?...~. 14 Apr i l . 40 (1744) 9 Mod 407 at 512, 88 ER 538 at 541. 
253 EG 473; 
July 1983); 
31 January 
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to regard the 'inchoate equity' as indefeasible prior to the 
court hearing. Implicit in such decisions is the view that 
if , when the case came before the court, the court would 
have been prepared to restrain the representor from 
disavowing his representation and would have granted an 
irrevocable right, it is then entirely reasonable to short-
circuit the process 
court equity. 41 
and permit the right to p re-date the 
Thus, by indulging in a minor legal 
fiction , an unconscionable outcome is a v oided. In Plimrner 
. .................. - .................. . 
v Mayor .... e.tc .... of ...... Well .. ingt.o.n 4 2 the Privy Council held that the 
'equity of estoppel' was an interest in land prior to the 
court's satisfaction of the equity and even prior to the 
disavowal of the equity by the representor's successors in 
title, 43 The Privy Council took the view that an equitable 
proprietary interest arose from the moment the representee 
spent money improving the representor's wharf in reliance on 
the representations made by the representor that the 
representee' s occupation of the wharf would be perpetual . 
Si r Arthur Hobhouse accepted that 
there are perhaps purposes for which a 
licence would not be held to be an interest 
in land . But their Lordships are construing 
a statute 44 which takes away private property 
for compensation, and in such statutes the 
41See Bailey, Estoppel and Re g istration of Title , ( 1983] 
Conv 99 . 
42 (1884) 9 App Cas 699. 
4 3 In Grund.t v Grea.t ...... Boulder .... Ptr .... Go.ld .... Mi.ne s ..... L.td ( 19 37) 59 CLR 641 Dixon J had maintained that "so long as the 
representee ' s assumption continues to be regarded as true, 
the question of estoppel does not arise. It is only wh e n 
the representor wishes to disavow the assumption contained 
in his representation that an estoppel arises." 44 Public Works Act 1882 (NZ). 
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expression 'estate or interest in, to or out 
of land' should receive a wide meaning. 
Indeed the statute itself directs that, in 
ascertaining the title of anybody to 
compensation, the court shall not be bound to 
regard strict legal rights only, but shall do 
what is reasonable and just,4s 
Al though the Privy Council made no distinction between the 
'inchoate equity' and the ' satisfied equity ' , the court 
applied the maxim "equity looks on that as done which ought 
to be done",46 
In tl?.-!1:1.~.J.!:.C).i::i v Geraghty 4 7 the New South Wales court 
similarl y viewed even an 'inchoate equity' as constituting 
an irrevocable interest in land prior to the court hearing. 
Here the defendant had permitted one, Connor , to have his 
house buil t on her land. She stood by silently with full 
knowledge of the fact that Connor believed the land to be 
his own . When Conno r failed to pay his builder, the 
pl a intiff who was the latter's administrator, sued and 
obtained judgment against Connor . The court later ordered 
the conv e yance to the plaintiff of all Connor's estate, 
right, t itle and interest in the defendant ' s land. The 
Ch i ef Justice in Equit y had ruled a t first instance that the 
de f endant's acquiescence would by itself give Connor no 
righ t or i nterest . in the land , though of course he might 
obtain such a right by a decree of the c ourt giving him a 
4 5 Plimme r v Mayo.r ..... etc ..... o.f ..... we.11 .. i n gt on ( 1884) 9 App Cas 699. 
46 Banks v ~.l-:1 . .!: .. !: . .9 . .T.:l. ( 1 732) 2 P Wms 700 at 715, 24 ER 922 at 
927. 
4 7 ( 190 1 ) 1 NSWSR ( Eq. ) 81. 
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lien, The first instance court thus held that until Connor 
obtained a decree, "his right would be ... a personal right to 
sue , "48 The New South Wales Court of Appeal subsequently 
overruled this decision, although it was divided as to the 
precise e xtent of Cortnor's interest in the land held under 
his 'inchoate equity'. 
B Th.~ .... .. ~ .. ~.~:t. .. :i.:..~.f.~ .. ~.Q .. equ.itY.'. 
Once the court has satisfied the 'inchoate equity', the 
nature of the remedy granted helps to determine whether the 
'satisfied equity' is defeasible. 
i) Legal .... o.r. equit.able .. proprietary interests 
Where the representee lS granted a legal or 
conventional equitable proprietary interest in satisfaction 
of the ' inchoate equity' this interest is 
indefeasible. 
ii) G..!: .. <.l..r.1. .. :t. ...... .<?.  .:f.. an .occupa.t.ion r.ight 
Where a 
occupational right 
remedy is 
for life 
granted in terms 
or an occupational 
clearly 
of an 
right 
determinable on other grounds specified by the court it is 
uncertain whether the 'satisfied equity' can be defeated 
and, if so, under what circumstances (other, of course, than 
those specified by the court) . 
--... .......... _____ _ _ O, .. M ..... .. ,,,o,,,,,,,, , .,.,,, .,,,,,ooHMNo .. ,, .. ,00000,,, N OoO•<<o, NO 
48 Ibi d a t 84. 
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a) Defeas.i.b.i .. l.i tY: ..... o.f ...... the ....... '.sat_isf i _ed ...... eq_ui.ty_' .. 
Whether and 
equity' might be 
in what circumstances the 'satisfied 
defeasible was discussed in Hardwick V 
Jo.hns_on . 4 9 Here the representor, the mother and mother-in-
law of the representees, had allowed them to live in the 
propert y as their family home. They had paid the 
representor £7 per week in reliance on their e xpectation 
that the property was to be their family home . When the 
representees' marriage broke up the wife remained in 
occupation of the property with their child. The court 
granted an occupation right to t he wife . Lord Denning MR 
v iewe d the case a s one of p roprietary estoppel. He 
exp lained that the 'satisfied equity' was not revocable at 
will b y the defendant. He said 
it was certainl y not re vocab le as against the 
daughter -in- law, who was still living in the 
ho use wi t h he r baby , deserted by th e son . 
Looking simply at wha t is reasonab l e, it 
seems to me that the mother could not turn 
the daughter -in-law and child out, at all 
events . when the daughter-i n- law was ready to 
pay the £7a week. so 
Both the social circumstances of the representee and 
her continuing detrimental alteration of position were 
considered as relevant to this view. Lord Denning MR' s 
4 9[1978] 1 WLR 638. 
sorbid at 689. 
See Anderson (1979) 42 MLR 203 at 204. 
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jud gment contained moral overtones. 
revocation might be possible 
He suggested that 
if in the present case there had been no 
grandchild and the wife had formed an 
association with another man in the house, I 
should have thought that the mother could 
have revoked the licence. But there has not 
been a divorce, not even a judicial 
separation ... Things may develop in the 
future . One cannot foresee when it may be 
possible to determine the licence, but it 
cannot be determined at this stage. s1 
This approach to defeasibility appears to transpose the 
principles governing maintenance on matrimonial breakdown 
i nt o the contex t of breakdown of wider familial 
relationships . s2 Lord Denning MR t o ok the unusual v iew 
that members of the extended famil y , if they are also 
representors, must maintain an abandoned wife and child by 
ho u sing her , unless and until a new de ..... ... jure or de facto 
............................................ 
spouse takes over that responsibility . 
In ~ ...... Wt!J .. t!:3. ......... lt ......  §9..tl v W.:i::J.Lt!:3.. 5 3 Parker L J suggested that 
e v e n if misconduct could permit the cancellation of a 
' satisfied equity ', the degree of misconduct necessary must 
·-.......................... ,., _______ ......... - ................ _ ,,, .................... . 
5 1Ib i d . 
5 2 Se e Matrimonial Causes Act 19 7 3 ss 2 5, 2 5A and 28 as 
ame nded by Matrimonial and Famil y Proceedings Act 1984 ss 3 
anci 4. See al so Q.f..f..s.> .. !:.9.: v Q..f..f .. <?. .. !:.£ [1982] 3 FLR 309. 5 3 (1 986] 1 EGLR 62 at 63. 
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be greater than the degree of misconduct which would rule 
out the satisfaction of the 'inchoate equity' . 
In ~.tJ.+. .. :i.: .. 1:l:!JlS v .§ .. :t?:.:i.: . .:t. .. ~. s 4 the Court of Appeal considered 
the defeasibility of a 'satisfied equity' of estoppel . 
Unfortunately, hm,ever, the judgments here were confusing 
and somewhat inconclusive. Some six years previously the 
defendants had been granted an occupational right by the 
Count y Court in satisfa ction of an 'inchoate equity' . The 
Count y Court specified that the defendants could remain in 
the property for so long as they required it as their family 
home. The plaintiff, who later purchased the property with 
full knowledge of the defendants' 'satisfied equity', moved 
into the adjoining property. The defendants had always 
used the paddock behind the properties but the plaintiff 
claimed that the defendants' occupational right in their 
co t tage did not extend to this land. He sent a letter of 
complaint to the defendants requesting them to cease using 
the paddock. The defendants' response was to build a 
stable and to cul vert the stream in the paddock which they 
cl a imed was a n integral part of their ' satisfied equity '. 
The defendants proceeded to threaten the plaintiff with 
' bloody t rouble ' and blocked the entrance to the paddock in 
order to inconvenience the plaintiff's move into his 
property . The plaintiff finall y brought an action for 
po s session of the paddock and the defendants' cottage . He 
maintained that the d efendants ' c onduct was so deplo r able 
t hat the y should for f eit their 'satisfied equity' . 
.. -........... , ......... ___________ , ................. ,- ... ,.. _ .. _, .,, ...................... . 
5 4 [ 19 7 9] Ch 2 91 . 
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In the Court of Appeal Lord Denning MR took the view 
that the 'satisfied equity' could be revoked but not in 
these circumstances. The defendants' conduct , "however 
reprehensible, was not such as to justify revocation of 
their licence to ciccupy the cottage as their home."ss In 
an exceptional case Lord Denning MR thought that an estoppel 
licence could be revoked but the defendants' "conduct would 
have to be bad in the extreme before they could be turned 
out of their own home. They have nowhere else to go. "s 6 
The overwhelming concern of Lord Denning MR was to protect 
the occupation of the defendants' family home. 
b) Inde.f eas .. i .b .i.l .. i .tY .... o.f ..... t .he .... ' .. sa ti s.f.i.ed .. _ .. equi ty .' .. 
Goff LJ, another member of the Court of Appeal, was 
prepared to accept that events supervening between the 
moment the 'inchoate equity' arose and the court hearing 
could ultimately affect the remedy granted. However, in the 
view of Goff LJ, once the remedy was granted "excessive user 
or bad behaviour towards the legal owner cannot bring the 
[satisfied] equity to an end or forfeit it."57 
c ) Self-.i.mpos.ed ..... defeas .. i.b.ili.ty 
Counsel for the plaintiff in WJ.11...tc.1..~ .. l::I. v §.!:.?-.. Lt. .. ~. had put 
forward what Goff LJ described as a "novel point ". Counsel 
had argued that the court has to determine when the matter 
55 Ibid at 298. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid at 299. 
199. 
See also Crabb v Arun DC [1976] Ch 179 at 
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is brought before it whether there is any equity to restrain 
the legal owner from exercising his legal right. He 
suggested that where there had been impropriety in relation 
to the property by the part y possessing the 'equity of 
estoppel', the court has to consider whether he comes with 
clean hands to be allowed to plead his ' equity of estoppel' 
as a defence. 
Goff LJ declined to decide whether this argument was 
correct but obj~er thought that the argument was correct in 
principle and indeed Cumming-Bruce LJ concurred on this 
point. Counsel's argument was somewhat ambiguous. Counsel 
did not specify whether he was referring to the 'inchoate 
equity' or the 'satisfied equity'. In the context of 
Williams v Staite it seems likely that he was referring to 
the ' satisfied equity', an inference which is, if anything, 
strengthened by Goff LJ' s reference to a 'novel point'. 
If counsel was suggesting that the recipient of a 'sat isfied 
equ ity' could effectively disentitle himself to that right, 
Goff LJ' s ea tegorical denial that misconduct towards the 
legal owner can never terminate a 'satisfied equity ' may 
require modification. 
Counsel's 'novel point' merits careful analysis. The 
legal owner who is precluded b y the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel from exercising his legal rights cannot normally 
return to court to reassert those rights once the court has 
satisfied the 'inchoate equity ' . The principle of res 
J . .Y.9,icata applies. He can return to court only if the 
ho l der of the ' satisfied equity' begins to deal with the 
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property in a way which is contrary to the terms of the 
court order. The mere existence of a court-ordered remedy 
will be no defence to this allegation of infringement of the 
legal owner's rights. In such circumstances there could be 
no question of equitable relief for the estoppel claimant . 
The court would have no need to decide whether the holder of 
the 'satisfied equity' came before it with "clean hands " .sa 
The court would be able simply to grant an injunction 
protecting the rights of the legal owner from further 
infringement, thus leaving the representee ' s existing 
'satisfied equity' intact . 
It may be that in the Williams v Stai te context the 
rights of both the legal owner and the recipient o f t he 
'satisfied equity' are so intertwined that the latter may be 
able to plead his 'satisfied equi t y' as a partial defence to 
an y allegation that he has infringed the legal owner ' s 
ri ghts. In these circumstanc es the c our t may hav e 
jurisdiction to decide whether the conduct of the recipient 
of the ' satisfied equity' has disenti tled him to equitable 
reli e f . Even in these circumstances , howev er, it is 
arguable that the recipient of the 'satisfied equity ' should 
on ly be d isentitled to equitable relief if the legal owner's 
ri ghts cannot be protected in any other way . In this 
limited situation, therefore, it appears possible that 
misconduct towards the legal owner may bring a 'satisfied 
equity' to an end . 
................ _,,,., ,,,_ , ___ ,,,, _ , .... -................ ,_,,,,,,, .. ,,_.,, ..... -.......... , .. ,_,_ .. 
5 8 Meagher, Gummow and 
(1984. 2nd Ed), p 76; 
See also J Wil l i s & So n ...... _,_ ............................... ,._.,, .. -.............................. . 
Lehane, Equi tY .... Doctr_ines ...... and ..... Re me d_i_e _s_, Singh v S i ngh ( 1985) 15 Fam Law 97. 
v ~J.J..J: .. t§. ( 1985) 277 EG 1133, 
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d) Problems ....... ass.oc_i_a ted .... w.i .. th ...... defeas_ib.il.i ty 
If 'satisfied equities' can be extinguished albeit in 
an indirect manner, it may encourage litigation by legal 
owners in an effort to regain their lost rights . 
Purchasers of the property would have to "investigate not 
merely the circumstances creating the estoppel but also the 
relative nastiness of the parties since then and that 
without knowing how nasty the [representees] would have to 
have been to justify termination of the licence. " 59 
Defeasibili t y of 'satisfied equities' intensifies the 
demand that the fee simple should be transferred in 
sat isfaction of the 'inchoate equity'. However, provided 
that a long- t erm occupation licence is indefeasible, it may 
often be a more suitable remedy in the family context than 
an order for transfer of the fee simple. Such a remedy 
does justice between the parties. The representor (and his 
assignees) do not lose their legal rights completely 60 
whilst the representee is securel y housed as indeed he has 
been led to expect. 
Defeasibility of the 'satisfied equity' is an important 
issue in the familial context. It may be pass i ble for 
59Anderson, (1979) 42 MLR 203 at 20 4. Anderson is critical of the decision in Williams v Staite on the ground that "since it is commonly thought that an estoppel creates a property interest ... it seems to make no more sense to talk of its revocat i on than to imagine a t rustee being able, in t he absence of express power, to deprive a beneficiary of his interest on the ground that the beneficiary has been unpleasant to him." See also Bowie ( 1981) 11 VUWLR 63 at 78. 
50Unless the occupational 
limitation, see Chapter 6. 
right becomes a right by 
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those who occupy property as their family home to accept 
that, prior to the court hearing, their occupational 
security is at risk. However, once a remedy has been 
granted giving them life-long occupational rights, it may be 
less readily understood that these rights can be taken away. 
IV ASS IGNAB.IL.ITY .... .. OF ..... THE ...... ' .. EQU.I.TY . 9..1.: .... ~~.!Q:f.>.f;J,U::'.' 
A The ..... ' ... inchoate ...... equity' 
Although the consensus of legal opinion has been that 
' inchoate equities' are not assignable, this conventional 
v iew has been disturbed in a number of cases. In Plimmer's 
case it was e xplicitl y accepted by the Privy Council that 
the equity was assignable. The appellants in this case 
were Plimmer and his assignees . The latter were held to 
hav e acquired an assignable interest in the land prior to 
any court hearing. S i r Arthur Hobhouse held that 
John Plimmer a cquired and transferred to 
Jacob Joseph a perpetual right to occupy and 
use the land in question for the purposes of 
a jetty o r whar f, . . . t h e intere st which the 
appellants had in the land on the 1st of 
September , 1880 , was the term which then 
remained to them under the lease granted to 
them b y Jacob Joseph,61 
6 IP.l.i.mme r v Mayor ..... etc .... o.f._.we.1.1.i.ngt.o n (1884) 9 App Cas 699. 
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The plaintiff in H.9--.!!!:.:i.J:: .. t. .. <?..n. v Geraghty6 2 similarly obtained 
judgment in his favour prior to any decision by any court as 
to what remedy should be granted to satisfy the 'inchoate 
equity' . 
In Propr.i.e.t o.rs .... o.f ...... Hauhungaroa ...... 2.c ... B.l .ock v A-.G6 J the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal held that in circumstances where 
the nature of the representation had led to a belief that 
the licence granted by the representor was to be permanently 
irrevocable , the representor lost his proprietary rights 
prior to any decision of the court. The licence granted by 
the representor was deemed to have derogated sufficiently 
from his proprietary rights to bring him within the 
statut ory definition of a person who had suffered 'an 
alienation of land' 64 If the representor has suffered 
such an alienation, it must be arguable that the representee 
has gained an assignable proprietary interest. 
In 1:3.rtJ.:.i:.<=.>.~ ... ..I!:1.:Y...~ .. ~ .. t:.~ .. ~ . .r::its Ltd v Car r 6 5 Lord Denning MR 
suggested that the 'inchoate equ ity' was a ssignable.66 
Lord Denning MR cited Coke on Littleton to the effect that, 
"eve r y estoppel ought to be reciprocal ... privies in estate, 
as the feoffee, lessee etc ... shall be bound and take 
advantage of estoppel. " 67 The key question to be asked in 
con sidering assignabili t y according to Lord Denning MR was 
6 2(19 01) 1 NSWSR (Eq.) 81. 
6 3(1973 ] 1 NZ LR 389. 
6 4Maori Af f airs Act 1953, s.2(1). 65(1979] QB 467. 
6 6The Brikom case was argued inter a li a on the basis of promisso-~-y··· ·E;-;;;;·"t··;;·ppeil al though f or·····t:h;;;·······pu.rpo.ses of the present 
discussion this is not relevant. 6 7Co Litt 352a cited in Brikom Investments Ltd v Carr [1979] QB·······4;-6-7·-··a:-t ········4··a··4··; Pople, .... ""(fg·s"oT·· ···i":fo"······Ni~J······:fi""3·······wa.s critical of 
this interpretation of Lord Coke's statement. 
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whether in all the circumstances of the case it would be 
unjust and inequitable to allow the landlords to recover 
against the assignees when they could not have recovered 
against their original representees. Lord Denning MR 
held that because any of the assignees of the landlord's 
reversionary interest would be bound by the equity, so 
should representees be able to assign of the benefit of the 
equity. The Master of the Rolls found, on the facts of the 
case, that it was plain that the landlords in tended their 
representation to be for the benefit of all those fr o m time 
to time holding the leases, realising that each in turn 
would tell his successor that the landlords were going to 
repair the roof at their own expense. 
In the Australian c ase of Cameron v Murdoch6S the 
representees' children were claiming the benefit of the 
'inchoate equity'. After the death of one of the 
representees, his children, as devisees under his will, 
maintained that their father had been led to believe that he 
would have the use of, occupation of, and ultimate ownership 
of, farmland owned by his brothers, the representors. The 
representees succeeded,69 The decision suggested that the 
'inchoate equity' was a right to come before the court to 
ask for satisfaction of the equity rather than any 
particular substantive equitable proprietary interest. 
Nevertheless it was held to be an assignable interest which 
could be devised by wil1 . 10 
·-···-•, ... , ................. ,,, ______ , ....................... _ ,,, ................................ . 
68 (1983] WAR 321 (affirmed by the Privy Council (1985 - 86) 63 ALR 575). 
69 Cf Jones .. __ ...(AEJ v Jone_s ___ ...(FWJ (1977] 1 WLR 438. 7
°Cf Brickwood v Young (1905) 2 CLR 387 at 395, 399 . 
t 
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In all the cases where the courts have accepted the 
assignabili ty of the 'inchoate equity', the representation 
has been overwhelmingly clear that a long-term, if not 
indeed perpetual, right was intended. In each case, 
moreover, substantial detrimental reliance had been 
undertaken by the representee. Furthermore, in most of the 
cases the land had not passed into the hands of an assignee 
of the representor. Unconscionabili ty still fell to be 
judged, primarily as against the original representor 7 1 
rather than any third party. 
B Th.~ ..... '..?. .. ?.:.:f::.!.?..fied .... equity .' 
i) 
Once the court has granted a remedy in satisfaction of 
the ' inchoate equity', assignability wi ll depend on the 
nature of that remedy. The grant of a legal interest in 
the land or a conventional equitable proprietary right will 
allow the representee to assign his satisfied equity. 72 
ii ) Grant ..... of ... ~n ..... o.cc.upati.on ...... r .. ight 
Occupational licences which are for life or are 
determinable upon the occurrence of a specified event are 
71 See Cameron v Murdoch [1983] WAR 321 at 360. 72 There remains little doubt that the rights of way granted in E R Ives Investment Ltd v High [ 1967] 2 QB 379, Ward v Kirkland [ 1967] 1 Ch 194 and Crabb v Arun DC [ 1976] Ch 179 co.uTd········h~ve been assigned togetT;~··:,; wft:-i~--·······t::h·~· representee' s interest in his own land . Lord Denning MR was explicit in 
~R Ives Investment Ltd v High [1967] 2 QB 379 at 394 that Mr High ' s right of way across the representor ' s land would benefit Mr High's successors in title. 
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generally accepted as being non-transferable equitable 
rights. In Jones. v Jones 73 
.............................. 
Roskill LJ implied that 
Frederick Jones' right to remain undisturbed in his family 
home could not be assigned. Had the right been assignable, 
it could have protected his wife and family. Roskill LJ 
denied that the right could extend to these people,74 
p~cta in the Australian case of Pearce v Pe.a.rc.e , 7 s however, ........ ......... ............ 
suggest that an irrevocable occupational licence might be 
registrable as a caveat claiming an equitable proprietary 
interest . If such a licence is caveatable it may constitute 
a conventional proprietary interest in so far as only 
conventional proprietary interests are caveatable,76 Such 
interests would, in general, be regarded as assignable. 
Professor Maudsley attempted to distinguish between 
positive and negative remedies in the context of 
occupational licences which are based on proprietary 
estoppel. 7 7 He put forward the v iew that negati v e remedies 
simply prevent the legal owner from exercising his 
proprietary rights: in these circumstances the representee 
has nothing to assign . Maudsle y thus claimed that the 
defendant in Inwards V Baker 78 could not sell his 
occupa t ional right ; if he were to leave the premises , it 
73(1977] 1 WLR 438 . 
74Ibid at 443; cf dicta of Lord Denning MR at 442. 75( 1977] 1 NSWLR 170 at 173 (ante at 138 ) . 76Pearce v Pearce was exceptional in that the circumstances 
clea rly indicated that a beneficial trust interest had b e e n i nt ended by the parties but statute prevented such a claim . See also MajaraJ v Chand [ 198 6 ] 3 All ER 107. 77 (19 6 5 ) 8 1 LQR 183 . Cf Brady , An English and Irish Approach to Proprietary Estoppel, (1970) I Jur 239 . 
7 &{1965) 2 QB 29. 
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would terminate. The estoppel claimant owns nothing new: 
he merely acquires a status of irremovability.79 
The English courts have not distinguished between 
positive and negative remedies in the context of 
occupational licences. Whether the satisfaction of an 
'inchoate equity' takes a positive or a negative form, the 
'satisfied equity ' is not assignable. 
The decision in Dodsworth v Dodsworth illustrates the .............. _,,,................................... . ....................................... ,,,,--····· ·· 
reluctance of the Court of Appeal to grant any remedy which 
even resembles an assignable right. Russell LJ, giving the 
judgment of the court, declined to grant a remedy which 
might be caught b y the pr ovisions of the Settled Land Act 
1925 ,B O Although the tenant for life cannot assign his 
life interest he may sell the property or lease it. On the 
basis that the 1925 Act applied, the holder of the 
'satisfied equity' would then be entitled to the income of 
the proceeds of sale or to the rents obtained from the 
lease . BI 
In G..:r.: .. Lf.f. .. t...ths v !i..t...:1.: .. :1.:Jams 8 2 Goff LJ likewise propounded a 
solution which would not attract the provisions of the 
Settled Land Act 1925. He was equally concerned to grant a 
remedy which would avoid the provisions of the Rent Acts. 83 
·;·9-( 1965) 81 LQR 183 at 184. Alder categorically asserts that the equity, whether satisfied in a negative or positive manner, is not assignable. See (1978) 41 MLR 208 at 209. 80 .P._9dsworth v Dodsworth (1973) 228 EG 1115 at 1117. s 1 r bier:········-········-··· ··························-·····-··················· 
8 2 ( 19 7 8) 2 4 8 EG 9 4 7 , 83 Ibid at 950. 
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The latter permit what is effectively a form of limited 
statutory devolution to members of a deceased family.s4 
In .P...~_i:,..9._.9. __ ~. v '.!\1..!:.Il.f?. .. !:. 8 5 the defendant had expended money 
in reliance on a representation that the property would be 
transferred to her. Cumming-Bruce LJ gave the defendant a 
remedy of a fee simple interest in the representor's 
property partly because he accepted that an occupational 
licence for life was not assignable. The latter form of 
remedy, he believed , would have been distinctly 
disadvantageous to the defendant because if she had to 
carry out further and more e xpensi v e repa irs in the future 
"she may only be able to finance them by a loan but as a 
licensee she cannot cha rge the house . "sG 
The family home has increasingl y become the main source 
of financing of both business and family projects. Families 
retain their occupational rights. To den y assignability to 
the holders of the ' satisfied equity' where the 'satisfied 
equity' is in the form of a long- t erm occupational licence 
excludes them from a valuable source of income and prevents 
geographical mobility. 
·---... -... ·-··---·-··-·-·····························"···-··········· .. ····· 84See Rent Act 1977 , Sch 1, para 3. See also C Hand , [1980) Conv 351. 
85 (1979] 1 WLR 431 . 86 Ibid at 439. See also Vitoria , (1976) 126 NLJ 772, " the l icencee may have gained but a pyrrhic victory if he cannot afterwards assign his interest . " 
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V CAN ..... THE ........ ' .. EQU.I.TY .... OF .. ESTOPPEL .. ' ....... B.IND ...... TH.IRD ...... PART.IES 
A Al.ienab.i,li ty .. o.f land 
The central concern of land law since the end of the 
sev enteenth century has been to ensure that land is freely 
alienable. 87 In a free market economy where land is a 
marketable commodity, a constant tension has arisen between 
the necessity to protect purchasers from obtaining an 
encumbered title and the need to protect pre-existing rights 
from being defeated by a purchaser.ss 
impairs the marketability of land . 
..... ....................... ...... ................................................................................. 
An encumbered title 
Yet to deny a legal 
a 7 Holdsworth in B. .. t~ .. :t:": .. 9 .. J.'.:Ag .. 9:.J.: ........ I:r.?-.. !:T.9.ci1::l.9..!:t.<? .. ~ ..... !:.9 the Lan.9.: . . Law, ( 1927), p 108, has explained that, ''the common law came to regard the principle of freedom of alienation as a fundamental principle based upon public policy. We can find statements of this principle in Bracton in the thirteenth century, in Littleton in the fifteenth century and in Coke in the sixteenth century. No doubt the grounds which these three authorities assigned for this principle differed. Bracton would have said that they were contrary to the conception of dominium, and would ~lso have emphasized the importance of breaking up the solidarity of the feudal group. Littleton would have emphasized the importance of maintaining the freedom of alienation because it wa s a principle of the common law . Coke would have had in v iew the attempt of the landowners to create perpetuities; and he emphasized the commercial advantage of a free circulation of property." 
8 SLord Simon of Glaisdale has referred to the "dual nature of the matrimonial home. On the one hand, it is the seat of a family and as such its integrity is of great social importance. On the other hand, it is a capital asset which should be capable on requirement of being dealt with commercially with speed, economy and safety." Han.s.ard, House of Lords Val 437, (Session 1982-83) Col 640. The speeches in Wi)..l.i.am.s ....... and ....... G.lyn.s ...... Bank v Bo'l.and [ 1981] AC 48 7 illustrate this tension. The Law Commission attempted to resolve the conflict of interests between conveyancers and holders of equitable rights in the family home ( see Cmnd 8636, para 7 0) . According to the Law Commission, "for over 150 years the policy of the law has been both to simplify conveyancing and to maintain the security of property i nterests on the one hand and the marketability of land on the other," Cmnd 8636 para 70. See also Royal Commission on Legal Services, (1979) Cmnd 7648 para 21.21. See also 
~J.s hops gat.e . . Mo tor .. F.i.nanc e .. ... c o rpo.rati.on .... Ltd v Trans.po r .t ..... Brakes. b ..:t:":.9: [1949] 1 KB 322, 336-7 P.(:;! .. f. Denning LJ; Law Com Working Pape~ No 37 (1971), para 7. 
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owner the abi 1 i ty to ere ate rights which are transferable 
with the land on sale, may equally affect the marketability 
of land. This latter right of a legal owner may be as much 
a part of the exchange value of land as is alienability of 
the legal title itself. Any · intervention by equity must 
take account of the tension between the interests of 
purchasers who require an unencumbered title and the 
interests of those who possess 'equities of estoppel',B9 
B The.,_ .. ' .. equ_i tY: ..... o.f .... estoppel .. ' ...... and ... th_ird ____ part_ies in 
unreg_i_stered ...... l.and ...... - ...... The ______ doctr_i_ne __ qf ___ ~qtj_q~-
i) The ' .. tr::i.c;h .. C?..l:l: .:f:. .. ~ ___ equ_ity_' 
If a third party has acquired the legal title to the 
property, doctrine of notice in representor's 
unregistered land in 
the 
the absence of any possible 
registration under the Land Charges Act 1972, governs the 
question of priorities. 
Where an equitable interest in the property has been 
assigned by the representor, the maximqu_i ______ pr_ior ____ es_t ____ tempore_ 
p_()t __ io_r ......... e.st ____ jure has been held to govern the question of 
the assignee and the holder of the priority between 
'inchoate equity' . The Vice-Chancellor in Rice v Rice 9 o 
99 It may be that equity will refuse to intervene in certain 
situations because equity tends towards the view that any 
act which makes land inalienable is in some sense 
unconscionable. Lord Upjohn in Nat_ional ______ Prov_i_nci_al Bank v 
~i_ns.worth [1965) AC 1175 at 1233 emphasised the importance 
of alienability of land in deciding that the deserted wife's 
equity was not binding on a third party purchaser. See 
also Hayton [1986] CLJ 394 at 398 . 
90 (1854) 2 Drew 73, 61 ER 646. 
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explained that this statement was an over-simplification. 
In particular, he stated that "as between persons having 
only equitable interests, if their equities are in all other 
respects equal, priority of time gives the better equity." 
He also stated, however, that priority in time is a residual 
ground of preference last resorted to and he listed the 
following points 
attention 
to which the court must direct 
the nature and condition of their respective 
equitable interests, the circumstances and 
manner of their acquisition and the whole 
conduct of each part y with respect thereto. 
And in examining into these points it must 
apply the test not of an y techn ical rule or 
any rule of partial application but the same 
broad principle of right and justice which · a 
court of equit y applies universally in 
deciding upon contested rights.91 
its 
Three categories of cases ma y be discerned in which the 
court has held that an 'inchoate equity' can bind the 
representor' s assignees prior to satisfaction by a court-
ordered remedy. The categories are not entirely unconnected 
but categorisation may help to predict the circumstances in 
which the estoppel claimant will be granted protection. 
R·--·-··--·-········-··---- ··············--0,-H_ .. ,, .. _ .. _____ ,, ...... -... 91Ib id at 6 4 8 . 
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(a) Wher.e ...... the ...... repres.entee ...... bel.ieves .. _ .. that ... he_,_has ....... acq_u.i.red 
pymanen t ...... r.i_gh_ts. 
The first category consists of situations where the 
representation and the nature of the detrimental reliance 
can only be understood as giving rise to permanent rights 
which bear a close resemblance to accepted proprietary 
rights. The third party in these cases has always been a 
stranger to the representee. He may also have purchased 
either expressly or impliedly subject to the rights of the 
representee. 
this category. 
At present there are no 'familial cases' in 
One must therefore turn to the non-
familial cases for guidance as to the approach which the 
cour t might take in the familial context. 
This category of case is well illustrated in Duke of 
Beaufort v Patrick.92 Here the representee had constructed 
a canal through the representor's land. Sir John Romilly MR 
held that the assignee of the representor had "bought with 
the knowledge, and subject to the implied condition that the 
canal was to remain, and was to be used for the benefit of 
the public for ever thereafter.' ' 9 3 Neither the assignee nor 
anyone else obtaining title through him could extinguish the 
representee's 'inchoate equity'. 
In similar circumstances in 1:!: ..... B .....  I.~l::! .. § ......... I.!1.Y. .. ~!:>. .. :t.~~:ri:t. ...... ~.:1:.9: v 
J:!igh94 it was held that a permanent proprietary right had 
been created in favour of the representee . 
- ................................. ,_, ___ ,, ............................................................ . 
92 (1853) 17 Beav 60, 51 ER 954. 
93
.(1853) 17 Beav 60 at 79, 51 ER 954 at 961 . 
9 4(1967] 2 QB 379. 
The 
183 
representors included details of the right in the 
particulars of sale of their property. The rights 
supposedl y created appeared to be akin to an easement 
permitt ing the representee to pass o v er the representor ' s 
yard with or with6ut vehicles. Lord Denning MR held that 
the ' inchoate equity ' bound the successors in title of the 
representor . In these circumstances the 'inchoate equity' 
can perhaps be analysed as suspending the legal owner's 
rights until the court hearing. Whatever the court decrees 
de termine s retrospectively what rights the assignee has 
acquired. 9 5 Such an approach can only be justified when 
the representation itself implies that a permanent right is 
intended and the third part y has the clearest knowledge that 
this was s o. 
In Ward v Kirk~and96 Ungoed-Thomas J held that where 
expenditure by the representee on the insertion of drains 
had been made with the full knowledge of the representor 
that there was no time limitation, permanent rights accrued 
which were potentially binding on third parties . The case 
i llustrates how the ' inchoate equity' can have proprietary 
qualities for one purpose but not for another . The 
representor's assignee had urged the court that if the 
'inchoate equi ty' was to be binding on third parties , the 
representor, as r ector of the local church , had required the 
necessary cons ents of his · diocese in accordance wi th 
statute,97 before making the relevant representations. 
Ungoed-Thomas J rejected the argument by explaining that 
'"-·---··-··········-····-· .. -·---······ .. ····-.. ····-····------··· 95 See Bailey, Estoppel and Registration of Title, [1983) Conv 99 at 100. 
9 6 [ 19 6 7] Ch 19 4 . 97Ecclesiastical Leasing Act 1858; Glebe Lands Act 1888. 
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such an equity may, in effect , take effect as 
an interest in property, but that is merely 
the consequence of the court's action in 
recognizing an equity ari~ing by reason of it 
being unconscionable in the circumstances to 
do otherwise , 98 
Thus although the 'inchoate equity' had no proprietary 
qualities for the purposes of a disposition by the 
representor until after the court recognised it , for the 
purposes of binding third parties purchasers from the 
representor the ' inchoate equity' appeared to have assumed 
proprietary qualities even prior to the court hearing. 
The third party assignee in Ward v Kirkland99 had the 
clearest possible notice of the representor's action as she 
had been the tenant of the representor's property prior to 
purchasing the legal interest from him. Furthermore the 
third party would suffer no damage if the 'inchoat e equity' 
held b y the representee were allowed to prevail. 100 
( b} The ........ ' .. g.re.a t .e.r ..... h.ards.h .. i .P .' ....... Pr inc i.pl e 
In the second category of cases where the representor's 
as signee h as been held bound by the 'inchoate equity', the 
----·-----·-.. ·-·-······-··-··---···· .. ··-, ..... ,_,,,,,,.,,.,,.,-.. ·-·· 98Ward v Kirkland [1967] Ch 194 at 242. 99
.[1967] Ch 194. 
100 In Ward v Kirkland the court considered that the ... ·-······-····--··· ................... . representee's further activities on the land were not covered by the representation and therefore constituted a trespass . However , an injunction was refused and merely minimal damages were awarded against the representee. 
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courts appear to have weighed up the relative burden which 
would fall on either party as a result of the decision. 
These cases seem to be governed by a 'greater hardship' 
principle applies rather than by any strict application of 
the doctrine of notice. 
In Re ...... S.harpe ...... JA ..... BankruptJ 1 o 1 Browne-Wilkinson J alluded 
to the difficulties facing the court in circumstances where 
the representor' s propert y had been assigned. Here the 
trustee in bankruptcy had acquired the representor 's 
propert y with the result that he took the property subject 
to all the equitable rights affecting it. He had then 
contracted to sell the property to a third party . Broi, ne-
Wilkinson J expressed his concern for the third party when 
he said that 
as an antidote to the over-indulgence · of 
s ympathy which every one must feel for [ t he 
representee], I put on record that the 
purchaser's plight is little better. He 
apparently had no reason to suspect that 
there was any flaw in the trustee's right to 
sell with vacant possession . As a result of 
the trustee 's inability to complete the sale 
he cannot open the business he intended and 
he and his wife and two children are being 
forced to live in a small motorized caravan 
parked in various places on or near Hampstead 
Heath. 102 
~ .. -... -........ -.. · .. -····-· .. -·--····-....................................................... . 10 1[1980] 1 WLR 219. 
102 Ibid at 224. 
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The purchaser was not a party to the action, and it is 
the ref ore a matter of mere speculation whether he would 
ultimately have been bound by the representee' s interest. 
Browne-Wilkinson J complicated the decision by holding that 
the representee had an interest behind a constructive trust 
which by its very nature pre-dated the court hearing. It 
is unlikely that the purchaser had actual notice of the 
representee's interest as neither the trustee in bankruptcy 
nor the representee knew the nature of the right claimed. 
Browne-Wilkinson J implied that only actual notice could 
bind a third party in these circumstances.103 
Unti l recently it was accepted that constructive notice 
was sufficient to bind third party assignees, 1 o 4 Thus a 
purchaser is expected to inspect the land and if any person 
other than the vendor is in occupation make inquiry of that 
person a s to his rights. Whether the court imposes actual 
or constructive notice on a third party is in reality a form 
of the 'greater hardship' principle .1 os 
103 Ibid. 
10 4See, e.g., .l.9. .. f.!.«::? .. ~. v 9..~A.:t:}:1 (1841) 1 Hare 43 at 55, 66 ER 
943; West v Reid ( 1843) 2 Hare 249 at 257, 67 ER 104 at 
10 7 ; Ji.<?..<:1.Jt:5. .. 9..!?: v - tl..?:.~ .. ~--!=5.. [ 19 71] Ch 8 9 2 at 914 ( dee is ion on 
registered land but the doctrine of notice in unregistered 
land was explained). 
105 See, e.g., Hunt v Luck [1901] 1 Ch 45 per Farwell J at 
48. "This doctrine of constructive notice imputing as it 
does knowledge which the person affected does not actually 
possess is one whi ch the courts of late years have been 
unwi lling to extend. I am not referring to cases where a 
man wilfully shuts his eyes so as to avoid notice, but to 
cases like the present where honest men are affected by 
knowledge which everyone admits they did not in fact 
possess ... even assuming both parties to the action to be 
equally innocent, the man who has been swindled by too great 
confidence in his own agent has surely less claim to the 
assistance of a court of equity than a purchaser for value 
who gets the legal estate and pays his money without notice. 
Granted that the vendor has every reason to believe his 
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Recentl y a subtle reversal of the doctrine of notice 
has been used to give effect to the 'greater hardship ' 
prin ciple . Where the holder of an ' inchoate equity ' who is 
in a ctual occupation of the property has remained silent 
about the e x istence of his right , he has been deemed to hav e 
postponed his 'inchoate equity' to that of any purchaser . 
At firs t instance in Br.istol .......... & ......... West ......... Bu.i_l.di_n~L. ... . soc .. i.e t y v 
Henn~ni106 it was held that an ' inchoate equity' which had 
arisen because the representor had encouraged his de facto 
wife to believ e that she had an interest in the property 
took priority o v er the representor ' s subsequent mortgag e of 
the propert y to the building society. The Court of Appeal 
allowed the building society ' s appeal but did not overturn 
that part o f the judgment which ruled that the 'inchoate 
equity ' gav e rise to a proprietary interest prior to its 
satis f action. Browne-Wilkinson LJ e x plicitl y refrained 
from de c iding that point . He held that the de facto wife 
who had notice of the mortgage had , b y her silence , 
rep r esented to the building socie ty that its charge too k 
priorit y over an y equitable proprietary interest she might 
have. The building soc iety was, therefore, e x empted from 
enquir ing into the natur e of the defendant's ri g hts. 
Browne - Wilkinson LJ ' s main concern was that the defe n dant 
sh o uld not obtain an unc o v enanted bene fit at the e x pense of 
t he bui lding socie ty. To permit othe rw ise could lead to a 
re fus al b y lending institutions to finance the purchase o f 
- -·"··---............................... .............. ............................................... ........................................................... ..... ............................ .............................. ..................................................... ........................... ........................................... . 
agent an honest man , still if he is mistak en a n d trusts a 
rogue, he rather than the purchas e r f o r v a lue without 
no tice, who i s mis led by hi s h a v i ng so t rusted o ught to b e ar 
t he burden. " 
10 &[1985] 1 WLR 778. See al s o Todd, [1985) Conv 361; 
Welstead, (1985] CLJ at 354. 
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family homes. Once again the alienability of land was of 
crucial importance to the decision - more important than the 
prese rvation of the family home. 10, 
In the New Zealand case of · A.P.c .. 9.:.:C.:~~§ v Q.9. _J,,.9._:r.1J,.1:1:.L ..... M.:i::i .. :t..Y .. 9.-J 
Life A:=.-.§.l::1.:C.:.?.:P.c9.E= .soc.i.etyios the representor made an assignment ...... -.. ~ ............ .. 
of the legal 
satisfaction of 
title 
the 
to a third party 
'inchoate equity' 
prior to the 
by the court. 
Although the dispute arose between the original representor 
and representee, Barker J alluded to the situation of the 
third party purchaser, who was not a party to the action. 
Barker J suggested that the third party might confront the 
representor with a claim in damages for remaining silent 
about the represen tee's 'inchoate equity' , but refused to 
allow this possibility to influence his decision to satisfy 
the 'inchoate equi t~r' with the grant of a lease. 1 o 9 The 
impli cation of this stat ement was that the plaintiff's 
'inchoate equity' ( which had retrospectively been given the 
status of a legal proprietary right) would have bound third 
parties even prior to the court hearing. To hold that the 
'inchoate equity' was binding on third parties in the 
Andrews case would have done little harm to the .................................. ............ 
representor's assignee; he would simply receive the rent 
... .................. 
1 0 7 See also the view of Robert Reid QC, the Le.gal 
J_I_ll_pl.i .c a tions .. of ..... wi.l .l_iams ...... & .... . Gl~Yns ........ Bank ..... Ltd: .. Y .... Bo.l.and p 61 in Gauer , Re.por.t .... of. ..... . Conference ..... in .. Pro.ble_ms .... .<?..f ........ 9..<?.P.J .. J.::.~qt. ....... _<? .f 
.In .. :t::eres t in the Matrimonial Home, ( 1981) . See al so Frank Kraus ' comments in the same . ieport p 47. See also 
P._1:1.ddington Building Society v Mendelsohn ( 1985) 50 P & CR 2.ff; ( 19 85) 4 9 Conv ( NS) 5 5. The High Court of Northern 
Ireland has accepted that this approach is correct in Ulster !t8:P:k Ltd v Shanks [1982) NI 143 at 150 . See also Ab.ig.ail v b_~.P.:r;··-··· ··c193~fj············Ac5·· 491; Midland Bank Ltd v Farmpride H~t.c}1er ies Ltd ( 1981) EG 49°":3-··;········-·-············w·:Cnk·~·o·r·th········v· Edward Bar.on P.~ v eT;··-·in-e·;·"t·······"c--o· Ltd ( 1 9 8 5 ) 5 2 p & cR··-··5·1···~···-·· ···········-··· ···· ···-·--·····-····-········· ·····-··-······· i .............. P-.............................................. ...... ......... . 08 [1982) 2 NZLR 556. 
1 0 9 Ibid at 5 7 0 . 
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due under the lease . Davies110 has suggested that "it is 
not a question of making an ascertained right bind a third 
party automatically but of measuring the degree of 
unconscionability afresh" when considering whether third 
parties should be bound. 
( c) Where .... .. t.he .... repre.s.entor .. ' s ...... as.s.ignee ... A.§ ....... an ..... agent .... of .... the 
r.e.pre se.n t.o.r. 
The third category of cases where an 'inchoate equity' 
has been held to bind third parties arises where the 
assignee has acquired the interest of the representor 
primarily in some capacity as agent or nominee of the 
representor. Khere, for instance, the assignee is a 
personal representative of the representor he can of course 
be in no better position than the representor himself. The 
assignee here may also be entitled to a share under the 
representor's estate. 
The ' familial cases' fall mainly into this third 
category. In the majority of these situations the assignee 
is related in some way to the representee. In Inwards v 
g~_l.i: .. ~.r, 111 for example, the plaintiffs were held bound by an 
'inchoate equity'. The plaintiffs were the trustees of the 
now deceased representor and beneficiaries under his will. 
To permit them to oust the representee (their step-brother) 
---. ............. , .. -, .. ,.,,.,,.,_, .. , ............................................ -... - ...... . 110 (1979) 8 Sydney Law Rev 578 at 585 . See also Woodman, (19 80) 96 LQR 336 at 340. 11 1(1965] 2 QB 29. 
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in circumstances where the testator could not have done so 
would have been grossly unconscionable. 112 
In the 'familial cases' the question of what 
c onstitutes notice to the third party may be less stringent 
than in a non-familial situation . In the Australian case 
took a robust approach 
to the question of whether the assignees knew of the 
represen tations which had been made b y their assignors and 
were thus fixed with knowledge of the ' inchoate equity'. 
The assignees were eight members of a large extended family 
with a somewhat hazy knowledge of the representations. 
Although one of the assignees was a personal representative 
as we l l as a beneficiary the other assignees were not 
personal representatives. Notice should therefore have been 
a relevant issue but the court did not question the extent 
of their knowledge of the 'i nchoate equity'. They .admitted 
that they had no specific knowledge of the 'inchoate equity' 
bu t ha~ heard rumours. 114 This was nevertheless deemed to 
be sufficient notice of the ' inchoate equity' raised on the 
facts of the case. 
ii ) The ... ' .. satis_f_ied __ equity_' 
Once the 'inchoate equity ' has been ·satisfied b y the 
award of a court-ordered remedy, the normal rules in 
unregistered land apply in determining priority between a 
third party who acquires title and the holder of the 
' satisfied equity'. 
11-2 .. I bid at ·····2·i°7····:························- ·· 
113 [1983) WAR 321. 
114 Ibid at 355. 
Legal rights will clearly bind any 
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future purchasers of the property. Where equitable 
proprietary rights or long-term occupation rights have been 
granted, there appears to be a general acceptance on the 
basis of Inwards v Baker11s that the 'satisfied equity' will 
bind third parties who have actual or constructive 
notice. l l 6 
Where a more idiosyncratic remedy has been granted, the 
courts may not necessaril y hold third parties with noti ce to 
be bound . In Vinden v V:t..P..9.:~_n117 the plaintiff was awarded 
an occupational right for so long as he continued to pay the 
agreed outgoings on his father's property. Such an open-
ended remedy ma y not necessarily bind third party 
purchasers ; it has the appearance of a personal rather than 
a proprietary right . It may be that in circumstances 
similar to Vinden v Vinden the courts would hold that a 
particularly stringent form of notice should be required in 
order to bind a third party. 
In M?:h?:.:r::.?:j v Chand I 1 s the Judicial Committee of the 
Pri vy Council ruled, in a situation where no third party 
was involved, that a 'satisfied equity' in the form of a 
long - term occupational licence was a purely personal right 
not binding on third parties . 11 9 Sir Robin Cooke held 
therefore that this long-term occupational licence was not a 
dealing wi th land for the purposes of Section 12a of the 
115
-[ 19 6 5] 2 QB 2 9 . 
116 Ibid at 37 . 
117 [1982) 1 NSWLR 618. 
118 [19861 3 All ER 10 7. 
119 Ib:i..d ~t 110. 
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FUi Native Land Trust Act.120 The Privy Council 
acknowledged that the plaintiff had a duty to house the 
defendant and their three children even though he had since 
married and created a new family. Had the 1 icence been 
held to be binding . on third parties it would have been an 
illegal dealing under Section 12a of the Fiji Native Land 
Trust Act. 121 The defendant would have been left homeless 
and the plaintiff would have received the benefit of a 
property improved by the defendant. 
The doctrine of notice was considerably modified by the 
English property legislation of 1925, which confirmed a 
principle of registration for certain equitable proprietary 
interests in land. Professor Wade has explained that the 
policy of the 1925 legislation embraced 
---........ .. 
a shift from a moral to an a-moral basis. 
Its just ificat ion was that the doctrines of 
constructive and imputed notice had been 
over-refined, to such an extent that it had 
become dangerous to employ in a purchase, a 
solicitor of good practice and reputation. 122 
120The Act makes illegal any dealing with native land vested in the Native Land Trust Board without the Board's consent. 121 See also Kulamma v Manadon [1968) AC 1062. 1 
·····-························-····-··· ·········································· 22 [1956) CLJ 216 at 227. 
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a.) The ........ 'J.nch.o.a te_ ... equ.i.tY .. '. 
i) s .ecti.on ...... 2 ....... of ... the_ .. _Land ...... Charges ...... Act .... ..1.9..7.2 
Section 2 of the Land Charges Act 1972 lists those 
maybe registered as land charges in inte rests which 
unregistered land. Section 198 (1) of the Law of Property 
Act 1925 states that registration of any land charge "shall 
be deemed to constitute actual notice of such instrument or 
matte r, and of the fact of such registration, to all persons 
and for all purposes connected with the land affected." In 
spite of this change in policy after 1925 Thompson has 
sugges ted that '' throughout the period when reg is tra ti on 
statutes have been in force ... a tension has existed between 
literal compliance with them on the one hand, and seeking to 
read into them general equitable principles on the 
other. " 1 2 3 This tension continues to attract the attention 
of the judiciar:v, In the light of the House of Lords' 
ruling in Midland.:. J:3.8:P!S .... IT:1::1?.!- .. 9.9 .. . 1 .!d v 9..T .. ~ .. ~ .. I.'.1124 it is most 
unlikely that any gloss can be put upon section 199 ( 1 l of 
the Law of Property Act 1925 which renders any registrable 
interest, under what is now the Land Charges Act 197 2, void 
for non-registration against certain categories of 
purchaser. In g i, -in g j u d gm en t in n.t.4. .. :1: .. ?.:.!.!.9-..... :E.5. .. ?.:.n.:ls ....... I.r u s t .. 9..9.... 1 .. t.d 
v Qreen12s Lord Wilberforce rejected the introduction of the 
requ irement of good faith on the part of an'y purchaser as it 
"would bring with it the necessity of inquiring into the 
Purchaser's rnoti ves and state of mind". A purchaser may 
take advantage of a situation, which the law has provided 
1·-------·----·---, ....................................  __ , __ .. 23 [1985] CLJ 280. 
1 2 4 [ 1 9 8 1 ] AC 5 1 3 • 
125 Ibid. 
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and the addition of a profit motive cannot create an absence 
of good faith. Any advantage gained by a purchaser seems 
necessarily to involve a disadvantage for another however 
to make the validity of the purchase depend 
upon which aspect of the transaction was 
prevalent in the purchaser's mind seems to 
create distinctions equally difficult to 
analyse in law as in fact: avarice and 
malice may be distinct sins, but in human 
conduc t they are liable to be intertwined. 126 
This a p pr o a c h must be contrasted with that of Lord 
Hard.,..·icke in the Le .. }i §:Y...§: v .1-:, .. ~ ......... N..eve 1 2 7 who viewed earlier 
registration Acts as enactments designed to prevent the 
mischief of secret conveyances. Where the transaction wa s 
e v ident to a subsequent purchaser he stated that "the taking 
of a legal estate after notice of a prior right makes a 
person a mala f ide purchaser ... this is a species of fraud, 
and dolus malus itself . "12s It is thus quite clear that 
such registration Acts were not intended to protect 
fraudulent transactions. 
There is substantial authority for the view that the 
'inchoate equity ' is not registrable under the Land Charges 
Act 1972. The question whether the 'inchoate equity' is 
registrable arose , for instance, in the Court of Appeal 
hearing in Na t.i.ona.l , .. _.P. .. :r.:..<2.Y...t..P .. <?. .t?-J ... .  :E.3-.!=l:.P..~ ........ l.:,.!:.4 v Has t .. i.ngs_ ... Car ........ Mart 
.............. _,,, ............... .. ........................ ................................... ,_ , 12 6 Ibid at 530 . 
1 2 7( 1748 ) 3 Atk 646 , 26 ER 1172 a t 11 74 ff . 1 28 I bid . 
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td, 1 2 9 !!.-....... In this case Lord Denning MR, referring to the 
'inchoate equity' of estoppel, maintained that it was 
incapable of registration under the Land Charges Act 
Lord precisely because it was not a proprietary right. 
Denning's view was not, however, without its difficulties 
and must always be considered in the context of the case in 
question. The deserted wife in National 
........................................ 
Bank 
• ......................... . ........ . .... . . ,n0 ...... .................. .. 
Provincial 
Lt,d v Has .tings Car 11.?: .. :r:::t... I.:, .t.9- had an 'equity' to live in her 
husband's house. This 'equity' was clearly not a 
proprietary right. In order to bring it within Section 
70(1)(g), Lord Denning MR had to find some way of 
demonstrating that the section includes equities of a non-
proprietary na t ure. If the 'inchoate equity' of 
proprieta r y estoppel were held to be a non-proprietary right 
which nevertheless bound a purchaser of unregistered land 
who had notice, then, by analog y the deserted wife's 
'equity' might be held to bind a similar purchaser of 
unregistered land and moreover to be an overriding interest 
in registered land. The House of Lords overruled the 
decision in the Court of Appeal and held that the deserted 
wife's equity was a mere personal right and could not 
therefore bind third parties. In Inwards v Bakeriao Lord 
Denning MR was bound by the decision of the House of Lords 
in Na t .i onal ....... Provinc.ial .... Bank 
'inchoate equity' of estoppel 
Ltd v Ainsworth. 1 a 1 If the 
........................... 
in Inwards v Baker 1 a 2 was to 
........ .................................. . .......... . 
be capable of binding third parties it could not be held to 
be a mere personal equity. Lord Denning MR therefore 
suggested that an 'inchoate equity' had at least some 
129. [ 19 6 4] Ch 6 6 5 . 
130 (1965] 2 QB 29. 
131 (1965] AC 1175. 
132 (1965] 2 QB 29 . 
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proprietary quality and could therefore bind third parties. 
Registration was not a relevant issue here. 
In E R ..... J.Y..E:=. .. !:>. ...... IP.Y..E:=..!:>.:t..1.1}.E:=! .. r.1. .. :l:.. ..... J:,.J:t:,_g v H.i.gh 1 a 3 the Court of 
Appeal gave further consideration · to whether an 'inchoate 
equity' of estoppel could be registered under the Land 
Charges Act. Here the defendant had expended money in the 
belief that he had been granted an easement over the land of 
the plaintiff's predecessor in title. In return the 
defendant had agreed to allow the foundations of the 
plaintiff 's property to encroach on to his land. 
Denning MR rejected counsel's submission tha t 
Lord 
the 
defendan t's 'inchoate equity' constituted any form of estate 
contract. 1 3 4 On the instant facts he held that there was 
no contract to convey a legal estate. Furthermore, the 
ri ght was not registrable as an 'equitable easement'. 
Lord Denning MR maintained that an 'equitable easement' 
is a category of proprietary interest in land such as would 
befo re 1926 have been recognised as capable of being 
conveyed or created at law , but which since 1926 only takes 
effect as an equitable interest. This category does not 
include any right, liberty or privilege arising in equity by 
reason of 'mutual benefit and burden' or arising under an 
estoppel because before 1926 this right would not have been 
a proprietary interest capable of being conveyed or created 
at law. It only subsisted in equity. Therefore the right 
doe s not need to be · registered as a land charge , so as to 
1 ··---·-·············································································-··--···· 33 [1967) 2 QB 379 . 
134 See the Land Charges Act, 1925, s 10(1) (now the Land Charges Act 1972 s 2). 
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bind successors, 
reg istration. 1 3 5 
but takes effect in equity without 
To find that the representee ' s 'inchoate equity' was 
capable of registration but unregistered would have enabled 
the owners of the property to "perpetrate the grossest 
injustice" for this reason Lord Denning MR was not prepared 
to make that finding . Any other view would have inhibited 
the equitable jurisdiction to prevent unconscionable 
dealings. 
In E R Ives Investment Ltd V Highl36 Danckwerts LJ 
held that a binding oral contract had been conclude d between 
the defendant and the plaintiff's predecessor in title. 
According to what is now section 4 ( 6) of the Land Charges 
Act 1 9 7 2 , failure to register a class C ( i ,- ) or a class D 
(iii) land charge makes the relevant interest void as 
against a purchaser for money or moneys worth of a legal 
estate in the land charged with it. However, the 
defendant's 'inchoate equity' wa s additional to his 
equitable rights under the oral contract . Danckwerts LJ 
held that the ' inchoate equity' was not a registrable 
charge, and section 199 of the Law of Property Act, 1925, 
therefore had no application,13 7 
;;-5E R Ive~··· .. i;;;~·~·t-;-~nt Ltd v High [ 1967] 2 QB 379 at 394. 
See ......... Da·v-i.dge, (1937) 53 LQR 259. Compare the decision 
reached in registered land in Celsteel Ltd v Al ton House H . .. ...... -... - ... -.................................................. .. ........................................... .. 
~.lci .. !.g.~.~--~ .. 19:. [ 19 85] 1 WLR 204 at 2 20 P.~ .. I.::. Scott J. 
6 [1967] 2 QB 379 at 397. 
137 Winn LJ ([1967] 2 QB 379 at 405) shared this view. He 
Said "the statute has no impact upon an estoppel , nor do I 
think that an estoppel could be registrable under its 
PI'ovisions." See also Wilkinson ( 196 7) 30 MLR 580; Todd , 
[19 81] Conv 347. 
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An obvious policy factor may have led the courts to 
bold that the 'inchoate equity' is not capable of 
registration.1as The 'inchoate equity' normally arises from 
informal arrangements b y people who are generally 
unaccustomed to seeking legal advice. To hold 'inchoate 
equ ities' 
harshly 
to be capable of registration would militate 
against vulnerable and uninformed persons. 
However, the exclusion of the ' inchoate equity' from the 
registration system undoubtedly leaves 'inchoate equities' 
at risk of being defeated by t he bona .. .... f.J..9: .. E::? purchaser for 
value without notice. Such a risk will be heavily 
accentuat ed where the owner of the 'inchoate equity' is not 
himself in actual occupation,139 
ii) Reg i .s.t.ra ti on. <?f.. 13.:. ... J .. ~ .  §. . .. Pe.ndens 
Section 5 (1 ) of the Land Charges Act 1972 provides for 
the registration of a lis ...... pendens (or pending land 
action), 140 If the 'inchoate equity' is indeed capable of 
registration, as a l .. i.s ....... pende.n.s, such , a registration places 
on record that the representee is seeking to have his 
'inchoate equity' satisfied by remedy of the court. 
Registration of a l .i.s ........ pende.ns will fix any purchaser with 
...... ~ ...................................... . 1 3 8 More recently the Court of Appeal implied in ~ .. :r.:.J.§.!:..<?L .. and Wes.t ........ Buil.d.i ng .... . s .o.c.i.ety v Henning [1985] 1 WLR 778 that an estoppel interest is not registrable under the Land Charges Act 1972. The judge at first instance had ruled that the interest was unregistrable and the Court of Appeal left that Part of the decision intact. See also Todd, [1985] 49 Conv 361. 
13 9See Hanbury and Maudsley, Modern ....... Equi.ty, (1985 12th Ed) PP 862, 871. 14 0 Secti on 1 7 ( 1) of the Act defines a pending land action, as "any action or proceeding pending in court relating to land or any interest in or charge on land." 
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notice of the representee' s action to have his 'inchoate 
equity' satisfied. According to section 5 ( 7) of the Land 
charges Act 19 7 2 a purchaser with express notice of the 
pending action will be bound even if the pending land action 
is not registered; constructive notice is not sufficient. 
There are no reported cases concerning the 
registrabili ty of an ' inchoate equity' as a l .i.s .... Penden.s and 
it remains an open question whether registration is 
possible. It may , however, be difficult to bring a claim 
to satisfaction of an 'inchoate equity' within the 
definition of "any action relating to land or any interest 
or charge on land . '' In Re Barned' s .. :i:3-c:i,:r:iJs.tD!L Co Ltd 1 4 1 
Cairns LJ defined t he lis. pendens as a technical e x pression 
which al ways implies a claim of right, or a claim to charge 
some specific property . 142 
there was no general rule for determining what a c tions fall 
within the definition of a li.s . pendens . Stamp LJ thought 
that each case must be looked at in terms o f the definition 
"some assistance in ans wering the question will no doubt be 
obta ined b y cons i d ering wh e ther in the absence of 
registration a purchaser or mortgagee might obtain a title 
to the land as a bona fide purchaser without notice of, and 
so d efeat , the plaintiff ' s claim. "144 
- --......... ,_,,.,,,, ,,.,- .. ,·---········ ........... ,... -... , ................................. . 
14 1 ( 186 7 ) 2 Ch App 171 . i~ 2 ~~~~ 4 ~ t 111: i1 E~e~ 8~~s o '.f8~{Po<?r<?..qv V T~·~r·~·!..r.·1·1~·~~1·~·§1 ... L;f 1 .. .L~~ 84 3 . 
.. ........ ,.......... ...... .. ...... ........ .. .... . . 
14 3 [1978] 3 All ER 805 . 
1 4 4 Ibid at 815 . 
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Where the holder of the 'inchoate equity' claims some 
form of proprietary interest in the property as a remedy, 
the 'inchoate equity' is likely to be held to be registrable 
as a .+.J .. !=.> ....... P.~:1::1.9.-~:f.:l.!=.> , Where the claimant demands an occupation 
right or compensation for expenditure, it is somewhat less 
certain that his 'inchoate equity' will be held to be 
capable of registration as a .l .. is ....... pendens. 
courts may satisfy the 'inchoate equity' 
Because the 
in a totally 
fle x ible manner, it may not, however, be entirely logical to 
differentiate in this way between claims involving 
proprietary rights and claims involving mere occupational 
rights or compensation for expenditure. 
b) The 'satisfied equi.ty.' 
There is no evidence to suggest that the satisfied 
equity is in general registrable under the Land Charges Act 
19 7 2. Something obviously depends on the precise form of 
the court-ordered remedy. For instance, the English courts 
have been fairly reluctant to order a lien when granting 
financial remedies in satisfaction of a claimant's 
'inchoate equity' . _1 4 s However, if a lien were ordered by 
the court, it is possible that the lien is registrable under 
section 2(4) of the Land Charges Act 1972. 14& It has been 
··~·-····~, ............. . 
In re 
............................... 
1 NSWLR 
145 Cf J::I1:1;1.r.1.t+.!:C?P v .Q.~ .. :r.:1?.:gh.!:Y (1901) 1 NSWSR (Eq) 81; Y.Jhitehead [1948) NZLR 1066 ; E.~ .. 1=1:T .. 9. .. E:::. v Pe.ar.ce [1977] 170 ; Morris v Morris [1982] 1 NSWLR 61 (ante at ) . 
(iii) land 
equitable 
14 6 Section 2 ( 4) of the Act defines the Class C charge as "a general equitable charge is any charge which -
a) is not secured by a deposit of documents relating to the legal estate affected; and b) does not arise or affect an interest arising under a trust for sale or a settlement; and 
c) is not included i n any class of land charge." 
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suggested that there is considerable uncertainty as to what 
the category of general equitable charge includes,147 
According to Wade a lien is probably included in the 
category but he has argued 
uncertainty should have no 
that "th is 
place in the 
penumbra 
system 
of 
and 
occasional equities would be better left to the tenderer 
mercies of the doctrine of notice, which is at least a 
principle of equity in the ethical as we ll as in the 
technical sense. 1 4 s 
An equitabl e lien imposes a charge upon the 
representor' s property until such time as the representee 
has been compensated,149 Th e charge is ul t ima tel y 
enforceable by a court order for sale 1 so unless when the 
remedy is granted the court decrees that the lien ma y only 
be enforced when the representor chooses to sell or dies. 1s1 
The mai n advantage obtained by registration of a 
representee's lien wo uld be that the representee could 
thereby ensure priority for his charge over any later charge 
of the same property. 
147 Wade, [1956) CLJ 216. 
1 48 Ibid at 22 5. The Lord Chancellor 's Commit tee on Land 
Charges under Mr Justice Roxburgh (Cmd 9825 July 1~56 para 
13) recommended the abolition of the class C (iii) general 
equitabl e charge. 
: 
4 9 see -~-P-~11 .. '. ... § ...... .P. .. ~ .. tnc::: .. tpJ_~ .. § ....... s:>..f ..... Jrm:1 .. :i.: .. t...Y ( 1 9 8 2 2 8 t h Ed ) I p 4 5 0 • 50 Ibid at 459. See also Halsbury's Laws of England (4th E 
·········································'································································· ································---··· /ll~oiR 2:
6
~ • 576, Vol 32 p 847. Cf H.:t::1.$..h.~_§_ v Q..?:.:J ... f .. f.in [ 1969] 
15 1 Se~ Gross v French (1976) 238 EG 39. 
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c Registered .... l.and 
i) The ....... Pol .. i.cx ...... behi.nd .... the ...... Land .Reg.istrat.i.on .A.9..t.. ..... .1.~? .. .? 
The policy behind the Land Registration Act 1925 was to 
simplify and cheapen conveyancing . More particularly, the 
purpose of the new system was to free the purchaser from the 
haza rds of notice 
unregistered land. 
real or constructive which arise in 
It was the original intention that, 
with limited exceptions, onl y those equitable rights entered 
on the register would be binding on purchasers. 152 
There was no intention in the 1925 legislation that 
equitable rights should receive protection only in the 
context of unregistered land and not in registered land. 
The means of protection were simply said to be different,153 
It is inevitable that decisions concerning the protection 
of an equitable right in unregistered land have often 
considered whether the equitable right has also been granted 
protect ion in registered land, 1 5 4 Increasingly, however, 
very real diffe rences concern ing the protection of equitable 
rights are becoming apparent as between registered and 
unregistered land. 15s 
............................... ............................ 
152Williams & 9.:.:1.:YP. .'. ... ~. Bar::1Jc. ... l:,,.!:q v Boland [1981) AC 487 at 503, 504 . 
15 3Lord Wilberforce stressed this point in N.9.-.. !:.J.<?..P..9.-J Provinc.ial.Bank .. Ltd v A..tP.!:J..~(?rth [1965) AC 1175 at 1261. See Ruoff and Roper, g .. ~~ .. t!:l..!:.~.r..~.9.: ....... 9..9.P.Y.~..Y..9.-.P..gJpJ~, p 100. . See 
a 1 so ~' ... tlJ.tc:i.I.I.l .. !:l. ..... §.c ... . 9..:1.:YP. .. !:l. ...... ~.~:r.~Jc. ..... J,J.9.: v ~.<?.:1.:9.-.:1::1.9.: [ 1 9 8 1 ] AC 4 8 7 at 5 0 4 per Lord Wilberforce. 
154 See Poster v Slough .Es.tates ....... Lt.d [1968) 1 Ch 495 at 507 P. .. f=,!X. C r o s··s·· .. ·· ;r:...... . ....................... . 
155The Law Commission has considered these discrepancies between registered and unregistered land (see Cmnd 8636 para 18 , 19 p 10). See now Law Com No 158, Property Law Third Report on Land Registration (31 March 1987), para 2 . 5 . 
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ii) Regi.s.tra.t.i.on .... of ..... the ....... ' .. i.nchoa te .. _.equi.ty' .. 
a) Entrr ... o..f .. a ...... cautio.n 
The Land Registration Act 1925 provides for minor 
interests in land to be registered in order to ensure their 
protection. According to a former Chief Land Registrar, 
'inchoate equities' may be entered on the register by way of 
a caution under section 53 or section 54 of the Act. 156 
The former section is concerned with land liable to be 
registered whilst the latter refers to land already 
registered. Both sections permit a claimant of an 
equitable right to make a statutory declaration supporting 
his claim. The land certificate or the permission of the 
legal title holder is not required for the lodging of a 
caution. For this reason the entry of a caution in respect 
of 'inchoate equities' ma y be regarded as a hostile act 
towards the representor and ma y deter familial members from 
registering any 'inchoate equity' which they might have. 
It is not intended as more than a temporary holding 
device, 15 7 and in that sense lodging a caution would seem to 
be a particularly appropriate procedure for protecting the 
'inchoate equity'. A cautioner does not have to establish 
his rights as proprietary rights at the date of entry of the 
caution. The entry simply permits his case to be examined 
before the registrar before any transfer of title by the 
registered proprietor is allowed. 15s 
156 See Ruoff and Roper, Reg.i.stered ..... conveyanc.i.ng, ( 1972 3rd Ed) p 768. 
1 5 7 See Hayton, Regi.s.tered .... .. Land, ( 1981 3rd Ed) , pp 25, 26. See Law Com 158 Propert y Law Third Report on Land 
Regis·tration Part IV para 4.38 at IV. 
15 8See Hayton, Re.gi.s.tered .. Land, (1981 3rd Ed) p 26. 
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If a person enters a caution without reasonable cause, 
an action in damages may be brought against him by any 
person who suffers loss as a result of the caution . If the 
claim to have the 'inchoate · equity ' satisfied lS 
subsequently rejected by the court, the cautioner may be at 
risk of such an action being brought against himself. 
Furthermore, the legal proprietor may seek a remedy by way 
of motion to have the caution vacated. In The ....... Rawl_pl ug__ ___ Co 
Lt.d v Kamvale Pro_pe_rti.es ... .... Ltd 1 s 9 Megarry J favoured the 
robust approach that "if there is a fair, arguable case in 
support of the registration the matter must stand over until 
the trial . But if though not cloudless, the sky had in it 
no more than a cloud the size of a man's hand, [he] would 
c l ear the register."160 This means that the equitable 
claimant could be prejudiced in any later hearing to 
de termine the satisfaction of his 'inchoate equity' if his 
caution were removed from the register. Between the 
clearing of the register and the court hearing the 
registered proprietor would be able to dispose of the land. 
Whether a caution which has been remo ved from the register 
can give rise to an ov erriding interest is uncertain. 161 
The question is discussed later in the chapter. 
It has been suggested by certain commentators that the 
'inchoate equity' cannot be entered as a caution because 
onl y those rights which are registrable as land charges in 
unreg istered land come into the category of a cautionable 
--···-···-·····-----······ .. ········-····-··· .. ···-.............................. . 1 5 9(1968) 20 p & CR 32. 160 Ibid at 40 
16 1 See post at 214 
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interest, 1 6 2 However, the more conventional v iew is that 
the 'inchoate equity' is still protectible by the entry of a 
caution even though it is not registrable as a land charge 
in t h e analogous contex t in unregistered land . 1 6 3 In 
po~.t..~ . .:r::. v §.J.: .. <::>~gh .. .. ~ .. !=.'.t.?.-.t..~.!=.' ...... 1.t.qi 6 4 Cross J drew the attention of 
the Law Commission to the consequences of accepting that 
certain rights are not capable of registration in registered 
land . He e x plained that in unregistered land the doctrine 
of notic e could be called into play to determine a fair 
result in any par t icular case of an unregistrable equitable 
ri gh t. Th e g eneral princ iple of the Land Registration Act is 
howe v e r that a purc haser of registered interests takes free 
from a n y unpro t ected right s which are not 'ov erriding 
interests ' Equitab le rights may not always be overriding 
interests , therefore if a right is not capable of 
regi s tra t ion there is n o way of making it bind a 
purchas e r . 1 6 5 
The Law Commissi on responded with the recommendation 
that protection of equitable rights in registered land 
should be effected b y en t ering a caution or notice . 166 
Pend i n g the registrat ion of r ights by a person who under the 
Law Commis s ion's propos a l s was e n titled t o a ppl y 
reg is tra t ion, 
Commission , 
such ri ght s should, according to 
r ema in enf orceable in accordance with 
f o r 
the 
the 
Pr inci ples la i d d own in E R. ....... I Y .. ~ .. § ....... Inv ~.§.t..i:r.i..~.n .. t. ........  1 .. t.d v High , 1 6 7 
16 2 See Vito r ia , ( 19 76) 12 6 NLJ 772. 16 3 See Ruo ff and Ro p e r, Reg .. i .s .te.red .. _ .. Conv ey anc,,i,ng., ( 19 72 3 rd Ed ), p 768 . 
1 6 4[1968) 1 Ch 495. 
16 5 Ibid at 5 0 7. 
166 Law Commission Publ ishe d Working Paper no 67 Land Registration (4th paper) April 1976 paras 49 ff. 167 [1967] 2 QB 379, (ante at 197 ff), 
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The Commission accepted that its proposal would bring about 
a. limited e x ception to the general principle of the 1925 
property legislation, which required notice to be derived 
exclusively from the register, 168 but justified this on the 
grounds that the existence of such equitable rights had 
probably not been considered by Parliament in 1925,169 
The Law Commission's concern in this respect was 
primarily with the type of equitable easements outlined in 
The obiter dicta of Cross 
... ............. .......... ............................... 
Jin that case will not generally apply to equitable rights 
arising from proprietary estoppel. At least in the 
'familial cases', claimants of these rights will normally be 
in actual occupation and may be able to claim an overriding 
interest. However, if the representee is not in actual 
occupation of the property, he will not be able to c laim an 
overriding interest . 
b) 
Where a more permanent protection is desired, entry of 
a 'no tice' may be possible. Section 49(1)(f) of the Land 
Registration Act 1925 provides for the entry of a ' notice ' 
in respect of "creditor ' s notices and any , other right, 
interest , or claim which it may be deemed e x pedient to 
Pro tect by notice instead of by caution, inhibition or 
restriction ." The ~ ording seems wide enough to cover 
~·-
68 Law Commission Published Working Paper 
Reg istration (4th paper) April 1976 para 64. 
169 Ibid . 
17 0 ( 1968] 1 Ch 495. 
no 67 Land 
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, inchoate equities ' . One obstacle which may prevent the 
ent ry of a 'notice ' is that the entry of a 'notice' requires 
the assistance of the registered proprietor, the Land 
certificate must be produced . If the certificate is 
already in the Land Registry the registered proprietor must 
be g i ven the opportunity to object . 171 
c) Overr .. i .di.ng. J.:r::i.t~:r.es ts 
Failure to register the equity under the prov isions of 
the Land Registration Ac t 1925 does not necessaril y def eat 
it , if the property is transferred by the r epresentor. Ev en 
if unprotect ed the right may s t i 11 receive protection if 
they c an be brought within the provisions of section 
70(1 )(g ) of the Land Registration Act 1925. 172 
Parl iamen t never inte nded in 1925 that all rights 
relating to land should be capable of registration.173 It 
171 See Hayton , :R~.~t~.!: ~:t::.~9:l,,<'l::r::t'?- (1981 3rd Ed) p 25. 172 See Williams & Glvn's Bank Ltd v Boland [1981] AC 487 at 50 8, 51i·;·5iz:·· ··· T11~·se.ction .... provide·s·· ··t'hat "All registered 
land shall, unless under the provisions of this Act the 
contrary is expressed on the register, be deemed to be 
subject to such of the following overriding interests as may for the time being subsisting in reference thereto'' . 
Section 3 (xvi) of . t he Land Registration Act 1925 defines 
overriding interests- as "all the incumbrances, interest, 
rights and powers not ente red on the register but subject to 
which registered dispositions are by this [Land 
Registration] Act to take effect, and in regard to land 
registered at the commencement of this Act include the 
mat ters which are by enactment repealed by this Act declared 
not to be incumbrances. 173Para 63 of the Royal Commission report in 1857 on 
regist ration of land stated that, "The register will be a 
subs titute for the documentary or parchment title. But the 
reg istered ownership .•. will remain subject, as the fee 
simple now is ... to such other rights as are not usually 
included in the abstract of title ... These rights which are 
Commonly evidenced by known usage or continued enjoyment or 
may be ascertained on the spot by inspection or inquiry; 
and the title to them is generally so independent of the 
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is a late twentieth-century obsession which demands an all-
embracing system of registration,174 The existence of a 
limited number of overriding interests was considered to be 
essential . Without this 
certain rights and interests would be 
deprived of recognition although if the title 
to the same land was not registered, their 
existence would be undoubted. This 
difference would cause hardship as we ll as 
confusion and would not be tolerated by the 
public wh ich the registration s y stem is 
intended to serve.17s 
It remained not entirely clear until the decision in 
the intention of the legislators to permit rights c apabl e of 
registration but untegistered in reg istered land to rank as 
overriding in te r e sts. The House of Lords in that case 
documentar y title to the property that they will necessarily for m a partial e x ception to that wh ich wi l l constitute the regi stered ownership .'' See also Ruoff and Roper, Registered_Conveyanc!ni , (1972 3rd Ed) pp 100 ff. 17 4 See inter alia Hansard Vol 460 (Session 1985-8 6) Co l 1273 per Lord Hailsham·; Law Commission draft report on Land Registration 8 November 1984 , Introduction para 5; 9e.l .s.tee l ..... Lt.d v Al.t.on .. . Hous.e Ltd [ 19 8 5] 1 WLR 2 04 ; Hayton, E_~~i .. ~.!:.~ .. I.::.~.9: ........ b .. 13.:-.:r:?: .. 9.: , ( 1981 3rd Ed) p 7 7. Even these ardent supporters of registration of equitable interests admit that a few limited e x ceptions to registration which r emain. 1 7 5 Ruo ff and Roper, Reg.i.s.tere.d ....... Conveyanci.ng, ( 19 7 2 3rd Ed) , PP 100, 101. 
17 6 [1981) AC 487. Although n ot decided, the point was implicit in such decisions as London & Cheshire Insurance Co L ....... .. ............. . ... ...................... .. ........ . .... _ .. . ..................... . 
.... td v Lapl.agrene ......... Property .... co ....... Ltd [ 19 71 ] 1 All ER 7 6 6 that unregistered but registrable minor interests can take e ff ec t as overriding interests. See also Strand Securities Ltd v C ....... ................................................................... --...................................... . 
. ~~~-~11 [1965) Ch 959; Webb v Pollmount Ltd [1966) Ch 584; Gra c e-·R I t t i>tJ ...... v W ....... : .. t' .... ....... t'i.ifefs"'f .. C h 8 3 1 · H dg --.......... - ... - ...  .Y.}!!:~ .. r.-.......... !1_~.~ .. ~ ....... ~ .. ~n. ..?..................... al e , ....... 9......... .~.<?..n. v tl~rks [1971) Ch 892. 
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confirmed the dual status of minor interests and overriding 
interests . Lord Scarman explained that a right of 
occupation if unaccompanied by actual occupation, is clearly 
within the definition of minor interests : in section 3 (xv) 
of the 1925 Act. It is not itself an overriding interest, 
but once it is associated wi th actual occupation "the 
association is an overriding interest."177 
The decision in Williams & Gt . .Y!l'..§ ... J?.?-. .f.lk Ltd v Boland is 
of crucial importance in the familial context. Members of 
families are highly unlikel y to register their 'inchoate 
equities' prior to any court hearing, even if they do so 
after such a hearing. Section 70(1) (g) of the Land 
Registration Act 1925 gives claimants of equitable rights, 
in effect, a second chance to protect their rights if they 
have failed to register them. The overriding interests in 
section 70(1) (g) comprise 
the rights of every person in actual 
occupation of the land or in respect of the 
rents and profits thereof, save where enquiry 
is made of such person and the rights are not 
disclosed. 
According to Lord Upjohn in National Provincial Bank 
Ltd v A_i_ns_worth, 17 s the rights which are protected under 
sec tion 70( 1) (g) are "rights in reference to land which 
have the quality of enduring through different ownerships of 
~~;~illi_ams .. .. &.Glyn' .. s ___ Bank .... 1' .. !:.9.: v J?..<?.!.?.:.~.9.: [1981] AC 487 at 511, 
17 8 [19 65] AC 1175 at 1237. 
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the land according to normal conception of title to real 
t I! prope r Y , In the same case Lord Wilberforce explained 
that to find what 'rights' come within the section , one must 
look outside the Land Registration Act 1925 in order to 
dete rmine the rights which are binding on purchasers under 
the general law. Personal rights do not become proprietary 
by vir tue of the section per_se.179 
S ome commentators have doubted that estoppel rights can 
be brough t within section 70(1)(g) of the Land Registration 
Act. Bailey, 1 so for instance, has maintained that the 
'inchoat e equity' does not fit the description of section 
70 ( 1 )(g ) rights. He was led to this v iew inter alia by the 
fact that one group of inchoate rights, i.e., those in th e 
course of acquisition under the Limitation Acts , forms a 
separate category of overriding interests under section 
70(1 ) (f) of the Land Registration Act 19 25. 
In London and Cheshire Insurance Co Ltd v Laplagrene 
P..T.opert Y ..... co .... Ltd 1 s 1 Brightman J held that the relevant date 
for adjudging the e x istence of an o ve rriding in terest is a t 
the moment when the land title is r eg istered a t the Land 
Reg istry. 1 s 2 I t is therefore the rights of thos e in 
179 I bid at 1 2 61. 
180Bailey , Estoppel and Registration of Title ·, [198 3 ) Conv 99 at 106 suggested that even if a proprietary estoppel equity were not registered it might be enforceable under the Principl e that " equit y will not allow a statute to be used as an instrument of fraud". Bailey viewed the Circumstances of mutual benefit and burden as one of th e Situations in which equity would intervene to prev ent fraud . See als o Hayton (1986) 45 CLJ 394 at 398. ~~ 1 [ 1 9 7 1 ] 1 A 11 ER 7 6 6 . S ee also F._~ .. -... J:3..9.X .. 1 .. ~ ... '. .... ~ ........ 9.J.9.: .. !.!!! [ 1 9 6 1 ] 1 ( 1~85 3) 3 95 () p & ~~ ff :9::f-gfff-.. ,-!3-.~ ... t!.q_t~JL_ ...... §.Q,,9_!_~ .. t. .. Y. V ~.~.P.q .. E?.J .. ~..9..!J:.~. 182 See Law Com 158 Property Law Third Report on Land Registration para 2.76, 2.77. 
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actual occupation at that date which bind the representor's 
assignee . Even if they cease to remain in occupation after 
that date their rights remain protected. 18 3 Brightman J 
could see nothing in the Act which could cause an overriding 
interest under section 7 0 ( 1) ( g) to be extinguished solel y 
because the owner of the right in question subsequently 
ceases to occupy the property after the relevant 
disposition. 18 4 If the overriding interest were to be 
extinguished whe n the owner of t he equitable interest went 
out of occupation, th is would result in an unreasonable 
windfall for the new proprietor. 
The requirement that the purchaser must enquire of 
every person in actual occupation of the land is an 
i mportant safeguard for claimants of equitable rights. 
Reliance upon "the untrue ipse dixi t of the vendor" is not 
sufficient, as Russell LJ remarked in Hodgson v Marks. 1 8 s 
This onus of enquiry has been strongly criticised in that 
the purchaser ma y not necessarily know who is in 
occupation. 186 The propert y ma y be occupied by persons 
whose presence is not discoverable by the purchaser or who 
move into residence between the time of the purchaser's 
enquirie s and the registration of the new title. In Kl .. i.ng 
183 Unless of course the propert y is sold again in which case the conditions of section 70(1)(g) must be satisfied at the date of registration of this transfer unless the overriding interest has been noted on the charges register after the 
or iginal hearing (see Land Registration Act 1925 , s 70(3)). 1 8 4 I.:,C?. .. r.:i.9.:C?._r:i ............ 13.:.I.:1.9: .............. 9..h..~ .. !=.>.hJ .. r:.~ ............ Ir.:i .. !=.> .. ll.:C.:13.:.r::1.f..~ ... ..... qq .......... l.:!.:1:.9: v Lap 1 ag re n e Property Co Ltd [ 1971] 1 All ER 766. See also I.r.:i .......... .:r:: .. ~. fh..owood's Registered Land [19 33) Ch 574. 185(1971) Ch 892 at 932. 18 6 See National Provincial Bank Ltd v Hastings .. G.13.::C.: ...... !1.13.:.:C.: .. !:. ....... l.:, .. !:.9.-[ 1964] 1 All ER at 700, 701. In unregistered land the Purchaser is only bound by the rights of occupiers of whom he has notice. 
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v Kes_ton ...... Prope_rt __ ies 1 s 7 Vinelott J acknowledged this tension 
between the interests of purchasers and the interests of 
holders of equitable rights. He found it disquieting that a 
purchaser could be prejudiced by rights notwithstanding that 
there is no person other than the vendor in 
apparent occupation of the property and that 
careful inspection and enquiry has failed to 
reveal anything which might give the 
purchaser any reason to suspect that someone 
other than the vendor had any interest in or 
rights over the property. 188 
The presence of members of families who are estoppel 
claimants is likely to be only too evident to purchasers 
except in cases of temporary absence from the property. 
The problem remains that even if a purchaser makes enquiry 
of holders of 'inchoate equities', the latter will be 
generally unable to verbalise their rights with any 
precision. There is no procedure, as there is in the case 
of a caution, by which the purchaser can clarify the nature 
of the right prior to a transfer of title to him. 
If an 'inchoate equity' is accepted by the court as an 
overriding interest, the Registrar may note it on the 
Charges Register of the burdened land . 1 s 9 The estoppel 
cla imant thereby obtains 
rights. 
more certain protection for his 
- -···---··-···············································-·-······ 1 8 7 ( 198 3 ) 4 9 P & CR 2 1 2 . 
188 Ibid at 220 . 
189 Land Registration Act 1925, s 70(3). 
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The overlap between overriding interests and minor 
i nterests may thus give protection to claimants of 
proprietary estoppel. However it remains uncertain whether 
a right can be revived as an overriding interest if it has 
been registered as a caution and the registrar has 
s ubsequently cleared the register of the caution. Section 
3(xvi) of the Land Registration Act 1925 appears to be wide 
enough to include such a right in the category of overriding 
interests in so far as it is no l anger "entered on the 
register". Section 55 ( 1) of the Act provides that if a 
caution is vacated the registered land may be dealt ~ith in 
the same manner as if no caution had been lodged. However, 
if the 'inchoate equity' has been cleared as a caution from 
the register because • -<-l L is deemed not to be a proprietary 
righ t, it may be that it will be rejected as an overriding 
interest for precisel~0 t he same reason. If it has be en 
cleared from the register for any other reason, there seems 
to be no logical reason for excluding it from the category 
of overr iding interests. 190 
d) The decline of _o_ve_rr.i.d_i_ng_ .... J:r.:t.!:§.:t::.~.§ .. !:.§ 
Since Wi_ll __ iams ____ & ___ __ Gl.yn_'s Bank ___ ,Ltd v ~-<? .. J.:.?.:_~-d191 attempts 
have been made to reduce the impact of section 70 of the 
Land Registration Act 1925 . Concern has been expressed 
repeatedly about the problem of 
~-;°Cf Crane, (1958) 22 Conv (NS) 17-18. 191 [1981] AC 487. 
the third party 
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purchaser. lg 2 
subtl y eroded 
A recent decision of the Court of Appeal has 
the protection of equitable rights as 
overriding interests. The pendulum has been judged to have 
swung too far in the direction of protecting equitable 
claimants, and it is now considered high time by Chancery 
lawyers for third party purchasers to be protected. In 
p_?,dd.ing.ton .... Building ... Soc.i.ety v M .. ~.P.c.9:.~.!.:.?.c::>J:i,.:r:i, 1 9 3 a son purchased 
prope rty and charged it to the plaintiff building society . 
His mother had contributed money towards the purchase and 
later claimed that her beneficial interest took priority. 
Browne-Wilkinson LJ held that where the owner of an 
'inchoate equity' remained silent about her right with full 
knowledge that the property was being charged by way of a 
mor tgage she could not claim that her 1 inchoate eqtiity'plus 
her occupation was, as an overriding interest, binding on 
the mortgagee. Browne-Wilkinson LJ explained that 
the mother kne..; and intended that the 
mortgage was to be granted to the society and 
that without the mortgage the flat in which 
she claims a beneficial interest could not 
have been acquired, the only possible 
intention to impute to the parties is an 
intention that the mother's rights were to be 
subject to the rights of the society. 194 
19
·-
2
-Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C has suggested that the 
~hole area of equitable rights and third parties needs 
reviewing - personal interview 22 October 1986. See also 
~ardiner and Martin, tl.<?. .. r. .. ~_ .... 1 .. 13.:.~ .... g~ .. f..<?.r..!1:! ....... ~ .. c:>..~ (1983) pp 197 - 8. 9 3 ( 1 9 8 5 ) 5 0 P & CR 2 4 4 , 
19 4 Ibid at 249. 
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There could therefore be no remaining rights to permit 
the operation of section 70 ( 1) ( g) . The decision is in 
keeping with a similar trend in unregistered land ,195 
In 1987 the Law Commission considered the future of 
overriding interests in its report on Land Registration,19 6 
It recommended the retention of a narrower class of rights 
as overriding interests including the rights of persons in 
actual occupation of the land. 197 Whether inchoate rights 
fall into this category remains uncertain . The Law 
Commission preferred to leave such a determination to be 
made in accordance with the general principles of land 
law. i 9 s The Law Commission also expressed concern about 
the problem of the 'Registration Gap'. It proposed that 
purchasers should take subject onl y to the rights of those 
in occupation at the date of the relevant disposition rather 
than of those in occupation at the date of registration of 
the transfer instrument at th e land registry. 199 
e) Ex.i.s.t .. i .ng . ... Pr ov.i.si.ons ..... f or_ .r .ect i fi.ca t .ion ... of ... .. the .. Land 
Reg.i.ste.r .. and .... th.e .... Pa~rment. of ?.:P. . .. ~P.9-.~r.1.1.P.Ll::.Y 
At present rectification of the Register may be 
Possible in favour of a claimant of an 'inchoate equi t:r'. 
Sec tion 82(1) of the Land Registration Act 1925 provides for 
~.' .. . ... .. ..................... -.............................................................. . 195 See Welstead [1985] CLJ 354; J:3-tt!=.>!:.c::>.L ..... and West Bui.lding 
~£iety v H~nning [1985] 1 WLR 778 . 196 Law' Com 158 Property Law Third Report on Land 
Regi stration. 
197 Ibid paras 2 . 54-2 . 74. This recommendation modifies s 
70( l)(g) Land Registration Act 1925 by excluding persons in 
receipt of rent and profits . 198 Ibid at para 2 . 56 . 19 9Ibid at para 2 . 106(ii ). 
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of the Register in a wide range of rectification 
circumstances. The circumstances outlined are sufficiently 
broad to permit rectification in favour of the holder of an 
'inchoate equity'. 200 
Section 82(3) states that the register may not be 
rectified, except for the purpose of giving effect to 
over r iding interests, so as to affect the title of a 
proprietor in possession unless he is in some way at fault 
or it would be u nj ust not to rectify the register against 
hirn .2 01 
In order to complement the powers of rect i fication 
section 83 (1), (2) of the Land Registration Act 19 25 provides 
2oose c tion 8 2( 1) provides for rectification of the register 
a) ... wher e a court . .. has decided that any person is 
enti tl ed to any e s tat e right on interest in or to any 
registe red land or charge and as a consequence o f such 
decision such court is of opinion that a rectification of 
the reg iste r is required . .. ; 
b) •.. wh e re the court, 
prescribed manner of an y 
entr y made in , or by the 
on the applicaation in 
person who is aggriev ed b y 
omission of any entry from, 
register ... ; 
the 
any 
the 
c) ... In any other c as e where, b y reason of any error or 
omission in the reg ister , or by reason of any entry made 
unde r a mistake it ma y be deemed just to rectify the 
regi ster . 
201
'Posses sion' i n_ section 82(3) is defined in sect ion 3 ( xvi ii) to include "the receipt of rents and p rofi ts or the 
righ t to recei v e the same, if any ". Section 82(3)(a) 
states that rectification is not possible where the 
reg istered proprietor is in possession e xcept for the 
Purpose of giving effect to overriding interests "unless the 
Proprietor has caused or substantially contributed to the 
error or omission by fraud or lack of proper care " (added b y 
the Administ rat ion of Justice Act 19 77 s 24 ) ; In Re 139 
£!Jg.h ... ... Street ........ Dept.f.ord [1951] 1 Ch 884 at 891 Wynn-Parry J 
made clear that innocent mistakes of the registered 
Propri etor were sufficient to permit rectification against 
him . Wh e ther the new section 82(3) (a) would be interpreted 
in this way remains to be seen. See also In re Chowood' s R 
.......................................................................................... . 
1}:~i .. 1.i~.~~~ ... \?.:!1$LR[ 1{;73 {; Ch 5 ~!;rton ,~·P.ff97v6 J~ .. ~cstJ .... P.iff9-~ .. r~·~"i"~·~ 
Law Com No 158, para 3.12. 
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for the payment of indemnity where rectification of the 
register is ordered or where an error or omission is 
accepted but rectification is not allowed.202 
The existing rectification provisions seem particularly 
relevant to the issue of priority in cases of proprietary 
estoppe l . Section 82(1)(h) of the Land Registration Act 
19 25 confers a broad judicial discretion to rectify2 o3 even 
where rectification may affect third party rights which have 
been registered. 204 A broad judicial dis6retion to rectify 
the register enables justice to be done. Rectif i cation 
according to the Law Commission is "a crack in the mirror 
principle" wh ich underlies all land registration schemes. 
The Law Commission compared the crack in the mirror 
principle resulting from rectif ication with that resulting 
from the recognition of overriding interests. It found 
with reference to rectification that the crack is "i.: ider in 
that it can be used to alter any aspect of registration ... it 
202 I f the claim for rectification i s made by pleading an 
over rid i ng interest based on proprietary estoppel, an 
indemnity is not payable to the registered proprietor. If 
rectification is ordered against him, he is deemed to have 
suf fered no loss. See In re Chow_?<?..9.:. 1. ~ .... _Re_gistered. Land [1 933] Ch 571. Compare, h-owever·,··'i:aw Com No 158 Property 
Law Third Report on Land Registration paras 2.11 ff. 203 In Re .... J .. 39 ...... H.i_gh . ... Street ...... Dept_ford [1951] Ch 886 at 890 Wynn-
Par ry J saw no reason "to l imit the word 'mistake' in that 
section to any particular kind of mistake. The court must 
determine in every case whether there has been ·a mistake in 
the registration of the title, and if so, whether justice 
requires that the register should be rectified." A broad 
approach to rectification was also taken in QT~~P<?. v M~g~qg 
~!:i.Y..§..§_!_ri:t .. ~D .. !: .. §. ........ . 1 .. !:4. [ 19 7 7 ] 1 WLR 3 4 7 at 3 6 0 pe_r Buckley LJ . 
ee also Crane, ( 19 7 7) 41 Conv ( NS) 210. 20 4In Freer v Unwins Ltd [1976) Ch 288 at 296 it was implied 
that r'ei~'t'ificiti'o'n"'"--cannot be retrospective' but section 
82 ( 2) suggests that such a narrow interpretation is not 
necessary . The Law Commission was critical of the 
dec ision , see Law Com 158 Property Law Third Report on Land 
Registration, para 3.8 . Cf Hay ton, [19 7 6) CLJ 211. See ~ .. t.~x.t~ .. J=3..:µ.t!.9.:.~.P.:JL ... § . .s>_.C?.t~.tx v J:!.8-: .. ~.1.1.1 .. C?..P.:4. ( 19 8 5) 4 9 P & CR 14 8 . 
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is shallower in that it is a discretionary matter." 2 o s It 
is thus a particularly appropriate means of protecting the 
'inchoate equity' as it reflects the flexibility of the 
judicial process in satisfying this equity. The courts 
have total flexibility as to 
exercising their discretion 
the 
may 
remedy 
alter 
granted and in 
completely the 
proprietary nature of the representor's rights. 206 
Fermi tting or denying rectification or indemnity will in 
reality depend upon whose conscience the court decided to 
place the blame .2 07 Where both parties are equally innocent 
the court may have to decide upon whose shoulder to place 
the burden. 
f ) Reg.is.tra t.ion .... of .... a .... l .is . pende.n.s. 
Once litigation has commenced, a claimant of an 
'inchoate equity' ma y be able to register a lis ..... Pende.ns. 
In registered land a l.i.s ..... pendens can only be protected by a 
caution under . section 59 ( 1) of the Land Registration Act 
1925. In Ca l .garY ....... and :.E.: .. 9:~ . .C?:r.:i.ton Land .... 9..9 .... 1.!-.d v Dobinson 208 
........... ............................... 
Megarry J explained that 
even as regards registered land, the 
essential question is that of the meauing of 
'pending land action' for Section 59 ( 1) of 
the Land Registration Act 1925 provides that 
a 'pending action' registrable under the Land 
---~--
205Law Com No 158, Property Law, Third Report on Land 
Reg istration para 2.10. 
206 See ante at 108 207 See, e . g ., Peffer v Rigg [1977] 1 WLR 285. 
2 0 6 [ 19 7 4 ] Ch 7 6::f:··· ..... . 
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Charges Act 1925 is to be protected, where 
registered land is affected, by a caution 
against dealings with the land and the effect 
of Section 18(6) of the Land Charges Act 1972 
seems to be to appl y this to any 'pending 
land action' registrable under the Land 
Charges Act 1972 . 209 
Megarry J proceeded to consider what restriction should 
be placed on the broad language of the statute. He 
interpreted it narrowly. As the rights under the Land 
Charges Act 1972 are for the most part substantive rights in 
land , he thought that section 59(1) of the Land Registration 
Act should also be restricted to substantive rights adverse 
to the owner. 
In Allen v Greenhi Builders Ltc:J.2 1 0 Browne-Wilkinson J .............................. ............................ . .................................................................. . 
took a broader vie"'·. He thought that the decision in 
Qa.l .gary ..... and ...... Edmo.nton Land Co V Dobinson211 was not 
comprehensi ve and had to be read in context. He then 
confirmed the view of Stamp LJ in Wh_it t _ingham 
W~Jttingham 2 1 2 that whether a right is registrable as a lis 
I?.~.1'.!.9.-.~.!:1 .. ~. depends on whether in the absence of registration of 
a 1Js .......... Pendens. , a third party bona fide purchaser without 
notice might obtain title and defeat the claimant's 
interest. As in unregistered land, the important question 
appears to be the nature of the relief claimed in any 
--................ -... ··-·-.. ··-··-.. ··········· .. ·····"''''"""'''''"'' ' '""'''""'"""""''"''-·· 20 9 Ibid at 105. 
210 [19 78] 3 All ER 1163. 
2 11 [1974] Ch 102. 
212 [19 78] 3 All ER 484. 
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pending action based on proprietary estoppe1 .2 1a It 
the ref ore remains uncertain whether a l .i .s .......... Pendens can be 
registered by a holder of an 'inchoate equity' . 
iii ) Reg.i .. stra t .i.o.n ...... o.f ... the ........ ' .. s.a t _i.s.f .i .e.d .. equ.i.t .Y..' 
In the familial contex t once the court has satisfied 
t he 'inchoate equity ' b y granting the claimant an order for 
transfer of the fee simple, this right will be c learl y 
r egistrable in the Land Register. Where the 'satisfied 
equ i t y' compris es some form o f conv entional equitable 
interes t which i s subjec t to registration but has n ot been 
r egistered, the interest may take effect as an overr i ding 
interest . 2 1 4 There remains a possibility that a me r e right 
of occupanc y granted in satisfaction of the ' i nc h oate 
equ i ty' i s capabl e of reg i s t ration and if n ot re giste red may 
take effect as an overr idin g inte r est. 
The preceding d i s c us si on r e la t ing t o r e ct i ficat i on and 
indemnity in registere d land2 1 s a ppl i es equal ly to th e 
'satisfied equity'. 
D CONCLUSION 
Th e natur e o f the 'equity of est oppel' remains 
uncertain . The ' inchoa t e equity' h a s r a rel y been gran ted 
any o f the attributes of a convent i o n al proprietary 
"i''i""a's ee an t e at 199 ff 
~~i~l~~:=g~~!,f1::l''\~·gff f ~~~-'~sif §!!(:~~ifr~~i1'!!\_z :e_~a ft~f ff n~_ 
215See ante at 216 
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interest . In most cases the courts have accepted that the 
'inchoate equity' is liable to defeasance, cannot be 
assigned, and has the potential to bind third parties only 
in a strictly limited number of situations . Where the 
courts have satisfied the 'inchoate equity' with some form 
of conventional proprietary right, the ' satisfied equity ' 
clearly has proprietary status. If, however, the 'inchoate 
equity' is satisfied any alternative remedy, this 
'satisfied equity' may be defeasible and it cannot be 
assigned . The 'satisfied equity' in these circumstances 
doe s, however, appear to have one proprietary attribute; it 
is normally regarded as potentially binding on third 
parties . 
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CHAPTER SIX 
;pgqpg.+.;g,r._,AJD' ...... :f.:.~TQI>P.;EL ...... AND .... ACQUIS.ITION .. UNDER ..... THE ...... LIM.I.TATION 
ACT 
I .INTRODUCTI.ON 
The estoppel claimant may be in a very vulnerable 
position unless his 'inchoate equity' is satisfied by a 
legal or conventional equitable proprietary interest. The 
alternative remedy of a right of occupancy exposes him to a 
number of risks. The representor may attempt to regain 
his property by returning to court to claim wrongful user of 
the property by the representee. 1 If the representee 
should ever go out of personal occupation himself, his 
family ' s occupation will not normally be protected. 2 He 
cannot assign his right in order to obtain finance to assist 
with the purchase of an alternative prope~ty or to improve 
his home. a 
These disadvantages would be largel y removed if the 
representee were able to acquire a possessory title under 
the Limitation Act 4 on the basis of a long-standing 'equi ty 
of es toppel' . In the Irish case of Cullen v Cu.l)en, s for 
instance, Kenny J refused to grant the legal owner of the 
disputed property an injunction which would have evicted the 
representee . 6 Kenny J suggested that as a result of his 
decision neither the legal owner nor any person claiming 
through him would now . be able successfully to assert a 
1 See Williams v Staite [1979] Ch 291, (ante at168 ff ) . 2See jone.s .... J .. A .... E ..... J v J~nes ........ (F .. ,..W..•J [1977] 1 WLR 438 at 443. 3 ( See ante at 1 76 ) . 
4 The current English statute is the Limitation Act 1980 . 5 (1962] IR 268, (ante at 37 ) . 
6 Cullen v Cullen [1962] IR 268 at 292. - ... .. M"• ••--••••-••OOM, ,0,,, .. ,,.,, , .. ,, , , 000•••••••••••••• 
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title to the disputed property. Thus, at the end of a 
t welve year period from the date of o rigin of the 'inchoate 
equity' 7 the estoppel claimant would be able to bring a 
successful applicati o n under Sec tion 52 of the Local 
Registrati o n of Title Ac t 1891 that he himse l f be registered 
a s owner. 13 
Maudsley also sugge s ted that a repre sentee might be 
able to enlarge his 'satisfied equity' into a possessory 
title . Referring to the decision in Inwards v Bake.r, 9 
Maudsley maintained that the repres e ntee who has been 
granted the right to remain in the property for as long as 
he desired it to be his home "cannot of course, sell his 
privilege; if he leaves the premises, it terminates. He 
of owns nothing new, but his status becomes one 
irremovability. A nice question arises if he remains there 
for thirteen years."10 
7 Ibid. Kenny J suggested that the 'inchoate equity' arose 
a t the date of detrimental reliance b y the representee. The more conventional \-ieh- is that the 'inchoate equity' does not arise until the representor attempts to resile from his representation , 
8Section 52 of Local Registration of Title (Ireland) Act 1891 provided that the person in adverse possession could 
apply to the court for an order declaring the title to the l and he would have acquired, had it been unregistered land, 
and for an order for rectification of the register. See 
now Registration of Title Act, 1964 S 49 (RI). See also Brady, (1970) I Jur (NS) 239. 
9 [ 1 9 6 5 ] 2 QB 2 9 . 10 (1965) 81 LQR 183. See also Wallace and Grbich (1979) 3 UNSW Law Jour 174 at 191, who question whether occupancy of Property based on an 'equity of estoppel' could be of such a 
nature as to constitute adverse possession . See also 
Wylie , .I.:t::J!:>,.P.: ......... J, 1,i:.:r,:isl: ....... ~.§:~ 1 (1980) pp 808, 809 for further 
consideration of the possibility that representees may 
acqui re rights under the Limitation Act after acquiring 
estoppel rights. 
I 11 ·" , 
I I 
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This chapter considers whether an 'equity of estoppel' 
can lead to the acquisition of rights by the representee 
under the Limitation Act. 
II THE LIMITATION ACT 1980 ....................................................................................................................................... 
Section 15(1) of the Limitation Act 1980 pro vides that 
no action may be brought by any person to recover any land 
after the expiration of twelve years from the date when the 
right of action first accrued to him. In order that a 
right of action should accrue, the land must be in the 
possession of some person in whose favour the period of 
limitation can run. This possession is referred t o as 
'adverse possession' , 11 Thus the period of limitation 
begins to run against the legal owner once his property is 
in the hands of an adverse possessor.12 
III ADVERSE POSSESSION 
There are two elements to possession of land for the 
purposes of the Limitation Acts. First, there must be 
exclusive physical _ control of the land and, secondly, there 
must be an intention to possess ( or animus .. __ poss_i_de_ndi). 1 3 
11 See Limitation Act 1980, Schedule 1, para 8. 12 The concept of adverse possession has changed over time, see eg Hughes v Griffin [1969] 1 All ER 460 at 463. 13 See e"i """" 'Leigh":;;''"":j'a-;;k ( 1879) 5 Ex D 264; Li ttledale V 1-tverpo_ol ........ c .. o'iTe'g_e (i§"cfo] 1 Ch 19 ; 9.9.~.?.:.n ........ ~ .. ~:i::~:±::~:~::::::::~~::t:~ v 
~!.P.:9:.~ .. ~ [ 1 9 6 9 J 2 AC 1 9 ; Y.:.?.:JJ.t!?. .. ' .... !:>. ........ .9..?.:.Y. .. !:..9..n .. ... J:}. .. l:l:.Y ... ... H..9..I.i9:?.:X ...... .9.l:l:.r.I.1P i .. t.d v Shell-Mex & BP Ltd · [ 1975 J QB 94; Treloar v Nute [f976] "T""'wi:-:i:i""""E(if5";""""""""'"""'p'a'well V McFarlane (19'fiff'-'':3if p &"""'cii 452; Williams v Usherwood ( 1983) 45 P & CR 235; Dockray (1 969 ) 85 LQR 170; Gore (1975) 38 MLR 354; Dockray [1983] Conv 398; Dockray [1982] Conv 256; Dockray [1982] Conv 34 5. 
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In T.X.::.t::,J.<?..?.:.~. v N..:ici .. t..~., 14 Sir John Pennycuik maintained that 
a person claiming adverse possession must show either 
"discontinuance by the paper owner followed by possession, 
or , dispossession (or as it is sometimes called 'ouster') of 
the paper owner. '' 1 s Possession concurrent with the paper 
owner is therefore insufficient to constitute adverse 
possessi on. 
Thus there can be no question of adverse possession 
in those cases of proprietary estoppel where the representee 
shares possession with another member of his family who is 
the legal owner. 
If the legal owner clearly permits a temporary 
occupation of the land until he requires it for an 
alternative purpose , such temporary occupation of the land 
is enjoyed merely bf licence of the legal owner. 16 Adverse 
possession cannot be said to have started where occupation 
is referable to a licence granted by the legal owner. In 
14 [1976] 1 WLR 1295; See also Smith (1978) 41 MLR 204. 
15 Treloar v Nute [1976] 1 WLR 1295 at 1300. 
l 6 Th'~""""a:·~·ci si'a'il"''"'in Wa l.l .. i .. s ... ' .. s ......... cayton,_ BaY ......... Hol .. i,day_ ....... carn_p ... Ltd V §.hell-Mex & BP Ltd [ 1975] QB 94 was modified by Schedule 1 l~fso Limitation Act para 8 ( 4) on the recommendations of the 
Law Reform Committee's 21st Report , Cmnd 6923 (1977) para 348 . 
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H.Y.S.h .. ~.E.:l v .9.i.:: .. tJ .. f.t.P., 1 7 for instance, Harman J held that the 
defendant who was the wife and personal representative of 
the testator, had failed to demonstrate that the testator 
had been in adverse occupation of the plaintiff's property 
for more than twelve years prior to his death. Harman J 
found that the testator's interest was "what indeed it was 
intended by both parties to be a permissive licence 
throughout . The testator never thought that he was 
acquiring any right; and the plaintiff has the same idea -
tha t he could safely let the testator stay in the house for 
the rest of his declining years, and that that should 
produce a posit ion where the personal representative of the 
testator can cla im a statutory title seems to be an 
un tenable proposition. ·1a The decision in Hughes v 
Grtf.:f...t..r:1: 1 9 may be of considerable relevance to a claimant of 
an 'equit y of estoppel'. A representee remains a licensee 
of the legal owner until the lat t er attempts to resile from 
the representation he has made. There can clearly be no 
question of adverse possession on the part of the 
representee unti l resilition takes place. 20 
17 [ 1969 J 1 All ER 460. See also Cobb v Lane [ 1952 J 1 All ER 1199 (that a licensee cannot be in possession was 
implicit in this case); MC?.>.:>~ .. § Y ~9.Y..l:::.g;.:r.:gy·l:::· [ 19.52] 2 QB 533; 
Mann v Jol.lye (1959) 1 74 EG 781; H.Y.9: .  l::: v ?. .. E:,!.?.:-.T . .9.l:::. [1982] 1 
All .. ER 10 2 9; T:iciP.Jl:::;',:. v .~.13.:.I.I:ll:::§ (Unreported, Court of Appeal 7 
April 1982); tl:ici.:r.:Ph.Y.. v M.~:r.:P.hY [ 1980] IR 183 at 195; Harris ( 1969) 32 MLR 567. 
18 Hughes v Griffin [1969] 1 All ER 460 at 464. See also t!_9se··s···· ··v·· · Lo,;·e··g·r .. o.ve · [ 1952] 2 QB 533; Paradise Beach and 
Trans ort·;;;:1:·r;;;······com an , Ltd v Price Robinson [ 1968 J 1 All ER ~ ......... ...... P. ............................................................ .. P. ............. J............................ . ................... ................................ ........................... . 
::>3 0 ; Culley v Doe D Taylorson ( 1840) 11 Ad & El 1008 at 1 ............................... ,.... . ..................................................... , ...................................... . T? 15, 113 ER 6 9 7 ; ;I:3, ........ P. ...... ..P...:C::9.P.§T .. t..tl:::§ .. Ltd v Buckl.e.r ( 19 8 7) Th.e 
-~_Illes 13 August . 
19 [1969] 1 All ER 460. 
2
°Cf 9..\!Jl~ .. I.!. v 9...~.J .. !..l:::.P. [1962] IR 268 at 292. 
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ii ) Oc c u pat. i. on ... ..r e_f e.r a b.l.e ....... to . .a. .. ..la w_f u 1 ..... r_i g h t ....... c.ann o t .... be 
advers.e ______ pos.s_e_s .. s __ ion 
An arrangement which at the outset constituted a mere 
licence may cease to be so by reason of the acts of both 
parties to the arrangement. 21 If the legal owner requests 
or permits the licensee to act to his detriment, the licence 
ma y often give way to an 'inchoate equity'. 
It is uncertain whether a right of action accrues to 
the legal owner because his former licensee is in adverse 
possession from the moment his licence becomes an 'inchoate 
equity' . In l:3.:r.:J9.:$~§ \- Me.e_s, 2 2 Harman J confirmed that 
''possession can only be adverse if it be not referable to a 
lawf ul right."23 The 'inchoate equity' merel y permits the 
claimant to come before the court and request a remedy. An 
equity of this nature has not always been recognised as a 
lawful right in the sense required here. Wh ere the 
representee ' s pre-existing licence has been replaced by an 
'inchoate equity', the representee's occupation may be seen 
as referable to that 'inchoate equity' and not to a lawful 
right. If occupation by the representee continues for more 
21 See Bellew v Bellew [1982] 
~ell v Bell (1957) 9 DLR(2d) 
14 .App Cas''437; Harris ( 1969) 
22 [1957] 1 Ch 475. 
IR 447 at 464 
7 6 7 ; Ly e.1.1 v 
32 MLR 567. 
P..~ .. :r.:. Griffin J; 
Ke.nne.dy ( 18 8 9) 
2 3 Ibid at 484. See also S_mi_ck v Lyndal_e ....... De_ve_l_opments ....... Ltd [ 19 7 4] Ch 317 ; T._;hg_m.?.-_§ v Thomas_ ( 18 5 5 ) 2 K & J 7 9 , ER 6 9 
701 at 7 0 3 ; gg __ r.:: .. ~.?.:. v Appuh.amy [ 19 12 ) AC 2 3 0 at 2 3 6 ; 
~t~--r.::i~ ~or: .. r.If..Y.1 o':it94 ) M2os~~ ~ 4 t~veg!:-vcie~ t19~-~,.:r.: .. ~.~ Q~ l ~~;) a! 
~i~; G::::::~ f 1 :ttt 0t9' sML1{II.l~h{tt. .. t.9_~ _§_ .... .<?f. .. . A.9..t. .. t<?..P..!:>. ( 2nd Ed) P 
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than twelve years prior to any intervention by the 
represen tor, this occupation may well be accepted as adverse 
possession . 
The courts have considered whether possession is 
referable to a lawful right in other contexts involving 
inchoate equitable interests. In Hyde v Pearce,24 for 
i nstance, Templeman LJ, giving the main judgment of the 
Court of Appeal, accepted that the plaintiff's equitab l e 
interes t in the property arising from an uncompleted 
contract of sale was not sufficient to defeat his claim to 
be in adv erse possession of the property. Templeman LJ 
too k the Yi ew that the plaintiff ' s position was equi \·ocal : 
he was ne ither a t respasser nor was his possession re fer a b le 
to any lawful right. His equitable interest was not on e 
which entitled him to specific performance of the contract. 
Temp l em an LJ distinguished Warren v Murray2s from the 
present case. In the former case the lessee was entitled as 
of right to a decree of specific performance. Hi s 
possession was not adverse because it was referabl e to a 
lawful right . 26 Templeman LJ pointed ou t that by contrast 
in HY4~ v Pearce27 th e purchase price remained to b e 
ascerta ined and paid. 
These dicta suggest that where an inchoate equitable 
right exists and possession is referable to that right there 
is uncertainty about the nature of the cla imant ' s 
·--,M-,o,,.,,,,_,,,,., ,, , ,,..,,,,, ,,-,o••H•••••• ••••oo, ,,oo ••o,,,,,,,,,,,,,0000,0,00,0-,M• .. 
2 4 [1982 ] 1 All ER 10 2 9 at 10 37. 
25 [1894] 2 QB 648 . See also Bri_dg_es v Mees [1957] Ch 475 
at 484, p e_r Harman J. 
26
~yde v p~~E2~ [1982] 1 All ER 1029 at 1037. 
2 7 Ibid . . 
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possession. 28 It is, therefore, possible that where a 
licence has been terminated and replaced by an 'inchoate 
equity ', the equitable claimant's occupation of property may 
be viewed as not being referable to a lawful right, with the 
result that adverse possession can commence. Such a view 
conduces towards the anomalous situation that an 'inchoate 
equity' may ultimately give rise to a more valuable property 
right - a possessory title - than an equitable proprietary 
interest of a somewhat more certain nature. 
The circumstances of the case and the outcome which is 
judicially deemed to do justice between the parties may 
ultimately determine whether a person is held to be in 
occupation adverse to the legal owner, or, whether his 
occupation is held to be referable to a lawful right, 
because he has an 'inchoate equity'. The case of Helm v 
f..?: .. ~~r29 provides an interesting illustration, albeit in a 
different context, 30 of the judicial decision-making process 
concerning the nature of a person's occupation. Sir Robert 
Megarry V-C held that a beneficiary who was equally entitled 
to possession with other beneficiaries could indeed be a 
- -·- - --·-·••, .. ,........... ... ............... . ............ . 
28 Cf the position of a tenant in common in fQ£~?.: v APP~h?.:@Y [1912] AC 2 30. See _also [1982] Conv 382 at 38 3; Dockray (1983) 46 MLR 89 at 90, 91. 
29 Unreported, Chancery 2 October 1980. See also Re ...... s.trong 
?.:.P:9' .. .. 9-.<? .. J.::.P..Y ( 19 7 8) 8 7 DLR ( 3d) 5 8 9, R~. P1ii.<?..~t.. ?.:P..9-: . . s3.?.:JY?:t.Jgp &ri:gy ( 19 8 2) 12 8 DLR ( 3d) 3 71 , RE:=.. A.PPJ.~P.Y.8.:P.C?: ... tl8.:.C?~E:=.<?9.: ( 19 8 3) 140 DLR(3d) 562 in which it was held that a co-owner can be 
in adverse possession to his fellow co-owner where nis 
Possession of the co-owned land is exclusive. Cf 9.<?PP~t v 
£h.~_.rl.e.s (Unreported, Privy Council 26 July 1982) where .there 
are dicta to the effect that a tenant in common cannot be in 
adverse possession if he is also a trustee for sale under 
the statutory trusts imposed by the Law of Property Act 
19 25. See also .c::: .. 9.1.:'. .. (=,: .• 8.:. v h..PP..~.h.?.::it:i.Y [1912] AC 230. 
~
0 In H..~.1!!1 v .f..?.:.9..~.Y. (Unreported , Chancery 2 October 1980) , the 
issue was whether a beneficiary could be a trespasser as 
aga i nst the trustee of the property and so entitle the 
trustee tb an injunction . 
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trespasser if he went into possession against the trustee's 
wishes . He explained that he took such a view because any 
other result "would indeed be remarkable. If land held on 
trust is vacant, any beneficiary has the right to take 
possession of it, and the trustees cannot evict him as a 
trespasser . " 31 Sir Robert Megarry V-C held that the 
beneficiary was in "adverse possession" to the trustee, but 
declined to grant the trustee an order for the vacation of 
the property. The trust property clearly required the 
beneficiary's presence for the protection of its 
profitability. Furthermore, even if the benefi c iary had 
remained in possession for more than twelve years, he could 
ne\'er ha ve cla im ed a possessor~- title. Such a c laim was 
expressl y prevented by section 7 ( 5 J of the Lirni tat ion Act 
1939,32 
31S ir Robert Megarry V - C pointed out that this was a most 
unusual case and made it clear that he did not intend to give an y encouragement to the idea tha t "if trespassers 
occupy land and the legal owner seeks an injunctiori to 
restrain the trespass, the courts are likel y to send him 
awa y empt y hande d. This decision is no trespasser's 
charter of immunit y. In all ordinary cases th e court will in all probability grant an injunction . In all ordinary 
cases the trespass will b e harmful and unjustifiable, and it 
will be right and pr o per for the legal owne r to seek t h e aid 
of the court in restraining it ... the r e will neve r theless be 
a few exceptional case s where the trespass, although in law 
a trespass, is nevertheless beneficial in its effect, and the purpose of the _legal owner in seeking to restrain it 
wanting in equity or defective in merit; and in those 
exceptional cases the courts may well exercise their discretion by refusing to grant an interlocutary injunction. Equi ty has long been accustomed to looking at the realities 
of a case, and to looking beneath the surface of labels such 
as 'trespasser' and 'legal owne r ' however accurately they 
are used; and here I have to deal with an unusual case o~ a trespass on trust property which in effect is beneficial to it ." 
3 2 The current legislation is to be found in Limitation Act 19 80, Schedule 1, para 8 ( 9) , which provides "Where any 
settled land or any land held on trust for sale is in the Possession of a person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land or in the proceeds of sale ( not being a person So lely or absolutely entitled to the land or the proceeds), 
no right of action to recover the land shall be treated for 
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b) Oc cup a t.i on ...... re.f e.ra b.l.e ...... t o ......... '. th e ....... s.a t i_s f_i ed ..... e quit Y .. ' 
In the majority of cases where a representor has 
attempted to revoke his representation, he will take early 
legal action against any representee who remains in 
possession of the disputed property. This attempt to 
assert the representor's rights may well terminate any 
adverse possession claimed by the representee . 
representor is granted an order for possession, 
If the 
either 
because the court finds that no equity exists, or, because 
any equity is deemed to have been adequately satisfied 
already, the adverse possession which may have existed 
clearly comes to an end. If the representee is gran t ed a 
positive remedy such as a right to occupy the property for 
life or for so long as he requires it to be his home, his 
occupation is thereafter referable to the court order. It 
is difficult to see how the representee's possession can be 
adverse unless the concept of judicially imposed adverse 
possession is accepted. 
c) The ... .. <:U.!'3. .. :1:.t..nc .. t..t . .<?..!.l. be.tween ... Po.s.itive and defensive claims 
In 9\1+..+..~!.l v Q.:i:1-.J.J .. E:=..!.l 3 3 the Irish High Court satisfied the 
defendant ' s ' inchoate equity' by barring the plaintiff's 
right to possession . Kenny J implied that the plaintiff's 
claim for an injunction preventing trespass to his land did 
not stop time running for the purpose of adverse possession . 
the purposes of this Act as accruing during that possession to any person in whom the land is vested as tenant for life , 
statutory owner entitled to a beneficial interest in the land or the proceeds of sale . " See also M . .<?. .. § .. ~ .. ~. v Lovegrove [1 952] 2 QB 533 at 540. 33(1962] IR 268. 
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such a claim neither terminated the defendant's possession 
no r gave the defendant any new right. According to Cullen 
the re appears to be a distinction between those cases where 
th e representee's ' i nchoate equity' is satisfied b y a 
posi tive remedy and those in which his ' inchoate equity' is 
held merely to bar the representor' s right to immediate 
possessi o n. In the latter ea tegory of case Kenn y J 
suggested that the court simply confirms the representee' s 
status of irremovability which was activated b~, his 
'inchoate equity'. 
In man y of the 'familial cases' of the past the court 
has satisfi ed the representee's ' inchoate equity' by 
granting a defined occupational right rather than me rely 
by barring the representor from exercising his own legal 
rights. T o differentiate between cases on the basis of 
whether a representor is barred from regaining his property 
or whether the representee is granted a positive re medy is 
to make a spurious d is tinct ion. If the barring of the 
represen tor's right gives the representee the opportunity to 
ob tain a possessory title , the representee would receive a 
more valuable remed;<-- than the court intended after it has 
al ready considered ali the circumstances of the case. Ev en 
if adverse possession is a possibility, from the time of 
revocat ion of the representation, the continuance or 
di scontinuance of such possession cannot depend on whether 
th e court bars the representor' s action or satisfies the 
'inchoate equity' by the grant of a positive remedy. 
Ei ther adverse possession commences from the time of the 
court's decision because it is in effect judicially imposed 
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or adverse possession ceases because it is referable to the 
order of the court. 
iii ) A.9.:Y.~ .. ~se .. posses.si on ..... where the ... legal .... owner. has no 
r.i.g.ht ...... o..f .. act .. i.on 
There is a further obstacle to the vi e w that an 
estoppel claimant may still be in adverse possession after 
his ' inchoate equity' has been satisfied. After the court 
hearing the legal owner cannot bring a successful action to 
regain possession unless the argument is accepted that 
subsequent misconduct by th e representee can deprive him of 
his ' satisfied e quit~- ' a 4 In the absence of misconduct the 
represen tor has no right of action. Can there be adverse 
possession if the legal owner has no right of action? In 
~loses Evershed MR held that adverse 
possession by the defendant continued even though the 
plaintiff had no automatic right to recover possession 
because of the Ren t Restriction Act 1939. This legislation 
restric ted the plaintiff ' s right to possession by 
substi tuting a discretion in the court to grant possession. 
In Mos es v Love.grove, ,however, the adverse possession had 
commenced prior to the enactment of the legislation which 
restricted the legal owner's rights. Evershed MR declined 
to accept that adverse possession rested on the premise of 
an unqualified right to recover possession. 36 He preferred 
to view adverse possession simply as "possession adverse to, 
; 4 See Williams v Staite [1979] Ch 291. See ante at 3 s [ 1 9 5 ·z""r·····2·······Q1f · 5 3 3 ··~···-·---··-······· 
36 Evershed MR found nothing in Section 10(1) of the 1939 Act 
to justify ~uch a conclusion. 
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that is to say, inconsistent with, and, in denial of the 
right of the landlord to the premises." 3 7 The occupation 
of the tenant without payment of rent and without 
acknowledgement was a relevant possession even though the 
right of the landlord td recover possession of his premises 
was indeed restricted by legislation. 
Similarly in Br.i.dges v Mees 3 s Harman J rejected the 
argument that a purchaser, in whom the whole beneficial 
inte rest resided, could not be in adverse possession merely 
because the bare trustee of the legal title who could not 
bring an effective action to recover possession of land 
occupied by the purchaser. 39 
situations in wh ich adverse possession had commenced prior 
to the rights of the legal owner becoming circumscribed by 
one means or another. If the ' inchoate equity ' of estoppel 
does give rise to adverse possession and that adverse 
possession is disturbed by the court hearing resulting in a 
remedy to the representee, a ne w situation has arisen. 
These circumstances may be distinguishable from a situation 
where adverse possession has existed without interference by 
the legal owner and his right to · intervene subsequently 
becomes qualified. The court hearing 
37 Moses v Lovegro v e [1952] 2 QB 533 at 538. 
3811957] Ch 475. 
in cases of 
39 See also .I.:r::i ....... :r.: .. ~ ......... C:::~.§.§<?.!1.§ [1904] 73 LJ Ch 296 at 298 where 
Kekewich J stated "A person who is a bare trustee without 
duties may lose his trust estate at the end of twelve years 
if he does not interfere ... One can see cases where a trustee 
might keep alive the right by bringing an action of 
ejectment but if he allows the ces.tu.i ..... que trust to remain in 
Possession, the statute must run against him, and by virtue 
of the Act of 1874 and the earlier Act the title is· gone". 
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proprietary estoppel would seem to prevent a new period of 
adverse possession from commencing at all (unless the 
concept of judicially imposed adverse possession is 
accepted) . In M..9. .. § .~.~ v 1..9.Y.~.$..T .. 9..Y.~. 4 0 Ever shed MR acknowledged 
the distinction outlined above. Here · the legal owner had 
no right to enter the property because the court would have 
immediately ordered a decree of specific performance. As 
there was no right of entry a t all, adverse possession could 
not even commence. In cases of proprietary estoppel once 
the Court has remedied the 'inchoate equity' it is li kely 
that any preceding adverse possession will have been brought 
to an end. Such adverse possession cannot be revived since 
there is no right of action accruing to the lega l owner: 
the court has effectively removed it. 
Even if a 
difficulties of 
representee 
establishing 
is 
that 
able 
he 
t o o v ercome the 
is factually in 
exclusive possession of the land , he must also prove the 
ex istence of the necessary element of intention to possess 
the land. The Lim i tation Acts have given no explicit 
guidance as to the intention required to be proved. 4 1 and 
the authorities on the meaning of ani.mus ...... Po.s.s .. i.dendi are at 
variance . It remains unclear whether the possessor must 
show an intention merely to possess the property concerned 
or whether he must also show an intention to e xclude the 
legal owner . The Privy Council has held that only the 
- -w-,~., ... ,,,, .. ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,_,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,_,,,.,.,,,,,,,,, .... , __ ,,,,,,,,,,,.,,,,,,,,,,,,, 
46 [1952] 2 QB 533 . 
41 See Dockiay [198 2 ] Conv 256 at 258. 
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former simple intention is essential, 42 whilst the Court of 
Appeal has held that the latter element of intention is 
necessary. 43 Following the Court of Appeal line of 
decisions , Slade J e xpla ined in Powell v 
!11:1;.ni.mus .. ... Po.s.si.dendi involves the intention, 
Mc Far lane 4 4 that ........................... 
in one's own name 
and on one's own behalf, to exclude the world at large, 
including the owner with the paper title . 11 4 s According to 
Slade J the courts require clear evidence that the 
trespasser had not only the requisite intention to possess 
but made that intention c lear to the world. If the 
trespasser's acts did not make it perfectly clear to the 
world at large that he intended to exclude the owner as best 
he could, the courts will treat him as not having had the 
requisite ani.mus .... Po.ssidendi. 
i) The 'inchoate equitY.' .. and animus .poss.idendi 
A claimant of an 'inchoate equity' clearly intends to 
occupy the land to the exclusion of almost everyone. He may 
42 See Ocean Estates\. Pinder [1969] 2 AC 19; Paradise l?.~ach .... and····T·r·a·n··sp·o·rt·a t .. i on .C"ompany ...... Ltd v Pr .. ic.e-Robinson [ 19 6 8] AC 1072; Woodhouse\. Hoonev [1915] 1 IR 296; ?.111\ .c:::)~ v 
.Lynsla.:J.~.. .P~y:e.::E~:i~@i~.t.?. l.,t:4 ·(19 7 4 ] 2 All ER 8 at 1 2 ; Muttunayagam v Brito [1918] AC 895 at 900. Cf Corea v Appuha·rn;;····ci§ 12 J Ac 2 3 o at 2 3 6 . 
4 3 See Li tJJ .. ~9.:?-J e v 1.:itY..~ .. I:P<?.<?..1 ....... co 11.e.g e [ 190 0 ] 1 Ch 1 9 ; Ph iJP.<?.1 v ;i?.?.:.J.h ( 190 4 ) 2 0 TLR 5 8 9 ; ( 190 5 ) 2 1 TLR 6 3 4 ; Bea.1::t . .f..<?. .. r..t v A.tr.q ( 19 0 4 ) 2 0 TLR 6 0 2 ; .G..<?..n.Y .. ~ . .Y. v :R.~ .. g.?,:r,i [ 19 5 2] I R 5 6 ; v.1jJJtam s . ;i?.T.<?..t.h..~.T.'?.. . .. P...Lr.:.~9 . .t.. ..... §.1:1.P.P.JY. . .. b.t..9: v :R.?.:.:f. . .t..~:r.:Y [1 958] 1 QB 159; Thomas W Ward Ltd v Alexander Bruce (.Gr.13.:Y'?.L b.t.9: [ 19 5 9] 2 Lloyd's Re·p· 47"2; . G.~.si:i.ie.: FiiriPii:::~::::g::9 
.Lt.d v Sohn [1967] Ch 487; Hughes v Griffin [1969] 1 WLR 23; .. T.ecbild Ltd V ChamberTain.(1969)··20 p & CR 633; 
~i.lJ.§ v ..... f.ir.na.nd·e.:i.:~:P..<?..:r.i .. ;;:;9:I~.:i·Tun·r·e·p·orted, Court of Appeal 23 October 1981). Cf Williams v Usherwood ( 1983) 45 P & CR 235. See also Dockr~y···· Ti·g·°Ef2"J Con·~·····2 "s"Ef" .. a"t 260, 264, Dockray [198 3] Conv 398, in which it is argued that the Privy Council view is to be preferred . See also Goodman, (1970) 33 MLR 281. 
44 (1977) 38 P & CR 452 . 
45 Ibid at 471. See also (1980) 96 LQR 333. 
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not , however, have had any intenti on to e xclude the legal 
owner . If the representee has been encouraged to believe 
that the land is his, he has probably given no consideration 
at all to excluding the legal owner. I t has been suggested 
by one commentator that possession taken "bona .... f.i.de and with 
a jus.t.a ...... cau.s.a" may well not be adverse possess ion. 4 6 In 
_prebl.e v Met .... Cent Ry 4 7 an American court declined to find in 
favour of a claimant who occupied land for the requisite 
period of time under the Limitation Acts because he thought 
i t was his own land.4S 
In the majorit y of the 'familial cases' the representee 
does not undergo a detrimental alteration of position with 
any certainty t ha t the land is his. The representor's 
encouragement may have led him to believe that he has been 
gran t ed a right for his lifetime or for some shorter period 
of time. If fortuito usl y either of these periods lasts for 
longer than twelve years, t he represen tee would certainly 
seem to have animus .... poss.ide.ndi, in the sense required b~c the 
Privy Council, i.e., an intention to exercise control and to 
exclude strangers. He is unlikely to have the more complex 
intention required in the line of Court of Appeal cases. 
He may we ll have an intention to exclude the legal owner for 
the period agreed, but this is not inconsistent with an 
acknowledgemen t of the permanent nature of the legal owner's 
dormant title during that period. 
46 Goodman, (1970) 33 MLR 281 at 284 . Goodman at 287 argues that a unilateral mistaken belief should give rise to 
adverse possession because a plea of proprietary estoppel is 
not available in such circumstances. Cf the position in Roman Law where only :!?.  .<?.D.?.: .... .f.tg.~ occupation with good cause 
can give rise to a squatter's t itle (see Inst II : 6). 47 (1893) Me 260. 
48 Ibid, 
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ii) The .'. .. § ..?-.~.t. .§.f. .. t.~ .. c:t .equi t y .. ' ...... and .. animu.s ...... Poss.i.dend.i 
After the court hearing the representee remains in 
occupation of the property with full knowledge of the e xtent 
of his 'satisfied equity ' . Where his occupancy is merely 
temporary, he cannot be said to have any real intention to 
exc lude the legal owner permanen t l y, al though he may hav e 
the intention t o exclude everyone other than the legal 
owne r. 
IV CONCLUSION 
........................ ... ..................... ........ 
It remains to be seen whethe r occupation by an estoppel 
claimant c an be regarded as constituting fact ua l adverse 
possessi on coup led "i th the requisite an i.mus possidendi in a 
sense sufficient to bar the legal owner's rights under t~e 
Limi tat i on Act. The only argument in favo ur of upholding 
th e representee' s occ upation as adverse possession is the 
policy which urges that, where t here is long -term occupation 
b y someone other than the legal owner, it ma y be 
advantageous that factual poss es si on o f the land and legal 
ti tl e should ultimately become synonymous,49 Succession b y 
members of the claimant's f amil y a nd assignment of the land 
would then be possib l e . 
........... M,u,•-•••••••., •o•o••~OO'"""''"""'"''"""'"'"''' ' ' , ""'""''''''' ' ' ''' ' ''''''''" 49 Holmes (1897) 10 Harv LR 457 at 477 observed that "a thing 
whi ch y ou have en j o yed and used as your own for a long time , 
whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and 
cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and 
t rying to . defend yourself, however you came about it". 
See also Goodman, ( 1970) 33 MLR 281 at 282. 
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It would seem unlikely that the courts will accept that 
occupation based on 'equities of estoppel' will lead to the 
acquisition of possessory title under the Limitation Act. 
The acquisition of possessory rights and of 'equities of 
estoppel' may arise from · similar fact-situations but the 
doctrines are distinctive.so Under the Limitation Act the 
kno wledge of the legal owner is irrelevant;s1 no 
detrimental alteration of position in reliance on a belief 
engendered bJ" the encouragement of the legal title holder is 
required but a long period of occupation and an intention to 
poss ess are necessary. Throughout the relevant limitation 
period the cla imant remains at risk. The legal owner ma y 
assert his right to possession at any time. If he does not 
do so , the reward for th e c laimant is substantial the 
acqui sition of e p ossessor~ title. Under the doctrine of 
pr opr ietary estoppel de tri mental alteration of p os ition in 
reliance on a r epre senta tion i s essential but there is no 
requ i rement of long - t erm occ upation or of any intention to 
possess. Neverthel ess the estoppel claimant risks the 
possibility that the co ur t exercise its flex ible discretion 
50 I n J F Perrott ~ C:::9. J:I.1p9.-!}r Ltd Y Co hen [ 1951] I KB 705 at 
70 8 Somervell LJ explained that "the principle underlying 
the cases on encroacihment is not, perhaps, strictly an 
estoppel, but it is akin to it. If a tenant takes 
poss es sion of adjoining property and by his conduct 
represents that he is holding it under th e demise, then, if 
the landlord acts on that representation by all ow ing the 
tenan t to remain in possession the tenant cannot afterwards 
as sert that he is holding it on any other footing ." In 
'.l'unJt=,::.Y v ;J:9:i:1:i.t=,::.!:> (Unreported, Court of Appeal 7 April 1982) 
the Court of Appea l rejected the claim under the Limitation 
Act maintaining that occupation was referable to a licence . 
Had proprietary estoppel been pleaded the court could have 
reached the decision that the representation and detrimental 
reliance by the plaintiff had superceded the licence . Cf }~~es~~~~ts 0 f td Ol(i;::e ;;tef ~ lt!;?t ovf ~i?·~··~:T .. §.:_9 __ .B.6~t~~~·; 19 s'6T: ·············· .. ·········· · P PP 
5 1 See M:i::i.:r::.Ph .. Y v M.'::1 .. :r:'.PP:Y [ 1 9 8 0 ) I R 1 8 3 at 2 0 2 . 
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in the direction of satisfying the 'inchoate equity' through 
the grant of a short-term right, al though even here his 
reward is an immediate remedy . Once the court has 
satisf ied the ' inchoate equity' by granting a remedy, it 
would make a nonsense of that satisfaction to give the 
representee a second chance of obtaining a more valuable 
reme dy of a possessory right, after twelve years of 
occupa t ion. One of the main aims of the Limitation Act is 
to end long dormant c laims and ensure that persons with good 
causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable 
dili gence. 52 It wo uld seem to defeat this aim to allow the 
Act to be u sed as an additional remedy b y those whose 
'inchoate equi ty' has already been satisfied under the 
doctr ine of propri e tar y estoppel. 
.............................. .... ..................... . ........................ . 
5 2I n RB Policies at ~~ . .'?.Y.9:.§: v Butler [1950) 1 KB at 81 . Streatf ie ld J remarked that, " It is a policy of the Limi tation Acts that those wh o go to sleep upon their claims 
should not be as si sted by the courts recovering their Property, but another, ahd I think, equal policy behind these Ac ts , is that there shall be a n end of litigation''. I n A'Court v Cross (1825) 3 Bing 329 at 332, 130 ER 540 Best CJ ·········c·o-mme.nt ed········°t:·hat a Statute of Limitation is "an act of 
Peace . Long dormant claims have often more of cruelty than 
of justice in them ". See also Dundee Harbour Trustees v Dougall ( 18 5 2) 1 M 31 7 t 3 21""··-···p···e·r···········r::··;;·rd·········st:···· ·· ·-r:;··eo.na·r·ds; j3" ·-··· ........... .... a c q a .. ............ . ockray, [1985) Conv 272. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
........................... -" .......................................... . 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL AND ................................ ................................................ ........................................................................... .......................... .... . ................ .... ............................................... . .. 
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 
I INTRODUCTION 
.............. . ...... ........................ . 
Throughout the commonwealth jurisdictions it has been 
ac kno wl edged that the resolution of familial property 
dispu t es ma y be 
approaches. 1 
found in any of a number of legal 
The concepts of proprietary estoppel and 
constructive trusts have both regularly been pleaded as 
al terna ti ves in claims rela ti ng to the family home. 2 A 
mo r e r ecen t trend is the attempt to merge these two 
concept s and thereby end the necessity to plead them in the 
al terna tive. 
Th is tendency towards assimilation ma y perhaps be seen 
as having its roots in the judgment of Lord Diplock in 
Th e language used there to define a 
constructive trust is not unlike the terms adopted b y Lord 
Kingsdown in his classic exposition of estoppel doctrine in 
!tamsden v Dys_o_n. 4 Lord Diplock defined a constructive 
trust as one 
created by a transaction between the trustee 
and the cestui que trust in connection with 
1 See Bailey (1979) 53 ALJ 92; Wade (1980) 11 Fed L Rev 34 6 ; 
Burridge [1982] CLJ 290. 
2 See e . g ., Bristol and West Building Society v Henn~ng ( 1985) l WLR 778; Thwa ites v Ryan [1984) VR E(s·:· 
3 [ 19 71] AC 886 . -····----························ 1 • 
4 (1866) LR l HL 129 at 1 70. 
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the acquisition by the trustee of a legal 
estate in land, whenever the trustee has so 
conducted himself that it would be 
inequitable to den y to the cestui que trust a 
beneficial interest in the land acquired. 
And he wi 11 be held so to have conducted 
himself if by his words or conduct he has 
induced the cestui que trust to act to his 
own detrimen t in the reasonable belief that 
by so acting he was acquiring a beneficial 
interest in the land. s 
In a series of recent decisions the present Vice -
Chance llor, Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson, has 
attention to the affin ity between the doctrin es of 
proprietary estoppel and constructive trusts. In Re Sharne 
............ ....... ...... ........... ... -..... 
( A _Bank rupt) , 6 he accep t ed that irrevocable li c ences 
arising from informal family arrangements migh t confer some 
equity or equitable interest under a constructive trust. 
According to Browne-Wilkinson J , the principle behind these 
cases was ''akin to or an extension of proprietary 
estoppel " 7 stemming from Lord Kingsdown' s speech in Ramsd_en 
v Dyson. s The constructive trust has been accepted as a 
possible remedy for the purpose of satisfy ing the 'inchoate 
equity' of proprietary estoppel, but it has not yet been 
explicitly employed in this conte~t.9 
5 Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886 at 905. 
6 T° 19 8 0 ] 1 WLR 2 19 . 
7 Ibid at 225. 
8 (1866) LR 1 HL 129 at 170 . 
This remedial 
9 See, e.g., Pearce v Pearce [1977] 1 NSWLR 170. Cf Warnes v 
H.~_dl_ey ( Unre·p·c;··r·t·e·d , .6.our·t···  of Appeal 31 Jan 1984 )····~···········~here 
Slade LJ suggested that the constructive trust in Hussey v 
P..~lmer [1972] 1 WLR 1286 was based on proprietary estopp.el. 
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approach to the use of the constructive trust was 
specifically rejected by Browne-Wilkinson J in Re ... S.harpe ... J.A 
!3 an..!r..:r.:.:t::i.P.t.J • 1 o The constructive trust in this decision was a 
substant ive constructive trust pre-dating the court order. 
The decision in Re . $h9.:TP.i:=. (A ~9.:DisT\lP.t.1, although somewhat 
ambi guous, suggests that if the elements of proprietary 
estoppel are pleaded they will give rise either to an 
'inchoate equity', which then requires to be satisfied as 
the court thinks fit , or a declaration that a substantive 
constructive trust e x ists . Nowhere does the judgment 
e xp lain the court is to decide which of these 
alternatives should prevail. The plea of constructive trust 
may be accepted in such a situation according to some 
unspoken policy of the court in question. 11 
It has been compellingly argued that the true basis of 
Re .......... ?.h.9.:TP.~ ......... .LA ..... . J?>§.nk:r.:1:1P!J is the doctrine of propr i etory 
estoppel. 1 2 Martin has maintaine d that the doctri n e of 
constructive trusts is a totally separate doctrine from that 
of proprietar y estoppel and that prior to Re ?0§.TP~ (A 
~<3.nkrupt.) it had never been though t necessary to introduce 
the constructive trus t into cases of proprietary estoppel. 
Martin has argued that to do so only confuses the issue. 
According to her vie~ 
Be did not elaborate the point. In re .... Stanl.e;v ..... Pal.m e.r (Unreported, Court of Appeal 5 July 1984) pe.r Oliver J; R.<?liday Inns Inc v Broadhead (1974) 2 32 EG 951 at 1086· In ........................... ,.......................................................... ...... .. ................ .............................. ' p=~ ....... Ba .. !:3.h?:~ ....... L9: .. ~.<?.9:J [ 198 6 ] 1 WLR 14 9 8 at 1 5 O 4 • 
1 
° I_l'}_ ...... :r.:.~ ...... $.h.~ .. f.P.~ ....... .LA ....... ~~.!!t.:r.:.t.:t.P .. t.J [ 1 9 8 0 ] l WLR 2 1 9 at 2 2 5 • 
0~~~~e:
1f;861.9;.t·1::a: r[Jl'f) ~~n~~~o;~~d~t C~~~~ of Appeal 10 12Martin [1980] Conv 207. 
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proprietary estoppel confers an equitable 
interest (as determined by the court ) on the 
party who has acted to his detriment. A 
constructive trust is simply another variety 
of equitable interest. 
without the other.13 
The one can exist 
In Walker v ~.!=l: . .+ .. ~ .. ~.:r.:1 4 Browne-Wilkinson LJ also implied 
that a constructive trust can arise out of a kind of 
proprietary estoppel '' 1 s and that a plea of a constructive 
trust (but not a result ing trust) can embr ac e a plea of a 
''lesser right"1s based on proprietary estoppel. Browne -
Wilkinson LJ suggested that the rea l difference between the 
two doctrines lies in the nature of the representation which 
unde rlies the application of either doctrine. Constru ct ive 
t r us t s , he s u g g e s t e d , re q u i re - , .. -i t h l i mi t e d ex c e D t i ons - a 
common intention to grant a co n ve n t i onal equitable 
proprietary in t ere8t. 11 By contrast proprietar:-· estoppel 
requires merely a belief on the part of the representee, 
encouraged by the legal title holder, that he i-:ill obtain 
some right in or over the representor's property. The 
representee 's expectation may relate to a conventional 
proprietary inte rest · or merely to an occupational privilege 
of some kind. 
13 (1980] Com; 207 at 213. 
at 213. 
See also Martin [1987] Conv 211 
14 Unreported, Court of Appeal 12 April 1984. 
15 Ibid , 
16 The remedy granted in P .. ~.!:3-.. <?. . .<? .. ~. v Turner [1979] l WLR 431 
suggests that the 'equity of estoppel' may 
ci rcumstances be a more valuable right than a 
trust. See ?C?..!:!:.~:r:: v 9..Y.1.~.!:3- (Unreported, Court 
Oc tober 1986). 
in certain 
constructive 
of Appeal 10 
17 Cf .I.n ...... re ...... Sharpe ....... (A .... Ban~rupt...) [1980] l WLR 219. See also 
tlat!:3-P..~r. .. Y. v M1::1:Ji:::}::>.~,TX [1982] l NSWLR 226; Hus.sey v :P.?.:.J:.~ .. ~.r. [ 19 7 2] 1 ·WLR 12 8 6 . 
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More recently, in Grant v Edwards., 1 s Sir Nicolas 
Browne-Wilkinson V-C has suggested that in cases where 
constructi ve trusts are pleaded in the context of the family 
home, "useful guidance ma y in future be obtained from the 
principles of proprietary estoppel which ... are closely akin 
to those laid down in G.i ssing v G.issi.ng ." 1 9 According to 
Sir Nico las Browne-Wilkinson V- C, to ground either plea 
the claimant must , to the knowledge of the l ega l owner, have 
acted in th e belief that he has obtained or wi l l obtain an 
interest in the property. The claimant must have acted to 
his or her detriment in r eliance on such belief. under 
both pleas ''equity acts on the conscien ce of the legal owner 
to prevent him from acting in an unconscionable manner by 
de feati ng the common intention. The t wo principles have 
been developed separately cross-fertilisation 
between them; but they rest on the same foundation and have 
on all other matters reached the same concl usions. ·2 0 
The law is in some state of confusion about the 
relationship between proprietary estoppel and constructive 
trusts. The English courts appear to be mo,-ing towards a 
me rger of the principles yet there has been little 
discussion as to how this has been achieved. More 
particularly, no attention has been given to the specific 
requirements underlying the doctrines of constructive trust 
and proprietary estoppel .and to the nature of the equitable 
interests arising from either kind of claim. 
- ~·-······-··-·· ............. -.. ·-·················· .. ·················-···-·············· .. ··········· 1 8 [1986] 2 All ER 426 at 439 . 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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The Australian courts have been most reluctant to apply 
the substantive constructive trust in the context of the 
familial home unless certain stringent requirements 
concerning intention can be met. Although proprietary 
estoppel has often been viewed as a more appropriate form 
of , . c.1.a1m, an alternative type of constructive trust has 
recentl y been introduced as a means of satisfying estoppel 
claims. It will be seen later in this chapter that the 
nature of this constructive trust is most uncer tain. It 
appears to date only from the time of the court hearing and 
is , therefore, a truly remedial con.s truc tive trus t. 21 
The Canadian jurisdictions hav e formulated the concept 
of the constructive trust in a way which is radicall y 
different from the approach of the Eng l ish and Australian 
courts. In Canada the concept of prop r ietary estoppel _ is 
no t u sed in the familial context, but on closer examination 
the Canadian constructive trust bears a distinct 
resembl ance to the English concept of proprietary 
estoppel. 22 
The New Zealand courts have inv oked the concepts of 
both constructive trust and proprietary estoppel but in the 
fiel d of constructive trusts have shown an 
unfulfil led desire to follow the Can~dian pattern. 2 3 
~See 
2 2See 
2 3 See 
post at 328 ff 
post at 305 
Havward v Giordani .......... _ ,: ....... _. ___ ... ,_.,,, ... ,_,_., __ ................ ................ . [1983) NZLR 140. 
as yet 
247 
This chapter analyses the conceptual requirements of 
constructive trust and proprietary estoppel in order to 
determine whether these requirements are the same and 
whether the two concepts have thus been merged into a single 
doctrine. 
II 
A The elusive task of definition ........... .... ........ ............................... ......... ........ 
The task of defining a constructive trust has p roved to 
be an elus ive one. Ac cording to Snell, "no satisfactory 
definition of a constructive trust has yet been e nun c iated, 
and perhaps none ever will be; for the concept is still 
uncertain and the boundaries obscure.'' 2 4 In simi l ar vein, 
Maudsley has claimed that "there are feh· areas of lai..· which 
are as fertile and as vague as that of constructi v e 
trusts. ·2s In the context of the family home the problem 
of defining the constructive trust has been exacerbated by a 
general judicial refusal to differen t iate b et ,,ee n t h e 
resulting and the constructive trust. 
The somewhat confusing dictum of Lord Diplock in 
Jts.s.i.ng v Gissing 2 6 that "it is unnecessary for P!.:.~.§~Elt. 
)U.!.:.P<?.§~§11 2 7 to distinguish between resulting, implied and 
ionstructive trusts , has been misused. This dictum has often 
1 4
.S.nel..l .. ' s ....... Pri.nci.ples ..... o.f .... Equ.i .. t..Y. ( 28th 15Maudsley (1977) 28 (2) NILQ 123. 
laudsley , Modern ...... Equity ( 12th Ed 1982] CLJ 290. 
•
6 [1971] AC 886 . 
7 Ibid at 905 (emphasis supplied) . 
Ed 1982) p 19 2. 
See also Hanbury and 
1 9 8 5 ) p 3 0 1 ; Burridge 
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led to the erroneous conclusion that there is no significant 
difference between the vari ous categories of non-express 
trusts. 28 There are indeed some circumstances where it is 
entirel y irrelevant whether a resulting or constructive 
trust is found. For instance, neither of these forms of 
trust requires the writing demanded by Section 53(1) (b),(c) 
of the Law of Property Act 1925. 29 However, there are many 
situations in whi ch i t becomes essential to differentiate 
between these two types of implied trust.3o 
In the cont e xt of the family home , a resulting trust 
norma lly arises where property is acqui red in the name of A 
bu t B provides a l l or par t of the purchase price. In the 
absence of evidence to t he contra r y , equity presumes a 
re sulti n g trust in B's fevour, 31 B 1 s beneficial interes t 
in A' s propert y wi ll be directly proportionate to his 
contribution: In a strict sense this category of resulting 
trust does not require . + + · lnuenulOn a t all; it arises by 
operation of law. 32 The principle upon which the purchase 
28 See, e.g., Hu.ss.er v_ Palmer [1972] l WLR 1 2 68 at 1289; Ha rpum (1982) Ox Jour Leg Stud 277 at 278; Burns v Burns [1984] l Ch 317; Allen v ?:r:1..~".3.~.:r.:. [1977) 2 NSWLR 685; Hodg son v Marks [1970] l WLR 956; Fox (1980) Fam. Law 106; Wi,nk.~orth ~:· Ed~ard .. Baro.n Development Co ... Ltd ( 1985') 52 P & CR 67; [1983] 47 Conv. 420; Helsham CJ (1979) 8 Sydney Law Re v 578; Bloch " Bloch (198 1 ) 55 AL JR 700; McCamus & Taman (1978) . 16 (3) .. Osgoode Hall Law Jour. 741 at 753; tlayward v Giordani [19 83] l NZLR 140 at 144. 29 Se"e' 'iaw of P;op.erty Act 1925, s. 53(2). 30 See Walker v Walker (Unreported, Court of Appeal 12 April 19 86); ........ Allen .... v. Snvder [1977] 2 NSLWR 685 at 698 ; tf ~·~·~tt·j\1lf-i.:ii:i:~t~ ·r-ri;:ll§Jf-9.f:J[-·\l'l:q v H.c.i..g_g.t~ [ 19 7 9) 2 NZLR 31 See Waters (1970) 16 (2) McGill Law Jour 188 . 32 See Wa ters (1975 ) L 111 Can Bar Rev 366 at 368; .?.S!..9. .. ! .. t . v §co.tt ( 1963) 109 CLR 649; Davies ( 1980) 7 Adel Law Rev 
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mone y resulting trust is based was stated in py~~ v py~~aa 
bY Chief Baron Eyre. He accepted that 
the clear result of all the cases, without a 
single exception, is that the trust of a 
legal estate, whether freehold, copyhold, or 
leasehold; whether taken in the names of the 
purchasers and others jointly, or in the 
names of others wit hout that of the 
purchaser ; whether jointly or successive , 
results to the man who advances t he purchase 
money. a 4 
This resulting t r us t ar i ses ou t of equity's presumption that 
bargains rather than gifts are intended in such 
circumstances. as The person advancing the purchase money 
is presumed to hav e intended that the legal t i tle holder 
sh ould hold the benefi cial title on trus t for him. 
The purchase money resulti ng trust has been extended to 
post-acquisition paymen ts pro\·idi n a· 
• e, that such pa;\·ments are 
referable to the property. 36 In Q)§§tr.:t ~ Y Gissing, a, Lord 
200 at 205; Cooney (1979) Ir Jur ( NS) 14 ; Gray Elements 
C?_f.. Land Law (1987) p 246; Bryan (1982) 12 Fam Law 21; 
Nicholson v Perks [1974 ] 1 WLR 476. Cf Dillow v Di l low 
-[196·5··r 3 NSWL1i°53 1 at 534 ff wher e Hope JA crf"ticised the 
presumption of resulting trust , as a primary presumption, he 
maintained that it was c ompletely anachronistic . 
33 (1788) 2 Cox Eq cas 92, 30 ER 42. 
3 4 Ibid at 93 . 
3 5 See Dono v an Waters ( 1970) 16 McGill LJ 18 7 at 199 ( see 
Gray, Elements of Land Law, p 245). 
~-~-~-~:~:h:!.}), 1; 8 21·~ ·?.J~D-~91 [ 1 ~ ~ 1 iot;c 88 ~-~l:r.:i ~06 ~nyder !3~~~~~~ ~ 
NSWLR 685 at 707; Pettkus v Becker (1980) 11 7 DLR (3d) 257 
per Martland, Beetz, Ritchie JJ; L v _I,, ( 1979) I Jur (NS) 
60 4. Cf Pettkus v B_ecker (1980) 117 DLR (3d) 257 at 270 
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Diplock recognised that it would be unreasonably legalistic 
to restrict the purchase money resulting trust to 
contributions made at the time of the acquisition of the 
property. He accepted that later financial contributions 
referable to the property could also lead to a resulting 
trust. A retrospective inference could be made from these 
financial contributions that the parties had intended to 
share the beneficial interest from the time of acquisition. 
Professor Waters has argued that the courts' discovery of an 
implied common in tent ion from financ ial con tr i but ions has 
frequently provided a mean s of giving wives a just and 
equitable share in disputed ma t rimonial assets. This 
retrospective inference is, in fact "a construc tive trust 
approach masquerad ing as a resulting trust approach." 3 8 
waters has stressed the absence of a common intention, in 
the majorit y of cases, at the time the property was 
acquired. 
It is clear of course that there can be no question of 
resulting trust where the relationship between the parties 
de v eloped only some time after the acquisition of the 
property. In no sense can the later con tr i buti ons be 
retrospectively referable to an intention to share the 
beneficial in t erest at the moment of acquisition. 
Inevitably attempts have been made to extend the 
resulting trust in order to include within its boundaries 
fact-situations 
pe_r Dickson J; 
( 19 8 2) 16 . 1 UBC 
37[1971] AC 886 
3 BWaters (1975) 
involving a labour contribution 
9...<?. ~:".9.h..~.r. v Cowcher [ 19 7 2] 
Law Rev 155. 
at 907, 908. 
L 111 Can Bar Rev 366 at 368. 
1 WLR; 
or a 
Mc lean 
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contribution to general household expenditure . The courts 
have shown a marked reluctance to accept that such 
contributions can lead to an inference of a resulting 
trust. 3 9 Where, however, there was at the moment of 
acquisition a separate agreement by the parties that they 
should share the beneficial interest in the property, the 
courts have been to accept that labour 
contributions or 
prepared 
contributions to general household 
expenditure can give rise to a t r ust . In G i s s __ i n g v 
QJ§§:i:1:":1~4 0 Lord Dip lock accepted t ha t in circumstances of 
express oral a greements 
i t has been assumed sub silentio that they 
provide for the spouse in wh om th e legal 
estate in the matrimonial home is not vested 
to do something to facilitate it s 
acquisition, by contributing to t he purchase 
price o r to the depos it or the mortgage 
insta_lments when i t is purchased or to make 
some other material s acr i fice b y way of 
contribution to or economy in the general 
f am ily expenditu re,4 1 
Lord Di plock did not speci fy the nature of such~ trust but 
it wou ld seem to be closer to a constructive than a 
resulting trust,42 
39 But see .N.t?.S . .C? .. 12. v .N .. t:i.s: . .C?.12 (1969) 1 WLR 1676 . See also the 
approach of the Canadian Courts post at 299 ff 
4 0(1971) AC 886. 
41 Ibid at 905 . See also Harpum (1982) Ox Jour Leg Stud 277 
a t 278. 
4 2G_i_s_s _  i _ng v Gis_sing [1971) AC 886 at 905. 
I I 
It has been suggested that a resulting trust can also 
arise out of an oral agreement based on evidence of the 
parties ' intentions as to how their respective contributions 
should be treated in giving them a shar~ in the property,43 
But it is arguable that in such circumstances there is both 
a resulting and a constructive trust. The resulting trust 
arises out of the initial contribution. The constructive 
trust arises out of the supervening agreement to vary the 
original beneficial interest , based on the pre-existing 
resulting trust providing detrimental reliance 
shown. 4 4 
C Nec_ess_ity .. to_ distinguish between resulting and 
constructive trusts 
can be 
Where a third party makes a claim to disputed property, 
it may be crucial for any original contributer to the 
purchase price to be able to sho..; that a resulting trust 
exists. Such a trust , if proved, exists from the moment of 
purchase of the property. B:v contrast, unless the 
agreement to vary the beneficial interest giving rise to a 
constructive trust was simultaneous with the financial 
contribution to the purchase price, a constructive trust 
43 See Hanbury and Maudsley, Mod~rn_Equjty (1985 12th Ed) p 254 ; Rathwell v Rathwell (1978) 8 3 DLR (3d) 289 at 293, 
-l;.~_~:n~·;t·§·i~-~11;i111§l~J£°R [_i~f~: th~SWP\Ro/e2r\·Y J:s Re u~~~:~!~ 
by i"he ...... pl~ ... f~tiff using the monies of the defendan~. The 
consequent resulting trust in the defendant ' s favour was 
subsequently altered by an agreement to grant the plaintiff 
a fifty per cent share. This agreement gave rise to a 0 onstructi ve trust. See also Cowcher v Cowcher [ 19 7 2] l WLR 425; Harpum (1982) Ox Jour Le·g·stud 27'i""" ""a"i"""""zfg, 
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will date only from the moment of agreement . The trust may 
then be subsequent in time to a third party's clairn,45 
A further situation in which the distinction between 
resulting and constructive trusts becomes important arises 
where a resulting trust is pleaded and the claimant's 
contribution is held to have been a gift or a loan. In 
such circumstances the plea of resulting trust must fail,46 
but this does not necessarily preclude a plea of 
constructive trust. However, unless a constructive trust 
is pleaded separately, the claimant of a beneficial interest 
will be left without an y proprietary remedy. In walker V 
Wal_k_e_r, 4 7 for instance, the plaintiff had urged that the 
plea of a resulting trust was wide enough to cover a 
constructive trust arising from some kind of proprietary 
estoppe l. Browne-11-ilkinson LJ reje c ted this submission, 
explain i ng that 
ln many contexts there are crucial 
distinctions as to the circumstances which 
give rise to the existence of such 
trusts ... Where a constructive trust is 
alleged to afise from a kind of proprietary 
the crucial factor is not estoppel, 
payment of the money by itself but 
the 
the 
representation made by the defendant as to 
M•-,, .. ,,. , ,,,, ,,,,,., .. ,, .. , , , , .... ,,,, .. ,_,,,,,,o,,.,,.,.,,,,,, .. ,,,,,,,, , ,.,,, ,, , ,,.,,,,,., ,,,,, , ,, ,,,,, • 
4 5 See post at 331 
46 See Hussey v Palmer [1972) 1 (NS ) co·n;··:·······65; ········ Fairest [1973) 
~.ankruptJ [1980) 1 WLR 2 19 . 
47 Unreported , Court of Appeal 12 
WLR 
CLJ 
1286 ; 
41; 
Hayton ( 1973) 37 
~.!1 .......... :r.: .. ~ .... s .harpe ..... (A 
April 1984 . 
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his future conduct and the reliance by the 
plaintiff on such representation,48 
D Pr in c .i p 1 e .... P..~.h..i n d 1:J~ .. ~ ...... <?.9..!1 .. § .. t. .. !:'.:Y. .. <? .. t..:i.:.Y.~ ......  t. .. ~:Y..§.:l: 
The principle behind all constructive trusts has been 
stated somewhat nebulously in Be.at.t.Y V Guggenheim 
Expl.orati on ....... co. 4 9 Here Cardozo J maintained that "when 
property has been acquired in such circumstances that the 
holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain 
the interest, equity converts him into a trustee."so 
In the context of the family home the issue of 
unconscionability has been widely debated . The broad 
approach of Lord Denning MR permitted the court t o impose a 
constructive trust Khenever it judged the conduct of the 
legal owner to be inequitable s 1 whils t the stric t approach 
of Mahoney JA. in Allen v Snvders2 
........... t ....... appeared to require an 
intention to create a trust as the basis for the imposi t ion 
of a constructive trust. Mahoney JA in All en v ?I.:1Yc:i..er 5 3 
main tained that the time had come to circumscribe the use of 
the constructive trust. He observed that 
4 8 Walker v Walker (Unreported, Court of Appeal 12 April 
19 84). 
49 2 2 5 NY 3 8 0 ( 1 9 1 9 ) , 
50 Ibid at 386. See also ~.:i::!:lj .. 9.!:1.§ ,· Evans [1972] eh 359 at 
368. See also Oakley, c.onst.ruc.tive .Trusts ( 2nd Ed) 1987 p 36 ff. 
51 See .f..:r::.t:t??.:!:1..9 .. ~ v :f..:r:: .tP.c.1:!:1.9~ (No 2) [1957] l WLR 384; Ulrich 
v Ulrich and Felton [1968] l WLR 180; 9.h..?.:.P.r.r.1.?.:.!:1 v 9.h.?.:P.J.1:1 .. c.1:.!.l: [1969] l WLR 1367; Nixon v N_t._~op [1969) l WLR 1676; 
H_usse;v v Palmer [1972) l WLR 1286; Re .. .... s.Pe.ars ....... and ..... LevY .... e.t 
~J 52 DLR ..... (1974) (3d) 146; McMahon v McMahon [1979) VR 
239 ; Rathwell v Rathwell ( 1978 .. ) .. 83 DLR ( 3df"'"2·g·g· at 297 pe.r Dickson J. · .. 
52 [1977) NSWLR 685 at 7 01. 
53 Ibid .· 
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not all cases in which in the popular sense , 
there is a sense of unfairness or in j ustice , 
will b e appropriate for this remedy. There 
are in matrimonial 
r e lati onships, i nequi t ies, 
sense of the term , which 
the r e lati onships . 54 
and analogous 
in the popular 
are incidental to 
According to Mahon e y J t h e s e inequities wer e not t o b e 
smoo t h ed o v er b y th e rando m use of the constructi v e trus t as 
a g ene r al r e medy fo r uncon s c i onab ili ty . 
Lo r d Diplock' s definition o f a co ns t ruc t i ve t rust s in 
Qj§§jr::ig v .Qt§§t.t::i.S.: 5s has n o·h· been a cc epted, e i the r implic i t l y 
or e xplicitl y , a s the fo undat i o n of t h e h ome 
constr u ctive t rus t . From this def i nit i on two r equiremen t s 
ha ve been d is t illed in o r d er to f ound a co n st ructive tru s t :-
common inten t ion a n d det rimental re lianc e . 56 Thes e two 
re quirements wi l l n ow be considered a nd c ompare d wi th thei r 
counterparts of enc ouragemen t a n d d etr imental re l iance in 
Proprietary estoppel . 
?-' """'"'"" " '" ' ' ' ' " ""' ' "'""'"'" " " " "'"' ''' " ' ' " '""'"" '" 4 I bid at 706 . 
55 [ 19 7 1] AC 886 at 905, see ante at 242 ff 5 6 See Mus;hJ.ns.:1t .. i v P ..<?.99.:§ ( 19 8 5) 6 2 ALR 4 2 9. 
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not all cases in which in the popular sense, 
there is a sense of unfairness or injustice , 
will be appropriate for this remedy. There 
are in matrimonial and analogous 
relationships, inequities, in the popular 
sense of the term, which are incidental to 
the relationships. 54 
According to Mahoney J these inequities were not to be 
smoothed over by the random use of the constructive trust as 
a general remedy for unconscionability. 
Lord Diplock' s definition of a constructive trusts in 
Gt§§j~g v 9?:-§.§..t.1!£ 5 5 has noF been a ccepted, either impli citly 
or explici tly, as the foundation of the home 
constru ctive trus t . From this definition two requirements 
have been distilled in order to fo und a constructive trust: -
common intention and detrimental reliance. 56 These two 
requirements wi l l n o w be cons idered and compared with their 
counterparts of en c ouragement and detrimental reliance in 
proprietary estopp e l. 
5 4Ibid at 706 . 
55(1971] AC 886 at 905, see ante at 242 ff 56See MU~£hi~~~J V QQ~~~ (1985) 62 ALR 429. 
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I I I THE REQUIREMENT ..... OF .. . COMMON ..... I.NTENTION 
Judicial statements have reiterated that the 
constructive trust is imposed regardless of intention. In 
Allen v Snyder 57 Glass JA explained that 
.............................. . ............ ~ .................... .. 
constructive trusts arise where it would be a 
fraud for the legal owner to assert a 
beneficial i nterest. Unlike express and 
impl ied (resulting) trusts, which reflect 
actual intentions, they are imposed without 
regard to the intentions of the parties, in 
order to satisfy the demands of justice and 
good conscience. ss 
Glass JA, in somewhat contradictory dicta then stated that 
when it is called a constructive trust, i t 
should not be forgotten that the courts are 
giving effect to an arrangement based upon 
the actual intentions of the parties59 as to 
how they should share the beneficial 
interest. 
In the 'familial context' the constructive . trust does 
appear to require a common intention or conduct which leads 
the claimant to believe that there is an agreement between 
himself and the legal owner, as to how the beneficial 
interest should be shared. This role of agreement in the 
-.~ ...... 
5 7 [ i"·i:n 7) 2 NSWLR 6 8 5 . 
58 Jbid at 690. 
59 Ibid at 693. 
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creation of constructive trusts of the family home was 
stressed by Lord Diplock in Gis_s __ ing v Gi_s_s __ ing. 6 o He 
observed that previous familial cases concerning beneficial 
interests in the home had passed over the role of agreement 
in creating equitable interests in prop~rty. According to 
Lord Diplock, the trust which the courts have construed 
arises 
from the common intention expressed in the 
oral agreement between the spouses that if 
each acts in the manner provided for by the 
agreement the beneficial interests in the 
matrimonial home shall be held as they have 
agreed. 61 
The decision of the New South Wales Court of Appea l in 
Allen v Snvder 62 
... ......... , .................. .. . 
has been interpreted in subsequent 
decisions in the Australian Courts as holding that the 
common intention of the parties (whether overt or inferred) 
mus t be tha t a trust of the property was intended,63 
The necessity to prove a common intention or agreement 
has been aclrnm.:ledged as giving rise to di ff i cul ties where 
constructive trusts are pleaded in the familial context. 
Lord Pearson once expressed the view that 
·······························-
60 [1971] AC 886. Cf Gibson LJ (1976) 27 NI LQ 333. 6 1[1971] AC 886 at 905. 
62 [1977] NSWLR 685 at 692. The Australian and New Zealand Court~ have not always spe6ified the category of trust being 
referred to in the intention-based family home cases but it 
G
is clearly a constructive trust (see, e.g. , !!.?.:X~l:1,.T.4. v 
... .iordani [1983] NZLR 140 at 144). 
63 See tl.<::>.:r::.:r.:J.!:'. v M<::>.:r:: .. :r_~ .. !:'. [1982] 1 NSWLR 61 ; .f. .. ~.-~ .. r.:i .. ~.Y. v Fe_e_ney (Unreported , New South Wales Court of Appeal 3 May 19 7 9) ; 
~~um~artner v Baumgartner [1985] 2 NSWLR 401. 
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it must often be artificial to search for an 
agreement made between husband and wife as to 
their respective ownership rights in proper ty 
used by both of them while they are living 
together . In most cases they are unlikel y 
to enter into negotiations or conclude 
contracts or even make agreements. The 
arrangements which they make are likel y to be 
lacking in the precision and finality which 
an agreement wo uld be expected to have,64 
In spi te of this acknowledgement, the common intention 
requirement prevails throughout the commonwealth exc ept 
perhaps in Canada. ss The onus of proof of a common 
intention is on the claimant of the constructive trust.ss 
IV OVERT COMMON INTENTION 
..................... , .. -................................. . ..................... ............. . 
A In the context of constructive trusts ............ .............. _ ............................................ . 
Prior to the decision in Grant v Edwards 6 7 there had 
been a tendency to distort the principles enunciated by Lord 
6 4 Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886 at 900 . See also Wade (1979) 6 (2) Univ Tas Law Rev 97; Baumgartner v 
Baumgartner [1985] 2 NSWLR 4 17 . 
65 See also the requirement in French law of a common 
i ntention '' to put into hotch patch all the fruits of thei r 
activity and to share their profits and losses '' to give rise 
t o a de facto marita l partnership having legal consequences, (§ v D [1983) Dalloz Jur 607 (CA Montpelier 8 June 198 2) 
c ited 1n (1984) XII European Law Digest pt 4.) 
66 See Hohol v Hohol [1980) 1 VR 221. 
6 7 [ 19 86·r···2 ....... A11 ·····E°ii°···425. 
, .. .• 
II 
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The courts had generally 
as sumed that to find a common intention they had to find 
substantial financial expenditure referable to the disputed 
property. The Court of Appeal in 9:t.:9'.P.:t. v ~.9.~~.:t.:9.§, 6 9 in the 
1105
t lucid of decisions, attempted to end this distortion. 
Nourse LJ pointed out that there is a 
rarer class of case, of which the present may 
be one, where al though there has been no 
writing, the parties have orally declared 
themselves in such a way as to make their 
common intention plain. Here the court does 
not ha,·e to look for conduct from which the 
in tention can be inferred, but only for 
conduct ,,h ich amounts to an acting on it by 
th e claimant. And, al though that conduct 
can undoubtedly be 
which is expenditure 
acquisition of the 
necessarily be so . 7o 
the incurring of 
referable to the 
house, it need not 
Li ke-....-i se in Grant y Edwards Sir Nicolas Browne-
Wilkinson V -C explained that Lord Diplock in G.i.ssi.ng had 
accepted that an overt intention could give rise to a 
constructive trust. If such evidence existed, substantial 
financial expenditure referable to the property was not 
• [ 1--·-- -·-----··---·· ····-··············-·········---·-········-················· 
'[ 971 ] AC 886 at 905 ff. 
0 1986 ] 2 All ER 426 . 
3~b)id1 at 432. See also Re ...... Spe.ars .and .... Levy (1974) 52 DLR h 4 6 at 15 3 where the Nova Scotia Supreme Court accepted 
e marr iage vow as evidence of a common intention. 
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Diplock in 9:t§..§.jpg v 9:!!:>..!:>..J.P..S:. 6 s The courts had generally 
assumed that to find a common intention they had to find 
substantial financial expenditure referable to the disputed 
property. The Court of Appeal in 9::r:: .. ?:P. .. 1. v ;i;:9.~ .. ?.:.:r:'.9:§., 6 9 in the 
mos t lucid of decisions, attempted to end this distortion. 
Nourse LJ pointed out that there is a 
rarer class of case, of which the present ma y 
be one, where although there has been no 
writ ing , the parties have orally declared 
themselves in such a way as to make their 
common intention plain. Here the court does 
no t ha\·e to look for conduct from which the 
intention can be inferred, but only for 
conduct 1,,rhich amounts to an acting on it by 
the claimant. And, al though that conduct 
c an undoubtedly be the incurring of 
expenditure which is referable to the 
acquisition of the house, it need not 
necessarily be so.7o 
Like~ise in Grant v Edwards Sir Nicolas Browne-
Wilkinson V- C e xplained that Lord Diplock in Gissing had 
accepted that an overt intention could give rise to a 
constructive trust. If such evidence existed , substantial 
financial expenditure referable to the property was not 
68 (1971] AC 886 at 905 ff. 
69(1986] 2 All ER 426. 
70 Ibid at 432. See also Re ... Spears .. and .. Levy (1974) 52 DLR (3d) 146 at 153 where the Nova Scotia Supreme Court accepted 
the marriagi vow as evidence of a common intention. 
260 
additionally required. There must simply be conduct which 
amounts to reliance on that overt intention.71 
i) ~ . .:r.:..t. .. t.:t:E::!_n agreements 
Written documentation of an agreement between the 
parties is indubitable evidence of a common intention. Such 
a situation is, however, rare in the familial context. In 
Gough v Fraser72 the New Zealand Court of Appeal held that 
written e vi dence of an agreement to vary a resulting trust 
would give rise to a constructive trus t of the property if 
th e agreement had been subsequently a cted upon. 
Although the courts, in principle, have declared 
themselves prepared to hold that a common intention can b e 
pr oved from verbal assurances alone, 7 3 mone ta ry 
contributions, conduct benefit ing the legal title holder and 
gross condtict by the legal title holder have all tended to 
reinforce the courts' vie,-:, in the context of constructive 
trusts, that there is direct e,-idence of an agreement or 
common expecta tion. There is no reason why there should be 
such a close relationship between these factors and the 
finding of express verbal agreements. 
71 See Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886 at 906 ff. 7 2[ 1977] l NZ LR 279. 
73 In Midland Bank PLC v Dobson [1986] 1 FLR 171 at 174 Fox LJ exp·r·e·s·se·d "the ~; :Ce~ · that"···;;a··;;;;·sertions made by a husband and 
wife as to common intention formed thirty y ears ago 
regarding joint ownership of which there is no contemporary 
evidence and which happens to accommodate their current need to defeat the claims of a creditor must be received by the 
courts with caution . " See also Baumg_artner v Baumgart_ner [1985) 2 NSWLR 406. 
261 
I 
I 
a) Where there is a direct financial contribution towards ................................................................................. ,,,,, .......................................................................................................................................................... _ 
the .P.:t::C?..P.~:r.:.!:.Y 
In the New South Wales case of Maurice v Lyons 7 4 
... ,,, \ , ,, ........... ...... . the .... .. ................................ . 
plaintiff claimed that his father, the deceased, had 
suggested to him that they should enter a land ballot and, 
if either of them was successful, he would build a house for 
both of them using the plaintiff's money. The deceased won 
the ballot and agreed that he wo uld leave the property, 
which he had built, to the plaintiff in his ..;ill. He 
subsequently changed his mind and left it to his widow and 
daugh ter. Helsham J held that a constructive trust had 
arisen from the verbal agreement. 75 The plaintif f and his 
wife had no t onl y financed the purchase of the property but 
for th e nine years prior to the deceased's death had lived 
in the property paying all th e outgoings. 
In tl.13.:J§}?. __ \l.TY \. Malsbury, 7 6 the plaintiff had sold his 
home in England and had handed over the proceeds of sale to 
his son in Australia. He claimed that his son had told him 
that he would be lool~ed after in his old age, in a house 
purchased by the son with the plaintiff's money. The 
detriment suffered by the plaintiff was considerable. 
There was uncertainty about the precise nature of the 
parties' agreement. The defendant, · the son , maintained 
that the plaintiff had merely loaned him the money . The 
New South Wales court held that the evidence gave rise to 
.. ~ .......... ____ ,,, ................... , ___ ____ _ , ····- ........................................ . 7 4 ( 19 6 8) 13 FLR 4 7 5. 
75 Ibid. 
76 [1982] 1 NSWLR 226. 
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the inference that there had been an intention to create an 
express trust: the plaintiff was to be cared for in his 
s on's property in return for his monetary contribution. 
The failure of this expre s s trust gave rise to a 
constructive trust. Any alternative i~ference would have 
permitted the son to retain the benefit of property 
purchased with the plaintiff's money without giving anything 
in return. 77 
In Butler v Craine 7 s the Supreme Court of Victoria 
found that a constructive trust could arise from a de facto 
h·ife' s e::-~pre ss represen tation to her male cohabitant that 
"If you do the h ome , t h e home "·i 11 be yours". Marks J was 
influenced b y th e fact that. the claimant had for sixteen 
years provided the deceased with money to pay off the 
mor tg age , lived Kith her as a husband, paid the taxes, rates 
and in s urance on the home, took the deceased on holidays, 
pro,:ided fo od and main t enance for the deceased, and did 
cooking and housel,;:eeping wel l aboYe the usual for a male 
spouse , de facto or de i ure. When they went on holidays 
the deceased wore rings and adopted the name of the 
claimant. 
The claimant's financial expenditure was extensive. 
Indeed the expenditure would have been suffic i ent to permit 
the inference of a common intention to share the beneficial 
interest had the common intention not been present. 
:'See also g~~~~y v Palmer [1972] 1 WLR 1206. 8 [1986] VR 274. 
26 3 
b) Whe.re ...... th.e ...... ..l.eg.al .. .... t.i.tl.e ..... h.o.l.de.r _:r.: .. E::.c:::: .. E:: .. ~YE::§ .. .. ?.-....... P .. E:: . .r.::t.E:: .. fi t 
A limited number of cases demonstrate that the courts 
have accepted evidence of an agreement even where there has 
been minimal financial contribution by the claimant. In 
Qg.iJ.v.i_e v R ..Y..?.-.. 1:":1. 7 9 the court may have been influenced to 
accept that an express agreement was present by the fact 
that a substantial contribution of a non-financial nature by 
the claimant which benefited the legal title holder had been 
made. In Og.i_l.vie v Rvan a 
................. 
de fa c to husband had promised 
the plaintiff that he would leave their quasi -ma tr imoni al 
home to her in . his will.so When he died, his will did not 
contain the agreed bequest. A const r u c tive trust was 
nevertheless held to exist on the bas i s of the express 
agreement. The plaintiff had dutifull y cared for the 
deceased for several years prior t o his death.BI 
c ) Effect of legal ti tl e holder ' s condu c t 
In the Australian case of Hohol \. Hohol 8 2 the Supreme 
Court of Victoria accepted evidence given by a de facto wife 
of some twenty five years th at her husband had said, 
referring to the disputed proper t y, ''I t' s for all of us, 
it's for you and me." s 3 The plaintiff had left behind a 
comfortable and secure home and had come to ·live in a 
........... .... 
79[1976] 2 NSWLR 50 4. 
8 0 The decision in Ogilvie v Ryan has survived Allen v $ . .r.::t.Y.ciE::T [1977] 2 NSWLR 685·· : · ·· ·· s ·ee afso Hejrdon, Annual ·· s·ur·~;·ey of Law 
1977 (Australia) p 69. 
81 Cf Thwaites v R.Y..?.:..r.::t [ 1984] VR 65; P?.:JE:: v :t.:I.?:gg_E::_J'.:t..Y [ 1979] Qd R 83. 
8 2 [1980] 1 VR 221 at 222. 
8 3 Ibid . See also Baumgartner v Baumgartner [ 198 5] 2 NSWLR 406 in which there ···~·a:"s··e;·fd"Eince ;;·r· a: · simiiar agreement but 
the New South Wales Court of Appeal preferred to infer an i n tention from financial contribution . 
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primitive garage on the property with four young children. 
o'Bry an J upheld a constructive trust on the basis of an 
overt common intention. He distinguished Eves v Eves , a 4 
The words of ass urance in Hohol were deemed by O'Bryan J to 
be a more certain indication that a trust of the property 
had been was intended than the unfulfilled promise of the 
legal title holder in Eves v Eves. The conduct of the 
de fendant in Bohol was a significant factor in the court's 
ruling that the familial declaration, was sufficient to 
create a trust of th e property. O 'Bryan J remarked that 
t h e defendant has an autocratic an d 
authoritarian p ersonalit y . I am satisf ied 
that he ruled his family , and particularl y 
his wife, 
together. 
l ike a despot when they li v ed 
Ko d o u bt h e had to struggle hard 
to su c ceed in his adopted c oun try, but in 
doing so he required his family and 
particular l ~- the plaintiff to adopt a very 
menial position in the household and rewarded 
her fro m h is earning s wi t h little more than 
sh e neede d for her basic household 
requireme n ts s u ch as food and c lo thi n g. 85 
8
•[1975) 1 WLR 1338 . 
8 s Hoh o l v Hoh o l [ 1 9 8 0 ] 1 VR 2 2 1 at 2 2 2 . Q.~~:2:i.:i;;:~: [ 1 ~i""ssT····vR 19 3 . See also Ril_ey v 
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d) Overt ... common ..... i .n tent.i_on .... - ...... co.vert ..... un.i,,l.a tera.l ..... J.ntent.i on 
In Eves v Eves a 6 a de f. .. 13.:-.9..t. .. <?. husband told his wife that 
the house was to be a home for themselves and their children 
as she was under twenty one, it could not be in their joint 
names and had to be in his name alone; and that but for her 
age , it would have been purchased in joint names.a? 
As the husband later admitted , this was a deception on 
his part, and a constructive trust was held to have been 
raise d on the facts. The husband had represented to his de 
facto wife that he wi shed her to have a share in the 
property; this was the overt common intention . The fact 
tha t the husband had a covert unilateral intention did no t 
detract from the force of the oYert common intention. 8 6 
The clai mant had made a significant contribution in labour 
to the acquisition of the property. 
Nore recently the Co u rt of Appeal has confirme d that a 
representation by the defendant that the plaintiff's name 
would ha Ye been put on the title deeds but for the ris k of 
affecting her impending divorce proceedings was evidence of 
a n agreement sufficient to give rise to a constructive 
trust. In Grant \- Edwards a 9 Mus till LJ accepted that 
strictly speaking there had never been any common. intention. 
The defendant never intended the plaintiff to have a share 
in the disputed property. He had simply given her. an 
................................... 
s 6 [ 1 9 7 5 J 1 WLR 1 3 3 8 . 
518 at 521. 
See also 9.<?..<?.}~ ~ v Head [1972] 1 WLR 
87 Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338 N..~.I.'.1 .. ~ .. t..P. ( 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 7 8 ) 1 7 ALR 5 0 0 , 
8 BEves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338. 
[ 1 9 7 0 ] 1 WLR 9 5 6 . 
89(1986] 2 All ER 426. 
at 1340. Cf Nemeth v 
. ................................ . 
See also Hodgson v Marks 
I 
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untruthful excuse for not putting her name on the title 
deeds. This did not, however, defeat the plaintiff's 
claim, Mustill LJ explaining that "whatever the defendant's 
actual intention, the nature of the excuse which he gave 
mus t have led the plaintiff to believe · that she would in 
future have her name on the title, and this in turn would 
justify her in concluding that she had from the outset some 
kind of right to the house." !Ill The language used here is 
that of proprietary estoppel. The plaintiff was encouraged 
to believe that sh e had or that she wo uld obtain a right in 
the property. 
e) 
Where an agreement is conditional on some subsequent 
event such as marriage, the agre e ment will lapse if the 
condition is not fulfilled. In suc h c ir c umstance s there 
will be n o constructi\·e trust. 9 1 In Muschinski v Dodds92 
the clai man t main tained tha t she ha d been induced to place 
the property in joint names by th e respondent's promise to 
expend a substantial sum on the property. The court 
declined to find a n express or implied condition that they 
would hold the property on constructive trust in shares 
relating to their respective contributions 93 if the parties' 
relationship did not work out or if the respondent did not 
fulfil his promise. Gibbs CJ held that the appellant had 
ne v er believed that she was acquiring more than a one-half 
beneficial interest in the property. The respondent had 
9 0 I bid at 436. 
91 See , e.g ., Jackson v Cros_by ..(No _2_J (1979) 21 SASR 280. 
9 2 ( 19 8 6 ) 6 2 ALR 4 2 9 : 
9 3 M.:t::t .. ~.9._h.t.n .. ~tJ v P..99:9-.~ ( 1 9 8 6 ) 6 2 ALR 4 2 9 at 4 3 5 . 
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made it plain to the appellant that he would not assist her 
as promised 9 4 unless he was given an absolute interest in 
the property. The parties had consulted a solicitor and 
had had adequate opportunity to formalise the claimed 
condition, if that was their intention. In Muschinski v 
podds the High Court of Australia eventually awarded an 
alternative remedy to that of constructive trust. It held 
that the parties held their respective legal interests upon 
trust to repay to each his or her respective money 
contribution and then to hold the residue in equal shares. 
Gibbs CJ declined to discuss the nature of the right from 
which t he remedy stemmed. 95 ~a son J96 and Deane J 97 
referred to the right as existing under a constructive 
trust albeit a different type of constructi v e trust to the 
agreement based family home constructive trust. It appears 
to be a constructive trust based on a breach of fiduciary 
duty and dates only from the time o f the court hearing . gs 
B I .. P ..... :t..h .. ~ ... ~ .. §.!:.9..PP~J ....... <? .. <?.P .. !:~.~ .. :t. 
The overt agreement necessary to f ound a construc tive 
trust is akin to the common expectation in those cases of 
proprietary estoppel where t he court has found an undeniable 
concordance between the representee's belief and the 
representor' s active explicit encouragement. 9 9 Monetary 
contributions and substantial labbur are also important 
94 Ibid at 431. 
95 Ibid at 438. 
96 Ibid at 439. 
97 Ibid at 458. 
98 Ibid. 
9 9S ee ante at 39 ff 
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corroborations of an explicit encouragement in the context 
of proprietary estoppe1.100 
The major difference between the common intention 
required in the constructive trust and the common 
e xpec tation which provides the basis of proprietary estoppel 
is that the latter embraces a wi der category of equitable 
ri ghts.1 01 Th e expectation satisfied in the law of 
estoppel ma y relate to either a conventional proprietary 
interes t or a long-term occupation right. The precise 
nature of the interest concerned need not be specified . 102 
The court's flex i ble a pproach to the satisfacti on of the 
'inchoate equity' in proprietary estoppel permits the 
recognition of less certa in agreements , the remedy being can 
b e tailored by the court to that uncertainty. 
es toppel is a less blunt j udicial instrume nt. 
Proprietary 
In the 
context of t h e constructive trust the courts ma y be forced 
either to grant no remedy at all or to manipulat e the facts 
of a s i t u a ti on i n to the shape of some artificial c ommon 
intention where circumstances c learly demand a remedy. 
100 See also In re Bash?:11:1 (g.~gg.) [19 86] 1 WLR 149 8; Mah.ara.J v Jai 9.h?-!19- [19 86] 3 All ER 440. 10 1Cf Hussey v Palmer [ 1972] 1 WLR 128C. B.ini.ons v Evans [ 1972] Ch359; Ba.nnister V Bannister [1948) 2 All ER 133; I .n ...... Re .. s.h.arpe ... .J.A ..... Banl~.ruptf .. [ 1 9 s··ci"T i ··wi,Ji 2 19 ; P...<?. .. :t:: .. :t:: .. E:=. .. l'.' \' Gy l .es (Unreported , Court of Appeal 10 October 1986 ). 102 In Vinden v 1Jinden [1982) 1 NSWLR 618 the defendant was found t-;;· ha~e a ··successfu l estoppel claim . His father had encouraged him to believe that he had a long-term occupational right by the words ''No son, I do n ot want. you to leave home. I would like you to stay and give me a hand to look after young Lynette. She hasn't a mother and her sisters are all marr ied and there is no one to look after her and as you are not the marrying kind I would like you to s top and look after her .'' See also J ... N ..... E.11 .. i .ot ...... & .... Co _(.FarmsJ !-,td v M.:t:i .. I.::.~At. .. I.::.<?.Y.9- (Unreported , New Zealand Court of Appeal 1 2 Septembe r 1984); pJj~~.~T v tl.1:1:Y.<?.T ... ~ .. t.9. .. .9..f..W.E:=. .. +:1t.ng.t. . .<?.P ( 1884) 9 App Cas 699 at 713. 
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V _INFERRED ____ COMMON _____ I _NTENTION 
Where the parties to the dispute have no overt common 
intention, the court must infer their intention from their 
conduct . In G_i_s_si_ng v Gi_ss __ i _ng 1 0 3 Lord Diplock explained 
that 
the rele vant intention of each party is the 
in te n t ion which was reasonabl y understood b y 
the other party to be manifested by tha t 
party's words or conduct not wi thstanding that 
he did no t c ons cious ly formulate tha t 
intention in his own min d or even acted with 
some different intention whi ch he did no t 
commun icate to the othe r party. On t h e 
other hand, he is not bound by any infere n ce 
,,h ich the o ther party draws as to h is 
intention unless that inference is one which 
can reasonabl~· be drawn from his words or 
conduct. It is in this sense that in the 
branch of English law relating to 
cons t ructive,· implied or resulting trusts 
e ffect is given to the inference as to the 
intention which a r easonable man would - draw 
from the ir words or conduct and not to any 
subjective intention or absence of intention 
wh ich was not made manifest at the time of 
the transaction itself. It is for the court 
to determi ne what these inferences are. 
1 o 3 [ 197 1 J. AC 8 8 6 at 9 0 6 . 
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A) !mput!ng_of_intent!on 
The possibility of imputing an intention to the parties 
where neither party had addressed their minds to the 
question of ownership of the beneficial interest has been 
considered by the courts. Lord Denning MR was the leading 
advocate of the theory that intention may be imputed. 1 o 4 
However, his approach to the question of what the parties 
would have intended had the~- given cons idera ti on to the 
matter of ownership of the property was often not to impute 
a t all but simply to ask "What is reasonable and fair in the 
circumstances as they have developed, seeing that they are 
circumstances which no one contemplated before?' '1os 
In Pettitt v Petti tt l06 Lord Reid thought that 
where there was in fact no agreement, we can 
ask what the spouses or reasonable people in 
t heir shoes would have agreed if they had 
directed their minds to the question of what 
rights should accrue to the spouse who has 
contributed to the acquisition or improvement 
of property owned by the other spouse.107 
10 4See Heseltine \- Hes.~JJ.:ic.:t::1E2 [1971] 1 WLR 342 at 345. See 
also Valent v §?:l.:?1:i:r.t<?.:1:1 (Unreported, Equity Division (New South Wales) 8 December 1986); Nemeth v Nemeth (1977-1978) 17 ALR 500 . 
1 0 5 AP.P..! .. ~ .. t. . .c:?..:f.l:. V AP.P.1~ .. t...9..:t::1 [ 19 6 5 ] 1 WLR (1973) 26 Current Leg Problems 17 . 
106(1970] AC 777. 
1 o 7 Ibid at 7 9 5 . See al so !1.?.: Y.:1:"..?l:!.:9- v 
140 at 151 . · 
25. See also Oakley 
Giordani [1983] NZLR 
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In the same case Lord Diplock accepted that most parties 
normally give no consideration to the beneficial ownership 
of their family home. He maintained that 
unless it is possible to infer from the 
conduct of the spouses at the time of their 
concerted action in relation to acquisition 
or i mprovement of the family asset that the y 
did form an actual common intention as to the 
legal cons e quences of their acts upon the 
proprietary rights in the asset the court 
must i mpu~e to them a constructive common 
in t ention which is that which in the court's 
op i nion ~ould have been formed by reasonable 
272 
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spouses. 108 
1 I 
The other judges in the House of Lords in Pettitt 
rej ected the possibility of imputing an intention where the 
parties to the dispute had given no consideration to 
ownership of the beneficial interest . Although Lord 
Upjohn 1 D9 was not as explicit as Lords Hodson110 and 
Lord Diplock later accepted in G.i .. s.sing V Morris,111 
G.i.ss .. ing 1 1 2 that a majority of the House of Lords in Pettitt 
had rejected the imputing of intention in the context of 
............................................................................................. 108Pettitt v Pettitt [1970) AC 777 at 823; Jones [1969) 28 CLJ ..... i9 .. 6·; ....... Til~ii ''{i969] CLJ 191. See also Dav.tl=.> ... 9 .. <?.P:!: .. :r.: .. ?.: .. g .tg.:r.: .. l=.> Ltd v Fareham UDC [1956) AC 696 at 725. 
·1 o s [ 19·foy ··A:-c::: · .... ·11·i' at 811. 
llOibid at 806. 
11 1Ibid at 797. 11 2 [ 19 71] AC 886. See also A+JE:=.P: v .§P: .. Y:4..E:=..!:. [ 19 7 7] 2 NSWLR 685 . Cf Doohan v Nelson [1973] 2 NSWLR 320. See also 
t!..l.1§.9..h.Jn.l=.>t.t. ~;"')?.::9.:44§ ( i'§'s'Gf 6 2 ALR 4 2 9 at 4 3 7 . 
, I 
constructive trusts. Any confusion caused by the decision 
in Pet.t,,i.t t 11 3 arose once again from a failure to distinguish 
conceptuall y between resulting and constructive trusts. 
The case law suggests that the courts are not very 
precise in terminology; inferring and imputing have been 
used interchangeably even when it is absolutely clear that 
inferring is the concept being used,114 
In 
Appeal, 
Havward 
............ ,· 
Giordani11s the New Zealand Court of 
leaned strongly towards the impu ti n g of intention 
in famil y home cases. The Co ur t of Appeal n everthe less 
found it unnecessar y to decide the issue, since sufficient 
evidence was already pres ent f rom ,,:hic h an agreement could 
be inferred. 
In Burn:c: v Burns 11 6 haller LJ once more r a ised t he 
question of whether th e cour ts could imput e an in t en t ion to 
the parties where there had been no agreement between them. 
He cited Lord Reid's judgment in Pettitt v Pettitt, 1 1 7 which 
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suggested that 
1 
ther e is alread~ a presumption which operates 
in the absence of evidence as regards money 
contributed by one spouse towards the 
................................................ 
1 1 3 P. .. ~ .. !: .. !:j ... !: .. :I:. v p e t t i t t [ 1 9 7 0 ] AC 7 7 7 . 
114S ee , e.g. , Petttt:t Y Pett._itt [1970] AC 
Lord Morris. 
115(1983] NZLR 140 at 153. Here the court 
was not bound by the precedent of the 
See, however, the criticism of tl~Y~~~~ 
M,us.ch.i.ns.k.i v Dodds. ( 1986) ALR 429 at 436. 
116(1984) Ch 31 7. 
117[1970] AC 777 at 794 . 
7 7 7 at 7 9 1 pe.r 
accepted that it 
House of Lords . 
v Giordani in 
Ii I 
I 'I 
I 
acquisition of property by the other spouse. 
So why should there not be a similar 
presumption where one spouse has contributed 
to the impro v ement of the propert y of the 
other? ... Th e improvemen t is made for the 
c ommon enjoyment of both spouses during the 
marriage . 11s 
Waller LJ n everthel ess rejected the possibi lity of impu ti ng 
intentions and concurred with the judgments of Fox LJ and 
May LJ to that effect. 
In spite of the clear contrary authority pr oYide d by 
the Hous e of Lords in G i s s ing \. Gissi n g 1 1 9 t h e Cou rt of 
Appeal in Bristol and West Building Society -v tJE:cJ::1:Dt:rig 1 2 ° 
appeared to accept that it was permissible to i mpute 
intenti on. Browne - Wi lkinson LJ hel d that the only way in 
which the defendant could es t a bl i sh either a cons tru e t i \·e 
trust or "some lesser r ight"121 based on proprietary 
estoppel, "would be to shoi--.· , inter ali_a, that as between her 
and Mr Henning the re was an express or tl!l-E1::lt~0 intention or 
assumption that she shoul d have such a r i ght."122 Browne -
Wi lkinson LJ was most concerned "that the common sense 
answer in this case ma y get lost in the many different 
technicalities which can arise ." 123 The legal title holder 
in Henn_ing had granted a mortgage to the Building Society 
................................ , .. , .............................................................. ... . 
1 1aBurns v Burns [1984] ( 19i:ffr···47 MLFi°'··°:3·4·1 at 3 4 3 ; 
119 (1971] AC 886. 
Ch 31 7 
(1984) 
120(1985] 1 WLR 778; Todd [1985] 
121(1985] 1 WLR 778 at 78 2. 
1221bid at 782. 
123 Ibid. 
at 322. See also Dewar 
14 Fam Law 4. 
Conv 361. 
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with the full knowledge and approval of the defendant, his 
de facto wife. They had both undertaken the joint project .............................................. 
of buying a family home with the assistance of a mortgage 
loan. 
bought. 
Without this loan the home could never have been 
When the legal title holder left the defendant , 
she alleged that she had a right of occupation in the 
property which enjoyed priority over the rights of the 
Building Society which had provided the bulk of the purchase 
money. The defendant had unsuccessfull y tried to find some 
way of paying the instalments under the mortgage. Browne-
Wilkinson LJ was not prepared, however, to accept that the 
defendant was entitled to stay in possession ind.efi ni tely 
without making any paymen t. The defendant had claimed in 
evidence that she would ha ve rea l ised that the Building 
Societ~ expected her beneficial interest (or other right) to 
be postponed in its favour but she said, "I never really 
thought abo u t it ... if somebody had explained it t o me as yoµ 
have now I ,..;ould have appreciated it. " 1 2 4 Browne-Wilkinson 
LJ explicitly stated that although Mrs Henning had no 
relevant intention , ''it would be ,.;rang to impute to the 
parties an y intention other than that the Society was to 
have a charge in priority to the parties' beneficial 
interests."12s The decision was clearly made on the ground 
of preventing what was seen as an injustice to the Building 
124 Ibid. 
12s rbid at 782. See Thompson (1986) 49 MLR 245; Thompson [1986] Conv. 57; M Welstead [1985] CLJ 354; Martin (1986) 16 Fam Law 315. See also Heavey v Heavey (1977) 117 ILTR 2. In a private interview ....... (zi····'- oct.o'S';;;·~· .... •1986) Sir Nicolas 
Browne-Wilkinson appeared to see very little difference between the imputing and the inferring of intention, and 
rejected any suggestion that he was not following Gissing in his decision in BrJ.§. .. t._ol ....... and .... w.e.s.t ....... Bu.ild.i.ng ...... s.o.ci.e.ty v Henni.ng. 
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society. To have decided otherwise would have permitted 
the defendant to retain an uncovenanted benefit. 
The distinction between imputing and inferring of 
intention is a fine one. 12s It wi ll be seen that a 
constructi ve trust will almost always be imposed where there 
is a substantial financial contribution to the legal tit l e 
holder. In such circumstances the imposition of the trust 
is based on little more than an imputed intention. 
ii) Es.toppe) 
In cases of proprietary estoppel the courts have not 
clearly dist inguished between inferring and imputing the 
nature of the represen tee's expectation . The y appear to 
have used both techniques in determining whether conduct c an 
be viewed as encouragement of the clai man t' s expectation. 
In t he '.\e ,,· South Wales case of Morris ,; Morris 1 2 7 the 
plaintiff had made a substantial contribution from the 
proceeds of s ale to1,ards the extension of the defendant's 
property. Mcclel land J ar ri-ved at what he described as 
the essential features of the arrangement in spite of the 
fact that there was no discussion relating to 
the duration of the proposed li ving 
arrangements, or as to what was to happen if 
1 2ssee Helsham CJ (1979) 8 (3) Sydney Law Review 571 at 576; 
K~I'~Y~~! v QQ~~~ (Unreported , Supreme Court of Victoria, 12 
December 1977); M Neave (1978) 11 Mel Univ Law Rev. 580. 
1 27(1982 ] 1 NSWLR 61. See also Broughall v Hunt 
(Unreported, Chancery Di vision February 1983); B.r .. i.stoland 
:v.{es t ....... Bu.i.ldi.ng .... s.o.c .. i.ety v tl~P..:r::t .tr::i.g [ 19 8 5 J 1 WLR 7 7 8 at 7 8 2. 
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the heretofore harmonious relationship 
between the parties broke down, or what was 
to happen if the defendants wanted to sell 
the house. 
On the basis of proprietary estoppel the plaintiff 
recei ved reimbursement of his expenditure. 
B INFERRING INTENTION FROM FINANCIAL EXPENDITURE .. ........................................... ........ ......... ...... ... ..... ... ....... ........... ... ................ ..... ....... .............. ........ ........ ........... ...... ... .................... .. ... .. ................. . 
i) 
During the period bet1,een the decision in .9t.!=.> .§~}1s; v 
C:,.t.s=':Xn.S: 1 2 s and the decision 1n Grant v Edwards 1 2 9 the courts 
tended to accept substantial direct f inan c ial expenditure 
referable to the property as ev idencing a common intention 
sufficient to found a constructive trust. There was lit tle 
discussion as to whether, in anr given case, a common 
intention could actually be inferred from the substantial 
financial expenditure referable to the property. In Gran t 
v Edi,.,' ar.ds, 1 3 o for instance, the Court of Appeal stressed 
that such expenditure merel y provided evidence from which 
the pa rties' intentions could be inferred. 131 According to 
the decision in Grant v Edwards . the relevant expenditure 
could occur either at the time of acquisition of the 
12s[1971] AC 886. 
129(1986) 2 All ER 426; 
130(1986) 2 All ER 426. 
13 lSee also Winkworth 
(1985) 52 P & CR 67; 
Warburton [1986) Conv 291 at 295. 
v Edward ......... Baron .......... De.ve.lopmen t .......... co .......... Lt.d 
K v K 1980 114 ILTR XXV. 
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1, 
property or at a later stage . In either case , however, the 
expenditure concerned must b e significantly greater than the 
expenditure which is required for the purpose of proving 
detrimental reliance on an overt agreement . 1 J 2 No cour t 
has y et been prepared to define with precision the nature of 
the substantial financial e x penditure which will be 
sufficient to permit an inference of a common intention. 
The Court of Appeal in Grant v EdwardslJJ de clined to 
arti c ula te such a defin i t ion , since there was in this case 
d ir e ct e vi d ence of a co mmon intention. 
b ) Inten tion not inferred 
In the context of constructive trusts the courts h ave 
not discussed at any length the question whether the state 
of knoKledge of t h e legal title holder concerning the nature 
of the finan cial pa:;-ments is a rele\·ant factor in inferring 
th e n ecessary co mmon i ntention. The legal title holder 's 
kn oKledge of t h e int en t io n of the claimant may be a relevant 
factor in the overall inquiry in constru ctive trusts in 
i nferring the common intention of the parties . If the 
legal t i tle ho lde r believes that the fin a ncial contr ibutions 
are being made to him as part of some bargain which does n ot 
have proprietary consequ e n ces, some objective judgment Kill 
require to be made as to the reality of that belief , 134 
In a very fe..,, cases the courts have been prepared to 
consider in greater detail whether the 
l32 Qrant v Edwards [1986) 2 All ER 426 at 434. 
133 Ibid . 
claimant's 
1 34See Grant v Edwards [ 1986] 2 All ER 426 at 439 P~.T Sir 
Nic olas ''i3"to;ne-w"{Tk'fnson V-C. 
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contribution, although both substantial and referable to the 
property, was such as to lead to the inference of a common 
intention. The cases have tended to concern disputes other 
than those between parties involved in a familial dispute. 
In his dissenting judgment in 
~' inlrno rth v Edwc.l-:r.:.<:t . :f.3-?.:.:r::.<?.r.:t Develo.pment 
explained that the description of 
the Court of Appeal 
Co .... Lt.d, 1 3 s Kerr LJ 
some payment being 
referable to the acquisition of some beneficial interest in 
propert y was onl y a convenient form of shorthand. He 
suggested that where the payment could be related to some 
other form of agreement , the inference that the payment was 
r eferable to the home would be negated. Kerr LJ's Yiew 
preva i led in the later appeal by the respondent to the House 
of Lords. Here it was hel~ that the payments must manifest 
an intention by both payer and payee that a beneficial 
interest was intended. 136 
In A:rinen v Rattee 1 3 • t he disputed property had been 
purchased with the aid of a one hundred per cent mortgage by 
the plainti ff, "'ho ha d ne\· e r li\·ed i n the propert:;·. He r 
co -o,,·ner then perm itted the defendant, a clo se friend, to 
live in the propert y . The defendan t contributed fifty per 
cent of the mortgage: payments and lent £4 50 to meet the 
plaintiff's legal expenses in t he purcihase. Lloyd LJ held 
that the defendant's mortgage payments were in respect of 
135(1985) 52 P & CR 67. 
13 6Winkworth v Edward .... Baron .... Deve .. lopment .... co ...... Ltd [ 1986] 1 WLR 
1512 at 1516. See Warburton [1987) Conv 217. See also 
:\.'.J .. ~~.:r:: v P...~.P.1::1.t. .. :r::.<?.r.:t (Unreported, Court of Appeal 6 March 1984); 
Neiderberger v Memnook (1982) 130 DLR (3d) 353 . 
1 37(1985) 1 EG LR 136. [1985] Conv 371; s.avage v 
Dunningham [1973] 3 All ER 429. 
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the use and occupation of the flat and, in the absence of 
any further agreement, could not give rise to a beneficial 
interest.ias 
c) I.nf e.rab.il.i.t.Y ...... and ..... fami l.ial ....... conduct 
Whether a financial contribution gives rise to a 
constructive trust depends, in the final analysis, on the 
judicial interpretation of familial conduct. Three cases 
illustrate particularly clearly the interpretation of such 
conduct. 
In :Rtc::!J?:<3:TCJ.,.§. v Pc:>YE'!, 1 a 9 the plaintiff claimed that her 
contribut ion to the deposit used to purchase the defendant's 
property gave her a beneficial interest in that property. 
v.·a1 ton J was not prepared to infer the common intention 
necessary to found a constructive trust. Since he held 
that the parties were living together only temporarily he 
was only prepared to regard that the plaintiff's monetary 
contribution as representing no more than an unconditional 
loan.1 4 0 There could therefore be no constructive trust on 
the facts of the case. 
1asAnnen v Rattee (1985) 1 EG LR 136 at 138 . See also 
Hann'a'fo"rd v Selby ( 1976) 239 EG 812 . 
..................................... -,.............. ...-.................. \ .. .. 
139(1974 ] 1 All ER 888. 
140Walton J at 894 explained clearly his view of the 
parties' relationship, "One hesitates slightly to put the 
matter on the basis that the whole of the consensual 
arrangement between the two of them was that Mr Dove should 
pay the rent and she should provide the food, and that they 
should mutually enjoy one another's sexual company; but it 
looks very close to that. She came straight from Jamaica 
into Mr Dove's bed, and when the split took place they 
continued to share the same bed for over a year . This 
points , I think , to the whole arrangement being purely one 
of convenience; there was certainly no thought of marriage 
on the pa:rt of either of them." 
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In Broug_hall v Huntt41 the elderly plaintiff had 
volunteered £1,000 towards an extension to her daughter's 
propert y in which the plaintiff subsequently resided. The 
parties later were unable to live amicably together and the 
plaintiff left to live in a mobile home. The parties had 
obviously given little thought to the nature of the 
plaintiff's contribution of £1,000. The plaintiff claimed 
that her money contribution had conferred on her a 
beneficial interest, whereas the defendants maintained that 
it was merel y a loan which had by now been discharged by 
their provi sion of board and lodgings for the plaintiff. 
Judge Wheeler QC was not prepared to find a beneficial 
interest in favour of the plaintiff. He explained that 
this was one of t hose all-too-frequent cases where much 
depends upon " individual recollection of events, many of 
,.,hich happened over 10 years ago and which at the time, 
probab l y had l itt l e or no significance to those conce rned." 
The passage of time and the underlying feeling to which the 
family dispute had given rise had ''t ended to harden views as 
to what was said and done and, more importantly of what was 
not said or done, so that several of the witnesses were on 
occasion far more dogmatic than their actual recollection of 
events warranted." 
Although Judge Wheeler QC was not prepared to infer an 
agreement to create a beneficial interest by way of 
constructive trust, he was nevertheless willing to impute to 
the parties a lesser intention, under some form of 
14 1Unreported, Chancery Division 1 February 1983. 
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proprietary estoppel, that the plaintiff could live there 
for the rest of her life in return for her payment of 
£1,000. Because this imputed agreement was no longer 
capable of ful f ilment and perhaps because the plaintiff was 
already rehoused she was awarded a financial remedy of 
£1,500,142 
In Re ........ S.harpe ... (A.. .. .. BankruptJ 1 4 a Browne-Wilkinson J was 
prepared on remarkably similar facts to infer an agreement 
to create an irrevocable licence for life in return for a 
loan of money by a licensee. The licensee was an elderly 
woman who not only required the property as her home but 
also needed the care of the legal title holder. Browne -
Wilkinson J held that where an irrevocable licence had been 
granted, a substantive constructive trust arose. 1 4 4 He 
felt bound by DHN Food Distributors 
..................................................................................................... 
Ltd Tower Hamlets 
where Lord Denning MR held that 
"a contractual licence (under which a person has the right 
to occupy premises indefinite l y) gives rise to a 
constructive trust, under which the legal owner is not 
allowed to turn out the licensee . "146 
The category of constructi v e trust raised in Re.Sharpe 
(A.. .... BankruptJ 14 7 differs in origin if not in effect from the 
i n tention-based familial constructive trusts which are under 
consideration in this chapter . There 
142See also W v W (1981) ILRM 202 at 205. 
143(1980) 1 ijLR ~19 . 
1 44S ee Woodman (1980) 96 LQR 336. 
is as 
14 5(1976) 1 WLR 852. See also Hayton [1977) CLJ 12. 
yet no 
146 DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough 
CouncJl [1976) 1 WLR 852 at 859. 
147[1980) 1 WLR 219. 
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satisfactory explanation of the legal basis for the category 
of constructi v e trust in Re ....... S.harpe ......... (A ...... Bankrupt.J . If the 
constructive trust were accepted as a purely remedial device 
which came into existence at the date of the court hearing, 
a link could be made between the Re .. s.h_arp·e ... .J.A .... Bankrupt...) type 
constructive trust and proprietary estoppel . The pre-
existing agreement to grant a permanent occupation right 
could accordingl y be seen in terms of a representation to 
the claimant which, if acted upon, would then bind the 
representor under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel . 
There are, of course, difficulties in that the 'inchoate 
equity' of estoppel is not generally regarded as 
constituting a right until the court hearing and, as such , 
will not bind third parties in advance of that hearing . 14S 
Once the hearing has taken place , it is true that the remedy 
might take the form of a constructive trus t, 1 4 9 but this 
type of trus t would itself appear to be binding on third 
parties only fro m the date of the court hearing. In Re 
the ( A .. B_ankrupt.J Browne-Wilkinson J rejected 
possibility of such a remedial constructive trust. 
It can be strongly argued that in Re §h~.1-::P.~ ... (A 
~?:..r::tk:r::\lP.t.)1 so was a case of proprietary estoppel. 1 s 1 The 
14SSee ante at 181 ff 
149See, e .g., Morris v Morris [1982] 1 NSWLR 
114. See also Hayton [ 1986] CLJ 394 at 398, 
is suggested that the English courts may 
remedial constructive trust. 
1so[1980 ] 1 WLR 219. 
61; ante at 
399 where it 
develop the 
1s1see also Martin [1980) Conv 207, 213; Sir Nicolas 
Browne-Wilkinson V-C has expressed the view that :R-.. ~ ......... .$.h .. <J.:..:r::.P.~ 
. .LA ........ !=.! .. 13.:.P..t .. :r::..:i::i.P .. 1:..1 was . a clear case of proprietary estoppel but 
that it was not argued on this basis . He explained that he 
felt bound by DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets 
1.<?.P..9'9..!l ........... :E.3. .. Q.:r::.Q.:t::ig_h ............ 99.:t::i .. r::t.<?.tJc [ 19 7 6] 1 WLR 8 5 2. ( private 
interview Z5 October 1986 ). 
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occupation right intended by the parties in this case was no 
different from the occupational right deemed to be the 
expectation of the plaintiff in Broughal.l v Hunt. 1 s 2 If 
occupational rights of this type are to be protected by 
means of a substantive constructive trust, more detailed 
consideration must be given to the position of third party 
purchasers.1s3 
d) In __ the ..... es_toppe_l ...... c.ont_ext 
In the estoppel context substantial financial 
expenditure wi ll certainly be an important factor in 
establishing that there has been a relevant encouragement . 
Where there has been substantial expenditure on the legal 
title holder's land , the expenditure warns the legal title 
holder that the person expending the money may have some 
expectation relating to the land . 
In Ramsden v Dvson154 Lord Wensleydale observed that 
······"····················· 
"equity considers it too dishonest ... to remain passive and 
afterwards to interfere and take the profit." 1 s s In 
the context of es~oppel the courts have tended towards a 
more considered analysis than in the context of constructive 
trusts of whether the financial expendi.ture provides 
1 s2unreported, Chancery Division 1 February 1983. 
1 s 3In Re ......... s .harpe ........ __ (A .......... BankruptJ [ 1980] 1 WLR 219 at 226 
Browne-Wilkinson J expressed his concern at the plight of a 
purchaser from the relevant trustee in bankruptcy (who was 
not a party to the action). The purchaser was living in a 
caravan with his family on Hampstead Heath. Browne-
Wilkinson J implied that such a third party would be bound 
only by actual (and not by merely constructive) notice. 
1 54(1866) LR 1 HL 129. 
l S 5Ibid·, 
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e v idence of the necessary belief encouraged by the legal 
title holder. Where the e x penditure can be seen as 
relating to a possible alternative belief on the part of the 
contributor , the courts have tended to dismiss any claim of 
relevant encouragement. The knowledge of the legal title 
holder is thus an important factor in determining whether 
his conduct is a relevant encouragement,156 
ii) Indirect fir.:i.?:J.:1.9.!.?:J. .expend.iture ..... referable ..... t. . .'?. ........ t.J1e 
a) Constructive trust 
In Gi.ssing Lord Pearson stated explicitly that the 
contributions relev an t in raising a constructive trust are 
not limited to t hose made directly in part 
payrnen t of the price of the property or to 
those made at the time when the property is 
conveyed into the name of one of the spouses. 
For instance there can be a contribution if 
b~ arrangement between the spouses one of 
them b y paiment of the household expenses 
enables the other to pay the mortgage 
instalments.1s7 
In the same case Lord Diplock similarly stated that 
1 s 6 S e e , e , g • , :g .. _}!: .... ):! ... ..J3-.~ .. :r..~ .. ... B . .9..gl .. ~ .. ~ ....... 1 .. !:.9.: v 9.:.:r. .. ~.Y. ( 1 9 7 9 ) 2 5 3 E G 4 7 3 ; 
Fru.i.n v f. .. :r..~ .. tl}. (Unreported, Court of Appeal 15 November 
19 8 3) ; W.§..T.!!.~-~. v !!.~9:.t~ .. Y. (Unreported, Court of Appeal 31 
January .1984). 
l57Gjssing v Gis~~nl [1971] AC 886 at 903. 
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It may be no more than a matter of 
convenience which spouse pays particular 
household accounts particularly when both are 
earning, and if the wife goes out to work and 
devotes part of her earnings or uses her 
private income to meet joint expenses of the 
household which would otherwi se be met by the 
husband so as to enable him to pay the 
mortgage instalments out of his moneys this 
would be consistent wi th and corroborative of 
an original common intention that she should 
share in the beneficial interest of the 
matrimonial home.1ss 
These speeches have led to confusion.1s9 It may be 
indirect financial payments, if substantial, can 
provide the basis for the inference of a relevant commo n 
intention if the legal title holder could not otherwise 
afford to purchase the property . Al though the indirect 
financial contributions have normally been required to be 
substantial in addition to being referable to the disputed 
property a number of Irish cases have taken a broad approach 
to this requirement. In f. ... :. .. .G ... :... v P. ... '. ... 9.. .. '. .. • 1 6 o for instance, the 
plaintiff had contributed to the general expenses of the 
family. These contributions meant that the defendant was 
able to engage in property deals in America, wher e the 
lSBGissing v Gissing [1~71] AC 
v Ha_z e .. J: .. J:. · [ 19 7 2 ] 1 WLR 301 ; 
Hall v Hall (1982) 3 FLR 379; 
886 at 908. See also Hazell 
.............. , .. ~················· Eekelaar ( 1972) 88 LQR 333; 
M ( 1 9 8 0 ) 11 4 I L TR 4 6 ; K 
Baumgartner v Baumgartner [19ff5] 
Nemeth (1977-1978) 17 ALR 500. 
Tiley [1970] CLJ 210; M v 
v K ( 1 9 8 0 ) 11 4 I LTR "ffo ; 
2 N·swLR 406. Cf Nemeth v 
1 s 9See, e.g., the speech of Lord Diplock in G.i.s.s .. i_ng at 909. 160(1982) ILRM 155. Cf M.G~. v R.D~ (1981) ILRM 377. 
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parties resided, without having to sell his Dublin house. 
The plaintiff was accordingly held to have acquired a 
beneficial interest in the Dublin house. Similarly, in R 
v g,1 61 McMahon J accepted that expenditure by the wife on 
herself and on household expenses gave rise to a beneficial 
interest in her favour. He explained that "in either case 
there is a saving to the husband and if that enables him p-,r::g 
.!:..?.-.P.: .. !:..9.. to meet the mortgage repayments the wife should be 
regarded as contributing towards these repayrnents."162 
It has been held however that indirect financial 
payments referable to the acquisition of property give rise 
to a constructive trust only if there is some pre-existing 
agreement between the parties. 163 In the Northern Ireland 
case of 
MacDermott 
McFarlane v 
LCJ held 
M_c_Far_l_a_ne, 1 6 4 
that a wife's 
for instance, Lord 
substantial financial 
contributions to household expenditure could no t, in the 
absence of further agreement, give rise to a beneficial 
interest behind a constructive trust. 1 6 s The Lord Chief 
Justice viewed financial contributions to housekeeping as 
"part of a joint and unselfish adventure" 1 6 6 and could see 
161Unreported, High Court of Republic of Ireland 12 January 
1979. See also Coonei (1979) 14 I Jur (NS) 3. 
162Unreported, High Court of Republic of Ireland 12 January 
1979. See also (1984) 2 ILT 40. 
163See, e.g., C v _g [1976] IR 254. CR v DR (19.85) 13 ILT 
137. 
164(1972] NI 59. 
165 Ibid at 70. See also McGill v Snodgra~s [1979] IR 283; 
Cooney (19 79) I Jur (NS) 7. 
16 6McFarl_ane v McFarl_ane [ 1972] NI 59 at 70. See also the 
view of the trial judge i:ri Pettkus v ~--~ . .9..~ .. ~.T. (cited in 11 7 
DLR (3d) 257 at 265) who found that the de facto wife's 
contribution to household expenses " ... was in the nature of 
risk capital invested in the hope of seducing a younger 
defendant into marriage." This conclusion was rejected by 
Ritchie J in the Supreme Court hearing as "gratuitously 
insulting". 
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no grounds for inf erring a relevant common intention from 
s uch cont r ibu t i ons . 
Even i f both parties are engaged in an un selfish 
adv enture, the male role in that adventure seems to be 
undul y rewarded if the courts hold that there can be no 
inference of intention to grant a beneficial interest to the 
female . The male is more likely to be the main wage earner 
a n d is more likel y to use his wages to finance the 
a c quisition of the famil y home . The female, by contrast , 
is more likely to use her more limited financial resources 
on household expenditure, a domain which is mor e 
pa r t i c ularl y hers b y tradition . 
b) Es.top pe__l 
I n cases of proprietary estoppel there is n o 
r e quirement that indirect financial contributions shoul d b e 
refera b le to the disputed p r ope r ty . Unlike the position 
wi th cons truc ti v e t r u s ts, the common e xpectation of t h e 
parti es in pr o p r ietary estoppel cases may relate to an 
occupa t ion r i g h t. Contr i bu t ions to h ousehold e x penditure 
are merel y part of the total conduct from which could be 
i nferre d a belie f that s uch a right e x ists ,16 7 
16 7See Vi.nden v Vinden [1982] 1 NSWLR 618. Cf g.j.._9_!:~ o f Kirby P in Baumgartner v Baum~artner [ 1985] 2 NSWLR 406 at 
415 to the . effect that contributions not referable to the 
property do not give rise to proprietary estoppel. 
288 
I 
·Jl"J'' 
I 
Ii 
II 
'11 
I! 
I 
II 
11
1
'1 I 
I I 
I I I 
I 
11 
I I 
, I 
I 1 
11 
I II 
II .r 11 
I 
ii 11• 
11, lj 
.!, ' 
:111 
I 
! 
,.I l,1 IJ 
II 
!I 
1111 
11: 11, 
I 
,Ii I 
I• 
l Ii 
1!'1 
I ! 
I· 
I ,I 
,. 
:: . ! 
,. ' 
1!1'1 11 ~ 
C INFERRING .. oF ..... INTENT.ION FROM, __ NON-FINANC.I.AL ...... coNTRIBUTI.ONS 
i ) Constructive trust 
.. ,-....... -...... , ... -....... -........................................................... , .. --······ 
a) Intention inferred 
.................................................................................. ... _., ................. . 
The courts have shown a marked reluctance to infer a 
common intention from non-financial contributions. 1 6 s In 
rare cases such contributions have been accepted as enabling 
an inference of a common intention if they are non-domestic, 
substantial and are referable to the acquisition of a family 
home. In :t:J .. t..?S .. 9..P.. v Ni.xon, 1 6 9 Lord Denning MR distinguished 
the unpaid work of a wife in running her husband's 
greengrocery business from the unpaid domestic work 
necessarily connected with running a home. The former, he 
held, gave rise to a constructive trust of the husband's 
property but not the latter . 
In the Irish case of C.R . v D~R~_, 110 Lynch LJ accepted 
in principle that non-domestic work if substantial c an lead 
to an inference of common intention . In the ins t ant case 
the plaintiff had helped her husband in his veterinary 
practice . She had acted as his chauffeur because he was an 
alcoholic a n d was unable to drive himself . This h elp was 
not , however, deemed a sufficient basis for any inference of 
an agreement that the plaintiff should obtain a beneficial 
1 6 ssee , e . g . , Wood v W..<?. .. SJ.g. (Unreported, Court of Appeal 7 
July 1982) where the Court of Appeal refused to infer a 
r elevant common intention f r om t he loan of deeds as security 
t o enable the completion of purchase of the disputed 
prope r t y. 
169( 1969] 1 WLR 16 76 . 
170(198 5) 13 ILT 137 . Se e also Mc C v Mc C (Unreported, 
Supr e me Court of Republi c of I r el and 29 Ma r ch 19 84 ) . Cf 
tl ... : .. 9..'. .. v :R. .. : .. P. ... : .. . (Unreported, High Court of Re public of Ireland 
April 19 8 1). 
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interest in the defendant's property. This result may 
appear a little harsh since it is clear that the husband 
would have been unable to continue his practice without his 
wife's help. 
In M v Ml7 1 the High Court of the Republic of Ireland 
took a somewhat more liberal view of n on-financial 
contributions . Here the claimant wife had taken her 
children to live with her sister for eight years. 
Precisely because the claimant had lived rent free in her 
sister's house, the court deemed her to have freed her 
husband to make repayments on the disputed property, and 
the wife's share of the property was increased b y means of a 
cons t ructive t rus t. The common intention required in 
support of this trust was inferred from the fact that the 
claiman t had released her husband from his obligation of 
support. 
In Hayward 
............ , .............. ............. . 
v Giordani 1 7 2 the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal maintained that it was inferring an intention to 
create a trust from the plaintiff's substantial improvements 
to property owned b y his now deceased de facto wife. 
There was even arguably sufficient e v idence for the court to 
have found that there was an ov ert agreement . Three 
factors may hav e influenced the court to take a liberal 
approach to the inference of intention . First , an informal 
homemade will was produced in court. In this document the 
deceased purported to leave the disputed property to "Mr E 
Hayward my de ...... _ ....f.acto husband houe 
171(1980). 114 ILTR 46. 
172(1983] NZLR 140. 
(sic) has been so 
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wonderful! to me and given me so much happiness . "173 
§econd , the plaintiff's partner had repeatedly suggested 
t hat the property be put into joint names, but the plaintiff 
had alway s rejected this as unnecessary. He was twenty 
years older than she was , expected to die before her and 
regarded it as sufficient that there was an "unwritten and 
unspoken agreement between them that the property was his as 
well as hers". 1, 4 Thjrd, the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
was e x ploring the possibility of imputing the relevant 
intention or even abandoning intention as an essential 
requirement of constructive trusts. The Court of Appeal 
finally decided that neither of these ways forward was 
necessary for the immediate decision in the .l::I.?-.Y~?.::r::q S:: .c.l:§~ but 
left open the possibility of a radical change along these 
lines in the future.175 
Prior to the decision by the Canadian Supreme Court176 
to base the constructi v e 
enrichment, the Canadian 
trust 
courts 
on a 
had 
theory of unjust 
been prepared to 
r ecognise a limited type of domestic contribution as leading 
17 3Ibid at 141 p~:r:: Cooke J. Here the Ne w Zealand Court of Appeal accepted that there was sufficient e v idenc e to g ive 
r ise to an intention-based trust, but failed to c ategorize 
th is trust precisely . The Court of Appeal conside red i t 
un n ecessary to consider " the alternati v e argument . .. of 
c onstructi v e trust . " The trust accepted was c learl y a 
constructi v e trust . The alternati v e claim was to a 
constructi v e trust not requiring common intention , as in 
M.~_§..S::P.:J_l}_§}S. t v Dodds ( 198 6 ) 6 2 ALR 4 24 . Cf !\.i:1-.. r.::.g .. Y!.:1?:f.: v pgg.~J~ (Unre p orted , Su p r e me Court o f Victoria 1 2 February 19 77) 
where the court refu sed to infer an intention from what i t 
v iewed as tri v ial improvements to the property. See also 
Hoare v Hoare. ( 198 2) 13 Fam Law 14 2 whe r e t he impr ov e me n ts 
were not onl y insubstantial but were seen as " no more than 
what a fath e r, h e lping his only son to set up a house with 
h is wi f e , o f whom he a n d his wi fe we r e then v ery fond, would do." Se e also Mc Gill v Snodgrass [1979] IR 283. 
174(1983] NZLR 140 at 144. 
175Ibid .at 153. 
176fett~-~.§. v !3,_~9..h.~!. (1980) 117 DLR (3d) 257. 
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to an inference of common intention.177 Such an inference 
required that the domestic contribution in question had to 
be an integral part of a work situation to which the woman 
was also making a non-domestic labour contribution. In 
:F.athwe_ll v g?-.. t..h.!::1.~ .. t!.17 8 Dickson J was prepared to recognise 
the provision of meals by the claimant as relevant conduct 
from which a common intention could be inferred. The 
workplace was a farm and Dickson J observed that to grain 
belt farmers "the kitchen was just as much part of the 
farming operation as the feed lot or the machine shed." 1 7 9 
In other words the farmer could not earn his living without 
being fed and the provider of food was deemed to work on the 
farm as much as had she driven the combine harvester. In 
other commonwealth jurisdictions the recognition of similar 
and limited types of domestic contribution has not been 
extended to cover housekeeping or childrearing whe r e the 
workplace is not also an integral p art of the home. So fa:r 
contributions of the latter kind have been recognised as 
evidence of detriment in the constructive trust context. 
In Eves v Eves 18 o Brightman J remarked that if a common 
intention had not been oral and express, the plaintiff ' s 
building work would not in itself have been conduct from 
which the requisite common intention could be inferred. 
l77Albeit in a resulting trust context. 
178(1978) 83 DLR (3d) 289. 
17 9Ibid at 299. 
180(1975] 1 WLR 1338 at 1345. See Ingleby [1984] CLJ 227; 
Dewar (1984) 47 MLR 735. 
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b) Intention not inferred ·-····· ...................... - .,,, ... _,_,,_ .... _.,,-,,,,_., .......... ._ ........ _, .... _,,, ............. ,_.,,-,., 
The more usual policy of the courts towards non-
financial contributions, particularly of a domestic nature, 
is illustrated b y the case of ;i:3-_-µ_!:_l} .. §. v :i:3-. .Y. .. !'.:.P. §. 1 s 1 
plaintiff was the 9:.~ ....... .f. .. ~ .  9. .. t. . .<?. wife of the defendant. 
Here the 
She had 
lived with the defendant for seventeen years, had given 
birth to, and taken care of their two children . During 
this time she had taken total responsibility for the 
housekeep ing and decoration the defendant's property. May 
LJ, held, with the concurrence of Fox and Waller LJJ, that 
when a house is purchased in the man's name alone, in the 
absence of any substantia l financial contribution towards 
either the purchase price, deposit or mortgage instalments 
of the family home , his partner 
In 
is not entitled to an y share in the 
beneficial interest in that home even though 
over a v ery substantial number of years she 
may hav e worked just as hard as the man in 
maintaining the family in 
keeping the house , giYing 
looking after and helping to 
children of the union.1s2 
the sense of 
birth to and 
bring up the 
Burns V Burns there was no overt agreement ,,- .......................... between 
th e parties . The man would not have been able to work .and 
so to purchase the family · home if the plaintiff had not 
181( 1984) 1 All ER 244. See also Wood v Wood Court of Appeal 7 July 1982); ~_µ __ 3.:J:~:ri.-·-·v f..~:r.'.!2.Y. Court of Appeal 24 November 1981) . 
1s2Burns v Burns [1984) 1 Ch 317 at 345. 
(Unreported, 
(Unreported, 
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accepted responsibility for the care of their children and 
home. Fox LJ suggested, however, that the plaintiff had 
been amply rewarded for her household and child care duties. 
According to Fox LJ the plaintiff entered upon her 
relationship with the defendant knowing that there was no 
prospect of him marrying her 
and it is evident that in a number of 
respects he treated her very well. He was 
generous to her, in terms of money, while the 
relationship continued, and, what in the long 
term is probabl y more important, he 
encouraged her to develop her abilities in a 
number of ways, with the result that she 
buil t up the successful driving school 
business.1s3 
This approach suggests in this area that the court may be 
just as concerned to balance out the benefits gained by the 
parties as to seek for any common intention which may or may 
not have been expressed by them. 
Although the courts' refusal to infer common intentions 
from non-financial contributions has been sex-neutral, such 
a tendency is clearly more likely to affect women than 
men. t s 4 In Grant v Sanderson,1ss however, the Court of 
183 Ibid at 332. 
184See Otto Kahn-Freund, Matrimonial Property__: ......... -... where ....... do ....... we 
go from here? (The Joseph Unger Memorial Lecture delivered 
in Birmingham in January 1971). See also Q ..r. .. 9..:i:1. .. !: .. ~ .. 9..h. v 
GE .. 9.E. .. !:.§..9..P:. ( 1978) FLC 90-461 in which it was suggested that 
"it does appear that the fruit ripening on the tree of 
marriage has all fallen in the husband's basket." 
1ssunreported, Court of Appeal 20 April 1983. 
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Appeal rejected the male's contribution as giving rise to 
an inference of an intention to share the beneficial 
interest in the property. His contribution took the form of 
glazing , replacing guttering and facia boards and putting up 
scaffolding. The work here was considered to be what a 
normal 'do-it-yourself male ' would do. 
c) Ef.f.e.ct ...... on ...... the .... ...fam.i.ly 
Lord Scarman has said that "married women are not 
single women . They live with and for their husbands and 
children in a unit known as the family which it is the 
policy of the law to cherish and support. "1 s 6 This 
statement ma y be equally true of other familial 
relationships which operate for the common good of the 
household unit. Any refusal by the courts to infer an 
intent ion to reward non - financial contributions within the 
family may lead to a decline in th e unselfish support which 
is so readily given for the welfare of the family unit. It 
is interesting, for instance , that Article 41 2 (1) of the 
Irish Constitution provides that 
In particular the State recognises that by 
her life within the home, the woman gives to 
the State a support without which the common 
good cannot be achieved. 
( 2) The State shall therefore endeavour to 
ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by 
1 s &Lord Scarman, Woman ....... and ....... Equal.i.tY. ...... bef ore .......... the .......... Law. See 
also Wade, (1979) 6 (2) Univ Tas Law Rev 97; Freeman, (1985) 38 Current Leg Problems 153 at 175. 
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economic necessity to engage in labour to the 
neglect of their duties in the home. 
If women , who are mothers, are valued in this way by the 
state, it seems inconsistent to differentiate between non-
financial contributions and financial contributions. Few 
men would be able to finance any alternative support system 
of housekeeping and child rearing whi ch enables them to work 
and thereby acquire the family home. The contribution of 
women in this manner can and should be quantified. 1s1 
ii) Es.t_o_ppe_l 
There are as yet no cases of 
which non-financial contributions 
proprietary estoppel in 
alone have been accepted 
as proof that the estoppel claimant has been encouraged to 
believe that rights in property are being obtained. Non -
financial contributions are merely part of the totality of 
the conduct wh ich the court must examine in determining 
whether any given conduct constitutes encouragement. There 
seems, however, to be no reason in principle why such 
~ontributions should not give rise to an inference of 
=ncouragement . The in-ference might be that at least a 
Long-term occupational right was intended by the parties. 
rhe legal title holder's awareness of his own rights and of 
:. he nature of the expectation of the claimant would 
)bviously be an important factor in determining whether an 
Lnference of encouragement could be made from non-financial 
8 7A major English insurance company , Legal and General, has 
1uantified the value of domestic contribution at £19 , 240per 
rear (The Times 28 March 1986 p 3 8) . 
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contributions. It is possible that the plaintiff in !3-.:i::i .. r..!l.~ 
v Burns 1 8 8 might well have succeeded if she had pleaded 
proprietary estoppel rather than constructive trust. She 
had cared for the children of her relationship with the 
defendant and taken care of the domestic arrangements of the 
home for seventeen years. It should not have been 
difficult to infer that she reasonably believed that she 
would be housed and cared for by the defendant on a long-
term basis. On this basis the plaintiff could have been 
awarded a financial remedy for the loss of this long-term 
occupational right. 1s9 
In Coombes v Sm.i.th, 1 9 0 however, the court rejected 
precisely such an approach. The plaintiff in this case had 
claimed that taking care of the illegitimate child of her 
relationship with the defendant was evidence that she had 
been led to believe that she had a right to occupy his 
property permanently.191 The court rigidly rejected the 
plea of proprietary estoppel, being unprepared to infer the 
requisite relevant expectation. It might, however, be 
suggested that the expectation of the plaintiff was 
interpreted from a male standpoint. The court was prepared 
to infer that the woman's expectation concerning her 
occupation of the property was merely for the duration of 
her relationship with the defendant or until their child 
became independent . 
188(1984] 1 Ch 317. 
l89See Dodsworth v Dodsworth (1973) 228 EG 1115. See also 
the approach in Tanner v T.~!l!l. .. ~ .. r.. [1975] 1 WLR 1346 in the 
context of contrac'tual ... licences. 
190(1986] 1 WLR 808. 
191 See ante at 103 ff 
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D _INFERRED ...... COMMON ..... INTENTI.ON ...... - ...... MYTH ...... OR ...... F ACT_? 
The decisions discussed in this chapter indicate that 
in the majority of cases relating to constructive trusts 
the courts will infer the existence of the required common 
intention only if there has been substantial financial 
expenditure or if (in the rare case) there has been 
considerable non-domestic labour. Contributions of either 
kind must in any event be referable to the acquisition of 
the disputed property. There has been little serious 
analysis of whether the claimant's contributions could be 
viewed as objectively manifesting a common inten t ion to 
share in the beneficial interest of the property. This 
limited approach · resembles the strictly circumscribed 
process by which intentions are imputed in the law of 
re sulting trusts. 
In their attempts to infer a relevant common intention 
the courts have often been accused o f indul ging in a 
mythical exercise. Helsham CJ in Equi ty of the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales has observed that it is unreal to 
suggest that the basis of the trusts which the court has 
found to e x ist in this matrimonial or quasi-matrimonial set 
up is one of actual intention . According to Helsham CJ 
the court attributes a common intention to the parties 
whenev er it is fair to do so. A trust is brought into 
being to meet the justice and equity of the case where "what 
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ought to be joint property ought to be so because its 
acquisition or improvement has been facilitated by the joint 
effort."192 
In :R .. ?.-.. t..h.~.~.Jl v :R?-.t.h.~~Ll 1 9 3 Dickson J described the 
search for a common intention as '' a meaningless ritual in 
search for a phantom intent." 1 9 4 He was later able to 
persuade a majority of the Canadian Supreme Court in P. .. ~ .. t. .. t.l:i:.:i:1 .. s 
v Becker19S to abandon common intention as the king bolt of 
the constructive trust. Giving the majority judgment of 
the Supreme Court Dickson J substituted the remedial 
constructive trust based on unjust enrichment. 196 
VI ABANDONMENT OF COMMON INTENTION IN THE CANADIAN 
JURISDICTIONS 
A The .. extended .. .. resu.lti.ng ... t.:r:.:t::i .. ~ .. !: 
The Canadian courts have abandoned the search for the 
mythical common i _ntention as a prerequisite of the 
192Helsham (1979) 8 (3) Sydney Law Review 571 -at 576; See 
also Wade (1979) 6 (2) univ Tas Law Rev 97; Jones (1969) 28 CLJ 196 ; Woodman (1980) 96 LQR 336; Zuckerman (1980) 96 
LQR 248, at 252. 
193 (1978) 83 DLR 289. 
1 9 4 ( 1 9 7 8 } 8 3 DLR ( 3 d ) 2 8 9 at 2 9 9 . 
shared by Laskin CJ and Spence J, 
254; Gray , [1983] CLJ 33; Pound 
420. 
Dickson J' s vi ew was 
See also C v C [1976] IR 
( 1920) 33 Harv Law Rev 
195(1980) 117 DLR(3d) 257. See also the dissenting judgment of Laskin CJC in ~.Y. .. [9.:.<? .. 9..h. v M::µ .. E.9.:.9..£.h. ( 19 7 3) 41 DLR(3d) 367 at 389. 
196(19 86) 11 7 DLR(3d) 257 at 275. 
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constructive trust,197 Prior to Pettkus v Becker 1 9 s the ...... --............... ,, .. __ ,,,..... . ......................... -...... . 
resulting trust, based on financial contributions to the 
cost of acquisition of the property, provided the most usual 
means by which the courts could grant claimants an 
equitable share in property. 1 9 9 The Canadian courts had 
considerably extended the concept of resulting trusts. 
Post-acquisition financial contributions and substantial 
contributions of labour were both accepted as raising 
retrospectively an inference of intention to share the 
beneficial interest in property. 2 o o This broad approach 
had indeed been criticised as somewhat artificial. Donovan 
Waters stressed that in the majority of cases there was an 
absence of any real common intention at the time the 
disputed property was acquired . He observed that the 
retrospective inference was merely "a constructi ve trust 
approach masquerading as a resulting trust approach. " 201 
In giving the majority decision of the Supreme Court in 
Rathwell v Ra thwel.l, 2 o 2 Ritchie J applied the extended 
resulting trust approach . He held that th e woman's limi ted 
financial contribution to the propert y at the t ime of 
1 s 7 ( 1 9 8 0 ) 11 7 DLR ( 3 d ) 
[1983] NZLR 140 at 
Hodkinson [1983] Conv 
ALR 429 at 453. 
198(1980) 117 DLR(3d) 
977. 
257. 
153; 
420; 
257; 
See also H?.:.Y~.1:l:T9: v Qt.<::>.r. c:l. ?.::.r..it 
Easton (1982) 12 VUWLR 159; 
M.:t:1. .. §.C?J?:J.r..i .. :;,.J.~t v Do.dds ( 19 86) 6 2 
Girard (1983) 28 McGill Law Jour 
I99 See Rathwell v g,9-_t,h.~-~JJ (1978) 83 DLR(3d) 289. 
2 o OThe Canadian Courts have stressed the role of intention in resulting trusts. See, e.g. , Pet tkus v Becke.r . ( 19 80) 117 DLR(3d) 257 at 265; Bryan (1982) 12 Fam Law 21; Neide rberger v M..~.J:P.:!..1 .. 9. .. 9..!s. ( 1982) 130 DLR( 3d) 353; Oosterhoff (1979) L VII Can Bar Rev 356; McCamus & Taman (1978) 16 (3) Osgoode Hall Law Jour 741; McClean (1982) 16.1 UBC Law Rev 155 at 156. 
201waters (1975) L 111 Can Bar Rev 366. 
202(1978) 83 DLR(3d) 289. See also Abella (1981) 13.1 Ottawa Law Rev 1 at 10, 
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acquisition plus her substantial non-domestic labour 
contribution thereafter gave rise to a resulting trust. 
In R..~.t..h.~ .. ~ .. tl Dickson J held, with the concurrence of 
Laskin CJC and Spence J that the pl~intiff was entitled to 
succeed either on the doctrine of resulting trust or the 
doctrine of constructive trust. Dickson J took the 
opportunity to appl y the concept of the constructive trust 
based on unjust enrichment, thus following the dissenting 
judgment of Laskin Jin the earlier Canadian case of Murdoch 
v Murdoch.2oa This type of constructive trust eschews any 
requirement of common intention . Dickson J explained that 
the relief is part of the equitable 
jurisdiction of the Court and does not depend 
on e vidence of intention . . the court will not 
allow an y man unjustly to appropriate to 
himself the va lue earned by the labours of 
another ... but, for the principle to succeed, 
the facts must display an enrichment, a 
corresponding deprivation and the absence of 
any juristic reason ... for the enrichment.204 
203(1973) 41 DLR(3d) 367 at 377. Laskin J's dissenting judgment was itself ( 1954) grounded on the Supreme Court 
decision , in D e.g. l man v .G.:t::1.?.: .. 1.-:'. .. ?.:P..:t..Y. ....... '.LJ.-:::t::I.?. .. t. ...... 9..<? ......... .<?..f. ........ 9.?.:.!.lc?.:9:?.: ...... ?.:!.lc.?-Constantineau ( 1954) 3 DLR 785 which for the first time 
recognised the principle of unjust enrichment, as g9od law in Canada in the context of quasi-contractual restitutionary 
claims. See also Jacobsen ( 1974) 20 McGill Law Jour 308, 
where it was suggested that the decision reached in Pettkus 
v ~.~9Js.~ .. r.. based on Laskin J ' s judgment could never happen in Canada. See also McClean (1970) 4 (1) UBC Law Rev 1. 
2 04Rathwell v Rathwell (1978) 83 DLR(3d) 289 at 306; McCamus & Taman (1978) 16 Osgoode Hall Law Jour 741; Bates (1979) 129 NLJ 288. 
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B) Constructive ... trusts ..... based ...... on ..... un.just ..... enrichment 
It was not until Pettkus v Becker2os reached the 
···--·-.. -, ....................... .. 
Canadian Supreme Court that a majority of the Supreme Court 
finally buried the artificially extended resulting trust . 
Dickson J, giving judgment on behalf of six of the nine 
members of the Supreme Court, firmly established as part of 
the common law of Canada the doctrine of constructive trust 
based on unjust enrichment.206 In P. .. ~ .. !: .. !J~.~ .. t:3- v Be.cker, 2 o 7 the 
appellant, was a bee keeper who had lived with the 
respondent for almost 20 years. They had lived frugally, 
the respondent having paid the rent, bought the food and 
clothing and having paid for other living expenses. The 
appellant was enabled by this expenditure to save his 
earnings. Using these sav ings he eventually purchased a 
farm in his sole name and established a bee keeping 
business . The respondent worked hard in this enterprise 
for 14 years but received no remuneration for her efforts. 
Further properties were purchased in the sole name of 
the appellant using moneys from the bee keeping business. 
After a deterioration in their relationship, the responden t 
departed. The appellant gave her $3,000, the car and 10% 
of the bee hives. Three months later the respondent 
returned and gave back the gifts. It was agreed that they 
would resu~e their relationship; that a joint bank account 
would be opened and all receipts from the sale of honey 
205(1980) 117 DLR(3d) 257. 
206The Quebec Civil Code 1980 permits a compensatory 
allowance to be paid to the non-legal title holder where he 
has "enriched" the legal title holder. 
207(1~80) 117 DLR(3d) 257. 
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would be deposited in that account. The parties built a 
new house on land previously purchased in the appellant's 
name. The cost of construction was paid for by moneys from 
the bee keeping business. Some time later the parties' 
relationship finally came to an end and the respondent once 
again departed the property. She claimed a half-share in 
all of the appellant's properties. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal varied the judgment at 
trial which had imposed a constructive trust under which the 
respondent was entitled to receive a half-share in all of 
the appellant's property. The appellant appealed to the 
Supreme Court. Dickson J was given the opportunity he had 
awaited since Rathwell to end the judicial quest for that 
fugitive common intention which had so far been essential 
for the purpose of founding a resulting trust. 
It was clear in P.~!:.!:..t1::1_§ v ;I:}_~ _ gJs~.:r::2 o s the parties to the 
dispute had no overt common intention. The trial judge had 
found that Rosa Becker's contribution to the household 
expenses prior to the acquisition of the first property "was 
in the nature of risk capital invested in 
seducing a younger defendant into marriage."209 
found this statement somewhat lacking in 
the hope of 
Dickson J 
gallantry. 
Ritchie J, in stronger terms, declared it to be gratuitously 
insulting. The Ontario Court of Appeal had upheld the 
finding at trial that there was no common intention but 
Ritchie J was prepared to disregard that finding. In his 
minority j u dgment he held that a result i ng trust had arisen 
208Ibid . 
209 Ibid at 265 . 
303 11 1 , 
I 
on the facts, 2 1 o Dickson J, however, was not prepared to 
overrule the express finding of both the trial judge and the 
Ontario Court of Appeal. 
There could not have been a more opportune moment for 
the introduction of the doctrine of unjust enrichment in the 
determination of familial property disputes. The fact-
situation in Pettkus v 
~,.~,.9.-~-~ .. :r.: c 1 ear 1 y demanded a remedy. 
The evidence was such that a resulting trust based on a 
common intention inferred from financial contributions could 
have been imposed had it not been for the earlier findings 
of the lower courts.211 
C The ...... requirements .. ,. .. of .... unjus."t:..,.,.,.~.P.:.!'..J .. C?. fl:il.1..~.P.:.!: 
In P..~.!:.:f::)S\1.!::i v ~~9.~.~r.:: Dickson J reiterated the principles 
of unjust enrichment which he had laid down in Rathwell. 
In his v iew three requirements must be met as a basis for 
any finding of unjust enrichment: i . e . , an enrichment, a 
corresponding deprivation and the absence of any juristic 
reason for the enrichment . For the court to impose a 
constructive trust based on unJust enrichment, there must be 
a causal relationship between the unjust enrichment and the 
acquisition of the disputed property . Here the appellant 
had been enriched by the respondent's nineteen years of 
unpaid labour . 
210 lbid . 
The respondent had been correspondingly 
2 l lPettkus v ~-~,.<?..~--~.£. was decided in 1980 after a six-year 
battle. Rosa Becker spent a further six years attempting 
to have her interest under a constructive trust enforced . 
In November 1986 she committed suicide leaving letters 
stating that her death was a protest against a legal system 
that denied her the fruits of her v ictory. ( The Montreal 
Gazette 11 ·November 1986 p 1 col 1). 
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deprived of the value of her labour during this time. The 
third requirement was fulfilled, according to Dickson J, if 
one person in a relationship tantamount to 
spousal prejudices herself in the reasonable 
expectation of receiving an interest in the 
property and 
relationship 
conferred by 
the other person in the 
freely 
the 
accepts 
first 
benefits 
person in 
circumstances where he knows or ought to have 
known of that reasonable expectation. 212 
This third requirement implies that once a reasonable 
e xpectation comes to the knowledge of the legal title holder 
he is under a duty to refuse the contribution of the 
claimant. If he accepts such a contribution, he is taken 
to have acquiesced in the claimant's expectation and must 
give effect to it. The language in which this third 
requirement is couched is reminiscent of the requirement of 
encouragement under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. 
It can reasonably be questioned whether Dickson J' s 
third requirement is little more than 'common intention ' by 
another name. If the claimant must have a reasonable 
expectation that she would receive an interest in the legal 
title holder's property and the latter must know or ought to 
have known of that expectation, there would appear to be a 
requirement of at least implied common intention. 
title holder does not reject the contribution, 
212(1980) 117 DLR(3d) 257 at 274. 
If the 
he is 
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effectively implying that he shares the claimant's 
expectation concerning his property. The Canadian Courts 
have not, however, accepted such an interpr~tation, taking a 
much more liberal view of Dickson J' s third requirement . 
The burden of proof is on the legal title holder to 
demonstrate that his enrichment at the expense of the 
claimant occurred without any knowledge of the claimant's 
e xpectation.213 Once he knows of that expectation, he may 
not in justice accept the claimant's contribution without 
giving effect to the expectation . If he cannot satisfy this 
burden of proof, the courts have been prepared to impute the 
necessary reasonable expectation even where the claimant has 
clearly not gi v en any thought as to what her expectation 
was. 2 i 4 By imposing a 
constructive trust, Dickson 
principled 
J was able 
basis 
to 
for 
evade 
the 
the 
accusations of "palm tree justice" wh ich were levelled at 
Lord Denning MR' s at tempts to impose constructive trusts 
where justice, equity and good conscience require the court 
to prov ide some remedy. 21s 
D P.9..~.~ .. ~ .. t..A,9. ..... 9..9.!1.t..:r.:.~.PY..t.A.9.P. ... as .... un j us t .... E:!_!1.TJ..9..h.~.~-!1..t 
Once the concept of a constructive trust based on 
unjust enrichment had become accepted law in Canada, the way 
was opened for the recognition of domestic contribution as 
unjust enrichment. 
213See Girard (1983) 28 McGill L Jour 977 at 1000 . 
214This was indeed the case in Pettkus v Becker. 
.................................... 21ssee Hodkinson [1983) Conv 420. 
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In Sorochan v Sorochan 2 1 6 the Supreme Court finally 
recognised that domestic contributions could confer unjust 
enrichment on a legal title holder just as readily as 
financial contributions. The parties in Sorochan had 
lived together in a de facto relationship for 42 years. 
They had worked the family farm together and produced six 
children . The appellant did all the domestic labour 
associated with running the household and caring for the 
children. She also laboured long hours alone on the family 
farm whilst her q~ __ _f._~.9. .. !:.C? husband worked as a travelling 
salesman . 
The Alberta 
judge's finding 
appellant. It 
Court of Appeal had reversed the trial 
of a constructive trust in fav our of the 
held that there was no causal connection 
between her contribution of labour and the acquisition of 
the property by the respondent . 
Court was given by Dickson CJC. 
Judgment in the Supr e me 
He did not differentiate 
between the appellant's domestic contribution to the 
household and her labour on the farm but held that the 
respondent had deri v ed a benefit from both types of labour. 
According to Dickson CJC , this benefit included the valuable 
savings made by the respondent b y reason of the appellant's 
performance of essential farm services and domestic work 
without remuneration. 
Dicks on CJC was reinforced in his refusal to 
differentiate between domestic contribut i on and other types 
of labour by the decision of the Alberta Court of Queen's 
216(1986) 29 DLR(4th) 1 ; 
Jour 151. 
M Welstead ( 1987) 2 Denning Law 
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Bench in Herman v .$..~!. .. 1:.h , 2 1 7 This case concerned a claim of 
a constructive trust based on a contribution of domestic 
labour alone. The Alberta court held that the rendering of 
normal spousal services by the woman amounted to a valuable 
service resulting in an enrichment for the man and a 
corresponding deprivation for the woman. In the Sorochan 
case the appellant was equally held to have enriched her de 
facto husband with corresponding deprivation to herself. 
Nor was there any juristic reason for that enrichment: the 
Supreme Court held that there had been no obligation, 
contractual or otherwise, binding the appellant to perform 
domestic or other labour. She had a reasonable expectation 
of receiving some benefit in return for her 42 years of 
labour. She had asked the respondent to marry her and to 
place property in her name. These two incidents convinced 
Dickson CJC that Alex Sorochan ought to have known that his 
de facto wife had formed a reasonable expectation of 
obtaining a share in his land. In the context of both 
proprietary estoppel and constructive trusts in other 
commonwealth jurisdictions, a continuation of e xpenditure on 
another's land after a refusal of transfer by the owner is 
considered foolish and no equitable interest could arise on 
this basis . 21s 
The legal title holder in Sorochan already owned 
disputed land when the claimant went to live with him. 
the 
The 
respondent therefore argued that there could be no logical 
or causal relationship between the appellant's contribution 
217(1984) 34 Alta LR (2d) 90. 
(1982) 21 Alta LR (2d) 141. 
21ssee, e.g., Ramsden v Dy~on 
Burns [1984] Ch 317. 
See also ~.~.!i .. !:'. .. ~-~ .. 9-~ v Linds.ey 
(1866) LR lHL 129; Burns v 
•••••••h•••····-··-····· ... 
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of domestic and farm labour and his own acquis i tion of the 
property. Howe ver, the Supreme Court rejected this narrow 
v iew as treating "a particular manifestation of the rule as 
the rule itself . "219 
According to t h e Chief Justice the cases "reveal the 
need to retain flexibility in applying the constructive 
trust." Dickson CJC recognised that it was important to 
require that some nexus exist between the claimant's 
deprivation and the property in question but the link need 
not always take the form of a contribution to the actual 
acquisition of the property. "A contribution relating to 
the pre serv a t ion , maintenance or improvement of property may 
also suf fi c e . Wha t remains primary is whether or not the 
services rendered have a clear 
rela t ionsh ip ... wh e n such a connection 
p roprie t ary re li ef ma y be appropriate. ·220 
is 
proprietary 
present, 
Purel y domestic activity according to the Canadian 
courts ma y fall into the category o f contribution to which 
Dickson CJC thus referred . In Murray v Roty, 2 2 1 the 
Ontario Court of Appeal had already employed a similar test 
of g ene r a l causal c onne cti on . Ca ry JA e xplained that 
domestic activity maintains and preserves the property and 
in this sense is both substantial and direct . It also 
releases the legal title holder from having to pay for 
domestic h e lp o r fr om having t o p erform domestic l a b our 
hi msel f. The mon e y or time t hus sav e d p e rmi ts h i m to 
2 1 9 § .. 9. .. !'. .. 9..9..h..~.P. v .~..9..E.9..9..:h~r:i: ( 1 9 8 6 ) 2 9 DLR ( 4 t h ) 1 at 8 • 220Ibid. 
221(1983) 147 DLR(3d) 438 at 445. 
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improve and maintain his property either by payments to 
another, using the money saved, or by his own efforts, using 
the time saved.222 
It was argued in the Sorochan case that the value of 
the property had inflated over the period of habitation by 
the claimant for reasons totally unconnected with any 
contribution made by her. This argument was rejected by 
the Supreme Court although it was accepted that there might 
be circumstances in which it would be appropriate to take 
into account the inflationary origin of increased values . 
The principle 
by th e Canadian 
of unjust enrichment has been broadened 
courts . There are few relationships 
involv ing joint participation in a communal , familial 
v enture which will be able to evade the imposition of a 
constructive trus t. The Canadian Supreme Court has finall y 
recognised that domestic contributions are equal in value to 
financial contributions in the creation of trusts of 
property in the familial contex t . This recognition is a 
realistic acknowledgement that living in a familial 
r e lationship is a common enterprise; each member contributes 
according t o his abilities and according to the needs of the 
other members of the household. If the common enterprise 
breaks down , its property will be distributed in accordance 
with these contributions ; financial contributions will not 
be va lued more highly tha.n domestic contributions. 
222cf Oosterhoff (1979) LV 111 Can Bar Rev 356 at 370. 
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Lord S i mon of Glaisdale , at one time President of what 
is now the Famil y Division of the English High Court, 
recognised that 
men can only earn their incomes and 
accumulate capital b y virtue of the division 
of labour between themselves and their wives . 
The wife spends her y outh and early middle 
age in bearing and rearing children and in 
tending the home ; the husband is thus fr e ed 
for his economic activities . Unless the 
wife play s her part the husband cannot pla y 
his. The cock bird can feather his ne st 
precisel y because he is not required to spend 
most of his time sitting on it . 223 
The Canadian Supreme Cour t has acknowl edged t h e t ru th 
of Lord Simon ' s v iew of the co-operati v e nature of th e 
familial enterprise. 
E 9 .. ~P.:.~4.t~!-l: ..... .9..9..!-l::;:;._t. .. !.'_1:1-9. . !: .. ~.Y..~ ....... !:!.':i.::t.:;:;t. .. :;:; . . a n d .... propr.i .etary .... es t oppe.l 
Since ~ .. 9..:t.: .. 9. .. <?.h?.:P v So:r.:..9.g.h.?.:.P..2 2 4 there will be ver y f ew 
cases where there will not be a constructive trust of 
prop e rty wh e n the part i es par t i c i pate in a joint fami l ia l 
v enture .22s There may, howe v er, be some circums.tances 
223'With All My Worldly Goods .. . ' (Address to the Ho l dsworth Cl ub , Uni versity of Birmi ngham 20 Ma r c h 196 4) p 3 2. 224(1986) 29 DLR ( 4 t h) 1. 
2 2 STh e appellant in §..9. .. E ..9.-9.h.?::r.t. v § .. <?. E..9. . .9..h.?-.!t. was found to be 
unde r no obligati on to make her d ome stic contribution in the 
respondent's home. Whether the Canadian courts will acc e pt 
that there is no obligation on the part of a spouse to 
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which could not give rise to a Canadian constructive trust 
but could instead give rise to a plea of proprietary 
estoppel. Even if there is encouragement and a detrimental 
alteration of position sufficient to found the latter plea, 
the alteration of position may still fall short of unjust 
enrichment .226 Furthermore there need be no causal 
connection between the alteration of position and the 
disputed property to found an estoppel claim.221 
In Pet tkus v Becker 2 2 s Dickson J intimated that the 
fact that the relationship of the parties was "tantamount to 
spousal" 2 2 9 was significant. Later Canadian cases have 
taken this to mean that a "tantamount to spousal" 
relationship is a necessary element . 230 In cases of 
proprietary estoppel the English courts have only concerned 
themselves with the nature of the relationship between the 
part ies only in so far as it helps them to infer 
encouragement or to determine whether given conduct 
constitutes a detrimental alteration of position.231 The 
Canadian courts may have been influenced in their v iew that 
a quasi-spousal relationship is required , b y the enactment 
of legislation which grants rights of support to de facto 
.................................................. 
prov ide domestic servi ces in the famil y home remains open to 
question . See , however, Rankin ( 19 84) 1 7 Ottawa L Re v 7 2 
at 80 . 
226See Riches 
representee's 
representor . 
227 Ibid. 
v Hogben 
detriment 
22B(198 0) 117 DLR(3d) 
229 Ibid at 274. 
257. 
[1986) 1 
did not 
Qd R 315 where 
unjustly enrich 
the 
the 
2 30 in Nei_derberg_er v Memnook (1982) 130 DLR(3d) 35 3 the 
British Columbia Supreme Court rejected the pl e a of a 
constructi v e trust, Bouch J maintained that the 
relationship between the parties was too casual to imply a 
trust . See also Murray v Roty (1983) 134 DLR(3d) 507; (1980) 19 RFL(2d) 165 McLeod. 
2 a 1 See ante at 26ff. 
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spouses at the end of their relationship ,2a2 There can be 
no logical reason to restrict the Canadian constructive 
trust to spousal or quasi-spousal situations. 
Dickson J stated in p_~_!:..t..~_:µ __ ~ v :I.3. .. ~-9JS~.r. 2 3 3 that 
the equitable principle on which the remedy 
of constructive trust rests is broad and 
general; 
enrichment 
occurs . 
its purpose is to prevent unjust 
in whatever circumstances it 
Indeed 
In proprietary estoppel there has been no attempt to 
restrict the equitable principle to spousal or quasi-spousal 
situations. 
VII Detrimental reliance 
........................................ ................. ....... .................... 
It is clear in the la~ of trusts that once an agreement 
to share the beneficial interest in property has been 
proved, the c laimant mus t demonstrate a detrimental 
alteration of position in reli anc e on the agreement. 
Diplocl-~ emphasised in Gis __ s_i_ng v G_i _s_s _  ing 2 3 4 that if 
the agreement did not provide for anyth ing to 
be done b y the spouse in wh om the legal 
esta t e was not to be v ested , it would be a 
Lord 
zazsee Family Law Reform Act 1978 (Ont) c 2 (Now RSO 1980 c 152) . 
233(1980) 11 7 DLR(3d) 257 at 275 . 
234(1971] AC 886. 
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merely voluntary declaration of trust and 
unenforceable for want of writing.23s 
According to Lord Diplock the relevant detrimental 
alteration of position must in some sense relate to the 
property. 
It has been argued that a detrimental alteration of 
position is not necessary in all the intention-based family 
home constructive trusts. Warburton has suggested that a 
detrimental alteration of position is only required where 
the agreement between the parties is overt. 2 3 6 She has 
argued that where the agreement is inferred from substantial 
financial expenditure or substantial labour no further 
detrimental alteration of position is required. For 
analytical purposes, however, the financial contribution in 
these circumstances performs the twofold function of 
demonstrating the necessary intention and the detrimental 
alteration of position in reliance on that agreement.23 7 
Strictly speaking, therefore, detrimental alteration of 
position is required but no additional proof of it is 
necessary . Where, however, the agreement is an overt 
agreement, detrimental . alteration of position as a separate 
element must be proven. 
235.QJ.§ .. ~ .. !.P:.€; v QJ_~_sing [1971] AC 886 at 905. See also 
Mi.dl.and ...... Bank v p.9._bsoI?;. [1986] 1 FLR 171 at 176 per Fox LJ, 
236(1986] Conv 291. 
2 3 7See Q ..!:.~.P.-~ .v ~.9-war.£.~. [ 1986] 2 All ER 428 at 432. 
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A Detri.mental ...... al terat.i.on ...... of ...... Posi t.ion 
In Grant v Edwards., 2 3 8 Nourse LJ accepted that the 
detrimental alteration of position need not comprise 
financial e xpenditure on the property bµt must at least be 
conduct on which the woman could not 
reasonably have been expected to embark 
unless she was to have an interest in the 
house. If she was not to have such an 
interest she could reasonably be expected to 
go and live with her lover, but not for 
example to wield a 1 4 lb sledge hammer in the 
front garden.239 
According to this view, what constitutes a detrimental 
alteration of position seems to be a mat ter of discretion 
for the court rather than a rigidly defined category of 
conduct. If the conduct can be seen as referable to the 
acquisition of the property, :i. t wi ll clearly constitute a 
detrimental alteration of position. In the context of 
proprietary estoppel by contrast, the relevant alteration of 
position need not be r.eferable to the property. 
i ) Financial contribution and non-domestic labour r 
In the context of both constructive trust and 
proprietary estoppel the courts have had little difficulty 
in accepting a detrimental alteration of position on the 
238(1986] .2 All ER 4 28. 
239Ibid at 433. 
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basis of financial contribution and non-domestic labour 
contributions even when such contributions would be 
insufficient to lead to an inference of common intention.240 
Contributions of these kinds may facilitate, albeit 
indirectly, the acquisitibn of property. 
ii) Ot_h e r ...... c onduc_t ...... wh i.c.h ...... be_ne f_i t s .... th.e ..... l.e g al ....... t .i_t l_eh o l_de r 
Domestic activity and other conduct which benefits the 
legal title holder may be accepted as detrimental alteration 
of position in the context of constructive trust. 241 This 
approach pays lip service at least to Lord Diplock's 
requirement of conduct which facilitates the acquisition of 
t he property, provided that the notion of acquisition can be 
extended to include preventing the loss or depreciation of 
property. 
In the New South Wales case of Og_il_v_i _e v Ryan, 2 4 2 for 
instance , ihe plaintiff had kept house for, and had 
personally taken care of, the deceased during the later part 
of his life. The defendant had received an undoubted 
benefit from the plaintiff. There was no discussion of how 
this conduct facilitated the acquisition of the home. It 
must be implied that the court in granting the plaintiff an 
interest under a constructive trust took a liberal approach 
in this matter. If the deceased had not been cared for by 
the plaintiff, he would probably have had to pay for this 
240See Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338; [1986] 2 All ER 426. Grant v .............................. 
2 4 1 see R..! .. ! .  ~ y V Q.~.c.?. .. 9..!'..!!_~ [ 19 8 6 ] VR 1 9 3 . 
242(1976] 2 NSWLR 504; Bates [1980] Conv 124. 
Edwards 
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service and possibly give up his home. The plaintiff's 
care permitted him to remain in his home until he died. 
In Hoho~ v Hohol243 the Victoria Supreme Court accepted 
that the claimant had acted detrimentally in that she was 
induced to leave the security which she had enjoyed in a 
rented home where she lived with her four children and move 
to live in a garage in the most primitive of · 
circumstances,244 She had also undertaken improvements to 
the house which benefited the defendant. It is uncertain 
whether the act of leaving her comfortable home in itself 
could be seen as sufficient detriment, since such conduct 
would not in itself have benefited the legal title holder. 
In Grant v Edwards24S Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C _ ............ ,,,_,, .. _, .......... --................ . 
at tempted to broaden the ea tegory of conduct from which 
detriment could be inferred, in order to include domestic 
contributions . He took the liberal view that once a common 
intention has been proved, any act done by the claimant to 
her detriment which related to the joint lives of the 
parties was sufficient detriment to qualify. "The acts do 
not have to be inherently referable to the house",246 This 
approach implicitly accepts that the success of the family 
enterprise is not dependent on financial contributions 
alone. Any contribution to the welfare of the family may 
indirectly facilitate the acquisition or prevent the loss of 
the family home. The Vice-Chancellor's view of detriment 
243(1981] VR 221. 
244Ibid at 227. 
245(1986] 2 All ER 426 . 
( 1986) 29 DLR( 4th). 
•••Ibid at 439, See also 
277 at 278. 
See also Sorochan v Sorochan ....... ,_., _ ___ ,, ........ _ ......... -.... -............. _ ..__ .. 
Harpum (1982) 2 Ox Jour Leg Stud 
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was, of course, obi ter and was not shared by Nourse and 
Mustill LJJ. The alteration of position of the claimant 
in Grant v Edwards247 was without question referable to the 
acquisition of the property. She had made financial 
contributions to the defendant without which he could not 
have paid the mortgage instalments. 2 4 s It is not without 
significance that the Vice-Chancellor's dicta on detriment 
were founded totally on cases of proprietary estoppel. His 
approach was not dissimilar to that adopted by the Canadian 
courts in relation to the causal link between unjust 
enrichment and the legal title holder's property. 
In the estoppel context conduct which benefits the 
legal title holder will generally be viewed as detriment . 
iii) Co_nduct ... ...wh.ich __ doe_s .... no_t be_nef.i.t ...... the ....... leg.al ...... t.i.tle ... ho.lde.r 
In Chri.s.ti.an v Christian 2 4 9 Brightman LJ regarded the 
equitable interest behind a constructive trust as primarily 
concerned with property interests; a detrimental alteration 
of position must therefore reflect that concern. In 
Christian v Ch r istian, . the plain tiff, a de facto wife, 
claimed that she had acted to her detriment by permitting 
her own home to be sold and by moving to a new property 
whi ch she had pu rchased jo i ntly with the defendant . The 
defendant had promised the plaintiff that if she did this he 
would place her name on the title deeds of additional land 
which were in his sole name . 
- - ---------247(19 86] 2 All ER 426. 
24Sibid at 438, 
249(1981) 131 RLJ 43. 
The new jo i nt l y owned 
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property was subject to a planning restriction and was in 
close proximity to the defendant's estranged wife . 
Brightman LJ rejected the plaintiff's claim that she 
had altered her position to her detriment. In relation to 
the planning restriction, he maintained that as the property 
was purchased at a discount it could be sold at a discount 
and there would be no loss to the plaintiff, In relation 
to the proximity to the defendant's wife, he held that 
equity is concerned with the protection of 
property and proprietary interests, not with 
the protection of people's feelings. The 
only contributions, detriment and sacrifices, 
that move the court in this field are those 
of a monetary or proprietary nature.2so 
Where an alteration of position has no financially 
quantifiable consequences if the encouragement is frustrated 
there can be no detriment to establish an estoppel clairn,2s1 
It is possible however that the first claim of detriment in 
Christian v Christian2s2 could have been held to be .... ,_.,,,, .. -----···-······· .. - ..... ..-,,, ..... ______ ........ . 
finan c i ally quantifiable for the purposes of proprietary 
estoppel. Property subject to an agricultural planning 
restriction will be more difficult to sell than a property 
free of such a restriction. This delay in sale is 
certainly fi nancially quantifiable . The opportunity cost of 
---·--·--··----··--·--2s0 Ibid. 
2 s 1see ante at 91 
2s2 unreported, Court of Appeal 6 November 1980. 
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money tied up in property pending a delayed sale has a 
value. 
What may have been more significant in Christ_i_an v 
Christi_an2s3 was that the claimed detriment was not seen as 
conferring any benefit on the legal title holder. In the 
context of constructive trusts this appears to be an 
important factor in determining whether conduct is 
detrimental to the claimant,254 
Proprietary estoppel is concerned with the prevention 
of loss to the representee and/or unjustifiable profit to 
the legal title-holder whi ch would result from an 
unconscionable retraction of a representation which has 
already been acted on. The court is therefore concerned 
with the question of whether the representee's act would be 
considered detrimental to him or her if the representation 
was not adhered to.zss Constructive trusts are 
concerned, however, with the prevention of unconscionability 
resulting from contribution which relates in some wa y to the 
property of the legal title holder . The latter may not 
retain the benefit of any contribution which he has accepted 
in return for his agreement to grant a beneficial interest . 
The difference between the relevant kinds of detrimental 
alteration of position for the purposes of establishing 
either an estoppel or constructive trust claim may relate to 
the d iffe r e nt natures of the i nte r ests being grant ed . 
2 53 Ibid . 
111 •see also TI?:w~.i.!.~.§. v Ryan [ 1984] VR 65. 
zsssee ante at 73 
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In the estoppel context the detrimental alteration of 
position need not necessarily benefit the legal title 
holder. In R_iches. v Hoa;ben2 s & the claimant had incurred 
considerable expenses in emigrating to Australia to take up 
residence, as agreed with his widowed mother, the legal 
title holder. She obviously stood to benefit emotionally 
by his presence but would not benefit in any other way 
accepted by the courts in cases of constructive trusts. 
The Queensland Supreme Court nevertheless accepted that the 
claimant had altered his position to his detriment and 
awarded a remedy based on proprietary estoppel,257 
In the estoppel context a failure to act at all may 
constitute detriment if the claimant would have acted if the 
representation had not been made. 2 s s The failure to act 
may result in a financially quantifiable loss to the 
claimant if the representation is not fulfilled, even though 
it may not necessarily benefit the representor. 
A recent trend can however be discerned towards a 
limitation of the activities which may be properly 
considered as detrimental alteration of position for the 
purposes of an estoppel claim. In ~ .. ~.!: .. :t. .. ~. v .~ .. !-...9.LY 2 s 9 the 
court refused to accept that a young, fit male who had moved 
house and had given up a job had altered his position 
detrimentally when what he received in return was rent-free 
2s&[l986] 1 Qd R 315. 
2s7Ibid at 320. 
2 sssee Jn re B .. ~.~-ha~-ig:~gd) [1986] 1 WLR 1498 at 1505; Fontana v Mauntner (1980) 254 EG 199. 
25 9(1983) 134 NLJ 631 (ante at 87 ) , See also Phili~ __ Lowe 
1.Qhinese Restaurantl._1td v Sau Man Lee (Unreported, Court of Appeal 9 July 1985); Coombe~ v §_~ith (1986] 1 WLR 808 at 820 . 
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occupation in a a pleasant home in his grandmother ' s house, 
The court ignored Dixon J' s dicta in Grundt v Great Boul.der 
p_ty GoJ.d ..... t~Jn~.?.. .... L.t.Q. u O that detriment was to be judged at the 
time the r epresen tor sought to retract his representation 
and not whilst it was being fulfilled. 
i v ) Al terat.i.on .... of ..... ~os i t .i .on __ by _.a .... _third ... party 
Both in the law of constructive trusts and in the law 
of proprietary estoppel the alteration of position need not 
be undertaken by the claimant himself; it may be the act of 
a third party.2&1 
v) Enjoyabl.e ...... conduct and _  co.nduct .. for ...... whi.ch _ .. compensation 
has ...... al.re.ady .... been ...... ~ai.d 
The courts have dismissed as a relevant detrimental 
alteration of position any acti v ity which is perceived to be 
enjoyable2s 2 or for which compensation has already been 
paid , 263 Under the doctrine of constructiv e trusts and of 
proprietary estoppel the former activity is not viewed as 
involving any sacrif i ce on the part of t h e c l a i ma n t . I n 
the latter situation any detrimental element which may have 
e x isted has been spent . 
260(1938) 59 CLR 639. See ante at73 
Z61See Ne ale V Willis (1968) 19 p & CR 
.Lc!ec d) IT986.] 1 · wLR-1498 at 1505. 
zezsee, e.g., Hannaford v Selby (1976) 
2&3See , e.g., Larr_on v Martin [1986] 2 
836; J.n re Ba~ham 
239 EG 811 at 813 , 
FLR 227, 
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vi) Degin;!~ntaJ: alteration of . ..22si tion in the .. Canadian 
jurisdictions. 
In the Canadian jurisdictions where constructive trusts 
are based on unjust enrichment, it is necessary to show a 
detrimental alteration of position in the form of a 
"corresponding deprivation",2 64 Financial expenditure and 
labour (including domestic labour) are equally accepted if 
they unjustly enrich the legal title holder,265 
B Reliance on Common Intention in the context of ··--.. ·--·-· .................. _ .. , ... _.,. ___ ... , ... ,,. _______ ... , ...... -........ ---·-·-····--·- ........ _, ___ , .............. , .... - .. , ......... ,_,,, ........... ,- -......... ,_ 
Constructive Trusts 
···-··---.. -, ............................... ,- ........................ , __ ................. . 
The claimant of a constructive trust must be ab l e 
to demonstrate not only that he suffered a detriment but 
also that he did so in reliance on a relevant common 
intention.266 This causal link between detriment and 
intention is essential. 
i) E~ress ....... Bargains. 
The causal link is clearly established if there is an 
express bargain between the parties that the claimant will 
be granted a beneficial interest in return for making a 
specific sacrifice and the claimant performs 
with the bargain ,267 Such an unequivocal 
however, rare in the family sett ing. 
264Pettkus v Becker (1980) 117 DLR(3d) 257 . 
2 s ssee ante at 302 ff 
t6&9is~~~ v Gis~ing [1971] AC 886 at 905 . 
267See Gra~i v Edwards [1986] 2 All ER 426. 
in . accordance 
agreement is, 
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ii) Inc.Q.!!!Plete ~ ins 
A difficulty in establishing the causal link between 
intention and detriment arises when there is an overt 
agreement between the parties but ~ilence as to what 
constitutes the relevant quid .... .....I?.roquo. In Gr_ant. v 
Edwardsz&s Mustill LJ held that where the bargain was not 
completely expressed it was the court's task to fill in the 
gaps by inferring the bargain. If the detrimental acts 
could be inferred to be part of the bargain between the 
parties, the court would accept that these acts were 
undertaken in reliance on the express but incomplete common 
intention. He implied that for this inference to be made, 
the detrimental acts must be "referable to" the property. 
The argument appears to be somewhat circular: if the 
detrimental action appears to be sufficient the court will 
hold that it must have been in reliance on the common 
intention and will therefore make the necessary inference 
that the detrimental action was part of the bargain. 
In Midland Bank Plc 
··--··· ..................... , .. -...... ,_ .... _,._,_ .. __ ...... _ ..................... . v P...C?..P. .. ~ . .<?..n. 2 6 s there was an overt 
agreement between the spouses that Mrs Dobson should have a 
beneficial interes t but the precise nature of the bargain 
was not specified. Mrs Dobson claimed that she had acted 
to her detriment but Fox LJ found that her conduct was 
not in reliance upon any understanding as to 
joint ownership of t he house. She did it, 
presumably, simply because she thought the 
Z6Sibid at 436. 
269(1986] 1 FLR 171. 
324 
ii 
'I: 
I 
I 
' 
II 
I 
I 111 
I 
,, 
I 
l',I ! 
I 
II 
Ii 
I 
I 
II 
I 
'I I 
I 
'ii 
I 
I
I' 
I 
I, 
II 
I 
ii 
! 
I 
I 
I 
expenditure appropriate and she had the 
money. She also did some ordinary periodic 
decorating, but I see no reason to suppose 
that was because of any arrangement that she 
would do so on account of a common intention 
as to joint ownership . It was the sort of 
work that members of a family do in a 
house.z10 
Mrs Dobson's expenditure was on household e xpenses, 
including purchase of domestic equipment . The courts have 
been reluctant to accept a detrimental alteration of 
position which is not referable to the property as being in 
reliance on a common agreement . The Court of Appeal's 
approach in Midl_and Bank_ Plc v !2 .. 9..b~ . .9..!1.. was unnecessarily 
restrictive and can perhaps be explained by the fact that a 
third party , the bank , would have been deprived of its 
mortgage security had the necessary reliance been found . 
The Court of Appeal also cast doubt on the existence of a 
common intention but was not prepared to over-rule the 
findings of the judge at first instance . 
Conduct which does not conform to sex-stereotyped roles 
is usually accepted as establishing the necessary causal 
link between detriment and common intention. In Eves v 
~~~~z11 Brightman J 
plaintiff 
210Ibid at 176. 
found it difficult to suppose that the 
27 1(1975] 1 WLR 1338. Freeman, (1985) 38 Current Leg 
Problems 153 at 154 suggests that "the message is clear: 
what women normally do, or are expected to do has no 
economic value. But 'real' work must be compensated. II 
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would have been wielding the 14 lb sledge 
hammer, breaking up the large area of 
concrete, filling the skip and doing the 
other things which were carried out when they 
moved in except in pursuance of some 
expressed or implied arrangement and on the 
understanding that she was helping to improve 
a house in which she was to all practical 
intents and purposes promised that she had an 
interest. 27 2 
It might equally well be argued that no-one, other than 
a married partner, protected by matrimonial legislati on, 
would undertake the onerous duties of housekeeping and 
caring for children if it were not in reliance on a common 
intention. 
iii) I_nf e_rred ..... Bargains. 
Where there is some agreement inferred from substantial 
financial contribution or labour, the evidence required to 
establish this agreement is always accepted as demonstrating 
a detrimental reliance on the inferred common intention. 
The substantial nature of the detriment moves the court to 
find the necessary link , and such · detriment is obviously 
referable to the property.273 
272Eves v . Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338 at 1345. 
273Ibid, 
iv) A broad view of detrimental reliance ·- .. --- -·-.. - ........ - ..... ,, .. , ___ .. ,_ ...... -..- .... -- .. _ ..____ , _____ _ 
In Grant v Edwards 27 4 Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C 
took a broad view of the requirement of reliance on common 
intention in t h e f amilial context. He accepted that there 
had to be a link between the common intention and the acts 
claimed to be detrimental, but his approach resembled that 
taken in proprietary estoppel. He explained that it is 
often impossible to say whether or not a claimant would 
still have done t h e acts relied on as det r i ment if she 
thought she had no interest in the house . In his view 
familial acts such as setting up house 
together , having a baby, making payments to 
general housekeeping expenses ( not strictly 
necessary to enable the mortgage to be paid) 
may all be referable to the mutual love and 
affection of the parties and not specificall y 
referable to the claimant ' s belief that she 
has art interest in the house. 
In t h e absence of evidence to the contrary , the Vice-
Ch a ncellor thought it r ight t o infe r t hat a claimant has 
acted in reliance on t h e r elevant common intent ion , t he 
bu rden restin g on the legal owne r t o prove that she did not 
do so. z 7 s Sir Nicolas Browne -Wi l kinson V-C ci ted .l9..!2 .. ~s. v 
-~ Of! e S z 7 6 and P~.~o.~. v Turner 2 7 7 in support of his v i ew. 
These cases were both cases involving proprietary estoppel . 
27 4 (1986] 2 All ER 426 at 439. 
275Ibid at 439. Cf Midland Bank PLC v Dobson (1986] 1 FLR 
171; Coombes v Smii~ [1986] 1 WLR 808. 
276(1977] 1 WLR 438~--
277(1979] 1 WLR 431 . 
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If the gjct~ of the Vice-Chancellor are accepted in future 
cases, det r imental reliance in proprietary estoppel and 
constructive trusts will be identical. 
C Reliance_,,_in .. the e.~ . !,_q~l co~t~xt.. 
In Greasl~ v Cooke 2 7 8 
-·-·-·- - ' 
Lord Denning MR maintained 
that the burden of proof is 
prove that the claimant of an 
on the legal title holder to 
'inchoate equity' of estoppel 
did not act in reliance on the representation made . 279 For 
the most part reliance will be a foregone conclusion if the 
detriment is deemed to be sufficient unless the legal title 
holder can prove that 
the estoppel claimant. 
there was no reliance on the part of 
VI I I THE ...... NATURE ...... OF THE ...... EQUI.TABLE ...... INTERESTS 
A The_constructive_trust -_remedial_or_substantive 
The English courts have, for the most part, regarded 
the constructive trust as a substantive280 rather than 
remedial institution.281 In Muschinski v Dodds282 Deane J 
-••••••••-••••·---•H••• .. •• •- •o•oo , ,, .. , •••• •• ••0- 000000 0oO"-' ' 
considered the percei v-ed dichotomy between the remedial and 
the substantive approach to the constructive trust. In his 
view the constructive trust could be seen in both 
institutional and r eme d i a l te rms . He e xpla ined that 
27& [1980] 1 WLR 1306. 
2798ee a l so Gri ff i ths v Williams (1977) 248 EG 947. Cf 
Philip . Lowe ·-:..lQginese .. ____R~sta~.ra n tJ_ __ ..1! . .!-_<! v Sau Man Lee (Unreported, Court of Appea l 9 July 198 5 ). 
2s 0Dewar, (1982) 60 Can Bar Rev 265. 
2&1In r e S~_arp~_.JA Ba n~_ru_ill [1980] 1 WLR 219 a t 225. 
282(1986) 62 ALR 429 at 450. 
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The use or trust of equity, like equity 
itself, was essentially remedial in its 
origins ... In time, the relationships in which 
the trust was recognised and enforced to 
protect actual or presumed intention became 
standardised and were accepted into 
conveyancing practice (particularly in 
relation to settlements) and property law as 
the equitable institutions of the express and 
implied trusts ... the constructive trust 
developed as a remedial relationship ... (it) 
shares however some of the institutionalised 
features of express and implied trust.2s3 
There is a further sense in which the expression 
'institution' and 'remedy' are used in the trust context. 
' Institution' has been accepted as a relationship whi~h 
arises and exists independently of any court order whilst 
the 'remedial' trust is created through the court's 
imposition of a relationship by the court order. However, 
even in those jurisdictions where the constructive trust is 
regarded as a remedial rather than substantive institution , 
equity regards as done that which ought to be done and the 
remedy is retrospective.2s c In that sense there is little 
difference between those jurisdictions which v iew the 
intention-based constr uctive trust in a remedial sense and 
jurisdiction s wh ich v iew it a s a s ubstanti v e tru st .2ss 
2 s 3 Ibid. The constructive trust imposed here was however 
t rul y r emedial. 
2scsee Youdan (1984) 6 Sup Ct Law Rev 279 at 290. 
2sssee Neave (1978) 11 Melb Univ L Rev 343. The 
constructive trust imposed in Muschinski v Dodds (1986) ALR 
429 at 450 appears to be an exception in that it date s only 
329 
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In the Canadian jurisdiction, where the constructive 
trust is considered to be of a remedial nature and comes 
into existence in order to prevent an unjust enrichment, the 
type of unjust enrichment which gives rise to the 
constructive trust is no less institutionalised than the 
conduct which gives rise to the substantive constructive 
trust. The legal process is a dynamic one. 2 s 6 As new 
situations are held to give rise to constructive trusts, the 
trusts will be held to be remedial. As those situations 
become circumscribed by the legal process they will, in 
effect, be similar to substantive constructive trusts,287 
B Constructive_trusts_arise ~t the_tjme_of_detr!mental 
alteration_of ~os!tion 
Dewar has described the effects of the constructive 
trust (whether institutional or remedial) as being identical 
al though "the remedial trust necessarily is not imposed 
until the hearing of the action; however, it is deemed to 
have arisen at the time of the wrongful act which gave rise 
to the claim ." 2 8 8 Dewar thus implies that the equitable 
interest does not arise until the legal title holder 
attempts to defeat the beneficial interest. Rankin, 
however, in discussing the Canadian remedial constructive 
trust based on unjust enrichment, has argued that once the 
·------·---- .. -------···-·-··-----from the court order. See also Hayton, [1986] CLJ 394 at 
398. 
286 See Hayward v Giordani [1983] NZLR 140 at 148. 287See Scott on Trusts (1967) 462.4. 
288(1982) 60 Can Bar Rev 265. 
I i'i\ 1 
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claimant of the beneficial interest has unjustly enriched 
the legal title holder and the causal link is satisfied 
the circumstances have occurred that give 
rise to a constructive trust, and it follows 
that the date of contribution should be the 
date on which property rights vest under a 
constructive trust,289 
According to Rankin, therefore, the constructive trust 
binds third parties with notice from the time when the 
unjust enrichment occurs. The trust is an equitable 
proprietary right from that moment onwards and cannot 
subsequently be revoked. 
C The __ '_e_g_ui_ty _of _ estop_p~l ... '. 
The ' inchoate equity' of estoppel does not arise until 
the representor resiles from his representation. 
parties are not 
The 'inchoate 
normally bound by 
equity' may not 
the 
be 
'inchoate 
assigned 
Third 
equity'. 
and is 
revocable ,290 Where the constructive trust has been 
accepted as a possible remedy to satisfy the ' inchoate 
equity' , this type of constructive trust dates from the 
cour t o r de r,291 
----·----·-289Rankin ( 1984) 17 Otta wa L Rev, 72 at 8 0 ; see a lso ~cot! 
on Tru~ts ( 1967) 462. 4; Youdon 1982-85 Term 6 Sup Ct L Rev 279 at 291. 
2 9 OAnte at 160 ff 
2 91S ee ante at 114 
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D The satisfaction of the constructive_trust 
In cases of constructive trust the court has no 
flexibility to grant a discretionary remedy to the 
parties.292 Once the circumstances for a constructive 
trust exist, the court must usually give effect to the 
intentions of the parties, The Canadian constructive trust 
appears, however, to be an exception to this ru l e, in that 
the court may award some al terna ti ve form of remedy. In 
§ .. or .. 9. .. 9 . .h.!3-:r::t v §..Q .. ~ . .9_9.h~.I.:12 9 3 the Supreme Court made it clear that 
a plea of unjust enrichment can be remedied eithe r by a 
constructive trust of the property or by the grant of 
financial compensation for the deprivation suffered and on 
the facts of the instant cases awarded both kinds of remedy. 
E The ... constructive _ trust ...... may not._protect ...... occupat.i.on 
Whilst the 'inchoate equity' of estoppel may in certain 
circumstances be satisfied by the award of an occupation 
right, the equitable interest behind a constructive trust 
may not always protect the occupation of the beneficiary . 
The constructi v e t r us~ clearly gi v es the beneficiary a right 
to live in the property prior to sale but the legal title 
holder retains the right to sell the property . , If and when 
he does so , the rights of t h e ben ef ic iary are o v e rre a c h ed 
and translated into the proceeds of sale. The beneficiary 
will lose h i s occupation right provided that the purchase 
292See post at 333 
293(1986) 29 DLR(4th) 1, 
1, '\I 
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money is paid to two trustees.a~• If the proceeds of sale 
are paid to a single trustee, the beneficiary's occupation 
will be protected in registered land as an overriding 
interest , 295 In unregistered land the doctrine of notice 
may well have the effect of protecting the right of 
occupation,296 Occupation rights in proprietary estoppel 
cannot be overreached. 
IX QUANTIFICATION 
A Overt ___ agreements 
Where there is an express agreement to grant a 
beneficial interest in the property, the extent of the 
beneficial interest under a constructive trust will directly 
correlate with that agreement. 
Gough v Fraser,297 Richmond P 
In the New Zealand case of 
concluded that Lord Diplock 
in Gi_ss_ing v Giss_ing 2 9 s made a clear distinction between 
cases where it is possible to establish an express agreement 
between the parties as to their respective interests, and 
those in which their common intention was that one of the 
parties should have some beneficial interest wi thout any 
express agreement concerning the respective shares of each 
party , 299 In the former type of case the court was bound 
---- -··-- -· 
29 4See Law of Property 
[1986] Conv 379, 415; 
Flei$ [1987] 2 WLR 1266 . 
Act 1925 , s 2(1)(ii); Swadling 
City .. of London ...... Buil.d_in~ ...... Societ_y v 
295See s70(1)(g) Land Registration Act 1925 ; 
Gl~s Bank Ltd v Boland [1981] AC 487 . 
Williams and 
296 See Kin~Q_9rth Trust v Tiz~_rd [1986] 2 All ER 54 . See 
also Potter v 9yles (Unreported, Court of Appeal 10 Octobe r 
1986) . 
297( 1977] 1 NZLR 279, 
298(1971] AC 886 at 903. 
299Se e also Qough v Fraser [1977] 1 NZLR 279 at 281. 
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to give effect to the express agreement, while in the latter 
type of case the court was free to arrive at a 'fair' share 
for each party in the light of the evidence as to their 
subsequent contributions and transactions,3oo In Gough. v 
.f...r.a~. 3 o 1 the parties had agreed t6 a fixed half share 
each. The claimant had only contributed one third of the 
cost of the property but the agreement between the plaintiff 
and the defendant as to a half-share in the property 
prevailed,302 
Where there is an overt agreement that there should be 
a beneficial interest in favour of the plaintiff but the 
extent of that interest is unclear, the English courts have 
claimed to have inferred the agreement from the subsequent 
conduct of the parties. In Eves v Eves, 3 o 3 for example, 
the overt intention of the parties was to have both names 
put on the legal title, but this intention was never carried 
out. The court imposed a constructive trust which gave the 
parties unequal shares. The plaintiff's contribution was 
inferred to be part of the bargain. The court held that 
this contribution gave her a one-third share in the property 
because the agreement was part overt and part inferred. 
This approach appears to be in reality almost as flexible 
an approach as prevails in cases of proprietary estoppel . 
The court is permitted to satisfy the equity of proprietary 
estoppel by granting the remedy which it deems to be 
equitable having taken account of all the circumstances the 
------·----·----.. ·----
3 o o rbid. 
301 Ibid. 
30Z!bid, 
30 3(1975]° l WLR 1338. 
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parties' conduct and financial and housing situation. 304 
Eves v Eves3os does not disclose as to how the Court 
concluded that the plaintiff's one-third share represented 
the bargain between the parties. 3 o 6 Brightman J indeed 
acknowledged that there was no ready answer to the problem. 
He expressed the view that 
there is a case for saying that in the 
absence of any contrary indication it can 
only be a joint interest in equity, leading 
to a half interest for each party as seen as 
the joint tenancy is severed,307 
He nevertheless concurred with Lord Denning MR and Browne LJ 
that a one-third beneficial interest for the plaintiff was 
the correct solution. 
The problem of quantification was again referred to in 
Grant v Edwards.aos Here the agreement had been that the 
· ----·· ·--· .. --.. ···--...... 
parties would have been joint legal title holders, were it 
not for their precise shares not being specified. 
However, the parties had shared equall y the fire insurance 
moneys awarded to them after a fire in the property and, 
Nourse LJ was thus influenced to give the plaintiff an equal 
3ocsee Chapter Four. 
305(1975] 1 WLR 1338. 
306It may be that Brightman J 
judicial one-third rule employed 
under the Matrimonial Causes Act 
Wachtel [1973] 1 All ER 829. 
employed the 
in di vis ion of 
1973 see, e.g., 
so-called 
property 
Wachtel v 
30'1Eves v !);.~ [1975] 1 WLR 1338 at 1345 . 
Ahone (1975) 56 DLR(3d) 454 . 
See also §..~.i .th. v 
308(1986] 2 All ER 426 . 
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share in the property.aoe Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C 
held that "prima faci.e the interest of the claimant will be 
that which the parties intended." a 1 o However, he went on 
to say that the law of proprietary estoppel might provide 
useful guidance in the future in deciding the extent of the 
claimant's interest. If the flexible approach of 
proprietary estoppel were followed, the constructive trust 
would not be an identifiable interest prior to the court 
hearing.a11 
B Inferred_agreements 
Where a relevant agreement is inferred from the 
claimant's substantial financial or labour contribution, the 
quantification of the interest will be in direct 
relationship to this contribution. 
C .In ...... the ...... estoppel ...... context 
Even where the representee's expectations are 
unequivocal the court may satisfy the 'inchoate equity' in a 
manner contrary to the representee's expectations . a 12 
309(1986 ] 2 All ER 426 at 434 . 
Mustill LJ at 437. 
a101bid at 439 . 
See also the judgment of 
a 1 lThe Vice- Chance l lo r has a c c e p ted that a t some stage i n 
the future the two doctrines may merge but not until the 
problem of th i rd parties and the doctr i ne of notice has been 
s e ttled - (personal interview 22 October 1986) . 
a12see , e.g., ;p_9..ds~-~:t..h. v Do9:.sw9..E..!:.h. (1973) 228 EG 1115 (ante 
131ff) • 
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X TIME OF VALUATION 
The date of valuation of the beneficial claimant's 
share in the context of constructive trust is at the date of 
realisation of the interest,313 In this respect 
proprietary estoppel and constructive trusts are different. 
Under the former doctrine, the time of any valuation which 
is required falls within the area of total discretion which 
the court enjoys in granting a remedy. 
XI CONCLUSION 
-.... ,_,, __ .. ,_ ........................... . 
The doctrines of proprietary estoppel and constructive 
trust have separate origins. The constructive trust 
whether substantive or remedial has been regarded for the 
most part as protecting a proprietary right pre-dating the 
court hearing. In the context of the family home the 
constructive trust has emerged as an amalgam of . a 
traditional constructive trust, a resulting trust and 
proprietary estoppel . Proprietary estoppel is a long-
established remedial 'inchoate equity' which generally has 
no proprietary qualities until satisfied by the court . 
Nevertheless, both concepts operate to protect those who act 
to their detriment in the belief that they are acquiring 
rights in or over property, against any unconscionable 
denial of those rights b y the legal title holder,314 
___ ,____ ,, ___ ,, .. ,,,, ____ ,, _____ _ 
313Qordon v Douce [1983] 2 All ER 228 at 232; Walker v Hall 
[1984] FLR 126. Turton v Turton (1987) J'l!.~ ..  T...!.!!!.es 29 April. 
Cf Hall v Hall [1982] 3 FLR 379. 
314See Dewar (1984) 47 MLR 735. 
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The informal relations between individuals in a family 
setting are complex and do not readily submit to the formal 
process of legal analysis. The facts of the cases decided 
under the doctrine of constructive trusts comprise a 
relatively small number of verifiable events and actions 
whose significance is beyond reasonable doubt and a much 
larger area which remains subject to interpretation of 
inference by the courts . The strict requirements of the 
constructive trust have forced the courts to consider 
familial events in terms of categories of conduct into which 
they do not readily fit . In this respect the constructive 
trust lacks the flex ibility of proprietary estoppel. The 
concept of proprietary estoppel is potentially a more 
appropriate legal construct for solving familial disputes 
concerning the family home, but the concept lacks the 
valuable equitable proprietary nature of the constructive 
trust, at least prior to the court hearing . 
A merger of the concepts of constructive trust and 
proprietary estoppel would solve the problems outlined 
above . Such a merger would require a broadening of one 
concept to cover all the circumstances of the other concept. 
The presen t Vice - Chancellor has ten tatively approv ed of such 
a merger , but onl y if the problems of third party rights are 
given prior consideration ,315 
The Canadian courts h ave already, by implication , 
mer ged the t wo concepts . 3 1 6 Pr opr i eta r y estoppel i s no 
----·-----------·-··---315Pers onal inte rview 22 Octobe r 1986. 
316The Ne w Ze aland c ourts have tentatively suggested that 
they too may accept the Canadian doctrine of unjust 
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longer referred to in the resolu t i on of f a milial home 
disputes . The language of proprietary estoppel has been 
translated into the constructive trust context with a slight 
alteration of the requirement of detriment . If detriment 
unjustly enriches the legal title holder, as opposed to 
merely depri v ing the claimant, a constructi v e trust will be 
found. Since a different form of detriment is acceptable 
in proprietary estoppel, it remains uncertain whether a 
merging of the concepts would leave some claimants 
unprotected . 
By contrast the Australian courts have opposed any 
merger of the concepts. The Australian cases suggest a 
desire to make more stringent the 
constructive trusts whilst retaining 
requirements 
the doctrine 
of 
of 
proprietary estoppel as a separate equitable cause of 
action . The remedy of a new t ype of constructive trust 
dating from the court hearing may then be a warded in 
satisfaction of estoppel claims. 317 
e nrichment . 
153 . 
---- , ____ ------,-····-···---·-·------··--·- ------See !!~,Y-:ward. v Giordani [ 1983] NZLR 140 at 
317See Morris v Morris [1982] 1 NSWLR 61. 
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CONCLUSION 
----··--··-·M·--· 
Setting up a family home is often characterised by 
considerable measures of faith, hope and trust by all the 
parties concerned. Legal title holders frequently come to 
a very informal, ill-defined agreement or even no agreement 
at all 1 relating to the occupancy of their properties as 
family homes. If there is some future conflict between the 
legal owner and the occupier the amicable, if somewhat 
muddled, arrangement at the outset can, particularly when 
coloured by the ensuing ill-feeling between the parties, 
become difficult to disentangle. The resolution of the 
disputes which ensue from such circumstances has provided a 
major problem for property and family lawyers during the 
last twenty-five years. In the majority of these disputes 
little attention has been paid by the parties at the 
commencement of the relationship to any implications which 
might result from a breakdown in their personal 
relationship.2 
The analysis of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel 
undertaken in this dissertation has shown how this doctrine, 
somewhat neglected in the first part of the twentieth 
century, 3 has been revi ta.lised as one potential means of 
granting to occupants of the family home at least some 
rights in respect of that home. Case law considered in this 
dissertation has revealed, however, that there are both 
--~--. --··-·--
1 See, e.g. , ~g~rs v Eller (Unreported, Court of Appeal 20 
May 1986) where Croom-Johnson LJ referred to the phenomena 
of "family non-arrangements~ 
2 See, e.g., Broughall v Hunt (Unreported, Chancery Division 
1 February 1983) (ante at 281 ff). 
•The first 20th century English case to employ the estoppel 
doctrine was Inwards v Baker [1965] 2 QB 29, 
34C 
Ii I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
,, 
I 
I 
I 
·I 
i 
' 
I 
I 
I 
' 
J 
I 1 
I· 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
advantages and limitations in the employment of the estoppel 
doctrine for the purpose of alleviating homelessness in the 
family context. 
The modern formulation of the estoppel doctrine, as 
discussed in Chapter One,• has distilled two broad 
requirements from the earlier and more complex formulations 
of the doctrine. In the familial context the estoppel 
claimant must now first prove that he has been encouraged by 
the legal title holder to expect that he should obtain 
rights in or over his family home. Second, the onus is on 
the estoppel claimant to prove that there has been a 
detrimental alteration of position in reliance on the 
engendered expectation. There remains, however, a judicial 
tendency to demand that claimants must prove that they have 
fulfilled the more rigid requirements of the five pro_banda 
outlined by Fry J in Willmott v Barber. s 
·-····-····-·-· .. ·····............... ..,,---·-··-········· .. ····· 
strict This 
approach may lead to the failure of claims which could have 
possibly succeeded under the modern formulation of 
proprietary estoppel,6 
Chapter Two7 examined the first requirement, i.e., that 
of encouragement. It was seen that judicial interpretation 
of conduct as a relevant encouragement in the absence of any 
explicit agreement depends on a number of interrelated 
factors. These factors comprise the nature of the 
relationship between the parties; the quality of the 
representor' s conduct and knowledge; the extent of the 
•Ante at 10 
5(1880) 15 Ch D 96 at 140 (ante at 14 ff). 
6See, e .g., Coombes v ~mith_ [1986] 1 WLR 808. 
7Ante at 26 
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representee' s alteration of position and any familial or 
social consequences which may result from a recognition of 
conduct as encouragement. 
One obvious limitation on the estoppel doctrine emerges 
from the courts' selective interpretation of conduct as a 
relevant encouragement. If the courts reject the alleged 
behaviour as a relevant encouragement the legal title holder 
may then retain the benefits, if any, of the estoppel 
claimant's detrimental alteration of position. The 
claimant is regarded as foolish to undertake a detrimental 
alteration of position in the absence of encouragement.a It 
may, however, be unrealistic if not impossible for a 
claimant to withdraw from the alteration of position in 
these circumstances. In Co.ombes. v Smi.th, 9 for instance, 
the claimant could not easily abandon the daughter of her 
relationship with the legal title holder when the court 
later made her aware that she had misunderstood the meaning 
of the legal title holder's agreement to provide her with a 
roof over her head. The claimant, of course , would 
continue to take care of their child. The legal title 
holder would be able to accept this contribution without 
further recompense to - the claimant. 
Chapter Threeio considered the second requirement, 
i.e., that of a detrimental alteration of position in 
reliance on the claimant's expectation engendered by the 
legal title holder's encouragement. The courts have tended 
----·-·-.. ·-·-.. --·-
ssee, e.g., Ramsden v ~yson (1866) LR 1 HL 129 at 140 , 141 
P.er. Lord Cranworth LC , 
9 [ 1 9 8 6 ] 1 WLR 8 0 8 ( ante at 9 3 ff ) , 
1 OAnte at · 72 
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to find a relevant detrimental alteration of position where 
the estoppel claimant has expended substantial money or 
labour . 
however, 
Where 
been 
the expenditure 
insubstantial or 
of labour or 
where the 
money has, 
detrimental 
alteration has taken some alternative form such as child 
rearing or housekeeping, the courts have not consistently 
accepted such conduct as fulfilling the requirement of 
detriment . It was suggested in this dissertation that the 
rejection of conduct involving no direct financial 
expenditure as a detrimental alteration of position results 
from a tendency to confuse the meaning of this second 
requirement.11 The relevant detriment for the purpose of 
estoppel is not the financial loss resulting from the 
alteration of position itself but the financial loss which 
will result from the alteration of position if the estoppel 
claimant's expectation is frustrated. Where the parties 
have a close familial relationship the courts have accepted 
that an alteration of position which benefits 
representee but involves no financial loss to 
the 
the 
representee during the currency of the e xpectation may be a 
relevant detriment . It is notable that de facto marital 
.... H••·-·-·-·--••o•o, .. -NNo,,o,oo-•• 
relationships have been placed within the category of close 
familial relat ionships; the relationships of lover/mistress 
have not been so treated,1 2 
The most significant advantage of the estoppel doctrine 
lies in the flexibility of the courts in their satisfaction 
of the 'inchoate equity'. This flexibility gives the 
11see, e.g ., Watts v Sto;:y (1984) 134 
12contrast the decision in Mahara~ v 
ER 107 with the decision in Coombes 808. 
-~-~-
NLJ 631. 
Jai Chand [1986] 3 All 
v Smith [1986] 1 WLR 
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courts considerable scope to alleviate homelessness but at 
the same time commits the claimant to an uncertain outcome. 
The estoppel claimant who reaches this stage in the judicial 
process risks receiving a remedy which will actually make 
him homeless . It was seen in Chapter Four 1 3 that the 
courts may grant any remedy, regardless of the parties' 
expectations, in satisfaction of the 'inchoate equity'. 
The courts' flexible approach to the satisfaction of 
the 'inchoate equity' was seen to be reminiscent of the 
reallocative process of the Family Division in cases of 
divorce . In Chapter Four nine factors were identified as 
having particular significance in the exercise of judicial 
discretion. Some of these factors were seen to be similar 
to those factors which the courts had already taken into 
account in determining prior issues relating to 
encouragement and detrimental alteration of position. Two 
of the nine factors relevant to the satisfaction of the 
'inchoate equity' are concerned with the nature of the 
relevant encouragement and detrimental alteration of 
position. The courts have not always granted a remedy 
which protects the occupancy of the family home. Financial 
compensation for the claimant's detrimental alteration of 
position has often been deemed an appropriate remedy, yet 
such compensation will rarely rehouse the estoppel 
claimant. 14 In some cases the courts have even decided 
that the 'inchoate equity' has already received sufficient 
satisfaction in the form of the occupancy enjoyed by the 
claimant prior to the court hearing , 
1 3Ante at 107 
14See, e~g., Dodsworth v Dodsworth (1973) 228 EG 1115. 
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There r emains considerable uncertainty concerning the 
nature of the 'equity of estoppel'. The nature of the 
'equity of estoppel' was examined in Chapter Five.is The 
estoppel claimant was seen to be in a vulnerable position 
with regard to the occupation of his family home at all 
stages prior to the court hearing. Because his equity is 
inchoate prior to the court hearing, an estoppel claimant 
risks losing his right, either because the court deems him 
to have had sufficient satisfaction for his detrimental 
alteration of position, or because his conduct bars him from 
relief. 
real. 
In the familial context this latter risk is very 
The relationship between the parties has normally 
broken down prior to the court hearing. The parties are 
likely to be in a state of ill-humour particularly if they 
have been living together in conflict. The claimant's fear 
of losing his home may lead him to indulge in acrimonious 
and unpleasant conduct , 16 The courts have shown a 
reluctance to define with any precision the type of conduct 
which would deprive the estoppel claimant of a remedy . 
Fraudulent conduct has sometimes led to the revocation of an 
'inchoate equity', 1 7 but there remains uncertainty in 
r elation t o oth e r t ype s of miscon duct wh ich might bar t he 
claimant ' s relief . Where the 'inchoate equity ' has been 
satisfied , by the grant of some form of right of occupancy 
the claimant may risk the loss of his 'satisfied equity ' ,is 
1 SAnte at 15 1 
l&See , e . g ., Williams v Staite [1979] Ch 291 , 
17J Willi s & Son v Willis. [198.5] 1 EGLR 62. 
l lSee Hardwick v Johns9.E._ [ 1978] 1 WLR 683 at 689 ~.!'.. Lord 
Denning MR; WilJJ~ms v S'taite [1979] Ch 291 at 828, 830. 
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If the legal title holder assigns the property to a 
third party prior to the court hearing, the estoppel 
claimant may lose his 'inchoate equity'. It was seen that 
the 'inchoate equity' is held to be binding on third parties 
in only strictly limited circumstances. 1 9 The 'inchoate 
equity ' was held to bind third parties where the 
representation was that a permanent right had been granted; 
where the third party was also a member of the claimant's 
family or where the court imposed the 'greater hardship' 
test. Once the 'inchoate equity' has been satisfied, the 
'satisfied equity' has, by clear contrast, much greater 
potential to bind third parties. 20 
The estoppel claimant cannot normally assign his 
'inchoate equity' or even his 'satisfied equity' unless he 
has been granted a legal proprietary right or a conventional 
equitable proprietary interest.21 The claimant may have a 
secure home himself but, if he is unable to assign his 
'equity of . estoppel', his family's occupation will remain 
vulnerable . If the claimant dies or abandons his family, 
the family will be left homeless . The non-assignability of 
the 'equity of estoppel' may have other wide reaching 
e ffects on the estoppel claimant and his family. For 
example , if he is unable to obtain employment in the area 
where he is currentl y housed, he will probably be unable to 
seek employment elsewhere without the risk of making his 
family homeless . 
1 9Ante at 181 ff 
IOSee however Mahara1 v ~h~n~ [1986] 3 All ER 107 at 112, 
2 lAnte at 173 ff 
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In Chapter Six 2 1 it was suggested that the Limitation 
Acts could not be called upon to protect the estoppel 
claimant's right either prior to the court hearing at which 
the 'inchoate equity' was satisfied or even thereafter. 
The claimant is therefore unable to enlarge his 'equity of 
estoppel' into any kind of possessory title. 
The remedial nature of the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel has led to the labelling of the 'equity of 
estoppel' as a lesser right than the right arising under a 
substantive constructive trust.23 In Chapter Seven24 the 
equitable interest which arises from a constructive trust 
was seen to have many overlapping features with the 'equity 
of estoppel'; but the constructive trust has generally been 
viewed as a more satisfactory device for the protection of 
the family home. It is in the nature of a right arising 
under a substantive constructive trust that even prior to 
the court hearing this right cannot be revoked. The right 
is assignable and is potentially binding on third parties. 
However, the beneficial interest behind a substantive 
constructive trust may be overreached, leaving the 
beneficiary with a mere share in the proceeds of sale 2 s 
rather than any right of occupancy. In this respect the 
constructive trust may be a less satisfactory device than 
the estoppel doctrine for the purpose of protecting 
informally obtained rights in the family home. 
2 2Ante at 223 
13See, e.g., Walker v Wa~ker (Unreported, Court of Appeal 12 
April 1984) P-~~ Browne-Wilkinson LJ, 
z•Ante at 242 
• •See pity of London Bui!.9-ill.~ ... _Soci~.!x. v fle~,R;. [ 1987] 2 WLR 
1266. 
~ 
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There remain further limitations on the potential of 
the constructive trust to protect the family home. The 
requirements of an actual or inferred intention to share in 
the beneficial interest in the property, plus a detrimental 
alteration of position referable to the property, have often 
been demonstrated as over stringent in the familial 
context.26 
It was acknowledged in Chapter Sevenz 7 that the 
Canadian doctrine of constructive trusts based on unjust 
enrichment may provide a more realistic means of resolving 
familial property disputes than the intention-based 
constructive trust. For this purpose unjust enrichment 
includes enrichment resulting from domestic contribution,2s 
and the Canadian doctrine is therefore particularly suited 
to familial property disputes. The abandonment by the 
Canadian courts of any search for common intention means 
that a legal title holder cannot expect to continue to 
receive benefits without compensating the claimant whose 
alteration of position has provided these benefits. Once 
the claimant can be viewed as having a reasonable belief 
that rights in the legal title holder's property will be 
gran ted , the legal ti tl e holder cannot deny these rights if 
he has accepted the benefits flowing from the claimant's 
alteration of position . 
By contrast , the i nten tion -based doct r ine of 
propr i etary estoppel a nd t h e d octr i n e o f cons truct ive trusts 
26 See , e .g., Burns. v Bur~-~ [1984] Ch 317 . 
2 7Ante at 24 2 
2ssee, e.g., Sorochan v S0r~9...l:!_~~ (1986) 29 DLR(4th) 1. 
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permit a legal title ~older to evade any diminution of his 
property rights if he can prove that the claimant's 
detrimental alteration of position was referable to some 
alternat ive kind of arrangement between the parties. The 
legal title holder may then retain the benefits resulting 
from the claimant's alteration of position. 
The doctrine of proprietary estoppel nevertheless 
retains one significant advantage over both the intention-
based constructive trust and the Canadian constructive trust 
based on unjust enrichment. The estoppel doctrine 
recognises a wide category of detrimental alteration of 
position . Theoretically an estoppel claim may be founded on 
any alteration of position which subsequently proves to be 
detrimental when the legal title holder resiles from his 
representation. 
title holder,29 
There need be no benefit to the legal 
At present there remains considerable uncertainty as to 
whether a plea of constructive trust simultaneousl y 
encompasses a plea of proprietary estoppel . Until this 
issue is clarified by an appellate court, those who wish to 
protect informal rights in their family home may find it 
necessary to plead both the doctrine of constructive trust 
and the doctrine of proprietary estoppel in the alternative. 
Where certainty is required and the stringent conditions 
required to found an intention-based constructive trust can 
be met, a plea of a constructive trust may be more 
appropriate than a plea of proprietary estoppel. There 
---~--------·--·--29See, e.g., Ri9he~ v !!.Q.S;b~g [1986] 1 Qd R 315. 
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are, however, very real dangers that claimants will attempt 
to · force the facts of a given situation into the 
constructive trust framework and risk the loss of an 
estoppel remedy, a remedy which may benefit a claimant to a 
greater extent than a substantive cohstructi ve trust. The 
estoppel claimants in b O t h P..~.§1 .. 9.Q..~. V Turner 30 
,,HHOoH•••-oo•••oooo•oH•••• ••• 
and in Re 
Basham ........ Jdec.d). 3 1 would not have received a 100% beneficial 
interest in their respective family homes had they pleaded a 
constructive trust. These defendants benefited by the 
judicial discretion in satisfying the 'inchoate equity' of 
estoppel permitted by the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. 
J D Davies has called for a wider employment of the 
estoppel doctrine and a less frequent resort to constructive 
trust doctrine in resolving the disputes inherent in 
'muddled' familial arrangements. 3 2 If, as seems 1 ikely, 
members of families and legal title holders continue to make 
'muddled' arrangements relating to the occupancy of property 
as a family home and subsequently fall out with each other, 
there will be a continuing need for an equitable concept to 
help courts resolve the ensuing conflict. The case law 
considered in this dissertation has shown that the doctrine 
of proprietary estoppel is a particularly useful means of 
resolving such conflict. 
----·---·-·----··--30(197 9 ] 1 WLR 4 31. 
31(1986) 1 WLR 1498 . 
32J D Davies, (1980) 7 Adel L Rev 200. 
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